COMMISSIONER OF POLICE and RILEY - [2022] WASAT 109

JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: PAWNBROKERS AND SECOND-HAND DEALERS ACT 1994 (WA)
CITATION:   COMMISSIONER OF POLICE and RILEY [2022] WASAT 109
MEMBER:   MR J O'SULLIVAN, SENIOR MEMBER
HEARD:   4 JULY 2022
SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSIONS
5 JULY 2022, 15 JULY 2022, AND 25 JULY 2022

DELIVERED          :   8 DECEMBER 2022
FILE NO/S:   VR 79 of 2021
BETWEEN:   COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Applicant
AND
LUKE JASON RILEY
Respondent

Catchwords:

Vocational regulation - Application to suspend second-hand dealer's licence - Pending charge involving dishonesty - Application to adjourn or stay proceedings until criminal proceedings resolved

Legislation:

Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), s 417
Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1973 (WA)
Pawnbrokers and Second-hand Dealers Act 1994 (WA), s 3, s 7, s 19, s 19(e), s 19(j), s 19(k), s 20, s 22, s 27, s 27(2), s 27(3), s 27(4), s 27(5), s 30(1), s 30(1)(e), s 33
Pawnbrokers and Second-hand Dealers Bill 1994 (WA)
Security and Related Activities (Control) Act 1996 (WA), s 52, s 52(c), s 67A, s 67A(2), s 67A(2)(c)
Security and Related Activities (Control) Amendment Bill 2007 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal (Conferral of Jurisdiction) Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 25(2), s 25(4), s 32(7)(e)

Result:

Application dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	Ms P Coldicott and Mr G Hicks
Respondent	:	Mr M Rennie

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	N/A
Respondent	:	HFM Legal

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Andrew Koh Nominees Pty Ltd as Trustee for KL Unit Trust v Pacific Corporation Ltd [No 3] [2010] WASC 248
Blue Ribbon Mines Pty Ltd v Roy Hill Infrastructure Pty Ltd [2022] WASC 362
Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 719
Freeman and Medical Board of Australia [2020] WASAT 64
Grover v Commissioner of Police [2005] WASC 263
McMahon v Gould (1982) 7ACLR 202
Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98
Owners of Strata Plan 58161 and Hanssen Pty Ltd [2022] WASAT 77
PAG (WA) Pty Ltd and Commissioner for Consumer Protection [2018] WASAT 57
Re AWB Ltd; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Flugge (2008) 222 FLR 240
Reid v Howard [No 2] (1995) 184 CLR 1

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Introduction

On 14 October 2021 the applicant applied to the Tribunal pursuant to s 27 of the Pawnbrokers and Second-hand Dealers Act 1994 (WA) (the Act) to have the respondent's second-hand dealer's licence suspended as a consequence of the respondent being charged with possessing stolen or unlawfully obtained property in contravention of s 417 of the Criminal Code ActCompilation Act 1913 (WA) (the Code).
The respondent is alleged to have possessed copper wire reasonably suspected to be stolen. That charge has not yet been determined although the matter has been committed for trial in the District Court.[1]
[1] Respondent's Outline of Submissions, 30 May 2022 at para 7.
The application contends that a licensing officer is no longer satisfied of two matters specified in s 19 of the Act:
•Section 19(e): that the respondent is of good character and is in all respects a fit and proper person to continue to hold a licence; and
•Section 19(j): that there is no charge pending in relation to the applicant for an offence involving dishonesty, fraud, stealing or any other offence of a nature that renders the applicant unsuitable to hold a licence.
According to the applicant the pending charge under s 417 of the Code supports both the s 19(e) and s 19(j) grounds. Mr Rennie, on behalf of the respondent, concedes that a charge under s 417 of the Code is an offence involving dishonesty.[2] That concession is rightly made.
[2] Respondent's Outline of Submissions, 30 May 2022 at para 13.
The respondent applies to have the Tribunal adjourn or stay the hearing of the application until the criminal charge against him is determined.

The respondent's application

The basis upon which the respondent seeks to adjourn or stay the proceedings before the Tribunal is as follows:[3]
The respondent is entitled to the presumption of innocence and, by implication, unless and until convicted, is still a person of good character and in all respects a fit and proper person to hold a licence.
[3] Respondent's Outline of Submissions, 30 May 2022 at para 14.
The respondent also contends that if the proceedings are not adjourned until after the determination of the criminal proceedings, the Tribunal will have to make at least a cursory examination of the strength of the prosecution's case. The respondent would then be in a position where he has to decide whether to respond and, in doing so, disclose his defence and waive his fundamental common law right to silence.[4]
[4] Respondent's Outline of Submissions, 30 May 2022 at para 33.
The respondent goes on to explain that the respondent (and related companies) interests will suffer financially if the application to suspend his licence is not adjourned.[5]
[5] Respondent's Outline of Submissions, 30 May 2022 at paras 19 and 23.
The applicant opposes the application to adjourn or stay the proceedings on the basis that once it is established that the respondent is the subject of a pending charge involving dishonesty, the question as to the respondent's guilt or innocence does not arise.
Whether the Tribunal, in exercising the power in s 27 of the Act to suspend a licence, is required to consider whether the holder who has been charged with a criminal offence involving dishonesty committed the offence, is ultimately a matter of statutory construction.

Principles of statutory construction

The principles applicable to construing legislation were recently set out by Quinlan CJ in Blue Ribbon Mines Pty Ltd v Roy Hill Infrastructure Pty Ltd [2022] WASC 362 at [64] - [66] where his Honour stated:[6]
[6] A more fulsome discussion of the principles of statutory construction can be found in Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98 at [31]-[36].
64The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Statutory construction involves attribution of meaning to statutory text. The Court's task in that regard must begin and end with the statutory text as a whole, considered in its context, including its objectively discerned statutory purpose.
65As to the last matter, statutory purpose, French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ, said in Thiess v Collector of Customs:
Objective discernment of statutory purpose is integral to contextual construction. … For:
'it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning'.
66The statutory purpose of legislation may be discerned from an express statement of purpose in the statute, inference from its text and structure and, where appropriate, reference to extrinsic materials. The purpose must be discerned from what the legislation says, as distinct from any assumptions about the desired or desirable reach or operation of relevant provisions.
(Footnotes omitted)

The legislative framework

The long title to the Act provides:
An Act to make provision for the licensing and regulation of pawnbrokers and second-hand dealers, to facilitate the recovery of stolen goods from pawnbrokers and second-hand dealers, to repeal the —
•Pawnbrokers Act 1860;
•Second-hand Dealers Act 1906; and
•Marine Stores Act 1902,
and for related purposes.
The term 'second-hand dealer' is defined in s 3 of the Act to mean:
… a person conducting the business of buying, selling or exchanging second-hand goods, whether the goods are bought, sold or exchanged on the person's own behalf or on behalf of another person.
'Second-hand goods' means:
any goods which have been worn or otherwise used but does not include goods belonging to a class of goods prescribed by the regulations as goods not to be treated as second-hand goods for the purposes of the Act.
Section 7 of the Act renders it an offence to act as a second-hand dealer except under and in accordance with a second-hand dealer's licence.
Section 19 addresses the issuing of licences. Relevantly for present purposes it provides that a licensing officer is not to issue a licence unless the officer is satisfied:
…
(e)that the applicant is of good character and is in all respects a fit and proper person to hold a licence; and …
(j)that there is no charge pending in relation to the applicant for an offence involving dishonesty, fraud, stealing or of any other offence of a nature that renders the applicant unsuitable to hold a licence[.]
With respect to the renewal of licences, s 20 relevantly provides that a licensing officer is not to renew a licence unless he or she is satisfied:
(a)in relation to the matters referred to in section 19(d) to (p) in so far as those matters apply to the renewal of a licence[.]
Self-evidently, this includes both s 19(e) and s 19(j).
The creation of the Tribunal in 2004 led to the passing of a significant body on enabling legislation which transferred the jurisdiction concerning a range of vocational matters to the Tribunal.
Section 22 requires the licensing officer when deciding to issue or renew a licence to advise the applicant of the reasons and to inform them of the right to apply to the Tribunal for a review of the decision.
Prior to the State Administrative Tribunal (Conferral of Jurisdiction) Amendment and Repeal Act 2004 (WA), a second-hand dealer's licence could be suspended by a licensing officer if the licensing officer was no longer satisfied in relation to, among other things, the matters in s 19(e) or s 19(j).
Section 27, as presently drafted, says a licensing officer on receiving a complaint or on their own initiative may conduct any investigation or inquiry necessary to decide whether an allegation should be made under sub-section (2).
Sub-section (2) provides that a licensing officer may make an allegation to the Tribunal that it should take action against a licensee:
(a)on the ground that a licensing officer should not or should no longer be satisfied in relation to any of the matters referred to in section 19, 20 or 21 that is relevant to the licensee[.]
If the Tribunal, on dealing with an allegation under sub-section (2), is satisfied that a ground referred to in that sub-section has been made out, it may:
a)suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit;
b)revoke a licence; or
c)disqualify a person from holding licence or from having a licence held on the person's behalf, for such period as the Tribunal thinks fit or permanently: s 27(3).
A person whose licence is suspended by the Tribunal under s 27(3) is required to deliver the licence to a licensing officer: s 27(4). A licence suspended under s 27 is of no effect during the period of suspension: s 27(5).
Section 30(1) provides that a person who is aggrieved by a licencing officer's decision:
(a)to decline the issue or the renewal of a licence;
(b)as to the period for which a licence is issued or renewed;
(c)as to a condition or restriction to which a licence is to be subject;
(d)as to premises to which the licence is, or is not, to apply; or
(e)as to the suspension or revocation of, or disqualification in relation to, a licence,
may apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for a review of the decision.
A licensing officer is empowered to refuse to issue or renew a licence however, because of amendments to the Act, they no longer have the power to suspend or revoke a licence or disqualify the holder of a licence. As a consequence, s 30(1)(e) no longer has any work to do. The power to suspend must now be exercised by the Tribunal upon receiving an application from a licensing officer and being satisfied that the ground has been made out: see s 27(3). In short, notwithstanding what s 30(1)(e) says, there is no longer a right of review to the Tribunal in relation to the matters in s 30(1)(e) as those decisions now fall within the Tribunal's original jurisdiction.
Section 33 is headed 'Effect of charges pending on Court hearings' and says:
Where —
(a)an application has been made under this Division for a review; and
(b)a charge for an offence referred to in section 19(j) is pending in relation to a person who is a subject of the application,
the State Administrative Tribunal may adjourn the hearing of the matter until the charge has been determined.
Curiously, a 'review' in s 33 is a reference to a review by the Tribunal of a decision made by a licensing officer. However, as I have just explained, the power to suspend is now exercised by the Tribunal, not by a licensing officer, hence s 33 has no application to the circumstances of this case.
Moreover, because the power to adjourn in s 33 is predicated on the licensing officer having made a decision which is the subject of review by the Tribunal, s 33 contemplates that the decision (i.e. the suspension) remains in place until the charge has been determined. Section 33, even if it did apply, does not operate to adjourn the operation of the licensing officer's decision; rather it only adjourns the hearing of the review by the Tribunal.

The principle applicable to an application to adjourn/stay proceedings

Although s 25(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) enables the Tribunal to stay a decision the subject of an application for review, this is not a review proceeding. Rather, the Tribunal is exercising its original jurisdiction in that the question as to whether to suspend the respondent's licence is yet to be determined.
Section 25(4) of the SAT Act provides that the Tribunal may make an order staying a decision only if it considers that it is desirable to do so after taking into account:
(a)the interests of any persons whose interests may be affected by the order; and
(b)any submission made by or on behalf of the decision-maker; and
(c)the public interest.
The respondent contends that notwithstanding that this is not a review proceeding, the principles relevant to the consideration of an application for a stay are instructive. I note that many of the authorities that deal with the question as to whether civil proceedings should not proceed until the determination of related criminal matters are the subject of applications for a stay.
It is not in dispute that the Tribunal possesses the power to adjourn the determination of the application to suspend the respondent's licence: s 32(7)(e) of the SAT Act.
The principles applicable to an application for an adjournment are apt to examine the issues that arise in this application including, if need be, those authorities that consider whether a stay should be granted pending the resolution of criminal charges. See Andrew Koh Nominees Pty Ltd as Trustee for KL Unit Trust v Pacific Corporation Ltd [No 3] [2010] WASC 248 at [55].[7]
[7] See also Re AWB Ltd; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Flugge (2008) 222 FLR 240 [19] in which it was accepted that the principles in McMahon v Gould (1982) 7ACLR 202 should be refined in light of the High Court's decision in Reid v Howard[No 2] (1995) 184 CLR 1 where a majority of the High Court stated that the privilege of the right to silence is not simply a rule of evidence but a basic and substantive common law right.
Recently, the Tribunal in Owners of Strata Plan 58161 and Hanssen Pty Ltd [2022] WASAT 77 (Hanssen) at [11] identified the factors relevant to an adjournment application. These include:
(a)the reason for the adjournment and any prejudice to the applicant for the adjournment if the hearing is not adjourned;
(b)any prejudice to other parties to the proceeding if the adjournment is granted;
(c)the effect of an adjournment on the Tribunal's use of its resources; and
(d)the impact of delay as a result of the grant of the adjournment.
The Tribunal went on to observe that in addition to the factors set out above the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion in relation to the grant of an adjournment must necessarily take into account the statutory framework within which that discretion falls to be exercised.[8]
[8] Hanssen at [16].
Relevantly, as the Tribunal pointed out, the objectives of the Tribunal are to act as speedily and with as little formality and technicality as is practicable. The grant of a lengthy adjournment may be considered antithetical to the achievement of that objective.[9] That objective is, however, subordinate to the Tribunal's primary objective which is to achieve the resolution of questions before it fairly.[10]

Consideration

[9] Hanssen at [16]-[17].

[10] Hanssen at [17].

In Grover v Commissioner of Police [2005] WASC 263 (Grover), Johnson J considered an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal affirming the respondent's decision to refuse to issue a crowd controller licence to the appellant[11] as provided for in the Security and Related Activities (Control) Act 1996 (WA) (SRAC Act).
[11] Grover at [1].
The single ground of appeal asserted that the Tribunal erred in law in finding that the fact that charges had been brought against the appellant and had not yet been resolved either showed the applicant was not of good character or were otherwise good reason under s 52 of the SRAC Act to refuse the appellant a crowd controller licence.[12]
[12] Grover at [2].
Section 52 of the SRAC Act relevantly provided that a licensing officer is not to issue a licence unless the officer is satisfied:
…
(c)that the applicant is of good character and is a fit and proper person to hold a licence; and
…
(k)that there is no other good reason why the licence should not be issued.
As at the time Grover was decided, s 52(c) of the SRAC Act was similar in its terms to s 19(e) of the Act, however, s 52 did not include an equivalent ground to s 19(j) of the Act.
Johnson J found that the essence of the grounds of review concerned whether, an appellant, who had otherwise met all requirements for obtaining the relevant licences, should be denied the grant of the licence on the sole ground that he had outstanding criminal charges against him.[13]
[13] Grover at [6].
Her Honour observed that:[14]
The third limb addresses the key issue in this appeal: the relevance and admissibility of evidence of unproven charges on an application for a crowd control licence. During the course of submissions, counsel for the appellant addressed this limb in terms of the probity of the evidence. However, there was at times some confusion as to the issue of which the evidence is said to be probative. At one point the question to be answered was described by counsel as whether the evidence is probative of the issue of whether the person committed the offence? With respect, that is not the issue to which the evidence related. Evidence that a person has been charged with criminal offences might not be probative of whether the person committed those offences; it might not be probative of the more general issue of whether the person is of bad character. However, in my view, the relevant question in this case is whether the evidence is probative of character in circumstances where a decision-making authority is required to be satisfied of good character, an altogether different proposition.
[14] Grover at [27].
Referring to the purpose of the SRAC Act and the nature of the licences it regulates, Johnson J concluded that a licensing officer was intended by Parliament to have regard to any matter which might be capable of raising a doubt as to the existence of the necessary 'good character'.[15]
[15] Grover at [47].
Johnson J said further that providing the evidence was admissible in its form, the fact that an allegation had been made that was not selfevidently unsustainable is sufficient to adversely impact on the licensing officer's satisfaction as to the appellant's good character.[16]
[16] Grover at [47].

Finally, her Honour remarked:[17]
… I consider that the pending charges, evidenced by tendering the Statement of Material Facts, are relevant and admissible and cast sufficient doubt to make a conclusion of good character something that cannot be reached.
[17] Grover at [49].
The inclusion of s 19(j) in the Act puts to rest the argument considered in Grover (where no equivalent to s 19(j) existed) that evidence of a pending charge is not relevant and admissible in determining if there is sufficient doubt to make conclusions as to good character for the purposes of deciding to grant, renew or suspend a licence.
However, Grover is important for a different reason. As Johnson J points out, the evidence of a pending charge is not concerned with establishing whether a person has committed the offence or offences. It is probative of no more than the general issue of whether the person is of bad character in a context where the decision-maker is required to be satisfied of good character.
The respondent's primary submission rests on the assertion that the Tribunal cannot be satisfied he is of bad character unless and until he is convicted of an offence.[18] It follows that in order for the Tribunal to satisfy itself whether or not that is the case, it must wait until the determination of the criminal charge.
[18] Respondent's Outline of Submissions, 30 May 2022 at para 14.
As was explained by Johnson J in Grover, evidence as to the existence of pending charges is enough to cast doubt as to whether a person is of good character. There is therefore no requirement that the Tribunal wait until the resolution of the criminal charges before it is capable of determining whether to suspend the respondent's licence.
If Parliament had intended that a conviction was required before a licence could be suspended, then s 19(j) could have no work to do. The present situation would be regulated entirely by s 19(k) of the Act which is premised on a finding of guilt.
The second proposition advanced by the respondent rests on the assumption that the Tribunal will have to make at least a cursory examination of the strength of the prosecution case. That being the case, the respondent would then have to decide whether to respond and in doing so disclose his defence and waive his fundamental common law right to silence.
As I have already explained, neither the licensing officer pursuant to s 19(e), s 19(j) or s 20 of the Act nor the Tribunal pursuant to s 27 of the Act are required to be satisfied that the accused is guilty of the charge.
As Johnson J observed in Groveran allegation that is not 'selfevidently unsustainable' is sufficient to adversely impact on a licensing officer's satisfaction as to a person's good character.[19]
[19] Grover at [47].
Her Honour does not explain what is meant by the expression 'selfevidently unsustainable'. However, having regard to the reasons in Grover as a whole, it is clear, that neither the licensing officer nor the Tribunal need be satisfied the person committed the offence to be capable of having a sufficient doubt as to a person's good character. Viewed in context the expression 'self-evidently unsustainable' does not invite consideration of whether the person is guilty of the offence.
The respondent also relies on the impact of suspension of his licence on his and the associated companies' interests. As I understand the respondent's argument, given the financial consequences of suspension, it should only be imposed after the respondent has been convicted of a charge of dishonesty.
As I have explained the Act provides for the suspension of a secondhand dealer's licence upon the holder being charged with an offence involving dishonesty. The evident purpose of the legislative scheme is to ensure the protection of the public by suspending a licence where there is a doubt as to the good character of the holder. That doubt does not depend on the conviction of the licence holder.
The respondent's Supplementary Submissions argue that if Parliament had intended that a pending charge of the kind in issue here should ipso facto result in suspension (subject to the residual discretion reserved to the Commissioner where extenuating circumstances exist), it would have adopted the disqualifying offences regime contained in s 67A(2) of the SRAC Act.[20]
[20] Respondent's email, 15 July 2022.
Section 67A(2)(c) of the SRAC Act relevantly provides that:
If the Commissioner is satisfied that —
…
(c)there is a charge pending in relation to a licensee for a disqualifying offence and that no extenuating circumstances exist,
the Commissioner must give to the licensee written notice of the suspension of every licence held by the licensee — …
Section 67A not only introduced an express power to suspend a licence because of a pending charge but set out the basis on which suspension might be avoided (i.e. extenuating circumstances).
Notably, the Act was enacted in 1994 whereas the inclusion of s 67A in the SRAC Act occurred in 2008. The second reading speech to the Security and Related Activities (Control) Amendment Bill 2007 (WA) (the Bill)[21] refers to an internal review of the SRAC Act by the Western Australia Police Force (WA Police). By the time the Bill was presented to Parliament, the WA Police would have had the benefit of Johnson J's observations in Grover as to the operation of the SRAC Act.
[21] Western Australia, Hansard Legislative Council, 22 November 2007, 7632-7633 (Mr Ford).
The fact that Parliament may have decided, after the benefit of judicial consideration of the statutory regime, to amend the SRAC Act, says nothing as to the proper construction of the Act. Nor am I aware of any principle of statutory construction which provides that a later amendment to an Act, which is not part of the same scheme can be called in aid in construing another Act.[22]
[22] c/f Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 719 at 722, 723724.
The respondent also relies on PAG (WA) Pty Ltd and Commissioner for Consumer Protection [2018] WASAT 57 (PAG). The applicant, PAG, applied to renew its motor dealer licence in accordance with the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act 1973 (WA) (MVD Act). The respondent imposed a condition on PAG's licence prohibiting the sale of motor vehicles on consignment without the permission of the respondent. PAG applied to the Tribunal to stay the imposition of the condition and have it removed.
Subsequently, the respondent commenced criminal proceedings against PAG in relation to substantially the same issues that resulted in the imposition of the condition. PAG sought to stay the review proceedings in the Tribunal and stay the operation of the condition imposed on the licence.
The respondent did not oppose the proceedings being stayed. Curthoys J remarked that '[g]iven that criminal proceedings have been commenced it is appropriate that the proceedings be stayed'.[23]
[23] PAG at [18].
Curthoys J, however, refused to stay the condition imposed on PAG's licence. His Honour noted that the statutory scheme of the MVD Act is to protect the public and that the conduct of PAG as disclosed in the respondent's reasons for decision, which is uncontested, establishes that the conduct of PAG places the public who deal with PAG on consignment at risk.[24]
[24] PAG at [46].
In my view, PAG does not assist the respondent. Although the review proceedings were stayed, the condition the subject of the review proceedings remained in place to ensure the protection of the public.
To the extent that Curthoys J considered the strength of the respondent's reasons for decision, this occurred in a context in which there was no specific ground in the MVD Act conditioning the exercise of the respondent's powers on the existence of a pending charge. As it happened the condition was imposed on PAG's licence before the criminal proceedings were commenced.
The significance of the objects of the statutory scheme was also referred to in Freeman and Medical Board of Australia [2020] WASAT 64 at [29]. Deputy President Sharp remarked that in considering an application for a stay of a suspension imposed as part of immediate action by the Board, that the Tribunal must observe the relevant statutory objectives of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (WA) Act 2010, namely 'to provide for the protection of the public by ensuring that only health practitioners who are suitably trained and qualified to practise in a competent and ethical manner are registered'.
Similar observations can be made in relation to the objects and purpose of the Act. The second reading speech to the Pawnbrokers and Secondhand Dealers Bill 1994 (WA) says:[25]
This Bill repeals the Pawnbrokers Act 1860, the Marines Stores Act 1902 and the Second-hand Dealers Act 1906. The Bill makes provision for the licensing and regulation of pawnbrokers and second-hand dealers. In line with the Government's commitment to law and order, this legislation is primarily aimed at putting a stop to the trade of stolen goods through the pawnbroking and second-hand dealing industry which costs the community millions of dollars each year. In recent years there has been widespread community concern that pawnbroking and second-hand dealing premises are used extensively for the disposal of stolen goods.
[25] Western Australian, Hansard Legislative Assembly, 22 September 1994, 4728 (Mr Weise).
Having regard to the objects of the Act and the fact that a licensing officer is to refuse to issue or renew a second-hand dealer's licence unless satisfied there is no pending charge for dishonesty (see s 19(j) and s 20 of the Act) it is clear that the legislature intended, in the interests of protecting the public, that neither a licensing officer nor the Tribunal, pursuant to s 27, is required to wait until the determination of the charge.

Conclusion

In my view, having regard to the principles outlined in Grover, a pending charge involving dishonesty that is not self-evidently unsustainable is sufficient to enable the Tribunal to conclude that a licensing officer should no longer be satisfied as to a licence holder's good character. Neither a licensing officer nor the Tribunal is required to be satisfied that the person committed the offence the subject of the pending charge.
Also, given the Act is concerned with the protection of the public together with the fact that the Act specifically contemplates that a licence may be suspended because of a pending charge of dishonesty, adjourning the proceedings would be inconsistent with that objective.
Having considered the respondent's grounds for an adjournment, in light of the principles set out above, I am not satisfied that in the exercise of discretion the proceedings should be adjourned until the resolution of the respondent's criminal charge.

Orders

The Tribunal orders:
1.The respondent's application for an adjournment is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
MR J O'Sullivan, SENIOR MEMBER
8 DECEMBER 2022