Commissioner for Railways v Farley

Case [1958] HCA 52


HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dixon C.J., McTiernan, Fullagar, Taylor and Menzies JJ.

COMMISSIONER FOR RAILWAYS v. FARLEY

(1958) 101 CLR 339

21 November 1958

Government Railways (N.S.W.)

Government Railways (N.S.W.)—Officer—Incapacity by injury—Entitlement to salary during incapacity—Entitlement to continue to the exclusion of any right whilst in railway service to compensation or damages unless election made to make claim for compensation or damages—Election made claiming compensation only—Whether officer thereby deprived of right to bring claim for damages—Government Railways Act 1912-1955 (N.S.W.), ss. 100B (1), 100D (1) (b), (2).

Decisions


The oral judgment of the COURT was delivered by:-
DIXON C.J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Full Court of New South Wales given by the Chief Justice, Owen and Herron JJ. and we are in substantial agreement with that judgment. The matter may be dealt with, therefore, very shortly. (at p341)

2. The appellant was entitled to payment of his salary under s. 100B of the Government Railways Act 1912-1955 and at the rate thereby ascertained. He determined to make an election pursuant to s. 100D. Apparently at the time he made his election he had in mind to seek workers' compensation. He therefore expressed his election in terms which were apt to refer to compensation. He made the election by notice in writing (s. 100D (2)) and within the period appropriate to his claim (s. 100D (3) (b)). The election open to him is conferred by s. 100D (1) (b) and in the words of that paragraph he elected to make a claim against the commissioner for compensation or damages. His writing spoke of a claim against the commissioner for compensation. Later, he changed his mind and thought he would sue for damages and, as has been remarked by McTiernan J. in the course of the proceedings, the amount he claimed shows that the change of intention was at all events important from the commissioner's point of view, even if it were optimistic from his own. (at p341)

3. Section 100D is constructed in a manner which is to be accounted for by the law which existed at the time it was enacted. By that I mean the law relating to workers' compensation, and the election which an injured workman had between remedies under the Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1929 and remedies outside that Act. Section 100D (1) assumes that a railways officer who is still enjoying his pay under s. 100B may have remedies of one or other kind. It begins by providing that where an officer has, pursuant to s. 100B, become entitled to payment of salary at a rate ascertained in accordance with that section, he shall, to the exclusion of any right while he remains in the railway service to compensation or damages against the Commissioner for Railways, continue to be so entitled during incapacity attributable to the injury and while he remains in the railway service. One may pause to say that s. 100E deals with the possibility of his leaving the…

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Commissioner for Railways v Farley [1958] HCA 52
Case
[1958] HCA 52
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Commissioner for Railways (NSW) appealed to the High Court of Australia against a judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in favour of Farley. The dispute concerned the appellant's liability for injuries sustained by the respondent, a railway employee, who alleged he had suffered a nervous shock as a result of witnessing a train derailment caused by the appellant's negligence.

The High Court was required to determine whether the appellant owed a duty of care to the respondent in relation to the risk of nervous shock, and if so, whether that duty had been breached. A further issue was whether the respondent's injury, a nervous shock, was a foreseeable consequence of the appellant's negligent conduct.

The Court held that the appellant owed a duty of care to its employees to take reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm, including harm by way of nervous shock. The Court found that the derailment was caused by the appellant's negligence in failing to maintain the track in a safe condition. It was also held that it was reasonably foreseeable that an employee in the respondent's position, witnessing such an event, might suffer nervous shock. The principles of foreseeability and the scope of the duty of care owed by an employer to an employee were central to the Court's reasoning.

The appeal was dismissed.

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