Colquhoun Murphy Pty Ltd v Reddy (Appeal)

[2018] ACAT 42

ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

COLQUHOUN MURPHY PTY LTD v REDDY (Appeal) [2018] ACAT 42

AA 32/2017 (XD 426/2017)

Catchwords:              APPEAL – debt application – solicitor’s unpaid costs – whether solicitor responded to client instructions – role of the Appeal Tribunal – role of the original Tribunal in response to a debt application – no role to review the merit of legal advice on a debt application where the advice was pursuant to the contract – appeal allowed – Tribunal to refund appeal filing fee where appeal wholly successful but unfair for respondent to pay it

Legislation cited:      ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 s 82
  Court Procedure Act 2004 s 15

Land Titles Act 1925 s 108

Subordinate

Legislation cited:      ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedure Rules 2009 (No 2), rules 14, 21

Court Procedures (Fees) Determination 2017 (No 3)

Cases cited:B&T Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd v Construction Occupations Registrar and the Owners-Units Plan 3324 [2013] ACTSC 219

Chakravarty & Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2013] ACAT 11
Colquhoun Murphy Pty Ltd v Reddy [2017] ACAT 83
Excel Intelligent Pty Ltd v Thomson [2018] ACAT 4
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
Giusida Pty Limited v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2016] ACTSC 275
Global Minerals v Valerica [2000] NSWSC 1143
Legal Services Commissioner v Kotsifas [2014] VCAT 1615
Ogbonna & Anor v Tankard & Anor [2018] ACAT 14
PCM Office Services Pty Ltd and Anor v Mi [2018] ACAT 36

List of

Texts/Papers cited:    Guide to Parties - Types of Conferences in the Civil Jurisdiction of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, ACAT website

Land Titles Practice Manual

Tribunal:                   Presidential Member G McCarthy

Date of Orders:  12 April 2018

Date of Reasons for Decision:         12 April 2018

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY             )

CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL           )      AA 32/2017

BETWEEN:

COLQUHOUN MURPHY PTY LTD

Appellant

AND:

GLORIA DARNELL REDDY

Respondent

TRIBUNAL:Presidential Member G McCarthy

DATE:12 April 2018

The Tribunal orders that:

1.The decision under appeal is set aside.

2.Within 28 days, the respondent pay the appellant $2,207.85 and $190.15 interest.

And the Tribunal notes that:

1.The Registrar should refund the original application filing fee and the appeal filing fee to the appellant.

………………………………..

Presidential Member G McCarthy

REASONS FOR DECISION

1.The appellant carries on business as a firm of solicitors. On or about 21 July 2016, under a costs agreement entered into between the appellant and the respondent, the respondent engaged the appellant to provide legal services.

2.On 10 April 2017, consequent upon the respondent not paying the appellant’s fees for services provided, the appellant applied to the Tribunal for an order that the respondent pay the appellant’s fees. The application was brought as a debt application. The appellant claimed $2,207.85 as the quantum of its unpaid legal fees, plus interest, plus the lodgement fee of $290.

3.On 18 August 2017, the Tribunal (hereafter the original tribunal) heard and dismissed the application. On 19 September 2017, the appellant appealed from the original Tribunal’s decision. On 13 October 2017, following a request from the appellant, the original tribunal gave written reasons for its decision.[1]

[1] Colquhoun Murphy Pty Ltd v Reddy [2017] ACAT 83

4.The original tribunal noted that the respondent declined to pay the appellant’s fees because she believed the appellant did not undertake the work that it was instructed to do and provided advice that was essentially irrelevant and of no value to her. The original tribunal characterised the respondent’s case as a claim that the appellant did not discharge its contract with her and that there was a total failure of consideration flowing to her.[2]

[2] Colquhoun Murphy Pty Ltd v Reddy [2017] ACAT 83 at [5] - [6]

5.In its reasons for decision, the original tribunal detailed its understanding of the facts and circumstances leading to the respondent seeking legal services from the appellant and the advice that the appellant then gave the respondent. The original tribunal then explained why it disagreed with the appellant’s legal advice and actions, and then gave its opinion about what the appellant should have advised and should have done. The original tribunal made a “finding of fact” that the appellant “did not advise the respondent on how to intercept” the imminent transfer of her parents’ property to the respondent’s sister; “did not follow the respondent’s instructions to communicate with the sister’s solicitors”; and “provided only unresponsive and unhelpful advice that was probably wrong in relation to the caveat issue.”[3] After stating what, in its opinion, the appellant should have advised and done but had not advised and done, it “found as a fact” that the appellant had not complied with its instructions and had done nothing of value for the respondent. For these reasons, the original tribunal dismissed the appellant’s application for an order that the respondent pay its legal fees.

[3] Colquhoun Murphy Pty Ltd v Reddy [2017] ACAT 83 at [17]

6.The appellant appealed. On the appeal, Mr Purvis, solicitor, appeared for the appellant. Mr Reddy, the respondent’s husband, appeared for the respondent.

7.Under section 82 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008, the Appeal Tribunal was able, as it considered appropriate, to deal with the appeal as a new application or as a review of all part of the original decision of the original Tribunal. In this case, on 13 November 2017, the Appeal Tribunal ordered that the appeal proceed by way of review.

8.The Supreme Court and the Appeal Tribunal have stated in different ways that an appeal by way of a review of an original decision entails the appellant demonstrating that the order appealed from is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error.[4] The line between error and an outcome or finding that was reasonably open on the evidence can sometimes be difficult to draw but it was not in this case.

[4] B&T Constructions (ACT) v Construction Occupations Registrar and the Owners-Units Plan 3324 [2013] ACTSC 219 at [14] – [18]; Chakravarty & Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2013] ACAT 11 at [38] – [39], cited with approval in Excel Intelligent Pty Ltd v Thomson [2018] ACAT 4 at [48]; Giusida Pty Limited v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2016] ACTSC 275 at [35] – [38]; Ogbonna & Anor v Tankard & Anor [2018] ACAT 14 at [13]

9.The original tribunal’s primary error, from which other errors flowed, was not responding to the application before it: a debt application. The question, and the only question, arising on the application was whether under the contract the respondent owed the appellant the claimed sum of money.[5] There was no counterclaim.

[5] For the meaning and ambit of a debt application, see PCM Office Services Pty Ltd and Anor v Mi [2018] ACAT 36 at [33] – [38]

10.The contract between the appellant and the respondent was set down in the costs agreement. The agreement, in section 1, stated the work that the appellant was instructed to do:

Work to be Done

The work we have been instructed to do is:-

Advise you in relation to the removal of [name] from the Enduring Powers of Attorney of [name] and [name], and associated matters.

If necessary, to act for you in an application to an application to ACAT to have [name] removed from the Enduring Powers of Attorney.[6]

[6] I have deleted the names of persons referred to in the description of the work to be done on the grounds that information is personal in nature and irrelevant for the purposes of the appeal

11.Under the costs agreement, the appellant did precisely what it was instructed to do: provide advice regarding removal of a named person as an enduring power of attorney and associated matters. There was not a failure of consideration, total or otherwise. The appellant was later instructed also to advise on the lodgement of a caveat on the respondent’s parents’ property. The appellant gave that advice. The task of the appellant acting for the respondent in an application to the Tribunal did not arise.

12.That other lawyers might have given different advice, or approached the respondent’s legal issue in a different way, is irrelevant. On the application before it, so too is an opinion about the quality of the appellant’s advice. In my view, the original tribunal had no role, when hearing the appellant’s debt application, to critique the appellant’s work beyond consideration of the general question whether, by reference to the contract, the appellant advised on the subject or subjects upon which it was instructed to advise. Where it did so, the appellant was entitled to be paid according to the contract.

13.Whether the respondent had a claim arising from the work done was a separate question that did not arise on the debt application that the original tribunal was asked to decide. However, in my view, even if the respondent’s defence were to have been treated as a claim for breach of contract or a claim in negligence under the Australian Consumer Law to which the original tribunal alluded,[7] both claims should have been rejected. As mentioned, under the contract, the appellant provided exactly the services that it contracted to provide. There was no breach. A claim in negligence was not pleaded, and would have been misconceived. On her own case, the respondent did not suffer any loss arising from the appellant’s advice: she elected not to accept or act upon the advice and went elsewhere.

[7] Colquhoun Murphy Pty Ltd v Reddy [2017] ACAT 83 at [25]

14.Other terms of costs agreement stated the fees that the appellant was entitled to be paid for the work it did on an hourly basis and at an hourly rate. It was common ground that the appellant rendered an itemised tax invoice for its legal services, referenced to the costs agreement, and that the respondent has not paid the invoice. The respondent agreed that she retained the appellant to provide legal services, and that she entered into the costs agreement with the appellant. She did not dispute the quantum of the applicant’s account per se.[8] In my view, on the admitted facts, the appellant’s case was established.

[8] Colquhoun Murphy Pty Ltd v Reddy [2017] ACAT 83 at [3]

15.I recognise that the description of the work to be done under the contract/costs agreement was a global or general statement. That was appropriate. How a legal matter should proceed, like many contracts for services to be rendered or work to be done, is a matter of dialogue, advice and instruction as the work unfolds. Some issues might involve options for the client. Others involve the judgement, knowledge and/or skill of the service provider. To give a simple example, a client might request (or instruct) a plumber to install a tap in a particular location or manner but it remains for the plumber to decide whether to do so by reference to whether (in their opinion) that can be done lawfully and appropriately. The more knowledge and skill required of the service provider, the more it is for the service provider to decide how to proceed. A doctor may (or should) consult with their patient before prescribing medication, but it remains for the doctor, not the patient, to determine what medication the doctor will prescribe and the dosage.

16.The respondent was entitled not to accept the appellant’s advice, and to seek advice elsewhere as she did, but her disagreement with the advice provided did not entitle her not to pay for it.

17.I respectfully disagree, therefore, with the original tribunal’s finding that the contract between the parties was for the appellant to provide legal services to the respondent “of the nature and kind that the respondent sought and not just any legal services”. I also disagree with the original tribunal’s finding that the appellant “failed to discharge its contractual undertakings”[9] in the ways described in paragraph 5 above. The original tribunal’s statement and what gave rise to it involved at least three errors.

[9] Colquhoun Murphy Pty Ltd v Reddy [2017] ACAT 83 at [18]

18.First, there were no such undertakings and the costs agreement provided no such details about the services to be provided. The advice given in response to the instructions, including advice upon how the respondent should proceed, was a matter of judgement for the appellant. The appellant did not fail in its contractual undertakings by not doing what the respondent wished it to do.

19.Second, as the appellant submitted, for the original tribunal to embark on its critique of the appellant’s legal advice was a breach of procedural fairness. The appellant came to the hearing for determination of its application for payment of a debt, not a review of the legal services that the appellant had provided. The original tribunal did not have before it an application or counterclaim alleging breach of contract or negligence, and had no role to consider the application as if it were a contract application or a damages application. Mr Reddy submitted that there was no procedural unfairness because the appellant was aware of her contention that she should not have to pay the appellant’s fees because the appellant had not followed her instructions. The respondent’s response stated it from the outset. That may be so, but the response (and its relevance) still needed to be considered in the context of the application to be decided.

20.Third, the breach of procedural fairness was compounded by the original tribunal making “findings of fact” about the appellant’s advice without giving the appellant a proper opportunity to be heard. Had it done so, a very different picture may have emerged. I give two examples. As mentioned in paragraph 5 above, the original tribunal placed much weight on the appellant’s decision not to place a caveat on the title of the subject property, and it not writing to the respondent’s sister’s solicitors. In my view, whether to take either of those actions involved the professional judgement of the appellant. On the debt application before it, that should judgement have been respected by the original tribunal. The opposite occurred. The original tribunal records in its reasons that it “put to Mr Ponna”, the solicitor appearing for the appellant in the initial hearing, that the appellant should have realised stated circumstances, and should have taken certain action, and that the advice the appellant gave was “contextually useless” and “just wrong”.[10] On the debt application before it, the original Tribunal should not have entertained such propositions from the respondent, much less put them to Mr Ponna.

[10] Colquhoun Murphy Pty Ltd v Reddy [2017] ACAT 83 at [15] – [16]

21.On the appeal, Mr Purvis appropriately acknowledged that the motivation for the appeal was more about protecting the appellant’s ethical and professional standing than recovery of its fees. He therefore made detailed submissions as to why the appellant advised against lodging a caveat on the title of the subject property as the respondent wanted, and why it did not write to the respondent’s sister’s solicitors as the respondent wanted.

22.Regarding the caveat, Mr Purvis submitted that the purpose of a caveat is to put others on notice that the caveator has an unregistered equitable, but not legal, interest in the land. He noted that a decision to lodge a caveat should not be taken lightly. He referred me to chapter 31 of the Land Titles Practice Manual, section 31.3, which in turn refers to section 108 of the Land Titles Act 1925 which provides that a person who secures the entry of a caveat without reasonable cause is liable to compensate anyone who suffers loss or damage as a result. He submitted that solicitors must therefore be diligent in terms of determining whether their client has a caveatable interest and whether it is defensible.

23.Mr Purvis took me to a decision of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, per Senior Member Smithers, in Legal Services Commissioner v Kotsifas[11] in which the tribunal considered three charges that a solicitor engaged in professional misconduct arising from the solicitor’s lodgement of a caveat. With reference to several decisions of the Supreme Court of Victoria, all parties to the application for disciplinary action against the solicitor agreed that

a high level of candour and preparation (in terms of gathering evidence to support the existence of the interests claimed by the lodgement of the caveat) is required on the part of the solicitor who lodges it.

[11] Legal Services Commissioner v Kotsifas [2014] VCAT 1615

24.Mr Purvis acknowledged that the respondent wanted the appellant to lodge a caveat on the title of her parents’ property because she believed that her sister was attempting to defraud their parents of their property. Mr Purvis explained however that in the appellant’s view there was insufficient evidence to support that concern. Also, whilst there were competing views about its relevance to the proposed caveat, each of the respondent’s parents had executed an enduring power of attorney appointing the respondent and her sister as attorneys to do anything jointly that the parent could lawfully do in relation to the parent’s property matters.

25.Mr Purvis then took me to a decision of the NSW Supreme Court, per Windeyer J in Global Minerals v Valerica[12] in which the Court found the registered proprietor of the land had an indefensible title unless fraud was established. Where fraud was not established, and the caveator did not have any other interest in the land, the Court ordered that the caveat be withdrawn.

[12] Global Minerals v Valerica [2000] NSWSC 1143 at [14]

26.Following this chain of reasoning (in short summary), Mr Purvis said that where the appellant had come to the view that because the respondent did not have a caveatable interest in the land and (in their view) there was insufficient evidence to establish an imminent fraudulent dealing, the appellant could not responsibly lodge a caveat having regard to its professional responsibilities.

27.I set out this detail not to find or even imply that the appellant’s advice in response to the respondent’s wishes was correct. It is not a question to decide. There may be additional facts about which I am unaware or to which others may have attached greater or lesser importance. The respondent provided detailed and submissions for why a caveat could and should have been lodged. The respondent apparently approached another solicitor who lodged a caveat.[13]

[13] Colquhoun Murphy Pty Ltd v Reddy [2017] ACAT 83 at [7(f)]

28.I note the appellant’s submissions only to explain why, in my view, the appellant’s advice was not “probably wrong” (as the original tribunal found). Indeed, a possibility that it was right or at least reasonable is implicit from the original tribunal’s finding. What matters is that the original tribunal’s opinion about the quality of the appellant’s advice was not a basis to dismiss the application for an order that the respondent pay the appellant’s legal fees for its advice.

29.I make a similar observation regarding the appellant not writing to the respondent’s sister’s solicitors, to put them on notice of the respondent’s concern about the prospective sale. I note that the appellant wrote to the parents’ solicitors, as prospective vendors of the property, putting them on notice of the respondent’s concerns. Whilst it was not for me any more than it was for the original tribunal to consider the issue, I struggle to see why the appellant’s action was not reasonable and sufficient. Logic suggests it is preferable to write to the holder of an asset at risk (or their agent) alerting them to the potentially fraudulent transfer of the asset (as the appellant did), rather than the person (or their agent) allegedly about to commit the fraud. Again, however, it is not for me to venture into the issue, save to observe that it was not “obvious” (as the original tribunal found) that the appellant should have written to the respondent’s sister’s solicitor.

30.The most telling aspect of the issue is that the original tribunal should never have entered the debate about the quality of the appellant’s advice and actions. It was irrelevant to the question whether fees were owed for services rendered.

Other matters - leave to file further evidence

31.The appellant’s claim in the original proceeding was for $2,207.85.

32.Many litigants or potential litigants are concerned that to pursue relatively small sums of money in the Tribunal can involve more time, effort and cost than the amount in dispute is worth. In an effort to address the dilemma, the Tribunal has established a procedure where applications in its civil jurisdiction for claims under $3,000 are dealt with by way of conference in an effort to try and settle the matter and, if not settled, then at hearing on the same day.[14]

[14] Guide to Parties - Types of Conferences in the Civil Jurisdiction of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal, ACAT website

33.The procedure was introduced with recognition of the importance of expediency and finality in resolving disputes involving small monetary sums. The procedure is not to be regarded as some kind of ‘dry run’ where an unsuccessful party then has the opportunity to prepare properly on appeal. Such an approach defeats the purpose of the procedure.

34.For these reasons, I respectfully disagree with the view of the original tribunal, where it said at the conclusion of the hearing:

If the matter goes on appeal, I think you will find that the Appeal Tribunal will require you to file and serve the evidence you’re relying on. Today was the cost of the nature of the process of small claims, seated (sic) on the best evidence we could get. You will find if there is an appeal that there might be a bit more preparation required and a bit more formality about the evidence and stuff.[15]

[15] Transcript of original Tribunal proceedings, 18 August 2017, page 28, lines 38 - 44

35.The need for finality was an important reason for why I dismissed the appellant’s interim application for leave to introduce further evidence on the appeal, save for my granting leave to tender the enduring powers of attorney.

36.The balance of the appellant’s proposed further evidence was in the form of detailed statutory declarations from two solicitors in the employ of the appellant detailing the work that the appellant did for the respondent and the communications between the appellant and the respondent, with many annexed documents in support of the statements in the statutory declarations.

37.In response, and perhaps independently, the respondent also wished to rely on further evidence in the form of statutory declarations made by her and her husband giving their versions of what the respondent said to the appellant and what the respondent asked the appellant to do.

38.Referring to the decision of the High Court in Fox v Percy,[16] cited by the ACT Supreme Court in B&T Constructions,[17] on an appeal by way of review fresh (or further) evidence should be admitted only in exceptional circumstances. The Appeal Tribunal proceeds on the basis of the record and any fresh evidence that, exceptionally, it admits. The question in this case therefore was whether exceptional circumstances warranted admission of the further evidence.

[16] Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

[17] B&T Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd v Construction Occupations Registrar and the Owners-Units Plan 3324 [2013] ACTSC 219 at [14] – [15]

39.Mr Purvis began by noting the predicament in which the appellant quickly found itself at the original hearing:

… to open I suppose I’d like to just confirm that the initial application brought by Colquhoun Murphy was a debt dispute, it was a dispute over unpaid legal costs. Now, that was how the matter was prepared and that was how we were prepared to run the matter on the day it was heard. It became apparent once the Senior Member began hearing evidence from both sides that he preferred to view it as a contract dispute, whether or not a contract had been performed. Now that fundamentally changes the nature of issues there because it is not simply about the recovery of money, it is about the performance of the contract, the scope of the contract and the issues that surround the contract and the degree to which it was performed which as you probably see from my submissions is quite a significant issue.[18]

[18] Transcript of proceedings, 24 January 2018, page 6, lines 14 - 24

40.Mr Purvis then continued:

Now, unfortunately the evidence that we adduced at the previous hearing was geared towards addressing it as a debt dispute and for that reason we didn’t have documentary evidence necessarily showing all of the issues about the scope of the contract and the works performed. So unfortunately the Tribunal accepted oral evidence from the respondent and the respondent’s agent which was contrary to all of that documentary evidence that we had[19]

[19]Transcript of proceedings, 24 January 2018, page 6, lines 33 – 37. It is apparent from Mr Purvis’ following comments that Mr Purvis was referring to the documentary evidence that the appellant had in its possession, but had not filed or assembled for the purposes of the hearing.

41.As noted above, Mr Purvis’s submission that the appellant had been denied procedural fairness was correct. Even the original tribunal seemed to recognise it when stating to Mr Ponna at the conclusion of the hearing:

I do feel for you in that you were to use the vernacular dropped in it with little information.[20]

[20] Transcript of original Tribunal proceedings, 18 August 2017, page 28, lines 33 - 35

42.I nevertheless concluded that the breach of procedural fairness was not a reason to give leave for the tender of the appellant’s further evidence. My reasons were as follows.

43.First, having reviewed the transcript of the proceeding before the original tribunal, I accepted the respondent’s submission that there was no attempt by the appellant’s solicitor to address the appellant’s predicament. I recognise that the predicament was not of Mr Ponna’s or the appellant’s making, and could not have been reasonably anticipated on a debt application, but Mr Ponna did not object to the original tribunal’s transformation of the appellant’s debt application into a contract application, or apply for an adjournment in order to deal with the unexpected change or seek to tender documents in reply to the respondent’s submission that the appellant had acted contrary to its instructions.

44.Mr Purvis noted that at one point, when Mr Reddy was reading from an email, the original tribunal asked if anyone had a copy of it. Mr Ponna said “I can give you my file”. The original tribunal did not take up the offer, and instead read the content of the email onto the record. I was not satisfied that Mr Ponna’s offer of the appellant’s file constituted an endeavour to tender it: indeed it would have been a curious thing to do.

45.Second, to have admitted the statutory declarations and all the annexed documents, and then (in fairness) the statutory declarations of the respondent and her husband, would have required me to permit cross-examination of each of the four deponents which would have turned the appeal into a new hearing, contrary to the determination that the appeal proceed as a review.

46.Third, and perhaps most importantly, whilst I well understood why the appellant wanted its viewpoint to be heard, the issue should never have been entertained in the first place. To receive the further evidence and to hear submissions about the quality of the appellant’s advice would have been to make the same mistake that the original tribunal made. The evidence was irrelevant. As Mr Purvis rightly noted, the application was a debt application.

47.I note that upon my refusing leave for the appellant to tender further evidence, Mr Reddy (appropriately) did not press the respondent’s application to tender her further evidence.[21]

Other matters - tribunal filing fees

[21] Transcript of proceedings, 24 January 2018, page 49, lines 40 - 44

48.In addition to the significant time, and lost opportunity costs that the appellant has suffered as a consequence of having to pursue its legal fees, and more particularly to prepare and conduct the appeal, the appellant as a corporation paid $290 by way of a filing (or application) fee in the initial proceeding and $1,076 as the filing (or application) fee for its appeal.

49.In the ordinary course, where an applicant (or appellant) is successful, the Tribunal orders the respondent to pay the filing fee to the applicant. However, in the unusual circumstances of this case, I have concluded that that would be unjust.

50.The respondent was successful in the initial proceeding, and has been significantly inconvenienced by having to participate in the appeal in circumstances where she was not really the driving party. The grounds of appeal were not a challenge to submissions that she put and that were accepted. Rather, they were a challenge to the original tribunal’s conduct where it transformed the application from a debt application to a contract application and found (contrary to the contract) that the appellant should not be paid. On the application before it, the original tribunal’s findings were made without jurisdiction to make them, without giving procedural fairness and without consideration of the relevant law.

51.I am also concerned that to order the respondent to pay the appellant’s filing fee for its appeal of $1,076, would be out of all proportion to the debt. The respondent must pay the appellant’s legal fees as she was contractually required to do from the outset, and the statutory interest owing on those fees, but I have concluded that that should be the limit of her obligation.

52.Section 15(1) of the Court Procedures Act 2004 provides that a determined fee can be refunded or remitted in accordance with the determination that determined the fee.

53.Item 1019 of the Court Procedures (Fees) Determination 2017 (No 3) provides :

A Registrar of the tribunal may remit or refund a fee or charge for the performance of a function or the provision of a facility or service, in whole or in part, where the circumstances warrant and it is in the interests of justice to do so.

54.In my view, the circumstances in this case warrant a refund of both filing fees to the appellant. It is in the interests of justice that that occur.

………………………………..

Presidential Member G McCarthy

HEARING DETAILS

FILE NUMBER:	AA 32/2017
PARTIES, APPELLANT:	Colquhoun Murphy Pty Ltd
PARTIES, RESPONDENT:	Gloria Darnell Reddy
COUNSEL APPEARING, APPELLANT	Mr D Purvis
COUNSEL APPEARING, RESPONDENT	N/A
SOLICITORS FOR APPELLANT	Colquhoun Murphy Pty Ltd
SOLICITORS FOR RESPONDENT	N/A
TRIBUNAL MEMBER:	Presidential Member G McCarthy
DATE OF HEARING:	24 January 2018