Collins v Djunaedi

Case [2023] SASCA 97


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

COLLINS v DJUNAEDI

[2023] SASCA 97

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable Justice Doyle and the Honourable Justice Bleby)

14 September 2023

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY - SUMMARY DISPOSAL - SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF OR APPLICANT  - GENERALLY

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - TAXATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSESSMENT - APPEAL, REVIEW OR REFERENCE - PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE - MODES OF APPEAL, REVIEW OR REFERENCE

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM SUPREME COURT - BY LEAVE OF COURT - GENERALLY

Appeal against orders of Judge Dart sitting as a Master of the Supreme Court and hearing a taxation of costs.

The respondents were the plaintiffs in District Court proceedings commenced in 2015; the applicants were the defendants.  The respondents were successful in their action and obtained summary judgment against the applicants.  The applicants appealed that decision.  They were unsuccessful and were ordered to pay the respondents costs of the appeal.

The respondents applied for a taxation of their costs of appeal by filing a claim for costs under r 195.2 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA).  An administrative judgment was entered by a Deputy Registrar.

Judge Dart set aside this judgment and proceeded to make a lump sum assessment of the respondents’ costs in the amount of $31,000.  His Honour subsequently heard submissions on outstanding costs issues, being the costs of the application to set aside the default costs judgement, and the costs of the taxation process itself. 

As to the former, he held that the applicants were entitled to 50 per cent of their costs of setting aside the default costs judgment.  This was on the basis that whilst they were technically successful and costs would ordinarily follow the event; the application had a number of different heads, and the applicants were unsuccessful in relation to a number of grounds.

As to the costs of the taxation, Judge Dart noted the applicant’s lack of cooperation in the process and held that the respondents were entitled to their costs of the taxation on a party/party basis, but with a 20 per cent uplift to reflect the Court’s disapproval of the applicant’s conduct.

The applicants seek to challenge the orders made by Judge Dart on various grounds.

Held (per the Court), refusing leave to appeal and refusing an extension of time:

1.Leave to appeal is required to appeal an order or judgment that “relates to costs” (r 213.1(c)).

2.Appeals against orders made in a taxation of costs should generally be heard by a single judge, rather than by the Court of Appeal.

3.The applicants’ proposed grounds of appeal are lacking in merit, and do not raise any matter of general principle or importance.  Nor would there be any substantial injustice to the applicants were the orders left to stand.

Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA)…

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Collins v Djunaedi [2023] SASCA 97
Case
[2023] SASCA 97
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Collins and Djunaedi, sought leave to appeal against orders made by a judge concerning the taxation of costs. The dispute arose from a taxation process following earlier proceedings, and the applicants contended that the judge's decision regarding the costs was erroneous.

The legal issues before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia were whether the judge's decision on the taxation of costs was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration on appeal, and whether the proposed grounds of appeal raised any matter of general principle or importance. The Court was also required to consider whether there would be any substantial injustice to the applicants if the orders were left to stand, and whether an extension of time to appeal should be granted.

The Court reasoned that the applicants' proposed grounds of appeal lacked merit and did not demonstrate sufficient doubt in the judge's decision to justify reconsideration. The Court found that the decisions involved the application of settled principles to the specific facts of the taxation process, rather than raising new points of principle. Furthermore, the Court determined that no substantial injustice would arise from the orders standing, as they related to procedural matters of costs rather than substantive rights. The Court also noted that the applicants were largely responsible for their financial difficulties.

Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal and also refused an application for an extension of time, finding no utility in granting such an extension.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

As no separate or further submissions were advanced in support of these grounds, there is no basis to conclude that there is sufficient doubt about the judge’s decision to warrant the reconsideration of orders 5 and 6 on appeal.Conclusion In summary, the applicants’ proposed grounds of appeal are generally lacking in merit. We are not persuaded that the orders made are attended by sufficient doubt to warrant their reconsideration on appeal. In addition to this, the proposed grounds do not raise any matter of general principle or importance. To the extent that the decisions made below involved any points of principle, they involved the application of settled principles to the particular facts of the taxation process undertaken by the judge. Nor do we consider that there would be any substantial injustice to the applicants were the orders left to stand. The orders in question, while resulting in sums of money payable by the applicants to the respondents, relate to matters of practice and procedure arising out of a taxation of costs rather than the parties’ substantive rights in the proceedings. The applicants say that if the orders are left to stand they will suffer financial prejudice (and potentially lose their home). The weight to be attached to this claim must be assessed in a context where, on any view, the applicants are liable to pay a significant sum of costs to the respondents. To the extent that this litigation, and in particular the taxation process, has placed them under financial strain, it is apparent from the judge’s reasons, and the history of the proceedings more generally, that the applicants are largely the authors of their own misfortune. Leave to appeal should be refused. In the circumstances, there is no utility in granting an extension of time and so the application for that extension should also be refused.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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