Hall v City of Burnside

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

HALL & ORS v CITY OF BURNSIDE & ORS

[2023] SASC 173

Decision of Judge Dart a Master of the Supreme Court  

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - TAXATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSESSMENT - APPEAL, REVIEW OR REFERENCE

Taxation of costs - large number of items taxed - lump sum assessment adopted for balance of the bill - nature of lump sum assessment - ex tempore judgment delivered - applicants seek review of the outcome - nature of a review - review grounds not made out.

Held:

1. Review dismissed.

2. Applicants to pay the second respondent's costs of the review.

Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) r 195.9 and r 195.12; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 271(6), referred to.
Bayley & Associates Pty Ltd v DBR Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 346; Catto & Ors v Hampton Australia Ltd (In Liq) & Ors [2008] SASC 231, considered.

HALL & ORS v CITY OF BURNSIDE & ORS
[2023] SASC 173

  1. The first and second applicants in this proceeding seek a review of a decision made to progress a taxation of costs. The application for review is dismissed.

    Background

  2. This proceeding commenced in 2006. It started with an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondents from proceeding with the construction of a residential property on land adjacent to the land of the applicants.

  3. The second respondent was the developer of the residential property. It obtained the relevant approvals from the first respondent to proceed. The basis for the injunction was a complaint about the approved retaining wall. It was alleged it was not sufficiently engineered to perform the task that was required of it.

  4. The land is sloping, and it was necessary for a retaining wall to be built once the relevant block was excavated for the purpose of footings. The matter resolved when a new planning approval was granted for an improved design of the retaining wall.

  5. In 2007 Bleby J made costs orders requiring the first and second applicants to pay the costs of the second respondent. Some of the costs were awarded on an indemnity basis.

  6. The taxation for the claim for costs has been a long and tedious process. The claim for costs extends to more than 3,000 items. Along the way a number of judgments have been delivered in relation to various issues of principle. Usually matters such as this eventually become capable of settlement. Not so this matter.

  7. A part of the difficulty in undertaking the taxation has been that the lawyers and engineers involved in the litigation were also involved in the dealings with the first respondent in relation to gaining approval for the variation of the retaining wall design.

  8. It has been necessary to remove from the claim for costs the costs of the lawyers and engineers which related to dealings with the City of Burnside for the variation. Those issues did not form part…

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Details
Case
[2023] SASC 173
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Hall v City of Burnside, the applicants sought a review of the decision to progress with a taxation of costs related to a property dispute. The applicants challenged the lump sum assessment approach used by the court in the taxation process. The court had to decide whether the lump sum assessment was appropriate and whether the applicants had grounds for review of the taxation outcome. The court considered the principles of lump sum taxation and the evidence provided by the parties. It concluded that the lump sum approach was suitable given the circumstances of the case and the extensive litigation history. The court found that the applicants' contentions regarding the potential for greater deductions if the taxation had proceeded were speculative and not supported by the evidence. The review application was dismissed, and the taxation outcome was upheld.

The court emphasised that the lump sum taxation process was appropriate in this case due to the complexity and length of the litigation. It noted that the applicants' claims for greater deductions were speculative and not based on concrete evidence. The court found that the applicants had not demonstrated that the lump sum assessment was unfair or unreasonable. Therefore, the review application was dismissed, and the taxation outcome was confirmed. The applicants' claims for greater deductions were rejected as speculative and not supported by the evidence. The court upheld the lump sum assessment as fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The first and second applicants in this proceeding seek a review of a decision made to progress a taxation of costs. The application for review is dismissed.Background This proceeding commenced in 2006. It started with an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondents from proceeding with the construction of a residential property on land adjacent to the land of the applicants. The second respondent was the developer of the residential property. It obtained the relevant approvals from the first respondent to proceed. The basis for the injunction was a complaint about the approved retaining wall. It was alleged it was not sufficiently engineered to perform the task that was required of it. The land is sloping, and it was necessary for a retaining wall to be built once the relevant block was excavated for the purpose of footings. The matter resolved when a new planning approval was granted for an improved design of the retaining wall. In 2007 Bleby J made costs orders requiring the first and second applicants to pay the costs of the second respondent. Some of the costs were awarded on an indemnity basis. The taxation for the claim for costs has been a long and tedious process. The claim for costs extends to more than 3,000 items. Along the way a number of judgments have been delivered in relation to various issues of principle. Usually matters such as this eventually become capable of settlement. Not so this matter. A part of the difficulty in undertaking the taxation has been that the lawyers and engineers involved in the litigation were also involved in the dealings with the first respondent in relation to gaining approval for the variation of the retaining wall design. It has been necessary to remove from the claim for costs the costs of the lawyers and engineers which related to dealings with the City of Burnside for the variation. Those issues did not form part of the litigation. A lump sum taxation The taxation has proceeded for a long time. More than 1,400 individual items have been adjudicated upon. There remains a greater number yet to be dealt with. I suggested to the parties that the time had come to finalise the taxation by way of a lump sum assessment of the remaining items. The Court has the power to make a lump sum assessment. Presently, that power is expressed as follows:195.9—Hearings(1) A taxing officer may use any one or more of the following methods to undertake a taxation—(a) a lump sum assessment, or otherwise determination of the amount of costs to be awarded in a wholesale manner, rather than undertaking an item by item assessment;(b) an item by item assessment;(c) assessments in successive stages;(d) separate assessments of different components of the costs claimed; or(e) any other method. The lump sum process occurred pursuant to UCR 195.9. There was a similar provision in the 2006 Rules.[1] A lump sum taxation is not a line-by-line taxation. [1] Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006, Rule 271(6). The principles in relation to lump sum taxations were set out by Foster J in Bayley & Associates Pty Ltd v DBR Australia Pty Ltd, who said:[2] [2] [2014] FCA 346 at [17].I intend to approach the applicant’s present application by applying the following principles:(a)Rule 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 provides for the award of a lump sum costs order in appropriate circumstances. That rule gives to the Court a broad discretion which should be exercised whenever the circumstances warrant it (see Dunstan v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (No. 3) [2006] FCA 916 at [23]; Black and Decker Inc v GMCA Pty Limited (No. 4) (2008) FCA 1737 at [3]; and Playcorp Group of Companies Pty Limited v Peter Bodum A/S (No. 2) (2010) FCA 455 at [3]).(b)The Court should not be slow to exercise the relevant discretion in an appropriate case.(c) Any exercise of the discretion to make a lump sum costs order should reflect the overarching principle embodied in s 37M and s 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The discretion should be exercised logically, fairly and reasonably (see Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No. 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119 at 120F and 123C; Ginos Engineers Pty Limited v Autodesk Australia Pty Limited [2008] FCA 1051; (2008) 249 ALR 371 at 377 [22]; and Sony Entertainment (Australia) Limited v Smith [2005] FCA 228; (2005) 215 ALR 788 at 813 [198] and [199]).(d) The rule serves to avoid the expense, delay and aggravation involved in a formal taxation of costs and associated litigation. In particular, in cases where the incurring of additional costs in taxing bills would result in an additional burden on the successful party, there is strong reason for making a lump sum costs order. A relevant factor in favour of a lump sum costs order will often be that the party against whom the order is sought is in financial difficulties with the consequence that the prospects of the successful party recovering its costs of taxation are poor (Bitek Pty Limited v IConnect Pty Limited [2012] FCA 506; (2012) 290 ALR 288 at 292 [15] per Kenny J).(e)The approach to be taken by the Court in deciding whether to make such an order and in arriving at the quantum thereof should be a broad brush approach. It is one of estimation or assessment and not of arithmetic. The Court should avoid, in effect, carrying out a taxation under the guise of performing a lump sum costs assessment.(f) The fact that the making of such an order may cause hardship on the party against whom the order is made is not relevant.(g)The evidence of an expert costs assessor is both relevant to and probative of whether a lump sum costs order ought to be made and the quantum of any such order.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

A review is well suited to addressing errors or omissions that arise during the taxation process. It can also lead to a reconsideration of an issue. The process is long standing.[5] However, where there are competing contentions of substance put forward by the parties, the Court will usually prefer one to the other. In that situation an appeal works better. There is a right of appeal.[6] In light of the recent Court of Appeal decision in Collins v Djunaedi[7] it is likely leave to appeal would be required. [5] For example the Supreme Court Rules 1947, Order 65 Rule 40 allowed for a review on similar terms as now provided for. [6] UCR 196.1.[7] [2023] SASCA 97.What was the decision As mentioned, I delivered an ex tempore decision which had regard to both the written submissions and the oral submissions made. For present purposes the relevant part of the decision is as follows:[8]There are slight differences between the parties as to what the present position is in relation to untaxed items. The applicants say untaxed solicitors' fees are $56,059.58, whereas the second respondent says $57,346.74. The only sensible thing to do at the moment is split the difference on that and allow the solicitors' claim at, say, $56,600.Mr Hall then says the items which have been reserved because there were no documents produced, or there was no proper explanation of a basis of a charge, amount to $3,000 or thereabouts. He says all of those should be taxed off. I think certainly a significant portion should be taxed off. Adopting a lump-sum approach, I would fix the untaxed solicitors' fees in the amount of $54,000.City Apartments are prepared to apply the percentage that they have been obtaining during the course of the taxation to that, which is 45%. That leaves the solicitors' fees to be fixed in the amount of $24,300.The other major item is counsel fees. The applicants say that they are $28,010. City Apartments says $29,459. All parties agree that the costs of the mediation of the dispute are not costs that fall within the scope of the costs order made by Bleby J. It is clear from the fee notes from counsel that there were charges for preparing for and attending at the mediation. Those fees are intermingled with general preparation and advice matters. I think as a reasonable compromise on counsel fees we come to a figure of $28,700. We can round counsel fees down to, say, $24,000, to make an allowance for the costs of counsel preparing for and attending at mediation.Counsel fees were being reduced by a much lesser percentage than the solicitors' fees. Part of the reduction was GST, which is not normally allowed on a taxation. So, applying the 68%, which was the overall figure in the taxation to date to the counsel fees, the number is $16,320. That, combined with the solicitors' fees, produces a figure of $40,620.There are $2,268 worth of disbursements claimed by the second respondent. Most of that appears to be transcript fees. I am prepared to allow that at $2,000, which would bring the total figure for the untaxed amounts in the bill of costs to $42,620.[8] Ex tempore ruling of Judge Dart delivered in court on 13 October 2022 (settled on 14 October 2022).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first and second applicants seek a review of the taxation outcome. The grounds of review are as follows:[9]1.In making the orders the court has not given sufficient weight to the matters referred to in the Applicants’ submissions FDN 159 and, in particular, in paragraphs 1-7, 12‑33, 35, 36-37, and 38-44 thereof.2.The application of a 55% reduction for solicitor’s fees to arrive at a lump sum is insufficient to arrive at a fair and reasonable result having regard to the matters referred to in the said paragraphs 12-33 and 35.3.The application of a 32% reduction for counsel fees to arrive at a lump sum is insufficient to arrive at a fair and reasonable result having regard to the matters referred to in the said paragraphs 35 and 38-44.4.Alternatively, it would have been reasonable to tax counsel fees in the normal way having regard to the matters referred to in the said paragraphs 35 and 38-44.5.The allowance of $2,000 for miscellaneous disbursements was made when the nature and status of those amounts remained in question and uncertain as insufficient information had been provided, and does not sufficiently allow for the matters referred to in the said paragraphs 36 and 37.[9] Application to Registrar, FDN 172 , filed 27 October 2022.Consideration The first ground of review is a catch all. It covers the matters which are set out more specifically in the other four grounds of review. In suggesting that I did not give sufficient weight to the applicants’ written submissions, I expect what is meant is that I erred in failing to accept those submissions. There is no real need to deal with ground of review one because the other four grounds deal in a more specific way with the complaints of the applicants. Grounds of review two and three are the substantive complaints. The applicants contend that if the taxation proceeded, the second respondent’s position would have worsened. A taxation where 55% of solicitor’s fees are taxed off is a rare outcome. It arose because of the mixing of litigation costs and the costs of negotiating with the Council about planning matters. The same issue caused the 32% reduction for counsel fees. The critical question on review is whether there is merit in the applicants’ submission that if the taxation had proceeded the reductions would have been greater for the remaining items. This is a very unusual taxation. The Court does not normally have the advantage, on a lump sum assessment, of having taxed 1,400 items. That is a very large sample size. I am not convinced that the applicants are correct that, if the taxation had continued, the deduction of solicitor and counsel fees would have been greater than for the items taxed. I regard the applicants’ position as optimistic speculation. There is an equal prospect, in my view, that if the taxation had continued that the position of the second respondent would have improved. That is, the percentage of solicitor’s and counsel fees to be taxed off would have diminished. There was a real prospect of that occurring. If that is correct, then the outcome achieved on the lump sum taxation was generous to the applicants.