CMU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CMU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 104

Appeal from: CMU16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No 2) [2017] FCCA 1948
File number: NSD 1783 of 2017
Judges: JAGOT, YATES AND STEWART JJ
Date of judgment: 11 June 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether primary judge’s decision was affected by actual or apprehended bias – whether evidence of primary judge’s previous decisions relevant on tendency or coincidence basis – whether primary judge had failed to give the appellant a hearing – whether primary judge erred in rejecting claims of Tribunal’s jurisdictional error – whether primary judge denied appellant procedural fairness – whether primary judge erred by accepting that the Tribunal had considered the appellant’s circumstances in their totality – whether primary judge failed to provide adequate reasons – whether primary judge constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction
Legislation:

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30

Allam v Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 75

British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie [2011] HCA 2; (2011) 242 CLR 283

CDD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 65; (2017) 250 FCR 587

CMU16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No 2) [2017] FCCA 1948

Collier v Country Women’s Association of NSW [2018] NSWCA 36

Concrete Pty Limited v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; (2006) 229 CLR 577

Condon v Pompano [2013] HCA 7; (2013) 252 CLR 38

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175

Dennis v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 231

Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

Grassby v R [1989] HCA 45; (1989) 168 CLR 1

International Finance Trust Company Ltd v NSW Crime Commission [2009] HCA 49; (2009) 240 CLR 319

Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd [2000] FCA 1886; (2000) 106 FCR 51

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488

Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51

Knight v Victoria [2017] HCA 29; (2017) 261 CLR 306

Lambert v Weichelt (1954) 28 ALJ 282

Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288

Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2016] FCAFC 183; (2016) 244 FCR 305

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2018) 264 CLR 421

MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081; (2016) 243 FCR 1

Public Service Board of NSW v Osmond [1986] HCA 7;

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 104
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of CMU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, who had applied for a protection visa after arriving in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival. The Tribunal had affirmed a delegate's decision to refuse the appellant's protection visa application. The appellant sought review of the Tribunal's decision by the Federal Court, raising several grounds of appeal against the decision of the primary judge who had dismissed the appeal. The grounds included claims of bias, denial of procedural fairness, jurisdictional error, and inadequate reasons.

The court was required to determine whether the primary judge’s decision was affected by actual or apprehended bias, whether evidence of the primary judge's previous decisions was relevant on a tendency or coincidence basis, and if the primary judge had failed to give the appellant a fair hearing. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether the primary judge had erred in rejecting claims of jurisdictional error by the Tribunal, whether the primary judge had denied the appellant procedural fairness, and if the primary judge had constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction.

The court found that none of the grounds of appeal were sustainable. It concluded that the evidence sought to be introduced by the appellant concerning unrelated migration proceedings was not relevant to the grounds of appeal as alleged. The court found no actual or apprehended bias in the primary judge’s decision and determined that the primary judge had given adequate reasons for the dismissal of the appeal. The court also held that the primary judge had not constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons given below none of these grounds of appeal is sustainable.Background The Minister’s submissions provide a convenient summary of the background to the appeal, including the decision of the Tribunal:The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia on 9 April 2013 and is an unauthorised maritime arrival. He lodged an application for a protection visa on 12 July 2013. He claimed … to fear harm in Sri Lanka as a Tamil, by reason of imputed political opinion, as a Muslim, a business owner and a failed asylum seeker who departed Sri Lanka illegally. The appellant specifically claimed to have been harassed by Sinhalese thugs who would come to his restaurant, ask for money and vandalise property. He claimed he was required to pay bribes to the Sri Lankan police in order to operate his business. The appellant claimed that in May 2012, Sinhalese thugs came to his restaurant and a fight broke out in which the leg of the brother of a minister was broken. The appellant then went into hiding, but his father continued to be harassed, beaten and threatened. A delegate of the Minister refused the appellant’s protection visa application on 6 November 2014. He sought review by the [Tribunal], which affirmed the delegate’s decision on 11 August 2016. The [Tribunal] found that the appellant was of Moor ethnicity and would not be perceived to be Tamil. The [Tribunal] accepted that the appellant was a Muslim. The [Tribunal] found that the appellant’s evidence about the altercation in May 2012 was vague, unconvincing and contradictory, that the incident did not occur and that the appellant was not targeted as a result. The [Tribunal] further found that the appellant’s evidence about the harm suffered by his father was inconsistent and did not accept that his father had been beaten, shouted at or otherwise adversely approached by anyone seeking to harm the appellant. The [Tribunal] rejected the factual premise for the appellant’s claim to fear harm by reason of imputed political opinion, and found that he did not pay bribes to the Sri Lankan police on a weekly basis. The [Tribunal] was of the view that the appellant would not suffer harm as a Muslim in Sri Lanka, and any altercations in connection with his business would not amount to serious or significant harm. Further, in light of his profile, the experiences he might encounter and penalties he may face upon return would not amount to serious harm for a Convention reason, or to significant harm. The [Tribunal] concluded the appellant did not satisfy either the refugee criteria or attract Australia’s complementary protection obligations.(Citations omitted.)The primary judge’s reasons The primary judge’s reasons identified the circumstances of the appellant’s claim to a protection visa, including his interview as an irregular maritime arrival, his statement in support of his protection visa application, and the decision of the delegate of the Minister refusing the protection visa application: [1] – [21]. The primary judge identified the salient aspects of the appellant’s application to the Tribunal and the Tribunal’s decision at [22] – [55]. The primary judge also identified the appellant’s grounds for review of the Tribunal’s decision at [56].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant seeks to lead evidence on the appeal concerning unrelated migration proceedings in which the primary judge was involved on the basis that the evidence is relevant to grounds 1 (actual bias of the primary judge) and 2 (an apprehension of bias on the part of the primary judge). The appellant argues, firstly, that this evidence is relevant (without reliance on tendency or coincidence reasoning); secondly, that it is tendency evidence satisfying s 97(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (the Evidence Act); and thirdly, that it is coincidence evidence satisfying s 98(1) of the Evidence Act. The evidence consists of: •extracts from the record of three unrelated cases in which the appellant’s present counsel represented a migration applicant before the primary judge;•the reasons for judgment in what are said to be the first 10 migration decisions of the primary judge in September 2017 (as published by – that month was chosen because it is the month in which the decision under appeal was handed down; and•10 decisions of this Court on appeal from the primary judge, which are said to be critical of the primary judge, although another eight such judgments were also referred to. From the record of the three unrelated cases before the primary judge, the appellant submits that the following findings of fact can be made in one or more of those cases which, so he submits, are relevant to the present case:(1)the primary judge dismissed the migration applicant’s case without adequate reasons.(2)the primary judge impeded the evidence or submissions of the migration applicant, including by challenging or arguing with counsel for the migration applicant, being authoritarian and discourteous and abrupt towards counsel, telling counsel that he understands the legislation and the authorities and counsel should move on or sit down, usurping the role of the Minister’s counsel, and taking the role of contradictor to the migration applicant.(3)the primary judge treated counsel on either side of the case differently.(4)the primary judge denied the migration applicant procedural fairness.(5)the primary judge failed to consider, or adequately deal with, written and oral submissions and authorities advanced by the migration applicant.(6)the primary judge did not have an open mind, including by defending the correctness of the findings under review. From the primary judge’s first 10 reasons for judgment in migration cases in September 2017, the appellant submits that there should be a finding that his Honour does not give proper reasons. In the judgments of this Court on appeal from the primary judge in other cases, the appellant submits that the following findings were made in one or more of the other cases which, so he submits, are relevant to this case:(1)the primary judge dismissed the migration applicant’s case without giving adequate reasons.(2)the primary judge denied the migration applicant procedural fairness.(3)the primary judge dealt with the case at a high level of generality, failed to consider fundamental aspects of the case, and merely asserted a conclusion.(4)the primary judge published his reasons for judgment only after a significant delay.

Decision

Reasons for decision

We also accept the Minister’s submission that given our conclusions about the grounds of the application before the primary judge (as set out above) there would be no utility in allowing the appeal for the alleged inadequate reasons and remitting the matter to the primary judge. We have concluded above that the grounds of the application before the primary judge are not sustainable. As such, the appeal should not be allowed even if it had been accepted that the primary judge’s reasons were inadequate: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 195 at [32]. Conclusion The appeal should be dismissed with costs for the reasons given above.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established