Clark v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Clark v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 1426

TAXATION – consideration of an application to strike out reliance by the Commissioner of Taxation upon s 468 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in support of an amended assessment, on the ground that reliance by the Commissioner upon the section would result in procedural unfairness in the conduct of an appeal from an objection decision of the Commissioner – consideration of whether the Commissioner is entitled to raise a new matter not relied upon in issuing an amended assessment or making a decision on the taxpayer’s objection to the assessment – consideration of the taxpayer’s entitlement to raise and rely upon events occurring after the date of the Commissioner’s objection decision

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – consideration of an application for leave to amend grounds of objection to an amended assessment issued by the Commissioner of Taxation – consideration of the adequacy of the Commissioner’s appeal statement for the purposes of Order 52B, rule 5(2)(a)(iv)

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s 160WA(1) and (2)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), s 14ZZ, s 14ZZ0(a), s 14ZZ0(b)(i)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 468
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Wade (1951) 84 CLR 105
Commissioner of Taxation v ANZ Savings Bank Ltd (1994) 181 CLR 466
Queensland Television Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1969) 119 CLR 167
Commissioner of Taxation v Jackson (1990) 27 FCR 1
Rio Tinto Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 55 ATR 321

HELEN CLARK v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
QUD501 OF 2006

GREENWOOD J
12 SEPTEMBER 2007
BRISBANE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD501 OF 2006

BETWEEN:

HELEN CLARK
Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

GREENWOOD J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 SEPTEMBER 2007

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Orders sought by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Notice of Motion of the applicant filed on 28 July 2007 are refused. 

2.The applicant is given leave to amend the grounds of objection to an amended assessment issued by the respondent so as to add those grounds set out at paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 5 of a document described as ‘Additional grounds of objection to amended assessments’ annexed to the Notice of Motion. 

3.The respondent provide within 14 days further and better particulars of those acts, transactions and events said by the respondent to support the contention at paragraph 5(3) of the respondent’s contentions contained in the respondent’s Amended Statement of Facts Issues and Contentions filed 1 June 2007 that on or about 8 September 1998 the Carringbush Unit Trust was resettled. 

4.The costs of the motion are reserved.

5.Orders 1, 2, 3 and 4 of these Orders shall be Orders also made in proceeding QUD500/2006 between David Clark and the Commissioner of Taxation. 

6.Proceeding QUD500/2006 and proceeding QUD501/2006 shall be listed for further directions on 9.30am on Tuesday, 18 September 2007. 

Note:    Settlement and…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 1426
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

David Clark and Helen Clark, the appellants, sought an order in the Federal Court of Australia to prevent the Commissioner of Taxation from arguing that the capital losses incurred from the sale of Rothwells Ltd shares were void under section 468 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). This argument, if accepted, would affect the availability of these losses to offset capital gains in the Carringbush Unit Trust. The Commissioner, the respondent, opposed the application, arguing that he was entitled to rely on this legal position as it was supported by existing authority and the taxpayers were not estopped from challenging it. The central legal issues in this case were whether the Commissioner was precluded from raising the argument regarding the voidness of the capital losses under section 468 of the Corporations Act, and if not, whether such a contention was fair and just to the taxpayers. The court found that the Commissioner was not precluded from raising this argument, as the law allowed him to rely on grounds not previously considered in the objection decisions. However, the court emphasised that the taxpayers must be given proper notice of such contentions to preserve their interests. The court also noted that there was no estoppel preventing the Commissioner from raising this argument and that it was within his rights to do so under the relevant legislation.

The court concluded that the application to strike out the Commissioner’s contention was refused, but the taxpayers were granted leave to amend their grounds of objection to include the argument related to the voidness of the capital losses. The court ordered the Commissioner to provide further particulars regarding the resettlement of the Carringbush Unit Trust and reserved the costs of the motion. Additionally, the court ordered that the same orders apply to another proceeding and scheduled further directions for both cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Orders sought by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Notice of Motion of the applicant filed on 28 July 2007 are refused.

2. The applicant is given leave to amend the grounds of objection to an amended assessment issued by the respondent so as to add those grounds set out at paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 5 of a document described as ‘Additional grounds of objection to amended assessments’ annexed to the Notice of Motion.

3. The respondent provide within 14 days further and better particulars of those acts, transactions and events said by the respondent to support the contention at paragraph 5(3) of the respondent’s contentions contained in the respondent’s Amended Statement of Facts Issues and Contentions filed 1 June 2007 that on or about 8 September 1998 the Carringbush Unit Trust was resettled.

4. The costs of the motion are reserved.

5. Orders 1, 2, 3 and 4 of these Orders shall be Orders also made in proceeding QUD500/2006 between David Clark and the Commissioner of Taxation.

6. Proceeding QUD500/2006 and proceeding QUD501/2006 shall be listed for further directions on 9.30am on Tuesday, 18 September 2007.

Background

Background to the litigation

No particular Order is pressed in relation to the onus point. It is not raised by the motion and the respondent was not expecting to have to deal with it. In any event, it seems to me inappropriate to make directions about which party bears an evidential onus on any particular issue (if an evidential onus truly shifts). The question is a matter for the conduct of the hearing. The background Although the motion recites Helen Clark as the applicant, the Orders are sought on behalf of both David Clark and Helen Clark. The factual background involves facts which, of course, are in controversy. However, the controversy relevant for present purposes is this. On 2 July 1984, the Carringbush Unit Trust (‘the Carringbush Trust’) was established with Carringbush Pty Ltd (‘CPL’) as trustee. In the year ending 30 June 1988, CPL acquired as trustee of the trust, 474,791 ordinary shares in Rothwells Ltd and 949,583 cumulative preference convertible shares in the company for $2,492,654.50 in all (p 15, Appellable Objection Decision – David Clark). On 3 November 1988, a provisional liquidator was appointed to Rothwells and on 22 September 1989, the company was placed in official liquidation. The appellants say that on 26 May 1993, CPL (controlled by the Denoon interest) sold all of the shares to Carringbush Corporation Pty Ltd (‘CCPL’ (also controlled by the Denoon interest)) for $1.00 thereby crystallising a loss of $2,492,654.00 arising out of a disposal, that is, a CGT event. The Commissioner at p 13 of the Objection Decision accepted that $1.00 was the market value of the shares on 26 May 1993 having regard to the liquidation and, in particular, the liquidator’s declaration of 16 August 1994 that there was no likelihood that ordinary shareholders or any other class of shareholder would receive any distribution in the course of the winding up of Rothwells. In each objection decision, the Commissioner contended that because certain events occurred leading up to 24 June 1993, a new trust arose on that date with the result that capital losses in the Carringbush Trust were not available to offset capital gains realised in the reconstituted trust. Those relevant events are set out at pp 2-5 of each objection decision. The Commissioner also contended that a sale of land at Gladstone by the Carringbush Trust (said by the taxpayer to give rise to a capital gain) was profit derived on revenue account and secondly, that Part IVA of the 1936 Act relevantly applied entitling the Commissioner to make a particular determination under s 177F(1)(a) of the 1936 Act. Neither of those contentions are now pressed. In the ASFIC, the Commissioner says, no disposal of shares occurred on 26 May 1993; no change of ownership occurred; the share register of Rothwells records CPL as the holder of the shares not CCPL; no court has granted leave in respect of the disposal of shares; s 468 of the Corporations Act renders the purported disposal void; no capital loss can arise out of a void transaction as a matter of law; and no ‘disposal’ crystallising a loss arose for the purposes of s 160WA arising out of the declaration of the liquidators of 16 August 1994 because no ‘election’ was made within the time limited by s 160WA(2).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GREENWOOD J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GREENWOOD J

A Deed of 24 June 1993 between CPL and ‘the Carringbush Group’ recites CPL’s notice of intention to resign as trustee of the Carringbush Trust. David Clark Enterprises Pty Ltd, for a fee, was to be and was appointed as the new trustee of the Carringbush Trust. For the financial year ending 30 June 2001, DCE Holdings Pty Ltd as trustee of the David Clark Family Trust was presently entitled as the sole unit holder in the Carringbush Trust to all the income of the trust. The trustee of the Carringbush Trust sold land at Gladstone in the financial year ending 30 June 2001 and asserted that no taxable capital gain arose in that financial year due to available offsetting capital losses in the trust. The Commissioner contended, due to the alleged resettlement events of 1993, that the capital losses were not available. The Commissioner therefore increased the income of the Carringbush Trust by the amount of the realised capital gain on sale of the land of $1,932,006.51 resulting in a net capital gain in the trust (due to ‘discount capital gain treatment’ of 50%) of $965,953.00. That gain is said by the Commissioner to have flowed to the trustee of the David Clark Family Trust and to the beneficiaries David Clark and Helen Clark resulting in an increase in the assessable income in the hands of each taxpayer of $482,976.00 in the financial year ending 30 June 2001. Considerations Paragraph 1 of the motion seeks an Order that the respondent not be permitted to raise the argument that no capital losses were incurred on the disposal of the Rothwells’ shares by reason of s 468 of the Corporations Act on two grounds, namely:(i)it denies procedural fairness to the applicant (if the applicant is now precluded, by reason of this Court’s jurisdiction to deal only with facts existing at the date of the objection decision (Jackson v Commissioner of Taxation 27 FCR 1), from the opportunity of meeting that argument where previously it was not so precluded); and/or(ii)it denies fairness to the respondent in precluding him, knowing that a capital loss would have been available to be carried forward before the relevant year of income, from carrying out his duty to collect the correct amount of tax, ‘not a penny more, not a penny less’ (Lighthouse Philatelics Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation 32 FCR 148). In effect, the Application by the appellants seeks to strike out the Commissioner’s contended reliance upon s 468 of the Corporations Act. The ASFIC filed by the Commissioner plainly enough relies upon an additional contention to support the amended assessment not relied upon in the objection decision nor, apparently, in issuing the amended assessment. The Commissioner is entitled to support the amended assessment on a ground not taken into account at the time the assessment was made (Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Wade (1951) 84 CLR 105; Commissioner of Taxation v ANZ Savings Bank Ltd (1994) 181 CLR 466 per Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ at 479). In an appeal to the Court, nothing in the 1936 Act (nor the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (‘the 1997 Act’)) or the TA Act confines the Commissioner to matters raised in the objection decisions (Commissioner of Taxation v ANZ at pp 478 and 479). Just as the Commissioner was entitled to rely upon the proper effect of s 26(j) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 – 1947 in bringing a particular receipt, as a matter of law, within the assessable income of the taxpayer even though the provision was not considered in making the assessment (Federal Commissioner of Tax v Wade at p 116, per Kitto J) and, entitled, in a similar way, to rely upon the effect of s 32(4) of The Local Government Acts 1936-1965 (Qld) in rendering a purported lease void and therefore depriving the taxpayer of an entitlement to deductions claimed (Queensland Television Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1969) 119 CLR 167), so too is the Commissioner entitled to rely upon s 468 according to its terms exposed by authority. Further, no conduct of the Commissioner gives rise to an estoppel in failing to raise the contention earlier. Plainly enough, the interests of the taxpayer must be preserved by ensuring that the taxpayer is given sufficient and proper notice of the contention.