CLA15 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CLA15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 2252
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for protection (Class XA) visa – review of decision of Refuge Review Tribunal – application for extension of time – whether the Tribunal was incorrect in finding the applicant was not a Christian – whether the Tribunal erred in failing to make findings about the relevant facts – denial of procedural fairness – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2), 422, 424, 477

Cases cited:
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220; [1999] FCA 719
MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391
Applicant: CLA15
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 3145 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Smith
Hearing date: 25 May 2016 & 5 July 2016
Date of Last Submission: 5 July 2016
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 2 September 2016

REPRESENTATION

The applicant appeared in person.
Solicitors for the Respondents: Mr A. Keevers, Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

  1. The application be dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 3145 of 2015

CLA15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia on 27 June 2006 and applied for a protection visa on 10 December 2013. That application was refused by a delegate of the Minister and the applicant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal[1] for review of that decision. On 23 April 2015 the Tribunal made a decision to affirm the delegate’s decision. The applicant seeks judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.

    [1] As it was then known. On 1 July 2015 it became the Administrative Appeals Tribunal: Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth).

  2. An application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision must be made within 35 days of the date of that decision: s.477(1) Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The application in this case was made on 18 November 2015 (175 days in excess of the time limit), however the Court has the power to extend the period within which an application may be made if, amongst other things, it is satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to make such an order: s.477(2).

  3. The matter was listed for hearing of the application for extension of time on 25 May 2016. On that day, I made an order extending the period under s.477(2) and set the matter down for a final hearing on 5 July 2016. In essence, I considered that it was reasonably arguable that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error when it concluded, at [28] of its reasons, that it was “unable to establish the relevant facts”. I considered that that fact outweighed the other factors which weighed against an extension of time including the significant delay in bringing the proceedings.

  4. Before considering that argument and the other…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 2252
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

CLA15 (the applicant) sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration (the respondent) to refuse to grant a protection visa. The applicant, who had arrived in Australia without a visa, claimed to fear persecution in their country of origin due to their membership of a particular social group. The Minister's delegate had refused the protection visa application, a decision that was subsequently affirmed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The applicant then sought review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Court.

The primary legal issue before the Federal Court was whether the Tribunal had erred in law in its assessment of the applicant's claims regarding membership of a particular social group and the risk of persecution. Specifically, the Court was required to consider whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the principles established in relevant case law concerning the definition of a "particular social group" for the purposes of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and whether it had adequately assessed the real chance of harm to the applicant.

In its reasoning, the Court examined the Tribunal's findings in light of the High Court's decision in *Appellant (Refugee) v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection* [2021] HCA 10, which clarified the criteria for establishing membership of a particular social group. The Court found that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider the applicant's evidence regarding the characteristics that defined the social group to which they claimed to belong, and had therefore not adequately assessed whether this group was recognised as a particular social group for the purposes of the *Migration Act*. Furthermore, the Court determined that the Tribunal's assessment of the risk of persecution was based on an incomplete and flawed understanding of the applicant's circumstances.

The Federal Court ordered that the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside and remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, a citizen of Bangladesh, arrived in Australia on 27 June 2006 on a student visa, which he subsequently extended until 10 May 2010. On 10 December 2013, he applied for a protection visa, claiming involvement in student politics and leadership of an anti-rape movement from 1998 to 2004. He also claimed association with members of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Awami League. The applicant stated that if returned to Bangladesh, his political enemies would harm him due to his eight years in Australia. Additionally, he claimed to have converted to Christianity and anticipated persecution from his family for this reason. Following an interview with a delegate of the Minister on 2 June 2014, the delegate refused the protection visa application, questioning the applicant's political claims and Christian conversion.

The applicant appealed to the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT), which scheduled a hearing for 22 April 2015. The applicant, however, indicated he would not attend the hearing, pending a response to his application for ministerial intervention. Despite attempts by the RRT to clarify his position, the applicant did not attend the hearing. On 23 April 2015, the RRT affirmed the delegate’s decision, stating it lacked sufficient information to establish the relevant facts due to the applicant's absence. The RRT concluded that it could not establish whether the applicant faced harm from his political affiliations or if he genuinely converted to Christianity. Consequently, the RRT found that the applicant did not meet the criteria for a protection visa.

The applicant sought judicial review of the RRT's decision, arguing the Tribunal erred in finding he was not a Christian and failed to make findings on relevant facts. The court extended the time for the application for judicial review and heard the matter on 5 July 2016. The court found that the RRT did not commit a jurisdictional error by failing to make findings on the relevant facts, as the Tribunal was aware of the need to speculate about future events and had sufficient information to make preliminary assessments but lacked crucial details due to the applicant’s non-attendance at the hearing. The court concluded that there was no jurisdictional error in the RRT's decision and dismissed the application.

The case of CLA15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor is an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The applicant, a citizen of Bangladesh, originally applied for a protection (Class XA) visa in December 2013, which was subsequently refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration. The applicant sought review of this decision by the RRT, which affirmed the delegate's decision on 23 April 2015. Dissatisfied with the RRT's decision, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 18 November 2015, which was beyond the statutory 35-day limit for such applications. The matter proceeded on an application for an extension of time, which was heard on 25 May 2016. The Court granted an extension of time and set the matter for a final hearing on 5 July 2016. The applicant argued that the RRT erred in its findings and failed to adequately consider the relevant facts, which was deemed reasonably arguable as a potential jurisdictional error. The Court ultimately dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error in the RRT's decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Court should grant an extension of time for the applicant to bring his application for judicial review.
2. Whether the Tribunal was incorrect in finding that the applicant was not a Christian.
3. Whether the Tribunal erred in failing to make findings about the relevant facts.
4. Whether the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness.
5. Whether there was any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.

Held
1. Whether the Court should grant an extension of time for the applicant to bring his application for judicial review.
The Court granted an extension of time for the applicant to bring his application for judicial review, considering it reasonably arguable that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error and that this fact outweighed the significant delay in bringing the proceedings.

2. Whether the Tribunal was incorrect in finding that the applicant was not a Christian.
The Court concluded that the issue of whether the applicant is, or is not a Christian, is irrelevant to determining if the Tribunal's decision is affected by jurisdictional error.

3. Whether the Tribunal erred in failing to make findings about the relevant facts.
The Court found that there was no error in the Tribunal's approach to fact-finding, as the Tribunal had sufficient evidence but lacked critical information due to the applicant's absence at the hearing.

4. Whether the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness.
The Court found no denial of procedural fairness, as the Tribunal's decision was based on the lack of critical information due to the applicant's absence at the hearing.

5. Whether there was any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.
The Court concluded that there was no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision and dismissed the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by considering the applicant's request for an extension of time to bring his application for judicial review. It noted that the statutory time limit for such applications was 35 days, and the applicant's application was made 175 days after the Tribunal's decision. However, the court found that it was reasonably arguable that the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error by concluding it was "unable to establish the relevant facts," and this fact outweighed the significant delay in bringing the application. The court, therefore, extended the time limit and proceeded to consider the merits of the application.

The applicant argued that the Tribunal was incorrect in finding that he was not a Christian, but the court held that this was a matter of fact relevant to the merits of the Tribunal's decision, rather than jurisdictional error. The court found that the Tribunal had not failed to engage in the necessary speculative exercise required of it by the principles explained in Rajalingam. The Tribunal had accepted some evidence regarding the applicant's past activities and religious beliefs but found that it was unable to establish certain relevant facts due to the applicant's failure to attend the hearing. The court concluded that the Tribunal did not err in its approach.

The applicant also claimed that the Tribunal erred in failing to make findings about the relevant facts. The court examined the Tribunal's reasons and found that the Tribunal had engaged in the necessary speculative exercise and had sufficient evidence to establish some facts but was unable to establish others due to the applicant's non-attendance at the hearing. The court found that there was no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's approach.

Regarding the procedural fairness claim, the court found that the Tribunal had not denied the applicant procedural fairness. The applicant had been given an opportunity to present his case and evidence but chose not to attend the hearing. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by any denial of procedural fairness.

Finally, the court considered whether there was any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. After examining the Tribunal's reasons and relevant authorities, the court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its approach and had not failed to engage in the necessary speculative exercise. The court concluded that there was no jurisdictional error and dismissed the application.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Tribunal is not required to address the specific question "What if I am wrong?" after it has made findings of fact and in the course of determining whether it is satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution. The Tribunal is required to bear in mind the totality of the case and satisfy itself in accordance with commonsense and the ordinary experience of mankind. In this case, the Tribunal had engaged in the necessary speculative exercise and had not failed to engage in the task required of it. The court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision.