CKV16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CKV16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 342

Appeal from: CKV16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1449
File number: VID 759 of 2018
Judge: BESANKO J
Date of judgment: 14 March 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION — where a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa — where the Immigration Assessment Authority affirmed the decision of the delegate — where Authority not satisfied that the appellant would face a real chance of harm by reason of having provided assistance to Syrian refugees in Lebanon — where the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of the decision of the Authority

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — application for leave to raise new grounds of appeal not raised before the Federal Circuit Court — consideration of the principles governing an application for leave to raise new grounds — where new ground relates to allegation of apprehended bias and is fundamental to the proper execution of the procedure laid down in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — whether Federal Circuit Court erred in failing to find that the decision of the Authority was affected by jurisdictional error by reason of apprehended bias — where the delegate had before him information from Victorian police about an investigation regarding the appellant’s possible involvement in an offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice — where the Authority had before it the same information by reason of s 473CB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) — where the Authority made no reference to the information in its decision — consideration of the principles governing apprehended bias in the context of administrative proceedings — whether a fair-minded lay observer, acting reasonably, might apprehend that the Authority might have been affected by the information — whether it is necessary for information to be highly prejudicial in order for apprehended bias to arise, or whether it is sufficient that the information is adverse or prejudicial — where the first respondent conceded that the information was irrelevant — where the credit of the appellant was a key consideration

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DB
Cases cited:

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1323

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 159

Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 [2017] FCAFC 136; (2017) 254 FCR 534

Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41

Date of hearing: 15 November 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 31
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms G A Costello with Ms J Katsivas
Solicitor for the Appellant: Bardo Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Wood
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the…
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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 342
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of CKV16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves a Lebanese national who applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa in Australia. The application was refused, and the decision was affirmed by the Immigration Assessment Authority. The appellant sought judicial review of the decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which was dismissed. The appellant now seeks leave to raise new grounds of appeal, arguing that the decision-maker was affected by apprehended bias due to information about an investigation into an alleged offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice.

The central legal issues in the case revolve around the principles governing an application for leave to raise new grounds of appeal, particularly in relation to allegations of apprehended bias. The court had to determine whether the Federal Circuit Court erred in failing to find that the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority was affected by jurisdictional error due to apprehended bias. The court also had to consider whether information needs to be highly prejudicial for apprehended bias to arise or if it is sufficient that the information is adverse or prejudicial. The court needed to assess whether a fair-minded lay observer, acting reasonably, might apprehend that the Authority might have been affected by the information, even subconsciously.

The court found that the information about the investigation into the alleged offence was indeed prejudicial and adverse. Although it was not highly prejudicial, it was sufficient to raise the apprehension of bias, particularly because the credit of the appellant was a key consideration in the decision-making process. The court concluded that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Authority might have been affected by this information. The court granted the appellant leave to raise the new grounds of appeal, set aside the substantive order made by the Federal Circuit Court, and issued a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority. It also issued a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Authority to reconsider and determine the matter according to law. The court maintained the order as to costs made by the Federal Circuit Court.

In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal with respect to the order made by the Federal Circuit Court and issued new orders to quash the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority and to reconsider the matter according to law. The first respondent was ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant be granted leave to raise the grounds in the Notice of Appeal filed on 26 June 2018.

2. The appeal be allowed with respect to Order 1 made by the Federal Circuit Court on 7 June 2018 and that order be set aside and in lieu thereof, the following orders be made:

(a) A writ in the nature of certiorari be issued to quash the decision of the second respondent, Immigration Assessment Authority, IAA reference “IAA16/00305” dated 15 August 2016.

(b) A writ in the nature of mandamus be issued directing the second respondent differently constituted to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

There are two proposed grounds of appeal, neither of which relate to the grounds of judicial review considered by the Federal Circuit Court. BACKGROUND The appellant is a national of Lebanon. On 28 September 2015, he applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. On 14 June 2016, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused to grant the appellant the visa. The IAA summarised the appellant’s claim for protection as follows:•He is a national of Lebanon and an ethnic Arab Sunni Muslim. He resided in northern Lebanon’s Akkar District.•He and his cousin became involved in assisting Syrian refugees. As a consequence of this, Hizballah came to his house and asked his mother about him on multiple occasions. She always said that she did not know where he was. He remained in hiding and departed Lebanon in March 2013. He departed lawfully from Beirut’s international airport on his own passport. Hizballah continue to come to the family home searching for him.•He fears that if he returns to Lebanon he will be tortured and killed by Hizballah.•He cannot rely on the Lebanese government for protection because it is controlled by Hizballah.•Hizballah have a very big network and will find him wherever he goes in Lebanon. The delegate said that he had a number of significant concerns about the credibility of the appellant’s claims to fear harm from Hizballah and that, considered cumulatively, the concerns that he held led him to find that the appellant was not a reliable witness. The delegate found that the appellant’s account of events on which his central protection claims were based was false. The delegate said that, in light of his findings that the appellant was an unreliable witness, and in the absence of independent information to suggest or indicate that the appellant’s circumstances were such as to cause him to be given an adverse profile by Hizballah, he did not accept that Hizballah agents or members continued to visit the appellant’s house several years after his departure and harass his mother daily as the appellant had claimed. It is apparent from the delegate’s reasons that he was aware of the fact that the appellant had been convicted of a serious crime in Australia. He considered whether the appellant would suffer serious or significant harm upon his return to Lebanon by reason of that fact. He did so despite the fact that the matter had not been raised by the appellant in his written claims or during the protection visa interview. The delegate found that there was nothing in the available information which suggested that the appellant would face a real risk of significant harm during encounters with Lebanese authorities upon his return in connection with his conviction in Australia. As I have said, the delegate’s decision was made on 14 June 2016. It appears that the Department was aware that the appellant had been convicted of a serious crime. There are two emails dated 28 January 2016 in the Court Book and I reproduce below the body of each of the two emails:As you can see from the below email, yesterday [name of the appellant and boat identification] received an outcome in relation to his criminal matters. He has been convicted of assault of a child under 16 yrs and Indecent assault with a child under 16 yrs. A fine has been imposed of $2500.00 and he has been placed on the Sex Offender Register for 8 years. Is it appropriate for your team to progress this case or is this a case for CCRS?…I sent an email to you this morning regarding [name of the appellant] as his criminal case was finalised yesterday. However, Vic Police contacted the ABF today as they now wish to speak to him on 03/02/16 to investigate his involvement in a criminal offence. The offence in question is Attempt to Pervert the Course of Justice, which relates the victim to the matters he appeared at Melbourne Magistrates Court for yesterday. Three people have been charged in relation to making contact with the victim and attempting to get her to change her evidence, and they now wish to interview [name of the appellant] in relation to this matter. Once Vic Police advise if they wish to charge or pursue [name of the appellant] in relation to this matter I will let you know.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The fact that Victorian police were investigating the appellant’s possible involvement in an offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice and were seeking to interview him was prejudicial information. The offence is a serious one, although it is not being said that he had been found guilty or was guilty of the offence. Furthermore, the information was provided in a context where the Secretary provided information to the IAA, which is not said by the appellant to be irrelevant, that the appellant had been convicted of indecent assault of a child. Nevertheless, it is not the case that the material must be highly prejudicial for apprehended bias to arise (CNY17 at [137] per Moshinsky J); it is sufficient if it is adverse or prejudicial (emphasis added). The information meets that description and it is conceded by the first respondent (correctly, in my view) that the information was irrelevant. This is in a context in which the credit of the appellant was a key consideration. That is apparent from the nature of the claims he made and the delegate’s decision. Not without some hesitation, I have reached the conclusion that, in the circumstances, the fair-minded lay observer, acting reasonably, might apprehend that the IAA might have been affected by the material, even subconsciously. CONCLUSIONS I will make an order granting the appellant leave to raise the grounds in the Notice of Appeal filed on 26 June 2018. I will set aside the substantive order made by the Federal Circuit Court, but not the order as to costs. In lieu of the first order made by the Federal Circuit Court on 7 June 2018, there should be the following orders:(1)A writ in the nature of certiorari be issued to quash the decision of the second respondent, Immigration Assessment Authority, IAA reference “IAA16/00305” dated 15 August 2016.(2)A writ in the nature of mandamus be issued directing the second respondent differently constituted to reconsider and determine the matter according to law. Having regard to the fact that the appellant has not appealed against the Federal Circuit Court’s decision with respect to the grounds of judicial review advanced before that Court, it seems to me that the order as to costs made by the Federal Circuit Court should stand. I note that a similar course was followed by Yates J in Chan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1323 at [62]. The first respondent accepts that he must pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal. That, in any event, is the appropriate order.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established