CKG15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CKG15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2017] FCCA 938
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirming decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant applicant a protection visa – whether Tribunal considered prior consistent evidence of applicant as evidence the applicant did not concoct his claims – whether by rejecting expert opinion evidence on the ground it did not accept the factual premises on which it was based the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by not considering or giving weight to the opinion that was based on the factual premises the Tribunal did not accept – whether the Tribunal considered evidence of a video – whether it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to conclude the video was a fabrication – whether the Tribunal had regard to a want expressed by the applicant that the Tribunal take oral evidence from a particular person – whether the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by failing to disclose to the applicant a certificate purportedly issued under s.438 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – no jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.424A, 424AA, 425, 426, 427, 438, 459A, 475A

Cases cited:

BIE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2978
Paric v John Holland Constructions Pty Ltd (1984) 2 NSWLR 505
Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2016] FCAFC 183
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP [2010] FCAFC 50; (2010) 184 FCR 184
MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1081
MZWDG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 497
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26

Applicant: CKG15
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 3102 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis
Hearing date: 2 June 2016
Date of Last Submission: 2 June 2016
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 10 May 2017

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Clark
Solicitors for the Applicant: Fragomen Australia
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr B Kaplan
Solicitors for the Respondents: Australia Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The application is dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 3102 of 2015

CKG15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant, who is a citizen of Bangladesh, seeks judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a Protection (class XA) visa (Protection visa). 

Claims for protection and evidence before Tribunal hearing

  1. The applicant articulated his claims for protection on four occasions before he gave evidence to the Tribunal at a hearing on…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCCA 938
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before Judge Manousaridis in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The applicant sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Anor, concerning the applicant's claims regarding a homosexual relationship. The core of the dispute revolved around whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had adequately considered certain evidence presented by the applicant.

The court was required to determine three key questions. Firstly, whether the "Communication Evidence," which concerned the applicant and Mr RM having communicated their relationship to Ms Ross, was reasonably capable of supporting the credibility of the applicant's claims about his homosexual relationship with Mr RM. Secondly, whether the Tribunal had, in fact, considered whether this Communication Evidence was capable of supporting the applicant's claim. Thirdly, assuming the Tribunal had not considered this corroborative potential, whether this failure constituted a jurisdictional error.

The judge reasoned that while the Tribunal was aware of the Communication Evidence, as evidenced by its inclusion of Mr Knibbs' letter in its reasons, the applicant's primary contention was that the Tribunal failed to appreciate its relevance to the applicant's credibility. The judge noted that a prior consistent statement, by itself, does not necessarily render a later statement more probable, but it can be relevant to credibility if the later statement is challenged as being invented. However, the judge found that the applicant had not clearly articulated to the Tribunal that the Communication Evidence was being relied upon as evidence of prior consistent statements. Instead, the applicant's submissions to the Tribunal indicated the letter was intended to demonstrate Mr Knibbs' opinion of the relationship and that the applicant and Mr RM had consulted him. Therefore, the judge concluded that the applicant's complaint was not that the Tribunal failed to consider evidence of which it was unaware, but rather that it failed to follow a specific chain of reasoning regarding the relevance of that evidence, a characterisation that did not easily amount to a jurisdictional error.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant’s submissions do not distinguish between the evidence the applicant submits the Tribunal failed to consider – the applicant’s and Mr RM’s having communicated their relationship to Ms Ross (Communication Evidence) – and the inferences the applicant submits are reasonably available to be drawn on the basis of that evidence. That is an important distinction because there is no doubt the Tribunal was aware of the Communication Evidence, the essentials of which is contained in Mr Knibbs’ letter. The Tribunal accurately set out Mr Knibbs’ letter in its reasons for decision, which indicates the Tribunal read and understood the letter.[33] The applicant’s real contention appears to be that the Tribunal failed to appreciate the Communication Evidence was reasonably capable of supporting the credibility of the applicant’s claims that he had been in a homosexual relation with Mr RM, but the Tribunal failed to consider whether that evidence did support the applicant’s credibility. In other words, the applicant’s true complaint is the Tribunal failed to appreciate the relevance of evidence – the Communication Evidence - that was before it of whose existence the Tribunal was aware.[33] CB277, [58] Three questions arise:a)Was the Communication Evidence reasonably capable of supporting the credibility of the applicant’s claims that he was in a relationship with Mr RM? b)Did the Tribunal in any event not consider whether the Communication Evidence was capable of supporting the applicant’s claim he was in a relationship with Mr RM? c)Assuming the Tribunal did not consider whether the Communication Evidence was capable of corroborating the applicant’s claims, did the Tribunal make a jurisdictional error? That a person has made a statement on one occasion (prior consistent statement) that is consistent with a statement the person made on a later occasion (later statement) does not by itself render more probable the truth of the prior consistent statement or the later statement. A person may as consistently repeat a falsehood as he or she may consistently repeat a truth. The making of a prior consistent statement, however, may be relevant to the credibility of the later statement if the credibility of the later statement is called into question. One set of circumstances where that might occur is where it is suggested the later statement was invented after the events to which the later statement refers occurred.[34] Here, evidence of a prior consistent statement might enhance the credibility of the later statement because, if accepted, the person’s having made a prior consistent statement would tend to repel the suggestion that the person invented the later statement.[34] See, for example, Heydon, J. D., Cross on Evidence Tenth Australian edition, LexisNexis Butterworths at [17250]. There are other examples where a previous consistent statement may be relevant. These, too, are discussed in Cross on Evidence at [17260]-[17355]

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant also relies on the following passage from the judgment of Robertson J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT:[37]In my opinion there is no clear distinction in each case between claims and evidence: see SHKB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 545 at [24], set out at [69] above. The fundamental question must be the importance of the material to the exercise of the Tribunal’s function and thus the seriousness of any error. In my opinion the distinction between claims and evidence provides a tool of analysis but is not the discrimen itself. Further, it is important not to reason that because a failure to deal with some (insubstantial or inconsequential) evidence will, in some circumstances, not establish jurisdictional error, then a failure to deal with any (substantial and consequential) evidence will also not establish jurisdictional error.[37] [2013] FCA 317 at [111] (see T.19) There are a number of matters to note. First, the passage from MZWDG refers to claims, and the passage from SZRKT refers to evidence that is “substantial and consequential”. It is difficult to apply these notions to the material the applicant submits the Tribunal failed to consider. As I have already noted, it cannot be said the Tribunal was unaware of the Communication Evidence. The applicant’s real complaint is that the Tribunal failed to appreciate, and therefore, failed to consider, what the applicant submits was the relevance of the Communication Evidence. It is a complaint the Tribunal failed to follow a particular chain of reasoning on the basis of evidence of which it was aware. That cannot easily be described as a claim; nor can it easily be described as evidence. Second, assuming the asserted relevance of the Communication Evidence can properly be characterised as a claim, I am not satisfied the asserted relevance of the Communication Evidence was one that implicitly arose on the material that was before the Tribunal. The applicant did not submit to the Tribunal Mr Knibbs’ letter proved the applicant had made prior consistent statements about his being a homosexual and in a relationship; the only purpose for which it can reasonably be inferred the applicant submitted the letter was to bring before the Tribunal the opinion of Mr Knibbs that the applicant was in a homosexual relationship with Mr RM, and that the applicant and Mr RM had consulted with Mr Knibbs. That is supported by what the applicant wrote in the “Response to hearing invitation” he submitted to the Tribunal on 14 August 2015. In that document, under the words “describe this person’s evidence and how it is relevant to your case”, the applicant wrote: “witness to the genuine relationship between the applicant and his partner”.[38] It is also supported by what the applicant wrote in the “Response to hearing invitation” he completed on 18 August 2015, namely, “witness to the [illegible] relationship between the applicant was [sic] his partner”.[39] Had the applicant intended to rely on his having made consistent statements to Ms Ross, he would have given evidence of that fact. As it is, the applicant put forward no evidence about when, and in what circumstances he first communicated to Ms Ross about his being homosexual, or what he said to her.[38] CB172. [39] CB189