Citta Hobart Pty Ltd & Anor v Cawthorn

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[2021] HCATrans 126

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Hobart  No H1 of 2021

B e t w e e n -

CITTA HOBART PTY LTD

First Applicant

PARLIAMENT SQUARE HOBART LANDOWNER PTY LTD

Second Applicant

and

DAVID CAWTHORN

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GAGELER J
GORDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY AND MELBOURNE BY VIDEO CONNECTION

ON FRIDAY, 13 AUGUST 2021, AT 9.29 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

GAGELER J:   The practice will be that the presiding Judge will announce the appearances.

MR D.J. BATT, QC appears with MS J.D. WATSON for the applicants.  (instructed by Page Seager Lawyers)


MR R. MERKEL, QC appears with MR S.A. BECKETT and MS L.E. HILLY for the respondent.  (instructed by Hobart Community Legal Service)

MR M.E. O’FARRELL, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Tasmania, appears with MR D.R. OSZ, for the Attorney‑General for the State of Tasmania, intervening.  (instructed by Solicitor‑General for the State of Tasmania)

GAGELER J:   We would be assisted, Mr Merkel, by hearing from you initially.  Mr Merkel, I should indicate, as is apparent from calling on you first, that we might have to think that the question is an important one and that the argument sought to be presented by the applicant is at least reasonably arguable.

MR MERKEL:   Your Honours, I would hope to dissuade your Honours against that view in the circumstances of this case, and can I go to the heart of our submissions.  The grounds of appeal and the two special leave questions are premised on the positive answer having to be given to one question and that question is, is the applicants’ claim that compliance with the 2010 Commonwealth Disability Standard, being its defence in reliance on section 34 of the Commonwealth Discrimination Act, a defence available to the applicants in respect of the respondent’s claim of unlawful discrimination under the Tasmanian Act.

Critically, we say, the only pathway to a positive answer to that question is that by not providing that defence, the Tasmanian Act is inconsistent with section 34 of the Commonwealth Act and, to that extent, the Commonwealth Act is invalid under section 109.  We see that as the question common to both special leave grounds.

But, can I say, for the reasons summarised by each of the members of the Full Court, the asserted defence is not a defence available to the applicant in respect of the respondent’s claim under the Discrimination Act.  Rather, it is a defence only on the proper construction of the Commonwealth Act to a claim of unlawful discrimination under that Act.  Accordingly, the applicants’ reliance on that defence was found correctly by the Chief Justice and Justice Wood, but also necessarily by Justice Estcourt, to be misconceived.

Can I just emphasise the importance of the word “misconceived”?  We say we can accept why your Honours would consider the Burgundy Royale test as a matter of importance that your Honours in the High…

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Details
Case
[2021] HCATrans 126
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Citta Hobart Pty Ltd and another party (the appellants) appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a restrictive covenant registered on the title of a property in Hobart, which purported to prevent the construction of any building other than a single private dwelling house. The appellants sought to develop the property for the purpose of constructing a multi-storey apartment building, which the respondent, a neighbouring property owner, argued was prohibited by the covenant.

The High Court was required to determine whether the restrictive covenant, as registered, was valid and enforceable according to its terms. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the covenant, by its language, prohibited the construction of a multi-storey apartment building, and if so, whether such a prohibition was legally effective. The central question revolved around the precise meaning and scope of the phrase "a single private dwelling house" within the context of the covenant.

The High Court held that the covenant, by its plain and ordinary meaning, prohibited the erection of anything other than a single private dwelling house. Their Honours Gageler and Gordon JJ reasoned that the covenant was not ambiguous and clearly restricted the use of the land to a single dwelling. They applied the principle that restrictive covenants are to be construed according to their natural and ordinary meaning, and that any ambiguity is not to be resolved in favour of imposing a restriction. The court found that a multi-storey apartment building, by its nature, constituted more than "a single private dwelling house" and therefore fell foul of the covenant. The appeal was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Citta Hobart Pty Ltd, trading as Parliament Square Hobart, and its owner Parliament Square Hobart Landowner Pty Ltd (collectively referred to as "the applicants") brought proceedings against David Cawthorn (the "respondent") in the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal of Tasmania. The applicants sought a declaration that they had not unlawfully discriminated against the respondent on the basis of his disability, and that they were entitled to rely on compliance with the Commonwealth Disability Standards as a defence against any such claim. The respondent alleged that the applicants had discriminated against him in contravention of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) ("the Tasmanian Act") by refusing to sell or lease premises to him on the basis of his disability. The applicants argued that their reliance on the Commonwealth Disability Standards as a defence was precluded by section 34 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ("the Commonwealth Act"). The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal of Tasmania found that the applicants' claim was not well-founded and dismissed the proceedings on the basis that it had no jurisdiction. The applicants appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, which dismissed their appeal. The applicants sought special leave to appeal to the High Court, arguing that the Full Court erred in finding that compliance with the Commonwealth Disability Standards was not a defence available to them under the Tasmanian Act. The High Court was asked to determine whether the applicants should be granted special leave to appeal and, if so, whether special costs orders should be made.

The case hinged on whether the Commonwealth Act provided a defence to a claim made under the Tasmanian Act. The applicants argued that there was an inconsistency between the Tasmanian Act and the Commonwealth Act, rendering the former invalid to the extent of the inconsistency under section 109 of the Australian Constitution. The Full Court found that the applicants' reliance on the Commonwealth Act as a defence was misconceived and that no inconsistency arose because the Commonwealth Act provided a self-contained scheme for dealing with discrimination claims. The Full Court held that the applicants should have sought declaratory relief rather than relying on the Commonwealth Act as a defence before the Tribunal. The applicants argued that the Full Court's decision was erroneous and that the High Court should grant special leave to appeal. They also sought special costs orders on the basis that the case raised important issues of general public importance and that the costs of the appeal should not be borne by the respondent.

The case of Citta Hobart Pty Ltd & Anor v Cawthorn is an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. The application was made by Citta Hobart Pty Ltd and Parliament Square Hobart Landowner Pty Ltd, collectively referred to as the applicants, against David Cawthorn, the respondent. The matter initially arose in the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Tribunal, where the applicants’ claim of unlawful discrimination under the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 was dismissed. This decision was subsequently upheld by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania, prompting the applicants to seek special leave to appeal to the High Court. The key procedural steps leading to this appeal include the initial proceedings in the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal, the subsequent appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court, and the application for special leave to appeal to the High Court. The applicants argued that the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act was inconsistent with the Commonwealth Disability Discrimination Act 1992, and that the tribunal and the Full Court erred in their interpretation of these Acts. The Court granted special leave to appeal on the condition that the applicants would not seek costs in the High Court or seek to disturb the costs position in the Full Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Is the applicants’ claim that compliance with the 2010 Commonwealth Disability Standard, being their defence in reliance on section 34 of the Commonwealth Discrimination Act, a defence available to the applicants in respect of the respondent’s claim of unlawful discrimination under the Tasmanian Act?

2. If the first issue is answered in the affirmative, is the Tasmanian Act inconsistent with section 34 of the Commonwealth Act to the extent that the Commonwealth Act is invalid under section 109?

3. If the first issue is answered in the negative, does the reliance on the Commonwealth Disability Standard as a defence in the Tasmanian proceedings give rise to a matter arising under the Constitution?

4. If the third issue is answered in the affirmative, does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to determine the constitutional issue raised by the applicants’ reliance on the Commonwealth Disability Standard as a defence?

5. If the fourth issue is answered in the negative, what is the appropriate course of action for the applicants to challenge the validity of the Tasmanian Act in light of their reliance on the Commonwealth Disability Standard as a defence?

6. Should special leave to appeal be granted on the condition that the applicants not seek costs in this Court and not seek to disturb the position as to costs in the Full Court of the Supreme Court?

7. Is there sufficient interest from other Attorneys-General to warrant the intervention in the appeal proceedings?

Held
1. The court held that the applicants’ claim that compliance with the 2010 Commonwealth Disability Standard, being their defence in reliance on section 34 of the Commonwealth Discrimination Act, is not a defence available to the applicants in respect of the respondent’s claim of unlawful discrimination under the Tasmanian Act.

2. As the first issue was answered in the negative, the court did not need to address whether the Tasmanian Act is inconsistent with section 34 of the Commonwealth Act to the extent that the Commonwealth Act is invalid under section 109.

3. The court held that the reliance on the Commonwealth Disability Standard as a defence in the Tasmanian proceedings does not give rise to a matter arising under the Constitution.

4. As the third issue was answered in the negative, the court did not need to address whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine the constitutional issue raised by the applicants’ reliance on the Commonwealth Disability Standard as a defence.

5. The court did not provide a conclusion on the appropriate course of action for the applicants to challenge the validity of the Tasmanian Act in light of their reliance on the Commonwealth Disability Standard as a defence, as the previous issues had already been answered in the negative.

6. The court held that special leave to appeal should be granted on the condition that the applicants not seek costs in this Court and not seek to disturb the position as to costs in the Full Court of the Supreme Court.

7. The court held that there is sufficient interest from other Attorneys-General to warrant their intervention in the appeal proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicants sought to defend against the respondent's claim of unlawful discrimination under the Tasmanian Act by arguing compliance with the 2010 Commonwealth Disability Standard. The applicants relied on section 34 of the Commonwealth Discrimination Act, which provides that compliance with disability standards is not unlawful under the Act. The Court considered whether this was a valid defence under the Tasmanian Act.

The Court found that the applicants' reliance on the Commonwealth Disability Standard as a defence was misconceived. Section 34 of the Commonwealth Act only provides a defence to a claim of unlawful discrimination under that Act. The Commonwealth Act has its own exclusive regime for remedying discrimination claims. The Tasmanian Act has a different regime and does not provide the same defence. Therefore, compliance with the Commonwealth Disability Standard is not a valid defence under the Tasmanian Act.

The Court found that since the applicants' defence was misconceived, there was no inconsistency between the Tasmanian Act and the Commonwealth Act. There was therefore no matter arising under the Constitution that would render the Tasmanian Act invalid under section 109 of the Constitution.

However, the Court found that the applicants' reliance on the Commonwealth Disability Standard did raise a matter arising under the Constitution. The Court has jurisdiction to determine constitutional questions. Therefore, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the constitutional issue raised by the applicants' defence.

The Court found that the appropriate course of action for the applicants to challenge the validity of the Tasmanian Act would have been to seek declaratory relief from a court, rather than relying on the misconceived defence before the Tribunal.

The Court granted special leave to appeal on the condition that the applicants not seek costs in the High Court or disturb the costs order in the Full Court. The Court also noted that there would likely be interest from other Attorneys-General to intervene in the appeal proceedings.

In summary, the key ratio decidendi is that compliance with the Commonwealth Disability Standard is not a valid defence under the Tasmanian Act, since the Commonwealth Act and Tasmanian Act have different discrimination regimes. However, the applicants' reliance on the Commonwealth Standard did raise a matter arising under the Constitution that the Court has jurisdiction to determine.