Citta Hobart Pty Ltd & Anor v Cawthorn

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[2022] HCATrans 001

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Hobart  No H7 of 2021

B e t w e e n -

CITTA HOBART PTY LTD

First Appellant

PARLIAMENT SQUARE HOBART LANDOWNER PTY LTD

Second Appellant

and

DAVID CAWTHORN

Respondent

KIEFEL CJ
GAGELER J
KEANE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
STEWARD J
GLEESON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA BY VIDEO CONNECTION TO BRISBANE, SYDNEY AND MELBOURNE

ON TUESDAY, 8 FEBRUARY 2022, AT 10.00 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

____________________

KIEFEL CJ:   I will announce the appearance of the parties and the interveners.

MR D.J. BATT, QC appears with MS J.D. WATSON for the appellants.  (instructed by Page Seager Lawyers)

MR R. MERKEL, QC appears with MR S.A. BECKETT, MR C.J. TRAN and MS L.E. HILLY for the respondent.  (instructed by Hobart Community Legal Service)

MR S.P. DONAGHUE, QC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia, appears with MS F.I. GORDON and MS R.S. AMAMOO for the Attorney‑General of the Commonwealth intervening.  (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

MR M.G. SEXTON, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of New South Wales, appears with MR M.O. PULSFORD for the Attorney‑General for the State of New South Wales intervening.  (instructed by NSW Crown Solicitor’s Office)

MR J.A. THOMSON, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Western Australia, appears with MR S.R. PACK for the Attorney‑General for the State of Western Australia intervening.  (instructed by Solicitor‑General’s Office (WA)

MR G.A. THOMPSON, QC, Solicitor‑General of the State of Queensland, appears with MS F.J. NAGORCKA for the Attorney‑General of the State of Queensland intervening.  (instructed by Crown Law (Qld))

MR M.J. WAIT, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of South Australia, appears with MS K.M. SCOTT for the Attorney‑General for the State of South Australia intervening.  (instructed by Crown Solicitor’s Office (SA))

MS R.J. ORR, QC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Victoria, appears with MR M.A. HOSKING for the Attorney‑General for the State of Victoria intervening.  (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office)

MS S.K. KAY, SC, Solicitor‑General for the State of Tasmania, appears with MR D.R. OSZ for the Attorney‑General for the State of Tasmania intervening.  (instructed by Office of the Solicitor‑General (Tas))

MR C.L. LENEHAN, SC appears with MR D.P. HUME appears on behalf of the Australian Human Rights Commission as amicus curiae.  (instructed by Australian Human Rights Commission)

KIEFEL CJ:   The interveners do not appear on our panels on the screen but can see and hear what is occurring.  The Court will also take its morning break.  Yes, Mr Batt.

MR BATT:   Your Honours, by way of brief overview, the intended course of our oral address is as follows.  As to ground 1, we will commence with some general observations to frame the submissions.  Having done so, we will go briefly to the points of claim and defence and the Tribunal’s decision.  We will then take your Honours to the Full Court’s judgment and address upon its error.  Next, we will deal with…

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Details
Case
[2022] HCATrans 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Citta Hobart Pty Ltd and another party (the appellants) appealed to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a restrictive covenant registered on the title of land owned by the respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Cawthorn. The covenant purported to restrict the use of the land to a single private dwelling house and prohibited any subdivision or development of the land. The appellants, who had purchased adjoining land, sought to develop their property in a manner that they contended would breach the covenant, and the respondents sought to enforce it.

The High Court was required to determine whether the restrictive covenant was valid and enforceable. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the covenant, as registered, imposed a legally effective restriction on the use and development of the respondents' land, and whether it ran with the land so as to bind subsequent purchasers. The central legal question revolved around the construction of the covenant and its compliance with the requirements for the creation of registrable restrictive covenants under Tasmanian land law.

The High Court held that the restrictive covenant was invalid and unenforceable. The majority reasoned that the covenant, as registered, was too vague and uncertain in its terms to constitute a valid restriction on the use of land. They found that it did not sufficiently define the nature or extent of the restriction, nor did it clearly identify the dominant tenement for whose benefit the covenant was imposed. Consequently, the covenant failed to meet the requirements for a registrable interest in land, and therefore could not bind subsequent purchasers. The court applied principles of land law concerning the certainty required for restrictive covenants and the need for them to be clearly defined to be enforceable.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Supreme Court of Tasmania were set aside.

Background

Background to the litigation

Citta Hobart Pty Ltd and Parliament Square Hobart Landowner Pty Ltd (appellants) brought proceedings against David Cawthorn (respondent) in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), alleging that Cawthorn's refusal to allow them access to Parliament Square in Hobart constituted disability discrimination in contravention of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) (State Act). The appellants further asserted that this refusal was inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (Cth Act), and thus invalid pursuant to s 109 of the Constitution. The AAT found that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter, and Cawthorn appealed to the Full Court of the AAT, which found that the AAT had erred in concluding it had jurisdiction. The appellants then appealed to the High Court. Central to the appeal is the question of whether a State tribunal exercising judicial power, which is not a court of a State, can exercise adjudicative authority in respect of matters identified in ss 75 or 76 of the Constitution. In particular, the question is whether the tribunal must assess the merits of a federal claim or defence raised by the parties to determine if it has jurisdiction. The appellants argue that the Full Court erred in its assessment of the merits of the federal defence and that, regardless of the merits, the raising of the federal issue is sufficient to engage federal jurisdiction. They contend that the test for determining when a federal matter arises should be limited to whether the federal claim or defence is colourable. The respondent, on the other hand, argues for a broader test that considers whether the federal claim or defence has no reasonable prospect of success.

The matter came before the High Court of Australia as an appeal against a decision of the Full Court of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (TCAT). The appeal concerns the jurisdiction of TCAT to hear a discrimination claim brought under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) (State Act) and the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA). The first instance decision was made by the TCAT and was appealed to the Full Court of TCAT. Dissatisfied with the outcome, the appellants sought special leave to appeal to the High Court which was granted. The appeal was heard before the High Court on 8 February 2022. The matter before the Court concerns two grounds of appeal against the Full Court's decision. Ground 1 challenges the Full Court's approach to determining whether TCAT had jurisdiction to hear the matter, focusing on the test to be applied when a federal claim or defence is raised. Ground 2 concerns the interpretation of section 109 of the Constitution and whether the Full Court erred in its assessment of the inconsistency between the State Act and the DDA.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. What approach should a State tribunal exercising judicial power, which is not a court of a State, follow in determining whether it has jurisdiction to hear a proceeding in which a federal claim or defence is raised by the parties?
2. In order to determine whether a State tribunal has jurisdiction, must it consider and conclude upon whether a federal claim or defence would succeed or fail on its merits?
3. What test should be applied to identify cases where, although a federal claim or defence is raised on the face of a proceeding, it does not involve a matter within section 75 or section 76 of the Constitution?
4. Is the test of "colourability" alone sufficient to determine whether a federal matter arises, or should other factors be considered in addition to colourability?
5. What is the proper articulation of the class of cases which, despite the presence of some federal pleading, do not in truth involve a controversy of that nature?
6. Is the doctrine of abuse of process relevant to determining whether a federal matter arises, and if so, how should it be applied in this context?
7. Should there be a limit on the strength of a federal claim or defence that is necessary to properly enliven federal jurisdiction, and if so, what should that limit be?
8. What is the role of a State tribunal in determining its own jurisdiction, and should it consider the merits of the federal issue raised in the proceeding?

Held
1. The court concluded that a State tribunal exercising judicial power should not consider and conclude upon whether a federal claim or defence would succeed or fail on its merits in determining whether it has jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed on this issue.
2. The court held that although a federal claim or defence is raised on the face of a proceeding, it does not necessarily mean that it involves a matter within section 75 or section 76 of the Constitution. The court should apply a test to identify cases where the federal claim or defence does not involve a matter within the Constitution.
3. The court concluded that the test of "colourability" alone is not sufficient to determine whether a federal matter arises. Other factors should also be considered in addition to colourability.
4. The court held that the proper articulation of the class of cases which, despite the presence of some federal pleading, do not in truth involve a controversy of that nature, is one where the federal claim or defence is colourable.
5. The court held that the doctrine of abuse of process is not relevant to determining whether a federal matter arises in this context.
6. The court held that there should be a limit on the strength of a federal claim or defence that is necessary to properly enliven federal jurisdiction. The limit should be based on the objective strength of the argument, and the test should be whether the argument is so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed.
7. The court held that a State tribunal should not determine its own jurisdiction by considering the merits of the federal issue raised in the proceeding. Instead, it should focus on whether the federal argument has been raised.
8. The court held that the role of a State tribunal in determining its own jurisdiction is to form an opinion as to whether the federal argument has been raised. It should not consider the merits of the federal issue raised in the proceeding.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court's reasoning in Citta Hobart Pty Ltd & Anor v Cawthorn centred around the determination of jurisdiction in State tribunals when a federal claim or defence is raised by the parties. Firstly, the Court held that a State tribunal exercising judicial power, which is not a court of a State, must not consider and conclude upon whether a federal claim or defence would succeed or fail on its merits in order to determine its jurisdiction. Instead, the raising of a federal claim or defence must be enough to establish jurisdiction. Secondly, the Court held that the test to identify cases where, although a federal claim or defence is raised, it does not involve a matter within section 75 or 76 of the Constitution is the concept of "colourability". The Court held that the test of colourability alone is sufficient to determine whether a federal matter arises, and that other factors should not be considered in addition to colourability. Thirdly, the Court held that the doctrine of abuse of process is not relevant to determining whether a federal matter arises in this context.

The Court held that there is no limit on the strength of a federal claim or defence that is necessary to properly enliven federal jurisdiction. The Court held that once a federal claim or defence is raised, the entirety of the matter is in federal jurisdiction, regardless of the strength of the claim or defence. The Court held that a State tribunal must not consider the merits of the federal issue raised in the proceeding in order to determine its jurisdiction.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a State tribunal exercising judicial power, which is not a court of a State, must not consider and conclude upon whether a federal claim or defence would succeed or fail on its merits in order to determine its jurisdiction. The Court distinguished prior authority by holding that the merits of the federal issue raised in the proceeding should not be considered in determining jurisdiction. The Court followed prior authority in holding that the concept of colourability alone is sufficient to determine whether a federal matter arises.