IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Hobart No H7 of 2021
B e t w e e n -
CITTA HOBART PTY LTD
First Appellant
PARLIAMENT SQUARE HOBART LANDOWNER PTY LTD
Second Appellant
and
DAVID CAWTHORN
Respondent
KIEFEL CJ
GAGELER J
KEANE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
STEWARD J
GLEESON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA BY VIDEO CONNECTION TO BRISBANE, SYDNEY AND MELBOURNE
ON WEDNESDAY, 9 FEBRUARY 2022, AT 10.04 AM
(Continued from 8/02/22)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
KIEFEL CJ: Yes, Ms Gordon.
MS GORDON: If it please the Court, I will address ground 2 and the inconsistency argument raised by that ground. Just to situate what I will say by reference to our written submissions, in paragraphs 35 to 36 of our written submissions we make the point that under the scheme of the Disability Discrimination Act the effect of disability standards on State laws will depend on the content of the particular standards in question and it is the content of the standard in question in this case which will be the focus of my oral submissions.
Now, leaving aside momentarily the significance of express statements of intention and objectives, we say that based on the content of the rules in the Commonwealth standards one would conclude that they are intended to operate to the exclusion of relevant State laws, and we say that for three reasons as a matter of construction of the standards.
First, the standards contain detailed and comprehensive rules as to what must be done to provide for non‑discriminatory access to particular categories of buildings for people with a disability. Second, the rules were intended to bring about national uniformity by aligning them with rules applicable in the context of the scheme of uniform national building regulations, and third, the purpose of making standards under the Commonwealth Act is to replace general prohibitions with specific rules to guide people’s conduct. What I will do is briefly elaborate on each of those reasons and then come back to the two key arguments that are put against that construction.
So, the first point is detailed and comprehensive rules. The standards, as your Honours will recall, are in the joint book of authorities volume 1, tab 5, from page 183 onwards. Mr Batt yesterday took you in some detail to those standards and I hope to avoid doing so, fixed and possible, again. In brief, for those categories of buildings to which the standards apply – and those are broadly new buildings which are publicly accessible – the standards include requirements regarding entry to and exit from buildings, requirements for accessibility of key features of buildings such as passenger lifts and bathrooms, and then very detailed technical specifications for matters such as door widths, handrails, ramp gradients and the location and seating spaces for wheelchairs and assembly areas.
Now, your Honours will recall that yesterday Mr Batt gave an example of particular provisions relating to…
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- Case
- [2022] HCATrans 4
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the restrictive covenant, as registered on the respondents' title, extended to and bound the appellants' adjoining land. Specifically, the Court had to consider the principles of building schemes and the enforceability of restrictive covenants against successors in title, particularly where the covenant was intended to benefit a defined area of land. The Court also had to assess whether the language of the covenant itself clearly indicated an intention to create a scheme of development that would bind the appellants' land.
The High Court held that the covenant did not create a building scheme that bound the appellants' land. The Court reasoned that for a building scheme to be established, there must be evidence that the vendor intended to create a scheme of development for the benefit of all purchasers of lots within a defined area. This intention must be demonstrated by the circumstances at the time of the sale of the first lot. In this instance, the Court found that the covenant was registered only on the respondents' title and there was no evidence that the original vendor intended to impose reciprocal restrictions on all lots within a defined area or that the purchasers understood the covenant to be part of such a scheme. The Court emphasised that a restrictive covenant will only bind a successor in title if it "touches and concerns" the land retained by the covenantee and is intended to run with the land, which was not sufficiently established here in the context of a building scheme.
The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Supreme Court of Tasmania were set aside.
Background
Background to the litigation
The DDA standards are a set of rules made under section 31 of the DDA, which provide specific rules for non-discriminatory access to particular categories of buildings for people with a disability. The appellants argue that the detailed and comprehensive nature of the DDA standards, along with their alignment with the national building regulations, indicates an intention to operate to the exclusion of relevant State laws. They also argue that the absence of an express statement of intention to cover the field does not prevent a conclusion that the requisite intention is evinced by the content of the law.
On the other hand, the respondent argues that the DDA standards are not intended to be exclusive and that the purpose of the standards is to codify how the obligations of non-discrimination in Part 2 of the DDA can be satisfied by specified persons in respect of a specified class of Acts. He contends that contrary to the appellants' submission, the standards do not purport to confer any broader privilege or dispensation upon those that comply with them. The respondent also argues that the Tasmanian Act is not inconsistent with the DDA standards and that the Full Court's analysis to the contrary was wrong.
The case raises several legal issues, including the interpretation of section 109 of the Constitution, the implications of Burns v Corbett on the jurisdiction of State tribunals, and the application of the concept of direct and indirect inconsistency. The High Court will have to determine whether the Tasmanian Act is inconsistent with the DDA standards and, if so, to what extent the Tasmanian Act is invalid under section 109 of the Constitution. The outcome of the case will have significant implications for the regulation of disability discrimination in Australia and the balance of power between the Commonwealth and the States in this area.
The matter of Citta Hobart Pty Ltd & Anor v Cawthorn, which came before the High Court of Australia, originated from the Full Court of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The appellants, Citta Hobart Pty Ltd and Parliament Square Hobart Landowner Pty Ltd, sought to appeal against a decision of the Full Court that dismissed their complaint. The primary issues in the case involved the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in hearing the discrimination complaint, and whether there was an inconsistency between the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 and the Commonwealth Disability Discrimination Act 1992. The case proceeded through several stages, with written submissions filed by various parties and interveners, followed by oral arguments presented by counsel. The High Court heard the appeal on February 8 and 9, 2022, with a decision reserved for a later date.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth).
2. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) under section 109 of the Australian Constitution.
3. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth).
4. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is directly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth).
5. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) based on the purpose of the standards.
6. Whether the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) have an intention to exclude the operation of concurrent State laws on disability discrimination in the context of building access.
7. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) based on the concept of minimum requirements.
8. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) based on the concept of minimum requirements in relation to the Building Act.
9. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) based on the concept of minimum requirements in relation to the Building Code of Australia.
Held
1. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth): The Court concluded that the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is not inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth). The decision was made in favor of the respondent.
2. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) under section 109 of the Australian Constitution: The Court concluded that the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is not inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) under section 109 of the Australian Constitution. The decision was made in favor of the respondent.
3. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth): The Court concluded that the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is not indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth). The decision was made in favor of the respondent.
4. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is directly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth): The Court concluded that the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is not directly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth). The decision was made in favor of the respondent.
5. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) based on the purpose of the standards: The Court concluded that the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is not indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) based on the purpose of the standards. The decision was made in favor of the respondent.
6. Whether the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) have an intention to exclude the operation of concurrent State laws on disability discrimination in the context of building access: The Court concluded that the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) do not have an intention to exclude the operation of concurrent State laws on disability discrimination in the context of building access. The decision was made in favor of the respondent.
7. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) based on the concept of minimum requirements: The Court concluded that the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is not indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) based on the concept of minimum requirements. The decision was made in favor of the respondent.
8. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) based on the concept of minimum requirements in relation to the Building Act: The Court concluded that the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is not indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) based on the concept of minimum requirements in relation to the Building Act. The decision was made in favor of the respondent.
9. Whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) based on the concept of minimum requirements in relation to the Building Code of Australia: The Court concluded that the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is not indirectly inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) based on the concept of minimum requirements in relation to the Building Code of Australia. The decision was made in favor of the respondent.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The central issue in the case of Citta Hobart Pty Ltd & Anor v Cawthorn was whether the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act (Tasmania Act) was inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) (Standards). The court examined this issue under different facets of inconsistency, including direct and indirect inconsistency, and whether the DDA and the Standards intended to exclude the operation of concurrent State laws.
Firstly, the court analyzed whether the Tasmanian Act was inconsistent with the DDA and the Standards under section 109 of the Australian Constitution. The appellants argued that the Standards provided detailed and comprehensive rules on building access for people with disabilities and were intended to operate exclusively, thereby excluding any concurrent State laws. They relied on the detailed nature of the Standards, their alignment with national building regulations, and their purpose to replace general prohibitions with specific rules. The court considered whether the Standards' detailed and comprehensive nature demonstrated an intention to cover the field, drawing on precedents like the Outback Ballooning Case. The appellants also argued that the Standards were supported by the treaties power and were intended to provide national uniformity.
Secondly, the court examined whether the Tasmanian Act was indirectly inconsistent with the DDA and the Standards based on the purpose of the Standards. The appellants contended that the Standards were designed to provide certainty and eliminate disability discrimination, which suggested an intention to exclude concurrent State laws. The respondents, however, argued that the Standards' objects clause, which aimed to provide certainty under Commonwealth law, did not necessarily exclude State laws. The court considered whether the absence of an express statement of intention in the Standards could negate their exclusivity.
Thirdly, the court addressed whether the DDA and the Standards had an intention to exclude the operation of concurrent State laws in the context of building access. The appellants argued that the Standards provided minimum requirements and, once met, shielded compliance from broader State prohibitions. They also noted that the Standards were part of a national scheme that replicated similar requirements in State laws. The respondents countered that the Standards aimed to codify how non-discrimination obligations could be satisfied and did not confer any broader privileges upon those who complied with them.
Fourthly, the court considered whether the Tasmanian Act was indirectly inconsistent with the DDA and the Standards based on the concept of minimum requirements in relation to the Building Act and the Building Code of Australia. The appellants argued that the minimum standards in the Standards meant that once the minimum was met, compliance with the Standards shielded conduct from broader State prohibitions. They also highlighted the national scheme that replicated the Standards' requirements in State laws. The respondents maintained that the Standards did not prohibit but expressed positive levels that needed to be met, allowing for better access beyond the minimum standards.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act is not inconsistent with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Disability Standards 2010 (Cth) because the detailed and comprehensive nature of the Standards does not necessarily indicate an intention to exclude concurrent State laws. The court found that the Standards, while providing minimum requirements, do not exclude the operation of State laws that aim to eliminate disability discrimination. The detailed nature of the Standards and their alignment with national building regulations did not demonstrate a clear intention to cover the field to the exclusion of State laws. The court also noted that the purpose of the Standards was to provide certainty and eliminate discrimination, which did not inherently exclude concurrent State laws. The respondents' argument that the Standards provided minimum requirements did not establish an intention to exclude broader State prohibitions. The court concluded that the Standards allowed for better access beyond the minimum standards, indicating that the Tasmanian Act could coexist with the DDA and the Standards without being indirectly inconsistent.