Cibolini P/L v Sullivans Hotels P/L & Others No. Scgrg-99-258 Judgment No. S326
[1999] SASC 326
•6 August 1999
CIBOLINI PTY LTD v SULLIVANS HOTELS PTY LTD AND OTHERS
[1999] SASC 326
Full Court: Bleby, Martin and Wicks JJ
BLEBY J.
The proceedings
The appellant was the applicant for a hotel licence in respect of premises comprising shops 3, 5 and 7 in the Metro Shopping Centre at 254-266 Unley Road, Hyde Park. The application was subject to a number of objections from hotels in the area and from the holder of a retail liquor merchant’s licence. The application was refused by the Licensing Court of South Australia, and the appellant now appeals to this Court against that refusal pursuant to s 27 of the Liquor Licensing Act 1997 (“the Act”).
The premises and the appellant’s proposed business
The appellant presently operates the Cibo Restaurant in North Adelaide. That establishment includes a small bar from which liquor is served not necessarily with or ancillary to a meal provided in the restaurant. That is pursuant to a general facility licence granted under the Liquor Licensing Act 1985, which Act was repealed with effect from 1 October 1997. However, that licence continues for not more than two years unless, within that period, it is converted to some other licence under the Act which the licensing authority considers appropriate, or unless the licensing authority decides that there is no other licence class into which the licence could appropriately be converted.
The nature of the establishment proposed to be conducted from the premises the subject of the application is similar to that of the Cibo Restaurant. It is to comprise a cafe style restaurant to seat up to 160 persons, a separate bar area to accommodate up to 60 persons, a rosticceria from which takeaway meals of the type served in the restaurant will be served and a bakery and pasticceria. The appellant also proposes to sell bottled liquor for consumption off the premises from a small bottle shop area.
It is intended that the food served in and from the premises should be of high quality Italian style, to be matched by the provision of high quality wines, many of them imported. Many of the wines would also be available by the glass from the bar as well as being available for sale through the bottle shop for consumption off the premises. Trade through the bottle shop is regarded by the appellant as complimentary to that through the bar.
Although there are a number of facets to the business proposed, there was no doubt both from the nature of the premises and from the evidence of Mr Cardone, the manager of the appellant, that the predominant purpose of the business was to provide meals, with emphasis on good food. He gave the following evidence in response to questions from Mr Anderson QC, then counsel for the objectors (Transcript page 37):
“MR ANDERSON: The emphasis in this proposal is on food.
MR CARDONE: It’s on the marriage of food and wine. I would definitely say that.
MR ANDERSON: Yes, wine with or ancillary to a meal. That is the primary emphasis, is not it?
MR CARDONE: There is an emphasis on food but there is also an emphasis on wine.
MR ANDERSON: Yes, and in answer to my question wine or any sort of liquor with or ancillary to a meal is the primary emphasis of the proposal.
MR CARDONE: Yes, it is.”
Later in his evidence he agreed that the appellants intended to conduct primarily a licensed restaurant, following which his evidence was as follows (Transcript page 62):
“MR ANDERSON: And that the premises will not have a front bar, saloon or poker machines but rather will trade essentially as a licensed dining room with a wine bar type bar and a small boutique style bottle shop.
MR CARDONE: Yes.
MR ANDERSON: So that really encapsulates the project as you have understood it and described it?
MR CARDONE: Yes.
....
[P]rimarily and predominantly it is to serve food and liquor with food. Yes?
MR CARDONE: Yes.
MR ANDERSON: In addition to what we would call a normal restaurant style operation you are embarking upon the take away food aspect which includes both retail and wholesale?
MR CARDONE: Yes.”
The case for the appellant before the Licensing Court was that it wished to cater for a clientele which appreciated good Italian food and quality wines, but which was not attracted to the atmosphere of what was described as “traditional” hotels, and which, for whatever reason, wished to avoid premises with gaming machines and sports-oriented television. In short, the appellant was seeking to promote a different style of restaurant and wine bar from that usually associated with hotels.
Relevant Liquor Licensing Act provisions
Subject to certain restrictions on hours of trading contained therein, s 32 of the Act enables the holder of a hotel licence to sell liquor on the licensed premises for consumption on or off the premises, whether or not such a sale is ancillary to a meal provided in a designated dining area. It also enables the provision of liquor in designated reception areas and under what is known as an extended trading authorisation. It is the least restrictive of any of the licences available under the Act for the retail sale of liquor.
A restaurant licence is more restrictive. Section 34 of the Act provides:
“34. (1) A restaurant licence -
(a)... authorises the consumption of liquor on the licensed premises at any time with or ancillary to a meal provided by the licensee; and
(b) authorises the licensee to sell liquor at any time for consumption on the licensed premises with or ancillary to a meal provided by the licensee; and
(c).... if the conditions of the licence so provide - authorises the licensee to sell liquor on any day except Good Friday and Christmas Day for consumption on the licensed premises by persons -
(i).... seated at a table; or
(ii)attending a function at which food is provided,
(but extended trading in liquor is not authorised under this paragraph unless an extended trading authorisation is in force).
(2) It is a condition of a restaurant licence that the business conducted at the licensed premises must consist primarily and predominantly of the regular supply of meals to the public.”
The Act authorised for the first time the sale of liquor for consumption in a licensed restaurant not with or ancillary to a meal but by persons “seated at a table” or attending a function at which food is provided.
Applicants for any type of licence must satisfy the licensing authority that the applicant is a fit and proper person to hold the licence (s 56) and that the premises meet certain standards (s 57). However, the applicant for a hotel licence, unlike the applicant for a restaurant licence, must satisfy the authority that the licence is “necessary in order to provide for the needs of the public in that locality”. Section 58 provides:
“58. (1) An applicant for a hotel licence must satisfy the licensing authority by such evidence as it may require that, having regard to the licensed premises already existing in the locality in which the premises or proposed premises to which the application relates are or are to be situated, the licence is necessary in order to provide for the needs of the public in that locality.
(2) An applicant for a retail liquor merchant’s licence must satisfy the licensing authority that the licensed premises already existing in the locality in which the premises or proposed premises to which the application relates are, or are proposed to be, situated, do not adequately cater for the public demand for liquor for consumption off licensed premises and the licence is necessary to satisfy that demand.
(3) A reference to licensed premises already existing in a locality extends to premises in that locality, or premises proposed for that locality, in respect of which a licence is to be granted, or to which a licence is to be removed, under a certificate of approval.”
Since the Licensing Act 1967 there has always been a requirement to prove need in respect of the grant of a hotel licence. A convenient summary of the principles which have been established in the operation of s 58(1) and its predecessors is to be found in Angler’s Hotel/Motel v Taranto (1980) Pty Ltd (1996) 188 LSJS 321.
That case dealt with an application for a hotel licence under s 63 of the Liquor Licensing Act 1985, which for all practical purposes was to the same effect as s58(1) of the Act. Speaking on behalf of the Full Court Debelle J said, at 322:
“1. The need to which s63 refers is need in the sense of a reasonable demand as judged by contemporary standards; it cannot mean need in the sense of necessity as judged by some ethical or sociological test: Buttery v Muirhead [1970] SASR 334 at 337 per Bray CJ who pointed out that, if the last were the real test, it might be difficult to show a need for any commodity above the minimum requirements of food, clothing and shelter.
2. The test is objective in the sense that for the demand to amount to a need, it must be a reasonable demand by contemporary standards: Blackwood Foodland Pty Ltd v Milne [1971] SASR 403, 407.
3. The needs of the public are not necessarily concerned with the mere availability of liquor. They may be concerned with matters of taste, convenience, preference for one type of facility over another, the manner in which liquor is displayed and served, and the type and standard of accompanying services: Lincoln Bottle Shop Pty Ltd v Hamden Hotel Pty Ltd (No 2) (1981) 28 SASR 458 at 460.
4. The convenience of the public is one aspect of the concept of need: Gladstone Cellars Pty Ltd v Fricker (1984) 36 SASR 22 at 26, 27 and 31. So, the desire to purchase liquor at particular premises becomes a need within the meaning of s63 but only if the desire is not sufficiently and reasonably met by other licensed premises existing in the locality: Gladstone Cellars Pty Ltd v Fricker at 26.
5. The question of need has a dynamic element so that the assessment of the need by reference to contemporary standards requires the Court to have regard to any perceived shift in public expectations about liquor marketing: per Cox J in Lovell v New World Supermarket Pty Ltd (1990) 53 SASR 53 at 58.
6. The public includes tourists who are sufficiently close to the proposed licensed premises to regard the availability of liquor at those premises as a practical means of meeting their demands: Lincoln Bottle Shop Pty Ltd v Hamden Hotel Pty Ltd (1978) 19 SASR 326, 340; Tonsley Hotel Pty Ltd v Whelan (1982) 31 SASR 321, 332-334. The later decision contains (sic) as to who can be fairly considered to be tourists.
7. Although many of these observations have been made in the context of applications for a retail storekeeper’s licence, they apply with equal force to an application for an hotel licence: Le Cornu v Astor Tavern Pty Ltd (1983) 34 SASR 117.”
I should add that the present test for the grant of a retail liquor merchant’s licence is different: Woolies Liquor Stores v Carleton Investments (Unreported, Full Court (Doyle CJ, Millhouse and Nyland JJ), 15 May 1998, Judgment No S6682).
The main thrust of the appellant’s argument emphasized principle 3 above, namely that the need for liquor in this case was to be seen in the particular context of the need for high quality food and the relaxed atmosphere of a wine bar. Matters of taste, preference and convenience were said to be relevant in determining that need.
However, it is apparent from the description of the business to be conducted from the premises that the predominant activity was to be the supply of food in and from the premises. The appellant would therefore have satisfied the requirements of s34(2) of the Act if it had applied for a restaurant licence. The only features of the proposed business which would not be covered by a restaurant licence were:
(a)the sale of liquor for consumption by persons standing at the bar, such liquor not being ancillary to a meal, and
(b)the sale of liquor through the bottle shop for consumption off the premises.
In relation to the first of these limitations, there is nothing in the Act which would prevent the holder of a restaurant licence from selling liquor for consumption on the premises at a bar, by people standing, provided that this was ancillary to a meal. There is nothing in the Act which would prevent the holder of a restaurant licence from selling liquor, not with or ancillary to a meal, for consumption in a bar area by persons seated at a table. The Act does not specify the type of table required, but it need not necessarily be a table of the type at which the appellant might serve a meal in the restaurant section.
The decision under appeal
The reasons of the Licensing Court Judge are somewhat discursive and unstructured. Nevertheless, it is possible to reduce them to a series of propositions from which the basis of his Honour’s decision can be discerned.
As is necessary for the purpose of s58(1) of the Act, he defined the relevant locality for the purposes of that section in very general terms as being bounded by Greenhill Road, Goodwood Road, Cross Road and Fullarton Road “with suburbs or parts of suburbs either within or bordering”. No-one challenged that definition of the locality. Within it were a number of hotels, including all the objector hotels, and one centrally located retail liquor merchant, who also objected. Within the locality was a large number of restaurants covering a range of quality and styles.
The Licensing Court Judge concluded on the evidence that there was a demand for the type of cuisine proposed to be offered by the appellant. It was a style of food that was not available from the objector hotels. His Honour nevertheless attributed little weight to that factor. In my opinion he was correct in doing so and in relying, as he did, on what this Court said in Japling Pty Ltd v Shenannigans One Pty Ltd (1998) 199 LSJS 469 at 479:
“A case proving a need based on providing premises with a different atmosphere from others in the locality is very ephemeral. The need for a hotel is not demonstrated in that way. If that were so, the need for another hotel would be demonstrated whenever fashions or tastes might change. Thus, a shift in tastes or preferences from an Irish pub to some other kind of decor and operation would provide a need for a licence. Plainly that is not what s58(1) contemplates. Plainly, some weight should be attached to the fact that preference and tastes will change. But matters of preference and taste cannot be pressed too far for there is nothing to prevent an applicant for an hotel licence from altering the decor and get-up of an hotel and its manner of operation in order to attract custom. Two hotels mentioned in the evidence in this case provide concrete examples. The Norwood Hotel is an old and well-established hotel. Its licensee is Saterno’s Norwood Hotel Pty Ltd. It has recently changed its get-up and manner of operation to emulate an Irish pub and is called “Finn McCool’s”. Reference has already been made to the Elephant & Wheelbarrow, where the proprietors changed their proposed premises from an Irish pub to an English pub. Thus, while matters of taste and preference may have a bearing, the weight to be attached to them must often be slight. To adopt a facon de parler of Gertrude Stein, a hotel is a hotel is a hotel is a hotel. What must be established is the need for the range of facilities provided by hotels as explained in Anglers Hotel/Motel v Taranto (1980) Pty Ltd (1996) 188 LSJS 321 at 325.”
The Licensing Court Judge next found that there was a significant desire for the type of wine bar facilities and atmosphere proposed by the appellant. That is, a facility with a bar separate from the dining area, where the patrons could have a drink without being required to sit at a restaurant table. He found that the type of liquor proposed to be sold at the wine bar was not generally available for consumption on other licensed premises in the locality. That type of wine bar was needed and was not being provided by the objector hotels. However, he considered that one hotel, namely the Earl of Leicester Hotel, which was not an objector, did attract the sort of people represented by the “needs” witnesses in this case. It contained a small bar devoted to good quality wine by the glass. It had high class restaurant facilities and was a “classy and excellent venue”. It did provide poker machines, but these were totally separated from the dining areas and bars. Of this hotel his Honour concluded:
“I say the Leicester Hotel, whilst clearly of a different decor, though just as upmarket, provides all of these things if these people choose to seek it out. As far as I can see, given these premises, the desire for the special bar is met and there is no need for another hotel to meet this want.”
Had that remained as the principal reason for refusing the licence, the result may well have been subject to serious question. Evidence of the facilities of the Earl of Leicester Hotel was introduced at a very late stage in the case. Many of the witnesses called by the appellant who had given evidence of the need for this type of bar were not asked about or were not aware of the facilities of the Earl of Leicester Hotel. Therefore they were not able to comment on its suitability as a wine bar of the type which they desired. The hotel is located in the north-east corner of the locality in an area not readily accessible from other parts of the locality. Although poker machines were in a separate area, many of the witnesses had said that they would not patronise any establishment with poker machines, even if they were not readily visible.
However, as it transpires, it appears that that was not the principal reason for the judge refusing to grant the application.
The third major finding by the judge related to need for takeaway liquor facilities. A number of witnesses had agreed with a suggestion put to them in evidence that there would be a convenience in being able to purchase liquor on the premises for consumption elsewhere. The judge was nevertheless left “with a lasting impression of doubt as to whether some of them would avail themselves of this facility at all or, if some did, whether it would be with any significant regularity”. In my opinion, that impression was well-justified, and having read the evidence, there were very few witnesses, if any, who expressed what could properly be classified as a need for additional facilities for takeaway liquor, even of the type proposed to be sold by the appellant.
His Honour (in my view correctly) dismissed demand for the style of cuisine proposed by the appellant as a compelling factor. He found (again in my view correctly) that there was a lack of need for additional bottle shop facilities in the locality. His Honour was then left with the demand for wine bar facilities over and above those which could normally be provided by the holder of a restaurant licence. Rather than refuse the application because such facilities were provided by the Earl of Leicester Hotel, his Honour adopted and acted upon a dictum of Debelle J which is set out below in Angler’s Hotel/Motel and Others v Taranto (1980) Pty Ltd (1996) 188 LSJS 321. The dictum must be read in the context of an application for a hotel licence by the proprietor of the Esquire Motel at Wallaroo, a country town in South Australia. The operator already held a residential licence under the Liquor Licensing Act 1985 enabling it to sell liquor to lodgers for consumption at the motel or away from the motel (in limited quantities), to diners in the motel, whether lodgers or other persons, and to those attending a reception for consumption in the designated reception area. The basis on which an hotel licence was sought was that the significant section of the population were looking for “more upmarket premises” where they could get a drink and sometimes a meal in comfortable, relatively modern and quiet premises, notwithstanding that there were five existing hotels in the town (population about 2500, increasing by about 500 in holiday seasons). In the course of allowing an appeal against the granting of the licence Debelle J, speaking also on behalf of Millhouse and Williams JJ said (at 324-325):
“Thus, the need which is identified is a limited one, namely, those who wish to have a drink and sometimes a meal in comfortable and relatively modern quiet premises. Those who seek to have a meal with liquor may already do so at the Esquire Motel. Thus, the only need which has been proved which is not actually being satisfied is the capacity to get a drink in modern comfortable and quiet surroundings. That is a very limited part of the overall trade or business of an hotel.
An hotel licence permits the sale and the supply of liquor to the public in bar rooms, lounges, and a dining room or dining rooms, and permits the sale of liquor for consumption off the premises which is usually effected by part of the premises being set up as a bottle department. The hours are quite long. If the hotel provides accommodation, lodgers may be served liquor at any time. It is unnecessary, for present purposes, closely to examine the terms and conditions of an hotel licence. It is sufficient to note that it permits the sale and supply of liquor in a wide variety of circumstances.
When proving the need for an hotel licence pursuant to s63, an applicant would have to satisfy the Licensing Court that there is a need for the range of facilities generally provided by an hotel. It is unnecessary to prove that there is a need for accommodation for lodgers. However, as a general rule, it would be necessary to prove a need for premises serving liquor to the public for consumption on and off the licensed premises. That need might be established in a variety of ways. It might not be necessary to prove the need for an hotel with a full range of bar rooms, lounges and the like and a substantial walk in and drive in bottle department. Each case will depend upon its own facts and circumstances. It is not necessary in this case to examine what will be sufficient proof of need. What can, however, be stated is that need for an hotel is not proved by identifying one small part of the overall trade of an hotel where, at the end of the day, all that is established is a preference to be able to drink liquor in a quiet lounge bar. Making all due allowance for contemporary tastes and standards and for shifts in public attitudes and expectations, Taranto has not proved a need for an hotel licence.”
The Licensing Court Judge in this case considered that those remarks were appropriately applied to the circumstances of this case, and for those reasons determined that the application should be refused.
Application of relevant principles
The Taranto Case was decided under the 1985 Act. At that time it was not possible, under a restaurant licence or a residential licence, to serve any liquor other than with or ancillary to a meal. There was an exception under a residential licence in relation to bona fide lodgers. Bar facilities were the additional facilities that the applicant wished to provide. It was those facilities which were described as being the very limited part of the overall business of a hotel and which were insufficient to justify the grant of a hotel licence. Thus, the availability of liquor under an existing or alternative licence was relevant to whether the need could be satisfied.
Whilst I do not suggest that Taranto was other than rightly decided, I would not be prepared to say that if bar facilities of a particular type was the only need demonstrated, a hotel licence should not be granted. In certain circumstances with a different kind of business that may be sufficient to justify the grant of such a licence. It might be shown to be a reasonable demand by emerging contemporary standards, and by giving due effect to matters of taste, convenience and preference. However, as Taranto demonstrates, whether the need required by s58(1) is able to be shown may also depend on whether that need can be largely satisfied by some other form of licence for which proof of need is not necessary. It must be remembered that a hotel licence once granted, even if only to satisfy a limited need or “niche” market can always later be used for the wider purposes generally provided by a hotel. If that market can be satisfied otherwise, the particular need disappears. The obvious alternative licence to consider in this case is a restaurant licence.
In this case, like Taranto, the allegedly unsatisfied need is not for the range of facilities generally provided by a hotel. It is a preference for drinking a limited range of liquor in a particular style of bar which was not shown to be generally available in the locality. That facility was to be incidental to another predominant activity, the needs of which could be satisfied by an existing or readily available licence. In fact, the range of additional need in this case was even narrower than that alleged in Taranto. As I have already pointed out, the licensee under a restaurant licence may now sell liquor for consumption other than with or ancillary to a meal where it is for consumption by persons seated at a table. The only relevant activity for which it was said that a need was established, and which is not catered for by a restaurant licence in this case, is the ability to sell liquor to persons in such circumstances for consumption while standing. The range of unsatisfied need is even narrower in this case than it was in Taranto.
That is probably sufficient to dispose of the appeal. However, when the evidence of need is analysed more closely against what can be provided by the grant of a restaurant licence, it appears to me that most of the witnesses’ needs, with one or two qualifications, could be satisfied by the grant of a restaurant licence even with the limitation of supplying for consumption while seated at a table. This is particularly so, given that the need for takeaway liquor facilities had not been satisfactorily proved.
The evidence of need
I have already pointed out that the nature of the business, being primarily and predominantly the regular supply of meals to the public, satisfies s34(2) of the Act. There seems to be little doubt that, subject to the licensing authority being satisfied as to the suitability of the premises and of the licensee, a restaurant licence could be granted to the appellant in respect of the premises.
There is no doubt that most of the “needs” witnesses called by the appellant on the hearing of the application demonstrated a need in the locality for a wine bar of the type proposed by the appellant, and that this need was not served by hotels in the locality, with the possible exception of the Earl of Leicester Hotel. However, as I have also pointed out, many of these witnesses were not asked about that establishment or did not know of it. Most of the witnesses were not concerned about whether liquor was taken standing or sitting down. What predominates their evidence is the need for the type of liquor sold and the relaxed and quiet atmosphere in which it was served. When speaking of such facility, for example, Mr Hopkins, a communications consultant and journalist writing predominantly on food and wine, said (at Transcript page 84) that he had no objection to sitting at a table in such a bar if it were the right sort of table.
Mr Galantomos certainly said that sitting down to have a drink would detract from the experience (Transcript page 103), and that being seated at a table required some sort of commitment and pressure which was not what he was looking for in a wine bar. It was apparent, however, from the evidence that he gave that he was speaking of a dining table to seat nine or ten people.
Ms Cornwell (Transcript page 127) said that if she were with a group of ten or so people she would prefer a table, but in a wine bar she did not want to be as formal as sitting at a table. The assumption in her evidence seems to be that it would be a dining room table used for serving meals. However, she did find a bar “more relaxed and appropriate”. “It just depends on who you’re with and what you’re trying to achieve on the day, really.”
Ms Baxter spoke of her experience at similar establishments, namely The Universal Wine Bar and Bin 273. She said that in those places she stood at a bar, but she was not permitted by counsel who called her to answer why she preferred standing to sitting (Transcript page 172). Apart from describing herself as “not a pub kind of person” she did not address the question of being seated in such an establishment.
Ms Porcaro said that at similar establishments she would generally stand and drink at the bar if she were socialising. She was asked what it was about standing and drinking at a bar that appealed to her. She said (Transcript page 185):
“Well, it’s just a social thing I think. It’s not - I mean you can go anywhere and sit down and eat but if you want to just go purely just to have a drink it would be nice just to stand and sit at a nice up-market bar basically. I mean I wouldn’t stand at the Cremorne or anything.” (My emphasis)
Ms Mitchell said that the restaurant without a bar would not have the same appeal as a meeting place and that a “stand up” area would attract a lot of people. She admitted that if there were no bar but she could still have a drink, even if it was at a table but not a table set for meals, she would prefer that to nothing. She said that if she had a choice she would have a bar (Transcript page 214).
Mr Christou (Transcript page 226) said:
“[I]t’s a lot easier to meet people rather than sitting down waiting at a table to meet somebody or friends from work. You can have a drink by yourself or you can talk to somebody else at the bar but it doesn’t - me for instance, I don’t know how long I’m going to stay at a bar when I do go and by standing up makes it a bit easier to get out and go or stay and drink... If it’s an organised dinner than we’d go straight to the restaurant and sit but if it’s an organised drinks and then it’s dinner we’d much prefer to meet at a wine bar.”
He preferred the ability to stand, but it was not made clear what sort of table he had in mind waiting at. The context of the answer suggests that it may well have been a restaurant table. Furthermore, the need evidenced by the latter passage could plainly be supplied under a restaurant licence.
Ms Fleming preferred the “flexibility” of standing, without necessarily having to stay for a meal. The theme running through her evidence was the need for comfort and informality.
Other witnesses did not address the question. However, the consistent theme from the evidence of the “needs” witnesses related to ambience, atmosphere and flexibility, without particular or in some cases any emphasis on standing at a bar.
I approach this evidence against the background that the predominant activity of the business is the service of meals, and the fact that there is nothing to prevent liquor from being provided in the premises ancillary to a meal in some part of the premises other than at a table. I also bear in mind that there is nothing to prevent service to those who do not wish to have a meal so long as the liquor is provided for consumption by persons seated at a table. I also take into account that the type of table is not prescribed, that it need not necessarily be the same table or tables on which meals are served, and that the chairs provided for seating need not be dining chairs. When properly analysed, the principal needs and those consistently expressed by the witnesses could largely be fulfilled without a hotel licence, by a bar area of the type proposed with suitable furniture to meet the requirements of a restaurant licence. In short, the need could almost entirely be met by the grant of a restaurant licence. It would not be impossible to create a similar ambience to that desired by those who gave evidence. The range of unsatisfied need thus becomes negligible.
The introduction in 1997 of the provision of liquor in a restaurant without an accompanying meal in the circumstances described in s34 of the Act bears all the hallmarks of a political compromise. As I have already observed, there is nothing to suggest that the tables provided need be the same tables as provided in the premises for the service of meals in the restaurant, nor that chairs for sitting at those tables should necessarily be dining room type chairs.
In my opinion the needs of the public in the locality as expressed by the witnesses did not render it necessary to grant a hotel licence, and in my opinion the application was properly refused. The appeal should be dismissed.
WICKS J I agree that this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Bleby J. I have nothing to add.
MARTIN J. I also agree that this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Bleby J.
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