TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Chromagen Solar Australia Pty Ltd to registration of trade mark application no(s) 1422626 – FIRST SOLAR with device– and 1422628 – FIRST SOLAR - filed in the name of First Solar, Inc.
| Delegate: | Bianca Irgang |
| Representation: | Opponent: Stephen Rebikoff of Davies Collison Cave Applicant: Gary Nock of Counsel instructed by Cullens |
| Decision: | 2015 ATMO 45 Opposition under section 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 – Sections 42(b), 44 and 60 pressed – section 44 established for all goods and services – costs awarded against the applicant. |
Background
First Solar, Inc (‘the applicant’) filed its trade mark applications on 29 April 2011 in classes 7, 9, 11, 37 and 42 of the International Classification of Goods and Services. Relevant details of the applications are set out below.
Trade mark:
Trade mark application: 1422626
Filing Date: 29 April 2011
Specification: Class 7: Machinery for the manufacture of solar panels
Class 9:Photovoltaic modules, assemblies and arrays of photovoltaic cells, solar cells for direct generation of electricity; electrical apparatus (other than generators) for use in electricity supply, including electrical apparatus for use in supplying electricity generated from photovoltaic cells
Class 11:Solar photovoltaic collector panels
Class 37:Construction services relating to planning, laying out and construction of photovoltaic arrays, systems and subsystems; construction information; installation of solar energy systems; installation of electrical systems to distribute electricity generated by solar cells; construction
Class 42:Technical research and consulting services on energy saving; quality control of solar panels; mechanical research of machinery for the manufacture of solar panels; technical research; consultancy in the field of energy saving; quality control of the layout, construction and operation of solar panels and photovoltaic arrays; design of power plants; design of solar photovoltaic systems; technical planning of photovoltaic installations and solar energy systems; and mechanical research
Trade mark: FIRST SOLAR
Trade mark application: 1422628
Filing Date: 29 April 2011
Specification: Class 7: Machinery for the manufacture of solar panels
Class 9: Photovoltaic modules, assemblies and arrays of photovoltaic cells, solar cells for direct generation of electricity; electrical apparatus (other than generators) for use in electricity supply, including electrical apparatus for use in supplying electricity generated from photovoltaic cells
Class 11: Solar photovoltaic collector panels
Class 37: Construction services relating to planning, laying out and construction of photovoltaic arrays, systems and subsystems; construction information; installation of solar energy systems; installation of electrical systems to distribute electricity generated by solar cells; construction
Class 42: Technical research and consulting services on energy saving; quality control of solar panels; mechanical research of machinery for the manufacture of solar panels; technical research; consultancy in the field of energy saving; quality control of the layout, construction and operation of solar panels and photovoltaic arrays; design of power plants; design of solar photovoltaic systems; technical planning of photovoltaic installations and solar energy systems; and mechanical research
The applications were advertised as accepted for…
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- Case
- [2015] ATMO 45
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether First Solar's representations about its solar panels constituted misleading or deceptive conduct. This required the Court to consider the nature of the representations made, the context in which they were made, and whether they were likely to mislead or deceive a reasonable consumer in the position of Chromagen. The Court also had to determine whether any such misleading or deceptive conduct caused loss or damage to Chromagen.
In its reasoning, the Court analysed the evidence presented by both parties, including expert reports and commercial documents, to assess the truthfulness and accuracy of First Solar's claims. The Court applied the established legal principles for determining misleading or deceptive conduct, focusing on whether the overall impression created by the representations was likely to mislead. The Court found that First Solar had not engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct as alleged by Chromagen, concluding that the representations made were not false or misleading in the circumstances. Consequently, Chromagen's claim for damages was dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Chromagen Solar Australia Pty Ltd filed a Notice of Opposition against the registration of trade mark applications 1422626 and 1422628 filed by First Solar, Inc. The applications were advertised for acceptance in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks on 25 August 2011. The opponent filed its Notices of Opposition on 25 November 2011. The matter was heard by Bianca Irgang, a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, in Melbourne on 16 March 2015. The opponent pressed grounds of opposition under sections 42(b), 44 and 60 of the Trade Marks Act 1995. The opponent established the ground of opposition under section 44, which prohibits registration if the trade mark is substantially identical or deceptively similar to an earlier trade mark. The delegate found that the applicant's FIRST SOLAR trade marks were deceptively similar to the opponent's SOLAR FIRST trade marks. The applicant did not provide sufficient evidence of prior use or other circumstances to overcome the established section 44 ground of opposition. As a result, the delegate refused registration of the trade mark applications and awarded costs against the applicant.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the opponent has established the ground of opposition under section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995.
2. Whether the applicant's trade marks are substantially identical or deceptively similar to the opponent's trade marks.
3. Whether the applicant has demonstrated prior use or honest concurrent use of the trade marks in Australia to overcome the section 44 ground of opposition.
4. Whether the applicant has provided evidence of other circumstances that would allow it to overcome the section 44 ground of opposition.
Held
1. Whether the opponent has established the ground of opposition under section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995: The opponent has established the ground of opposition under section 44, concluding that the applicant's trade marks are deceptively similar to the opponent's trade marks.
2. Whether the applicant's trade marks are substantially identical or deceptively similar to the opponent's trade marks: The applicant's trade marks are found to be deceptively similar to the opponent's trade marks.
3. Whether the applicant has demonstrated prior use or honest concurrent use of the trade marks in Australia to overcome the section 44 ground of opposition: The applicant has not demonstrated sufficient prior use or honest concurrent use of the trade marks in Australia to overcome the section 44 ground of opposition.
4. Whether the applicant has provided evidence of other circumstances that would allow it to overcome the section 44 ground of opposition: The applicant has not provided sufficient evidence of other circumstances to overcome the section 44 ground of opposition.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court in Chromagen Solar Australia Pty Ltd v First Solar, Inc considered whether the opponent, Chromagen Solar Australia Pty Ltd, had established the ground of opposition under section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995. The opponent claimed that the applicant's trade marks, FIRST SOLAR and FIRST SOLAR with device, were substantially identical or deceptively similar to its own trade mark SOLAR FIRST. The opponent argued that the applicant's trade marks would cause confusion and deception among Australian consumers. The delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, Bianca Irgang, examined the visual and conceptual similarities between the trade marks and concluded that the applicant's trade marks were deceptively similar to the opponent's trade mark. The visual differences between the trade marks, such as the reversed order of the words, were not deemed significant enough to distinguish them. The court found that the opponent had successfully established the ground of opposition under section 44.
The applicant argued that it had been using the FIRST SOLAR trade marks since 1999, five years before the opponent commenced using its SOLAR FIRST trade mark in Australia. The applicant provided evidence of its use of the trade marks in overseas markets and a few instances of use in Australia. However, the court found that the applicant's evidence was insufficient to demonstrate prior use or honest concurrent use of the trade marks in Australia to overcome the section 44 ground of opposition. The applicant's use of the trade marks in Australia was limited and did not cover the entire goods and services specification. The court also found that the applicant had not provided evidence of other circumstances that would allow it to overcome the section 44 ground of opposition.
The court's reasoning in this case establishes that the opponent has successfully established the ground of opposition under section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995. The court applied the relevant legal principles and authorities to determine whether the applicant's trade marks were substantially identical or deceptively similar to the opponent's trade mark. The court found that the applicant's trade marks were deceptively similar and that the opponent had established the section 44 ground of opposition. The court's decision in this case provides guidance on the factors that should be considered when assessing whether trade marks are deceptively similar and the evidence required to overcome a section 44 ground of opposition.