Christakos Transport Pty Ltd (in Liq) v Croft

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      Christakos Transport Pty Ltd (in liq) v Croft [2005]  NSWCA 472

FILE NUMBER(S):
400097/05

HEARING DATE(S):               22/08/05

JUDGMENT DATE: 22/12/2005

PARTIES:
Christakos Transport Pty Ltd - Claimant
Lance Croft - Opponent

JUDGMENT OF:       Santow JA McColl JA Campbell AJA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          12840/01

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Quirk DCJ

COUNSEL:
J E Maconachie QC with Ms V M Heath - Claimant
J L Sharpe - Opponent

SOLICITORS:
Henry Davis York -  Claimant
Maurice Blackburn Cashman - Opponent

CATCHWORDS:
Limitation of Actions - Application for extension of time - Limitation Act, s 60C - Onus of proof - Application of Limitation Act, s 60E - Costs - Whether trial judge erred in advising that each party pay own costs.

LEGISLATION CITED:
Limitation Act 1969

DECISION:
1. Extend time for filing and serving of ordinary summons for leave to appeal until date of filing and serving of ordinary summons for leave to appeal filed herein;  2. Leave to appeal granted; 3.     Notice of appeal to be filed within seven days; 4. Appeal dismissed with costs.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40097/05
DC 12840/01

SANTOW JA
McCOLL JA
M W CAMPBELL AJA

Thursday 22 December 2005

CHRISTAKOS TRANSPORT PTY LTD (in liquidation) v CROFT

JUDGMENT

  1. SANTOW JA:     I agree with M W Campbell AJA.

  2. McCOLL JA:      I agree with M W Campbell AJA

  3. M W CAMPBELL AJA:

INTRODUCTION

On 3 September 2004 Her Honour Judge Quirk of the District Court, pursuant to s 60C of the Limitation Act 1969 (the Act), extended the relevant limitation period thus enabling the opponent to bring proceedings against the claimant.

  1. The claimant seeks leave to appeal from that decision.  The leave application has been argued on the basis that, if leave is granted, the appeal will be determined without further argument.  I should note that procedural difficulty has resulted in a need to seek an extension of time in which to file the ordinary summons for leave to appeal.  I propose that that extension be granted.

  2. The proceedings relate to the joinder of the claimant (CT) as the fourth defendant in a District Court action in which the opponent (Croft) claims damages for personal injury.

  3. In the District Court action Croft sued as first defendant Lau Nay Nominees Pty Ltd t/as ABS Transport (ABS), as second defendant Christakos Bros Transport Pty Ltd (in liq.) (CBT) and as third defendant Christakos Bros Pty Ltd (CB).  The proceedings against CB have been discontinued.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES

  1. On 1 May 2000 Croft, in the course of his employment as a truck driver with ABS, was assisting (on his account) in the loading of a tanning machine, by employees of CT, onto the truck of which he was the driver in premises at 47- 49 Boolcarrol Road, Wee Waa occupied by CT.  He said that oil escaped from the tanning machine onto the tray of the truck and that, as a…

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Details
Case
[2005] NSWCA 472
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Christakos Transport Pty Ltd (in Liq) v Croft* concerned an application for an extension of time to file and serve an ordinary summons for leave to appeal, and the subsequent appeal itself. The primary dispute revolved around whether the trial judge erred in exercising her discretion to extend the limitation period for the respondent, Croft, and in her decision regarding costs. The matter came before the appellate court following a decision by a trial judge.

The legal issues before the court were whether the trial judge had erred in her reasons for granting an extension of time under section 60C of the *Limitation Act*, and whether she had erred in her decision that each party should bear their own costs of the application for an extension of time. The court was required to consider the onus of proof in relation to the extension of time application and the application of section 60E of the *Limitation Act*.

The appellate court reasoned that while the trial judge's reasons for extending the limitation period might have had deficiencies in expression, they satisfied the legal requirements. The court found that the trial judge had adequately considered the delay and that it was open to her to conclude that the delay was explained, particularly given the complex corporate structure and the information available to the respondent's solicitors at the time. The court noted that submissions relying on hindsight were not persuasive. Regarding costs, the court observed that neither party had drawn the trial judge's attention to District Court Rule Part 29A rule 32, which generally mandates that the applicant for an extension of time pays the costs of the application unless the court orders otherwise. However, the court also acknowledged that it was usual for the applicant to bear costs even if successful.

Ultimately, the court granted leave to appeal, finding it desirable to finally resolve the limitation issue. However, the appeal was dismissed as the court found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion to extend the limitation period. The court also dismissed the appellants' contention regarding costs, upholding the trial judge's order that each party pay their own costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Extend time for filing and serving of ordinary summons for leave to appeal until date of filing and serving of ordinary summons for leave to appeal filed herein; 2. Leave to appeal granted; 3. Notice of appeal to be filed within seven days; 4. Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The grounds of appeal rely upon a failure to give adequate reasons. I have already accepted that there are deficiencies in expression such as are to be expected in a near ex tempore judgment. In my opinion the reasons given by the Judge satisfy the requirements of the law (Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247).CONCLUSION There are features of this case which militate against the grant of leave to appeal. However, it does seem to me that in the context of the litigation as a whole it is desirable that the limitation issue be finally resolved at this stage. Accordingly, I propose that leave to appeal be granted. In my view CT has not established error on the part of Judge Quirk in the exercise of her discretion to extend the limitation period. (House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499). Accordingly, I propose that the appeal be dismissed with costs.COSTS The order made on the hearing was that each party pay its own costs of the application. The appellants seek an order that, whatever the outcome of this appeal, Croft pay the costs of the application. Upon this question CT has the onus of showing a manifest error on the part of the trial judge and, moreover, of the kind warranting intervention in an area of discretion concerning practice and procedure. (See Gorczynski v Perera [2004] NSWCA 71 per Santow JA at [24], Wentworth v Rogers (No 3) (1986) 6 NSWLR 642). In the Will of F B Gilbert (Deceased) (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318 at 323 Jordan CJ said: “…. there is a material difference between an exercise of discretion on a point of practice or procedure and an exercise of discretion which determines substantive rights. In the former class of case, if a tight rein were not kept upon interference with the orders of judges of first instance, the result would be disastrous to the proper administration of justice.” At the commencement of the portion of the judgment dealing with costs her Honour said:“The plaintiff seeks an order that the fourth defendant (CT) pay its costs, or alternatively an order that costs be costs in the cause. The defendant seeks costs from the plaintiff. Costs are discretionary.” Neither party appears to have drawn her Honour’s attention to Part 29A rule 32 of the District Court Rules which provides:32. Where a party applies for an extension of time, unless the Court otherwise orders, the party shall, after the conclusion of the proceedings, pay the costs of and occasioned by the application, or any order made on or in consequence of the application.” That rule leaves it open to “the Court to otherwise order.” It is unnecessary to consider whether CT having failed to draw the Judge’s attention to the rule, can rely upon it. For Ms Heath put to her Honour that where an indulgence is sought the normal order would be for the applicant to pay the costs even though otherwise successful. Mr Gibson of Counsel, who appeared for Croft at first instance, subsequently said:“My friend is correct is submitting to your Honour that in [an] application of this nature it is usual for the applicant to bear the costs even if successful.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Sharpe also referred to the advice from Mr Tuckwell as to CB [31] and to the later letter from Phillips Fox advising that the premises were occupied at the relevant time by either CBT or CT. [11].Section 60E (1)(a) Consideration As I have mentioned there is an overlapping element in the consideration of these separate matters and, at the end, a determination to be made upon all the circumstances of the case. Nonetheless, it is useful to make some comments as to the separate elements. It would not be practicable to deal with every issue mentioned, although I have considered them all. CT’s submissions are carefully drawn and obviously reflect much thought however, with respect, they rely significantly on the great advantage of hindsight and a level of perception and activity not found in the real world of litigation. A somewhat similar point was made by Judge Quirk when she referred to a contrast between what it was suggested would have been done for CT and what appeared to have been done for CBT. I consider that Judge Quirk did deal with the question of delay. I think it was open to her to conclude that the delay was adequately explained. The course of events emerged clearly enough, as Mr Sharpe put, from the correspondence. The suggestions in the submissions as to what might or should have been done after the searches were received seem to me to depend very much on hindsight. Near to the commencement of his address Mr Maconachie said:“….I want to stick as closely as I can to the written submissions which Ms Heath has, being (sic) principally responsible for because to do otherwise is to make that which is already complicated, even more complicated…..” Croft’s solicitors had to cope with the complicated situation arising from the number of related Christakos companies, their difficulties and their connection with 47-49 Boolcarrol Road Wee Waa without the assistance of the information now available. Amongst the company searches carried out on 12 February 2002 was one of CT. It is not an unreasonable inference that a search was carried out on all the Christakos companies. Whether that be so or not the principal place of business was stated to be “Lot 1022 Newell Highway Narrabri”. Judge Quirk appears to have been under the impression that this search was later, however, she identifies in her judgment not “an address other than 47-49 Boolcarrol Road Wee Waa” as the submission suggests, but Narrabri, as the principal place of business. I do not think that without the advantage of hindsight and with the knowledge that CBT and CB owned parts of 47-49 Boolcarrol Road Wee Waa, it was unreasonable not to sue CT. Indeed a letter from Mr Dunphy, the liquidator of CT, to Croft’s solicitors of 9 March 2004 said, amongst other things:“You stated that the injury to your client occurred at 47 Boolcarrol Rd Wee Waa. During my investigation of the affairs of the Company I was unable to locate a lease of the premises from the owner RFI Pty Ltd. It is my understanding that the Company occupied the premises with the informal consent of the director of RFI Pty Ltd, Mr John Christakos until approximately 13 March 2003. At that time a payment of $16,500 was made by me as Liquidator of the Company to permit an on-site auction to be conducted at the premises on behalf of the Company, Christakos Bros Transport Pty Ltd and Sunderland Pastoral Co Pty Ltd. I provide this background information in case it is relevant to establishing the proper defendant in these proceedings.”