Choundary v Capital Airport Group Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Choundary v Capital Airport Group Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1755

CONTEMPT – whether prima facie case of interference with the course of justice – whether prima facie case of breach of discovery order and breach of subpoena

Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r 19.02

Choundary v Capital Airport Group [2006] FMCA 530 varied
Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (2001) 122 A Crim R 166 followed
Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union and Others v Mudginberri Station Pty Limited (1986) 161 CLR 98 cited
Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1982] AC 136 applied
Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 563 cited
May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 followed
R v AC Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd (2005) 152 A Crim R 384 applied
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 applied

KORINA CHOUNDARY v CAPITAL AIRPORT GROUP PTY LTD
ACD 10 OF 2006

GYLES J
18 DECEMBER 2006
CANBERRA


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

ACD 10 OF 2006

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

KORINA CHOUNDARY
Appellant

AND:

CAPITAL AIRPORT GROUP PTY LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

GYLES J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 DECEMBER 2006

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be upheld in part. 

2.The order of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 19 April 2006 dismissing the proceeding be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the proceeding be remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court for hearing in relation to charges 3 and 4. 

3.The respondent pay two-thirds of the appellant’s costs of this appeal.  The costs of the proceedings below should await the result of that proceeding.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

ACD 10 OF 2006

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

KORINA CHOUNDARY
Appellant

AND:

CAPITAL AIRPORT GROUP PTY LTD
Respondent

JUDGE:

GYLES J

DATE:

18 DECEMBER 2006

PLACE:

CANBERRA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 19 April 2006, pursuant to r 19.02(7) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), Mowbray FM dismissed contempt charges brought by the appellant, Korina Choundary, against Capital Airport Group Pty Ltd, the respondent, on the basis that no prima facie case had been made out on any of the three charges pressed (Choundary v Capital Airport Group [2006] FMCA 530). A fourth charge (originally described as charge 2) was not pressed. The appellant appeals in relation to each remaining charge.

  2. The three charges are as follows:

    ‘1.That Pursuant to Federal Magistrates Court Rule 19.02(1) the Respondent be found guilty of contempt of this Court for interfering in the due administration of justice in that it intentionally destroyed the Applicant’s e-mail mailbox after it had been notified of the proposed proceedings and after it had accessed that e-mail account on or about 3 October 2002 for the purpose of its…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 1755
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Choundary v Capital Airport Group Pty Ltd, the appellant, Choundary, brought proceedings against the respondent, Capital Airport Group, before the Federal Magistrates Court, alleging contempt of court due to interference with the administration of justice, failure to comply with subpoenas, and failure to comply with an order for discovery. The Federal Magistrates Court dismissed the proceedings, finding no prima facie case for contempt. Choundary appealed the decision, arguing that the Federal Magistrate erred in not considering whether the conclusion of no prima facie case could be reached rather than deciding the issue on his own.

The court considered the elements required to establish contempt of court in this case. The Federal Magistrate had found that there was no direct evidence of the respondent’s intention to interfere with the administration of justice, and no direct evidence that the email mailbox had been destroyed or deleted. The court noted that the Federal Magistrate referred to the proper test and used the word ‘could’, which is consistent with the correct test. However, the court found that it would not be possible, on the primary facts, to exclude the hypothesis that any destruction of the emails that took place was the result of actions by persons with no knowledge of the proceedings or potential proceedings or was a result of a procedure which did not take account of those proceedings.

The court held that the appeal was upheld in part. The order of the Federal Magistrates Court dismissing the proceeding was set aside, and the proceeding was remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court for hearing in relation to charges 3 and 4. The respondent was ordered to pay two-thirds of the appellant’s costs of this appeal. The costs of the proceedings below were to await the result of the remitted proceeding. Any application that could be made pursuant to the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) could be made to the court in Chambers.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be upheld in part.

2. The order of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 19 April 2006 dismissing the proceeding be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the proceeding be remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court for hearing in relation to charges 3 and 4.

3. The respondent pay two-thirds of the appellant’s costs of this appeal. The costs of the proceedings below should await the result of that proceeding.

Background

Background to the litigation

The three charges are as follows:‘1.That Pursuant to Federal Magistrates Court Rule 19.02(1) the Respondent be found guilty of contempt of this Court for interfering in the due administration of justice in that it intentionally destroyed the Applicant’s e-mail mailbox after it had been notified of the proposed proceedings and after it had accessed that e-mail account on or about 3 October 2002 for the purpose of its proposed defence.…3.That pursuant to the Federal Magistrates Court Rule 19.02(1) the Respondent be found guilty of contempt of this Court for failing to comply with the subpoena issued by this Court on 12 February 2004 in that it did not produce the full chain of email correspondence dated 4 December 2001 between the Applicant and Ms Leesa Baker and then Ms Baker and Ms Hall and Ms Lindsay.4.That pursuant to Federal Magistrates Court Rule 19.02(1) the Respondent be found guilty of contempt of this Court for failing to comply with the order for discovery made by this Court on 1 July 2004 in that it did not discover the full chain of email correspondence dated 4 December 2001 variously between the Applicant and Ms Leesa Baker and then Ms Baker and Ms Hall and Ms Lindsay.’FACTS Because of the manner in which the Federal Magistrate decided the case, he did not need to set out a chronology of events. It is best to do so in order to deal with the issues on appeal. The following statement of facts is substantially drawn from the submissions for the appellant. I am satisfied the facts are properly based in the evidence. It needs to be borne in mind that it was only the appellant’s evidence which was relevant. The appellant was entitled to have that evidence considered at its highest (May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654; Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (2001) 122 A Crim R 166 per Ipp AJA at 172–176). I shall discuss some of the evidence in more detail when considering the individual charges. The appellant commenced full-time employment with the respondent as an accountant on 15 December 1997. In December 1998 the appellant was promoted to financial controller and received substantial pay increases during 1999 and 2000. In May 2000 the appellant married. In November 2000 the appellant became pregnant and in August 2001 gave birth to her son. In November 2001, during her maternity leave, the appellant met with Mr Stephen Byron, the respondent’s Managing Director, and indicated that she would like to return to work in February 2002 on a part-time basis. Whilst Mr Byron said he would consider her request, the appellant was uneasy about the way in which he treated her; she generally considered that he had been evasive and was unlikely to accede to her request. The appellant met again with Mr Byron in December 2001 during which he refused her request to return to work part-time. However, Mr Byron said that circumstances had changed since the collapse of Ansett Airlines. He now needed a person, who could work full-time, who could deal directly with the banks. When the appellant asked if she was the person who could do this work, he said ‘no’. The appellant then said she would return to work on a full-time basis. Mr Byron then recommended that the appellant take a part-time position she had been offered with another company instead. The appellant felt devastated after this meeting and was in tears. The appellant did not make a decision at that time but telephoned some days later to see if she could return to other available roles in the respondent’s accounts department. Mr Byron told her she would be bored by the other positions and he confirmed that she should resign. The appellant did not resign and considered herself dismissed in December 2001.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GYLES J
I gather from what was said by the respondent’s counsel that the ruling in question was not the result of an application by the respondent, but followed from the learned Federal Magistrate’s reading of r 19.02(7) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules which provides that, after hearing evidence in support of the allegation, the Court may, if it decides there is no prima facie case, dismiss the application. The effect of the rule in question was not argued before me. I am concerned if it requires the Court to rule as to whether there is a prima facie case of its own motion and regardless of the position of the respondent. A respondent with a simple explanation may prefer to fight the merits and so avoid interlocutory appeals. For all I know that may be the case here.CONCLUSION The appeal is upheld in part. The order of the Federal Magistrates Court dismissing the proceeding is set aside. In lieu thereof it will be ordered that the proceeding be remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court for hearing in relation to charges 3 and 4. The respondent should pay two-thirds of the costs of this appeal to reflect the failure of the appellant on one of the charges. The costs of the proceedings below should await the result of that proceeding. Any application that can be made pursuant to the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) can be made to me in Chambers.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GYLES J

Mr Ferraro stated in evidence that the email chain existed in electronic form as a whole and never as the separate emails annexed to Ms Baker’s email. His examination of the back-up tape of 9 January 2003 did not find the appellant’s email mailbox. CHARGE 1 – INTERFERENCE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE The Federal Magistrate found that:(1)It was necessary for the appellant to prove that the respondent intended to interfere with the administration of justice in any deletion or destruction of the email box.(2)There was no direct evidence of the respondent’s intention.(3)There was no direct evidence that the email mailbox had been destroyed or deleted.(4)He ‘could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent intended to interfere with the administration of justice’. Any finding of intention would be so speculative that it would not be beyond reasonable doubt. It is submitted in this appeal that the Federal Magistrate erred in his approach to the question by coming to his own decision as to whether the charge was proved beyond reasonable doubt, rather than considering whether that conclusion could be reached. Whilst there are some indications of that approach, the Federal Magistrate referred to the proper test and used the word ‘could’, which is consistent with the correct test. I would not uphold that submission in relation to this charge. There was debate both on this appeal and at the original hearing concerning the place of intent in relation to this charge. Reference was made to R v Rogerson (1991) 174 CLR 268; Meissner v The Queen (1994) 184 CLR 132; Lane v The Registrar of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Equity Division) (1981) 148 CLR 245; Hatty v Pilkinton (No 2) (1992) 35 FCR 433; and R v McLachlan [1998] 2 VR 55. In my opinion, it is not necessary to get deeply involved in fine distinctions to resolve this case. Counsel for the appellant accepted that it was necessary to prove that the respondent had intentionally destroyed the appellant’s email box knowing that to do so would have the tendency to interfere in the administration of justice. Counsel’s summary of the elements to be established was as follows:‘(a) the Respondent knew proceedings were imminent;(b)after the Respondent became aware that proceedings were imminent it destroyed the Appellant’s email mailbox;(c) that the destruction of the email mailbox was intentional;(d)that the destruction of the email mailbox interfered with the administration of justice;(d)the respondent knew the destruction of the Appellant’s email box was likely to have that tendency.’If intent to interfere with justice were an element and if those elements were established then intent could easily be inferred. The elements themselves of course can be established by making inferences from primary facts. This is a circumstantial case. The Federal Magistrate was required to take into account all inferences most favourable to the appellant, which could reasonably be drawn from the primary facts (see the decision of the Privy Council in Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1982] AC 136 at 150).In my opinion, it would not be possible, on the primary facts, to exclude the hypothesis that any destruction of the emails that took place was the result of actions by persons with no knowledge of the proceedings or potential proceedings or was a result of a procedure which did not take account of those proceedings. It is quite possible that a system could have existed which provided for the destruction of emails at fixed times during the year, at a particular length of time after an employee has left or as directed by some person in the administration or technology areas to suit the convenience of administration. In other words, any destruction may have been the result of a routine procedure. There is no inference available from the primary facts that would exclude that hypothesis unless there is speculation as to the circumstances of the alleged destruction.