FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Choundary v Capital Airport Group Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1755
CONTEMPT – whether prima facie case of interference with the course of justice – whether prima facie case of breach of discovery order and breach of subpoena
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r 19.02
Choundary v Capital Airport Group [2006] FMCA 530 varied
Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (2001) 122 A Crim R 166 followed
Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union and Others v Mudginberri Station Pty Limited (1986) 161 CLR 98 cited
Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1982] AC 136 applied
Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 563 cited
May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 followed
R v AC Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd (2005) 152 A Crim R 384 applied
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 appliedKORINA CHOUNDARY v CAPITAL AIRPORT GROUP PTY LTD
ACD 10 OF 2006GYLES J
18 DECEMBER 2006
CANBERRA
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
ACD 10 OF 2006
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
KORINA CHOUNDARY
AppellantAND:
CAPITAL AIRPORT GROUP PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
GYLES J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 DECEMBER 2006
WHERE MADE:
CANBERRA
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be upheld in part.
2.The order of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 19 April 2006 dismissing the proceeding be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the proceeding be remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court for hearing in relation to charges 3 and 4.
3.The respondent pay two-thirds of the appellant’s costs of this appeal. The costs of the proceedings below should await the result of that proceeding.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
ACD 10 OF 2006
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
KORINA CHOUNDARY
AppellantAND:
CAPITAL AIRPORT GROUP PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
GYLES J
DATE:
18 DECEMBER 2006
PLACE:
CANBERRA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 19 April 2006, pursuant to r 19.02(7) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), Mowbray FM dismissed contempt charges brought by the appellant, Korina Choundary, against Capital Airport Group Pty Ltd, the respondent, on the basis that no prima facie case had been made out on any of the three charges pressed (Choundary v Capital Airport Group [2006] FMCA 530). A fourth charge (originally described as charge 2) was not pressed. The appellant appeals in relation to each remaining charge.
The three charges are as follows:
‘1.That Pursuant to Federal Magistrates Court Rule 19.02(1) the Respondent be found guilty of contempt of this Court for interfering in the due administration of justice in that it intentionally destroyed the Applicant’s e-mail mailbox after it had been notified of the proposed proceedings and after it had accessed that e-mail account on or about 3 October 2002 for the purpose of its…
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- Case
- [2006] FCA 1755
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the elements required to establish contempt of court in this case. The Federal Magistrate had found that there was no direct evidence of the respondent’s intention to interfere with the administration of justice, and no direct evidence that the email mailbox had been destroyed or deleted. The court noted that the Federal Magistrate referred to the proper test and used the word ‘could’, which is consistent with the correct test. However, the court found that it would not be possible, on the primary facts, to exclude the hypothesis that any destruction of the emails that took place was the result of actions by persons with no knowledge of the proceedings or potential proceedings or was a result of a procedure which did not take account of those proceedings.
The court held that the appeal was upheld in part. The order of the Federal Magistrates Court dismissing the proceeding was set aside, and the proceeding was remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court for hearing in relation to charges 3 and 4. The respondent was ordered to pay two-thirds of the appellant’s costs of this appeal. The costs of the proceedings below were to await the result of the remitted proceeding. Any application that could be made pursuant to the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) could be made to the court in Chambers.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be upheld in part.
2. The order of the Federal Magistrates Court made on 19 April 2006 dismissing the proceeding be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that the proceeding be remitted to the Federal Magistrates Court for hearing in relation to charges 3 and 4.
3. The respondent pay two-thirds of the appellant’s costs of this appeal. The costs of the proceedings below should await the result of that proceeding.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GYLES J
Mr Ferraro stated in evidence that the email chain existed in electronic form as a whole and never as the separate emails annexed to Ms Baker’s email. His examination of the back-up tape of 9 January 2003 did not find the appellant’s email mailbox. CHARGE 1 – INTERFERENCE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE The Federal Magistrate found that:(1)It was necessary for the appellant to prove that the respondent intended to interfere with the administration of justice in any deletion or destruction of the email box.(2)There was no direct evidence of the respondent’s intention.(3)There was no direct evidence that the email mailbox had been destroyed or deleted.(4)He ‘could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent intended to interfere with the administration of justice’. Any finding of intention would be so speculative that it would not be beyond reasonable doubt. It is submitted in this appeal that the Federal Magistrate erred in his approach to the question by coming to his own decision as to whether the charge was proved beyond reasonable doubt, rather than considering whether that conclusion could be reached. Whilst there are some indications of that approach, the Federal Magistrate referred to the proper test and used the word ‘could’, which is consistent with the correct test. I would not uphold that submission in relation to this charge. There was debate both on this appeal and at the original hearing concerning the place of intent in relation to this charge. Reference was made to R v Rogerson (1991) 174 CLR 268; Meissner v The Queen (1994) 184 CLR 132; Lane v The Registrar of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Equity Division) (1981) 148 CLR 245; Hatty v Pilkinton (No 2) (1992) 35 FCR 433; and R v McLachlan [1998] 2 VR 55. In my opinion, it is not necessary to get deeply involved in fine distinctions to resolve this case. Counsel for the appellant accepted that it was necessary to prove that the respondent had intentionally destroyed the appellant’s email box knowing that to do so would have the tendency to interfere in the administration of justice. Counsel’s summary of the elements to be established was as follows:‘(a) the Respondent knew proceedings were imminent;(b)after the Respondent became aware that proceedings were imminent it destroyed the Appellant’s email mailbox;(c) that the destruction of the email mailbox was intentional;(d)that the destruction of the email mailbox interfered with the administration of justice;(d)the respondent knew the destruction of the Appellant’s email box was likely to have that tendency.’If intent to interfere with justice were an element and if those elements were established then intent could easily be inferred. The elements themselves of course can be established by making inferences from primary facts. This is a circumstantial case. The Federal Magistrate was required to take into account all inferences most favourable to the appellant, which could reasonably be drawn from the primary facts (see the decision of the Privy Council in Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1982] AC 136 at 150).In my opinion, it would not be possible, on the primary facts, to exclude the hypothesis that any destruction of the emails that took place was the result of actions by persons with no knowledge of the proceedings or potential proceedings or was a result of a procedure which did not take account of those proceedings. It is quite possible that a system could have existed which provided for the destruction of emails at fixed times during the year, at a particular length of time after an employee has left or as directed by some person in the administration or technology areas to suit the convenience of administration. In other words, any destruction may have been the result of a routine procedure. There is no inference available from the primary facts that would exclude that hypothesis unless there is speculation as to the circumstances of the alleged destruction.