Chopsonion Pty Ltd v Mulga Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 51 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Chopsonion Pty Ltd v Mulga Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2G 1418

File number(s): ADG 261 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE BROWN
Date of judgment: 29 August 2025
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application in a proceeding – application for a further amended statement of claim – pleads alleged misleading and deceptive conduct under Australian Consumer Law– need for precision – whether pleading confusing or embarrassing – whether pleading reveals a reasonable cause of action – pleading accessorial liability – whether the amended statement of claim should be accepted – whether leave to replead paragraphs struck out – matters to be considered
Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s138A

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)

Schedule 2 (Australian Consumer Law) ss 18, 21, 236, 237

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s182

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 5, 143, 174, 190, 192

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 5, 31A

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 8.05, 16.02, 16.21

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 1.04, 1.06, 4.01, 4.04, 4.05, 30.04

Cases cited:

Adachi v Qantas Airways Limited [2019] FCCA 1107

Aon Risk Management Limited v Australian national University (2009) 239 CLR 175

Australian Automotive Repairers Association (Political Action Committee) Inc v NRMA Insurance Limited [2002] FCA 1568

Banque Commerciale SA (EN Liquidation) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279

Bruce v Oldhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697

Chopsonion Pty Ltd v Mulga Corporation Pty Ltd [2024] FedCFamC2G 1450

Gaven & Gaven (No 2) [2012] FMCAfam 1005

Gupta v Menulog Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 1247

Kakazych v Santa Sabinda College & Anor [2020] FCCA 11

Kelly v Atanaskovic Hartnell Corporate Services Pty Ltd [2021] FCCA 552

Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth)

Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs: Ex parte Lam (2003) 195 ALR 502

Sabapathy v Jetstar Airways [2021] FCAFC 25

Takemoto v Moody’s Investors Service Pty Limited [2014] FCA 1081

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 175
Date of hearing: 15 August 2025
Place: Adelaide
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Belperio
Solicitor for the Applicant: Charlton Rowley
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Djurdjevic via Webex
Solicitor for the Respondent: DWF Law

ORDERS

ADG 261 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

CHOPSONION PTY LTD (APPOINTED CONTROLLER) (ACN 142 897 971)

Applicant

AND:

MULGA CORPORATION PTY LTD (ACN 144 810 435) AS TRUSTEE OF THE MULHERIN FAMILY TRUST

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE BROWN

DATE OF ORDER:

26 AUGUST 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Applicant’s application dated 24 April 2025 is dismissed and leave to replead the various paragraphs of the statement of claim filed on 5 August 2022 is refused.

2.No further leave is to be granted to the Applicant to file any further amended statement of claims in this matter.

3.Further consideration of the matter…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Chopsonion Pty Ltd v Mulga Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1418
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Chopsonion Pty Ltd brought an action against Mulga Corporation Pty Ltd, asserting claims of misleading and deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) and other related allegations. The case involved a dispute over payments made by the respondent, which were alleged to have been made without the authority of Chopsonion and for its detriment. The respondent, a corporate trustee of a family trust, was accused of being accessorily liable for the actions of the former director of Chopsonion, Mr. Sharpe, in connection with these payments. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant's proposed further amended statement of claim sufficiently pleaded a cause of action against the respondent and whether it was in the interests of justice to allow the applicant another opportunity to amend the pleadings.

The court found that the applicant's proposed pleading was still deficient in several respects. The allegations of accessorial liability against the respondent were based on bare assertions without sufficient detail to identify how or when the ACL or the Corporations Act had been contravened by the respondent. The court also noted that the case had been ongoing for several years with multiple attempts to amend the statement of claim, yet the applicant had not been able to sufficiently articulate a viable cause of action against the respondent. The court considered that allowing further amendments at this stage would not be consistent with the objectives of the Federal Court of Australia Act and would result in practical injustice to the respondent. Consequently, the court decided to refuse the application for leave to further amend the statement of claim.

The court ordered that the case be listed for directions on 26 November 2025 at 9:30am (Adelaide Time). The directions hearing would provide an opportunity for the parties to consider whether the case should proceed based on the current statement of claim or if any other interlocutory applications should be brought before the court.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Again, it is axiomatically not in the interests of the administration of justice that a potentially meritorious case is dismissed because of technical defects in pleadings, which will be ironed out as a case proceeds to trial. At the same time, it is unfair to the opposing party to put to unnecessary expense whilst an inept party haphazardly attempts to cure such defects.BACKGROUND With these principles in mind, I will attempt to ascertain what is each parties’ essential narrative of facts and law, from the copious and lengthy documents, which have hitherto been filed. Due to the lack of any significant affidavits of evidence being filed in the matter, I confess that the background and context of these proceedings is, from my perspective, still shrouded in mystery. Doing the best I can, from what I have been provided, the applicant – Chopsonion Pty Ltd[26] - is a company incorporated in New South Wales. What was the nature of its business is unclear to me. Its director, prior to the appointment of its current controller in October of 2016, is said to be James Sharpe.[27][26] Hereinafter referred to as “Chopsonion”.[27] Original Statement of Claim filed 28 July 2020 at 1.1. Chopsonion apparently entered into some form of lending agreement, at some unspecified time in the past, the provisions of which were registered pursuant to the provisions of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth). In general terms, this legislation enables the registration of a lender’s security interest, which if the relevant debtor becomes insolvent, enables it to protect its interests. In this context, on 20 October 2016, a controller was appointed in respect of Chopsonion, at the instigation of its various creditors. The controllers concerned were Nicholas Cooper, a chartered accountant and Richard Willson, a solicitor. The administration was concluded in July 2020 and revealed the company had no assets and no dividend was paid to creditors. The controller is, it would seem, in effect, the various creditors of Chopsonion, pursuant to the loan agreement between various corporate entities and it. Necessarily, their interests (and perhaps perspectives on the case) are not congruent with those of Mr Sharpe.The first statement of claim Chopsonion commenced these proceeding on 29 July 2020 filing an application and a statement of claim.[28] The application is a brief document. It seeks compensation in an amount of $130,000.00 and alternatively damages or compensation in an amount of $626,751.00.[28] Hereinafter referred to as SOC 1. As noted above, it was between October 2014 and early-2015 that various sums which amounted to $130,000.00, were paid to the respondent, which is the corporate trustee of a family trust – the Mulherin Family Trust – which carries on business as a firm of chartered accountants in Sydney, under the name of Mulherin Schier.[29][29] Hereinafter referred to the respondent. The application asserts that the respondent, between December 2014 and April 2015, caused certain payments to be made from its trust account which entirely dissipated this sum, which payments had been made without the authority of the applicant or for its benefit.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rather the pleading alleges the respondent bears some form of accessorial liability for Mr Sharpe’s breach of a directorial duty to Chopsonion rests on little more than bare assertion and as such can amount to a material fact and as such are to be characterised as embarrassing.CONCLUSIONS At the end of the process of closely examining three sets of pleadings, the case alleged against the respondent remains that it knew (or ought) to have known that an action attributed to the former director of Chopsonion (Mr Sharpe), in conjunction with dealings with Mr Anderson, was misleading and deceptive and, as a result, it was obliged to inform the individuals, who now control the respondent, of that director’s deception. As a result, the respondent is in some way alleged to be complicit with the deceptive behaviour of that director. How the respondent should have known of this deception, other than it was a firm of accountants, and what are the precise steps it should have taken to inform the current controllers of Chopsonion of the knowledge imputed to it is not specified. Thus, in my assessment, it has not identified how and when either the ACL or the Corporations Act has been contravened by the respondent, in distinction to any such breach by Mr Sharpe. For these reasons, in my view, the proposed pleading remains defective in the same manner as identified by Judge Lucev. As such, in my assessment, it would constitute a species of practical injustice to the respondent to allow the case to proceed on the basis on which it is proposed to plead it. At this juncture, I can see no utility in allowing the applicant a further attempt to remedy its statement of claim. The case has been on foot for five years, in respect of a cause of action which is asserted to have arisen at least five years before that. The application has been marked by delay – in this context, I concede the court itself has contributed to this delay – however, axiomatically, how the case has proceeded is not consistent with the overarching principles pertaining to the conduct of civil litigation. The applicant has had three attempts at formulating its case, which for the reasons provided above, still remains a bare assertion that the respondent is accessorily liable for the actions of Mr Sharpe (and other associated with him). It would not be consistent with the objectives of the FCFCOA Act to allow the applicant a fourth attempt to articulate its case. Accordingly leave to replead the various paragraphs of the statement of claim filed on 5 August 2022 is refused. In these circumstances, I propose to list the case for directions on 26 November 2025 at 9.30am (Adelaide Time). By this stage, the parties can consider whether it is appropriate for the case to proceed on the basis of the remainder of the statement of claim currently filed or whether any other interlocutory application should be brought before the court. For these reasons, the orders of the court will be as set out at the commencement of these reasons for judgement.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established