DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Chi Pharma B.V. v Andrew Barnes (t/a Healthtest) [2005] QDC 083
PARTIES:
ANDREW BARNES TRADING UNDER THE STYLE OR FIRM NAME OF HEALTHTEST (Applicant)
ATS
CHI PHARMA B.V. (Respondent)
FILE NO/S:
BD 2058 of 2004
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Chamber application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court
DELIVERED ON:
30 March 2005
DELIVERED AT:
Beenleigh
HEARING DATE:
1 March 2005
JUDGE:
Tutt DCJ
ORDER:
1. That the application to set aside judgment of 25 October 2004 is dismissed; and
2. That the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed on the standard basis.
CATCHWORDS:
Default judgment entered – principles for setting aside – prima facie defence on the merits – persistent attempts at service.
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 290.
Aboyne P/L v Dixon Homes P/L [1980] Qd R 142.
Bratic v Toohey [1988] 2 Qd R 140.
Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473.
National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Oasis Developments P/L [1983] 2 Qd R 441.
Watson v Anderson (1976) 13 SASR 329.
Yankee Doodles P/L v Blemvale P/L [1999] QSC 134 (unreported 23 June 1999) Atkinson J.
COUNSEL:
Mr H J Zillman for the applicant.
Mr P D Hay for the respondent.
SOLICITORS:
James Conomos Lawyers for the applicant.
Allens Arthur Robinson for the respondent.
Introduction
The applicant in the matter (defendant in the original action) seeks to set aside the judgment by default entered against it by the respondent (plaintiff in the original action) on 25 October 2004.
The application is made pursuant to r 290 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“the Rules”).
The principles to be considered on an application to set side a default judgment are set out in a number of authorities[1] and may be conveniently summarised as follows:
[1]Aboyne P/L v Dixon Homes P/L [1980] Qd R 142 at 143-144; National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Oasis Developments P/L [1983] 2 Qd R 441 at 449-450; Bratic v Toohey [1988] 2 Qd R 140 at 146-147.
1. Whether the defendant has given a satisfactory explanation of the failure to defend;
2. Whether the defendant’s delay in making the application to set aside is not such as to preclude it from obtaining relief; and
3. Whether the defendant has a prima facie defence on the merits.[2]
[2]Per Atkinson J in Yankee Doodles P/L v Blemvale P/L [1999] QSC 134 (unreported 23 June 1999) at paragraph [13].
The court has a wide discretion in its consideration of all relevant criteria upon which it reaches its conclusion.[3]
[3]Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473 at 478, 481 and 482; Bratic v Toohey (supra) at 145.
The Claim
The respondent’s claim is straight forward and seeks the reimbursement of the sum of USD60,000 being one half (½) of the agreed purchase price for goods (diabetes test strips) which it contracted to buy from the applicant who it is alleged failed to deliver as agreed.[4]
[4]Exhibit…
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- Case
- [2005] QDC 83
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues centred on the principles applicable to setting aside a default judgment, with particular emphasis on whether a prima facie defence existed on the merits and whether there had been persistent attempts to effect service of the originating process on Chi Pharma B.V. The applicant argued that it had a bona fide defence on the merits and that there were exceptional circumstances warranting the setting aside of the judgment.
The Court found that while the applicant had established a prima facie defence, this was not sufficient to set aside the default judgment in the absence of exceptional circumstances. The Court held that the applicant's persistent attempts to effect service, including attempts at service by email and by hand, were not sufficient to constitute exceptional circumstances. The Court also found that the applicant had not demonstrated any prejudice or injustice that would warrant setting aside the judgment.
Accordingly, the application to set aside the default judgment was dismissed. The Court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed on the standard basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. That the application to set aside judgment of 25 October 2004 is dismissed; and
2. That the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application to be assessed on the standard basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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