FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chhuon v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 565
MIGRATION – cancellation of visa – whether notice of cancellation given under s 128 given in prescribed way – whether notice of cancellation given but specified time for response not given – whether decision not to revoke cancellation of visa may be made despite failure to comply fully with s 128.
MIGRATION – decision not to revoke cancellation of visa under s 131 – whether decision made in good faith – whether decision involved jurisdictional error from error of law by decision-maker.
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 99, 101, 116, 128, 129, 131, 474Cheaib v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 145 ALR 379; [1997] FCA 562 followed
Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 167 cited
Noeung v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1304 followed
Jalal v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 60 ALD 779; [2000] FCA 207 referred to
SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749 [2002] FCAFC 361 followed
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 applied
Plaintiff S157 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] 195 ALR 24; [2003] HCA 2 followed
Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1196 citedBUNKHENG CHHUON v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
S 218 OF 2002
MANSFIELD J
6 JUNE 2003
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 218 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
BUNKHENG CHHUON
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 JUNE 2003
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The decision of a delegate of the respondent made on 2 August 2002 not to revoke the cancellation of the visa of the applicant by decision made on 5 July 2002 be set aside.
2.The respondent reconsider pursuant to s 131 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) whether the cancellation of the visa of the applicant by decision made on 5 July 2002 should be revoked.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 218 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
BUNKHENG CHHUON
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE:
6 JUNE 2003
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to have declared invalid the exercise of powers by delegates of the respondent on 24 July 2002 (the first decision) and on 2 August 2002 (the second decision) by virtue of which the visa granted to the applicant on 29 April 2002 was revoked, and the revocation confirmed. The visa which was revoked was a Partner (Resident) Subclass 801 (Spouse) visa…
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- Case
- [2003] FCA 565
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the second delegate's decision was an improper exercise of power and whether it was made in a bona fide manner. The applicant argued that the second delegate failed to properly consider the relevant statutory provisions and the merits of the case. The court found that the second delegate had indeed misconceived his function by treating his role as that of 'the department' rather than as a delegate of the Minister. The Court also found that the decision was not made in a bona fide manner as it failed to consider relevant information and misconceived the nature of the delegate's function. The court concluded that the second delegate's decision should be set aside and the matter remitted for reconsideration.
In light of the findings, the Court ordered that the decision of the delegate made on 2 August 2002 not to revoke the cancellation of the visa of Ms. Chhuon Bunkheng should be set aside. The Court further ordered that the respondent reconsider, pursuant to section 131 of the Migration Act, whether the cancellation of the visa of the applicant by decision made on 5 July 2002 should be revoked. The Court's decision underscores the importance of procedural fairness and the correct application of statutory provisions in the context of visa cancellation decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decision of a delegate of the respondent made on 2 August 2002 not to revoke the cancellation of the visa of the applicant by decision made on 5 July 2002 be set aside.
2. The respondent reconsider pursuant to s 131 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) whether the cancellation of the visa of the applicant by decision made on 5 July 2002 should be revoked.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case involves a challenge to the decision made by a delegate of the respondent not to revoke the cancellation of Ms Chhuon's visa. The matter came before the court following an application by Ms Chhuon to set aside the decision made on 2 August 2002. This was an interlocutory application seeking judicial review of the administrative decision. Prior to this, Ms Chhuon's visa had been cancelled on 5 July 2002, and she sought to have this cancellation reviewed and potentially revoked. The court was tasked with determining the validity of the decision made by the second delegate on 2 August 2002.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MANSFIELD J
The attack upon the second decision, assuming it could have been made notwithstanding the clear failure to comply with s 129 and regs 2.55 and 2.46(a), is that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of power because it took into account the irrelevant considerations and failed to take into account relevant considerations, that the second delegate misconceived his function by making his decision as that of ‘the department’ rather than as a delegate of the Minister, and thirdly that the exercise of his power was not bona fide.CONSIDERATION OF CONTENTIONS(a) The First Decision The first decision was based upon s 116(1)(d) of the Act, and in turn upon s 101. That is, the first decision was made because the visa was liable to be cancelled because the applicant, in her application form for the visa, had given an incorrect answer or answers. The particulars of the ground given under the heading ‘Reasons’ in that decision and set out in [17] above must be read in that light. I have difficulty in understanding the use of the expression ‘false and misleading statements’ in the first dot point of those reasons, as in the context of s 101, the expression adds nothing to the expression ‘incorrect answers’. I take it to be an introductory statement to the points. They were that the applicant had not stated in her visa application:(1)her marriage to Mr Ney was ‘contrived’ to obtain the visa;(2)her spousal relationship to the former husband continued;(3)her son, Chou David or Davit is also known as Phanith David;(4)her former husband is also known as Ly Sophanith; and(5)she is also known as Seng Chenda. The nature of the decision then set out particulars of the information because of which the grounds were considered to exist. The information about the contrived marriage and the continuance of the spousal relationship was:(i)‘Reliable community information’ that the spousal relationship between the applicant and Mr Ney was contrived for migration purposes;(ii)The applicant had returned to Cambodia to sponsor the former husband to Australia;(iii)‘Earlier information’ from the Section Chief (referred to in [ ] above and procured in September 2001) that:(a)the applicant and the former husband ‘were still married’; and(b)the former husband was waiting for the applicant to sponsor him to Australia;(iv)‘Separate community information’ received in March 1999 that the former husband intended to lodge an application for ‘a visitor visa to join’ the applicant in Adelaide.The information about the other names used by the applicant and members of her family referred to in (3)-(5) of [32] above was:(v)The applicant’s son Chou David in the name Phanith David had applied for a student visa on 24 April 1998, 30 September 1998 and 16 June 1999 and been refused, and on 1 September 1999 when the visa had been granted but then cancelled, and in each instance had declared his parents to be Ly Sopanith and Seng Chenda.(vi)The former husband on 22 December 1999 had applied for a visitor visa under the name Ly Sopanith, stating he was married to Seng Chenda ‘aka Chhuon Bunkheng’.