FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chhetri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1026
Appeal from:
Chhetri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 298
File number:
NSD 236 of 2019
Judge:
GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment:
5 July 2019
Catchwords:
MIGRATION –application for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) Subclass 820 visa – where the Minister’s delegate and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) found there was no compelling reason for waiving the public interest criteria – where the appellant claimed the AAT erred by unconsciously applying the Procedures Advice Manual (PAM 3) – where the appellant contended PAM 3 was ultra vires as a fetter or restriction on the exercise of the waiver power – where the AAT expressly disavowed any reliance on PAM 3 in making its decision – no jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed with costs
Legislation:
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 48
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2 cl 820.211(2)(d)(ii), sch 3 items 3001, 3003 and 3004
Cases cited:
Babicci v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 77; 141 FCR 285
Chhetri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 298
Choi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 291
MZYPZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 478; 127 ALD 510
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1199
SZUDO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 194
Waensila v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 32
Date of hearing:
1 July 2019
Registry:
New South Wales
Division:
General Division
National Practice Area:
Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category:
Catchwords
Number of paragraphs:
47
Solicitor for the Appellant:
Mr C Levingston of Christopher Levingston & Associates
Counsel for the Respondents:
Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the Respondents:
Mills Oakley
ORDERS
NSD 236 of 2019
BETWEEN:
ANIL SINGH CHHETRI
Appellant
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRAION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 July 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GRIFFITHS J:
The appellant appeals from a judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) given on 13 February 2019. The FCCA’s decision is reported as Chhetri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 298. The primary judge dismissed the appellant’s judicial review challenge to a decision dated 31 March 2017 by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT affirmed an earlier decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse to grant the appellant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) Subclass 820 visa (visa).
For the following reasons, the appeal will be dismissed, with costs. As will emerge, however, the case is one which warrants close…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1026
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the AAT had erred in its consideration of the waiver criteria, and if so, whether this error was sufficient to warrant overturning the decision. A secondary issue was whether the AAT's use of PAM 3 constituted an ultra vires act that would invalidate the decision. The appellant argued that the AAT's failure to acknowledge the need for a waiver amounted to an error of law and that the reliance on PAM 3, which the appellant deemed to be an unlawful restriction, also contributed to a flawed decision-making process.
In delivering the judgment, the court addressed the appellant's claims by first examining the AAT's decision-making process. The court found that the AAT had expressly disavowed any reliance on PAM 3 and had made its decision based on the merits of the case. The court further determined that there was no evidence of an error in the application of the waiver criteria, and thus, no basis for finding that the AAT had made a jurisdictional error. Regarding the appellant's argument about the legality of PAM 3, the court found that since the AAT did not rely on it, any argument about its validity was moot. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was first decided by the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, who refused Mr Chhetri's visa application. Mr Chhetri sought review of this decision by the AAT, which affirmed the delegate's decision. Dissatisfied with the AAT's decision, Mr Chhetri appealed to the Federal Court. The appeal was heard by the Federal Court, which dismissed the appeal and ordered Mr Chhetri to pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the AAT erred by unconsciously applying the Procedures Advice Manual (PAM 3) in making its decision.
2. Whether PAM 3 is ultra vires as a fetter or restriction on the exercise of the waiver power.
Held
1. The court held that the AAT did not err by unconsciously applying PAM 3 in making its decision. The court concluded that there was no jurisdictional error in the AAT's decision, as the AAT expressly disavowed any reliance on PAM 3.
2. The court held that PAM 3 was not ultra vires as a fetter or restriction on the exercise of the waiver power. The court concluded that the appellant's argument was without merit and dismissed the contention that PAM 3 was ultra vires.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the appellant's contention that the AAT had unconsciously applied PAM 3 in making its decision. The court noted that the AAT had expressly disavowed any reliance on PAM 3 and had made its decision based on the evidence before it. The court found no jurisdictional error in the AAT's decision, as the AAT had made its decision based on the correct legal principles and had not erred in law.
The court also considered the appellant's contention that PAM 3 was ultra vires as a fetter or restriction on the exercise of the waiver power. The court noted that PAM 3 was a procedural manual and not a legislative instrument. The court held that PAM 3 did not impose any substantive limitations on the exercise of the waiver power and was therefore not a fetter or restriction on the exercise of that power. The court found that the appellant's argument was without merit and dismissed the contention that PAM 3 was ultra vires.
The binding legal principle established by this decision is that the AAT did not err in making its decision, as it disavowed any reliance on PAM 3, and that PAM 3 is not ultra vires as a fetter or restriction on the exercise of the waiver power. This decision follows the established principle that procedural manuals do not impose substantive limitations on the exercise of administrative powers.