Chen and Chen and Anor
[2016] FamCA 758
•8 September 2016
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CHEN & CHEN AND ANOR | [2016] FamCA 758 |
| FAMILY LAW – Injunctive relief declines on the basis of the evidence. Inferences to be drawn from the evidence as presented. Jurisdiction in dispute and issue concerns injunctions pending determination of jurisdiction. Injunctions sought against third party where documents suggest contractual obligations were at arm’s length. Injunction application refused. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63; 208 CLR 199 Abella v Anderson [1987] 2 QdR 1 Jackson v Stirling [1987] HCA 23; (1987) 162 CLR 612 R v Ross-Jones; exparte Green (1984) FLC 91-555 Waugh and Waugh [2000] FamCA 1183; (2000) FLC 93-052 Woodcock and Woodcock (1997) FLC 92-739 Yunghanns and Ors and Yunghanns [1999] FamCA 64 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Chen |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Chen |
| THIRD PARTY: | Ms Quen |
| FILE NUMBER: | MLC | 5805 | of | 2016 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 8 September 2016 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Melbourne |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Cronin J |
| HEARING DATE: | 7 September 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr P Davis |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Taussig Cherrie Fildes |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Sweeney |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Lander & Rogers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE THIRD PARTY: | Mr Glick QC with Dr Ingleby |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE THIRD PARTY: | Oakfair Lawyers |
Orders
That to the extent necessary to say so, paragraph 6 of the orders made on 27 July 2016 is discharged.
That paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the orders made on 27 July 2016 are discharged.
That leave is granted to all parties to file such further applications and affidavits as they are so advised.
That paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the application for interim orders contained in the amended initiating application by the wife filed 27 July 2016 are dismissed.
That paragraph 1 of the application for interim orders contained in the response to the initiating application filed by the husband on 5 August 2016 is dismissed.
That paragraphs 1 and 2 of the application for interim orders contained in the response to the initiating application filed by the third party on 27 July 2016 together with paragraph 1 of her application in a case filed 31 August 2016 are adjourned to a date to be fixed to be determined at a time that the case management judge so directs.
That the application in a case filed by the husband on 1 September 2016 is dismissed.
IT IS CERTIFIED:
That pursuant to Order 19.50 of the Family Law Rules 2004 it was reasonable to engage counsel, senior counsel and in the case of the third party, two counsel to attend.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Chen & Chen and Anor has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
FILE NUMBER: MLC 5805 of 2016
| Ms Chen |
Applicant
And
| Mr Chen |
Respondent
And
| Ms Quen |
Third Party
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The discrete issue in this determination is whether the Court should continue or discharge interim injunctions made by consent of all parties on 27 July 2016. For the reasons that follow, I find the evidence does not support the Court granting the injunctive relief sought.
It is an understatement to say that the facts (perhaps also the law) in this case are complicated and indeed, very unusual if not at times, baffling.
The parties to the proceedings are Ms Chen (“the wife”), Mr F Chen (“the husband”) and Ms Quen (“the third party”). Their respective relationships are unusual. It would seem that there are yet more parties to be joined to these proceedings. What position they will adopt is obviously unknown.
The husband and wife married in 1983 and from their union, three children were born. Those three children are now adults. It seems that they will be the subject of a joinder application by the wife. Notwithstanding what immediately follows, along with the nature of the substantive disputes between the parties, it is not suggested that the husband and the wife are separated from each other.
In about 1999, the husband commenced a relationship with the third party. She had been an employee of the business conducted predominately (apparently) by the husband but her services were terminated by an employee-supervisor. This new relationship between the husband and the third party continued for years and its conclusion is in dispute. It may have been in 2011, 2014 or even 2015. That dispute does not affect my immediate determination even though it is said that it may determine whether or not the husband’s application arising out of the conclusion of that de facto relationship, is statute barred. From this second union, two children were born. They are aged 13 years and nine years respectively.
The unusual feature here is that it is said that the wife knew nothing about the husband’s alternate lifestyle until 2013.
The business conducted by a variety of entities services at least one major corporate client in Australia.
It would seem uncontroversial that a series of documents were executed by the husband and the third party in January 2014, August 2015 and what was described by the third party as a binding financial agreement on 15 October 2015. Each of these agreements or documents is relevant to the issue of the injunctive relief.
The January 2014 agreement
On 15 January 2014, the husband and the third party along with a company (B Pty Ltd) executed an agreement. In respect of B Pty Ltd, it would seem uncontroversial that the husband held 51 per cent of the shares and the third party 49 per cent. The wife described the husband as the managing director. Despite that, in the agreement just mentioned, the recital noted that the husband and the third party had been “business associates” for over ten years. Curiously, in his affidavit filed 5 August 2016, the husband said (at para 4(d)):
(The third party) has no business experience other than that which she has acquired through my company. She has little business acumen. She had no money or other property when she first started work in our business and now controls much of what has been acquired through the income of the business in recent years. (My emphasis).
Despite his reference to “my company” and “our business”, the husband said (at para 4(b)):
(The third party) has recently controlled the income generated from the … business…
To the extent that the husband’s case is that the third party’s inexperience or ineptitude for business was a basis for some form of protective injunction, I would reject that based on the earlier share structure and the fact that the husband now concedes that the third party has been controlling at least the income of the business.
The recital to the January 2014 agreement went further to say that whilst the husband remained sole director of the company, the third party had been “taking up the management” of it.
Counsel for the husband correctly observed that an agreement, albeit said to be binding on the parties, cannot bind the Court in any property proceedings under either s 79 or s 90SM of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) (see Woodcock and Woodcock (1997) FLC 92-739) but in respect of the exercise of the Court’s injunctive power to which I turn below, it is a relevant indication of what the parties to the agreement were doing even if one of them now argues all is not what it seemed to be.
The January 2014 agreement provided that the husband effect the transfer of shares in B Pty Ltd to the third party and appoint the third party as a co-director. That agreement was then executed by the husband and on behalf of B Pty Ltd by the husband as sole director and the third party executed it as well.
Stopping there, it is helpful to understand what the parties said about that agreement.
The wife by her affidavit filed 24 June 2016, made no mention of that agreement. She said that in May 2016, she discovered, and then was told by the husband, that he had purchased numerous properties for the third party and he had transferred his shareholding in B Pty Ltd to the third party. Nothing was said by the wife as to the husband’s justification or explanation for what he had done. She said (at para 36) that he acknowledged the transfers had taken place in early 2014 which is consistent with the January 2014 agreement. Nothing was said about how the third party came to be a significant shareholder in B Pty Ltd before the January 2014 transfers.
In November 2014, according to the wife, her adult children became aware that the third party of whom they knew but understood to be a wealthy Chinese investor, was having a relationship with the husband. Curiously, notwithstanding the husband’s evidence about the third party’s business role and the January 2014 agreement itself, the wife said that her adult daughter, who was a “CPA” and had helped prepare the third party’s tax returns, did not know of that person’s true identity. I am obviously not in any position to make any finding about the truth of the wife’s evidence and I do not have any evidence from the adult children, but by inference, it must mean that the tax returns of the third party did not reflect that she was a significant business associate dealing in the company affairs (as the husband seems to portray). All of this just adds to the intrigue because the wife then said that the children confronted the husband. She then said:
They decided to try and deal with (the third party) as best they could by entering into a settlement with her. They have told me that they decided not to reveal the relationship to me to avoid any further emotional harm to me. (My emphasis).
It seems on the basis of all of the evidence before the Court, the children did not speak to their mother about what had happened. Then on 14 August 2015, a “deed of settlement” was executed, the parties to which were the third party, the husband, the three children and a company C Pty Ltd. According to the wife, she knew nothing of this agreement until 2016. That agreement had as a party, another company, which for the purposes of the immediate application is not relevant.
The position of C Pty Ltd is somewhat confusing. According to the wife (para 22(c)) the shares in C Pty Ltd are owned as to 85 per cent by the three children and 15 per cent by her. Here, therefore, was a company C Pty Ltd ostensibly controlled by the three children as majority shareholders not telling the minor shareholder what they were doing.
The August 2015 settlement
The deed of settlement on 14 August 2015 has a recital which provides that the parties desired to settle all matters in connection with, inter alia:
(a) division of properties between the husband and the third party;
(b)the …business including the payment of future liabilities by [B Pty Ltd], engagement as consultant, payment of fees and commissions and restraint of trade (set out as per the original).
The “terms of settlement” then provided inter alia:
2.10(The husband) agrees to pay 38 per cent of all liabilities, penalties, claims or charges…incurred by ([B Pty Ltd]) prior to its closing down;
2.11(The husband) shall provide collateral in the form of real properties and in the value of $1.5 million to secure the third party’s interest for four years from the date of closing down of [B Pty Ltd];
…
2.13Subject to the approval of NAB, the third party agrees to pay the husband a total of $3.3 million by a variety of methods.
The “closing down” of B Pty Ltd adds to the intrigue. The commercial arrangement appeared to be that the third party was to start up a series of similarly-named companies. If the husband was agreeing to that, what was his logic bearing in mind his stated position that he was not selling or disposing of the business?
The document then provided agreement between the parties that they would enter into a deed of restraint of trade between the third party, the husband and the three children. That came with conditions which were set out to be:
(a)The third party pay the husband and the three children $100,000 per annum net of tax;
(b)The husband to be employed for consulting work;
(c)The third party to pay the husband and the three children an annual amount representing 8 per cent of sales revenue generated from a particular commercial agreement and 5.5 per cent from another agreement; and
(d)The husband and the three children were thereupon restrained from carrying on any business in Australia.
Thereafter, the agreement referred to the consequences of a breach of the restraint of trade clause.
The document is much more complex than I have just described but it is not controversial that it was executed by all of the parties. In respect of C Pty Ltd, it was executed by one of the children and also by the husband as directors.
On the wife’s version of events, no-one told her of this until 2016. Importantly for my purposes, no explanation has been given by either the husband or the wife as to what the children told her other than, as I have already described, they wished to avoid causing her emotional pain.
By the time the wife’s injunctive application came before the Court in July 2016, the third party had possession of the wife’s affidavit. The third party, by her affidavit filed 27 July 2016, said (at para 17):
(The husband) and his children thereafter (after the January 2014 agreement) continue to press me for more money. I wanted to put an end to this continuous re-negotiation and therefore on 14 August 2015 I entered into a Deed of Settlement with (the husband) and his three children…
I note that I required the children to be parties to this Deed of Settlement as they had continuously tried to make me pay them money. (Set out as per the original).
The last statement just mentioned is remarkable because of its assertion of pressure by the children who have remained silent both personally and through their parents.
The husband filed an affidavit on 5 August 2016 but there he said he reserved his right to file a detailed and particularised trial affidavit. Albeit generally put, the husband said there was never any “joint intent” for the business to be “sold” to the third party. He went on to say that he was “essentially” to retain his interest in the business as he was its face and the primary contact with the clients. Naturally, that does not sit well with the evidence of the third party, the two documents to which I have already referred and, importantly, the silence of the children. This evasive explanation by the husband is in my view, a telling point on the issue of whether the third party should be restrained from otherwise exercising what would seem on the best evidence available, to be her legal right even if there is some potential equitable claim by the husband which is not immediately apparent.
The chain of events does not conclude there.
The agreement on 15 October 2015
On 15 October 2015, the husband and the third party entered into the third document which was described on its face as a financial agreement under s 90UD of the Act. It was apparently drawn by the same lawyers who drew the earlier document.
Unlike the earlier document, the October document purports to be an agreement between the husband and the third party only. Its recitals need not be set out save that it made reference to the August 2015 agreement. The court copy of the document is attached to the wife’s affidavit filed on 24 June 2016 and is badly paginated. I think the construction I have considered is the full document. The terms of the agreement included that the third party pay the husband $3.3 million. Each party acknowledged having been provided independent legal advice. At least in respect of the husband, there is a certificate signed by a Mr D who certified he had provided the husband with independent legal advice. The husband then signed a separation declaration which said he and the third party separated on 7 May 2011 albeit his affidavit said that the separation date was 2015. No evidence has been provided by Mr D to indicate this document is not really what it appears to be.
The wife’s evidence was that the husband had “recently” told her of the binding financial agreement and provided her with a copy. Again, she said she knew nothing of it until weeks before she swore her affidavit on 22 June 2016.
For her part, the third party acknowledged the document attached to the wife’s affidavit as the binding financial agreement she entered. She then set out all of the things to which she had financially committed herself after that agreement. That included paying the husband and the three children monthly payments, obtaining new business and entering into funding arrangements with her bank for the acquisition of machinery. She has borrowed significant amounts of money.
The wife’s application for injunctive relief
In support of her application for injunctive relief, the wife said that the third party had established a new entity into which she had “channelled” 75 per cent of the B Pty Ltd business and had drawn large sums of money from the business.
Having regard to the nature of the plain reading of the agreements to which I have referred, none of that is surprising. The uncertain issue is whether the agreements mean what they say, in which case, the third party is literally executing her lawful rights or, in contradistinction, she is ignoring the real owner of the business (the husband) who says what I have earlier described.
On 24 June 2016, the wife filed an application seeking final and interim orders. That application was amended on 27 July 2016 to seek relief presumably against the husband and the third party. The application seeks to set aside the various transactions which transferred the property to the third party under s 106B of the Act. In the alternative, it was pleaded that the binding financial agreement between the husband and the third party should be set aside under s 90UM(d)(i) of the Act.
By way of interim orders, the wife sought injunctive relief against the husband and the third party restraining them from selling, alienating, disposing, encumbering and/or further encumbering, or drawing on any asset owned by the husband and/or the third party. The basis of the application for that relief was the concerns expressed by the wife about what the third party was doing as I have earlier described.
On 5 August 2016, the husband filed a response seeking a declaration that the agreement in October 2015 was not binding and that it should be set aside.
Notwithstanding it seems uncontroversial that the husband and the wife are not separated, he then sought a s 79 order against the wife. He also then sought relief against the third party under s 90SM of the Act. Obviously, in respect of the latter, much depends on whether or not he is successful in setting the financial agreement aside.
In respect of interim relief, the husband sought to continue injunctions made on 27 July 2016 to which I shall turn in a moment. His supporting affidavit was as I have earlier described it but that was not filed until after the July 2016 orders.
There is a further application in a case filed by the husband seeking enforcement of the July orders particularly in relation to information to be provided by the third party but if the injunctions do not stand, my view is that he is not entitled to those orders.
The third party filed a response asking for a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds of the wife’s application.
The hearing on 27 July 2016
On 27 July 2016 with all parties represented by counsel before Macmillan J, consent orders were made that until the adjourned hearing (and I interpolate here that was agreed to be extended until the orders I now make), various injunctions restrained the third party (and the husband) as to what she could do with monies under her control. What was not agreed but became orders of the Court, was that both the husband and the third party were restrained for (in effect) dealing with assets and entities until further order. No reasons were given for the making of the orders just mentioned although it was submitted by senior counsel for the third party that the hearing had been in a busy duty list and her Honour had suggested that comprehensive evidence was required by the next return date. In my view it does not matter what the basis of the orders was because they were only until further order. Her Honour’s orders contemplated a hearing on the return date.
Discussion
In respect to the law relating to injunctions, the power for an order of the nature sought particularly relating to asset preservation pending trial, is found in both ss 34(1) and 114(3) of the Act.
Section 34(1) relevantly provides:
The court has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kind…as the court considers appropriate.
Section 114(3) relevantly provides:
A court…may grant an injunction, by interlocutory order or otherwise…in any case in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient to do so and either unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate.
Various authorities make it clear that an interlocutory injunction is not to provide the party with security in advance for a judgment that that person hopes to obtain or fears may not be satisfied (Abella v Anderson [1987] 2 QdR 1). Abella was approved by the High Court of Australia in Jackson v Stirling [1987] HCA 23; (1987) 162 CLR 612. There, Dawson and Wilson JJ said [at 168]:
The Mareva injunction represents a limited exception to the general rule that a plaintiff must obtain his judgment and then enforce it. He cannot beforehand prevent the defendant from disposing of his assets merely because he fears that there will be nothing left against which to enforce his judgment. Nor can he be given a secured position against other creditors. The remedy is not to be used to circumvent the insolvency laws.
As their Honours pointed out, injunctions to not create additional rights but rather, were designed to enable a court to protect its process from abuse in relation to the enforcement of its orders.
In Waugh and Waugh [2000] FamCA 1183; (2000) FLC 93-052 the Full Court of this Court adopted Jackson in respect of an application for injunctive relief under s 114(3) of the Act.
Section 114(3) of the Act requires the Court to be satisfied that it is just and convenient to make the order. Similar to the discussion in Jackson, the underlying basis for an injunction was considered in ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63; 208 CLR 199. There, the question was what right was being protected. Gleeson CJ said that the purpose of an interlocutory injunction was to keep the matters in status quo until the rights of the parties could be determined at the hearing of the suit. That is the argument of the wife here supported by the husband. But what must be considered is the following:
(a)there must be an existing or potential claim under s 79 of the Act (or s 90SM) for the alteration of property interests;
(b)any injunction ought be limited to that which is designed to reasonably protect the legal or equitable rights or a party but it is not the function of an injunction to provide security in advance of a judgment;
(c)the Court is required to take into account the balance of convenience as well as hardship and in respect of matters connected to businesses, the Court will not usually restrain a party unless there exists a substantial risk of dissipation of assets or some substantial reason justifying a restriction; and
(d)there must be an objective risk of danger that a claim for substantive rights may be prejudiced unless the injunction is granted.
Of course, all of the matters just set out are predicated on the assumption that the Court has jurisdiction. That is not only not accepted here, but hotly disputed by the third party. There is no doubt that this Court has power to make orders pending the determination of the question of its jurisdiction. In Yunghanns and Ors and Yunghanns [1999] FamCA 64, the Full Court observed that in carrying out the Court’s limited exercise of jurisdiction, it is required to determine any essential facts upon which the existence of its jurisdiction to make the orders sought ultimately depends. That determination is a function which is incidental to the exercise of the jurisdiction. The Court went on to say that the only circumstance in which the Court may proceed to make orders, despite a challenge to its jurisdiction to do so and before the existence of jurisdictional facts are found, is that referred to by Gibbs CJ in R v Ross-Jones; exparte Green (1984) FLC 91-555, namely when it is considered necessary to make “holding orders” to maintain the status quo pending its determination of whether it does have jurisdiction. As the Full Court observed, the fixing of a hearing to determine jurisdiction is one of the utmost urgency and I propose to make an order referring the matter to the case management judge for urgent attention.
As it is common ground that some hearing time will be necessary in respect of jurisdiction, the issue then becomes one of whether it is necessary to make the holding orders, or a continuation of any of the orders of 27 July 2016.
Submissions
Senior counsel for the third parties submitted that the Court must first be satisfied there is an issue to be tried with respect to which the injunctive relief is pertinent. It was then submitted that at least the husband should not be heard because he had excluded the jurisdiction by virtue of executing the binding financial agreement. But even if there is a basis for the husband to seek to set aside that agreement, he has not set out with any particularity, why that should be so. As senior counsel for the third party put it, the husband has said nothing. That becomes significant when I consider what claim for alteration of property interests he has.
Most importantly, the husband’s silence about how all of this occurred, bearing in mind his simple assertion that he had not given up his interests in the business or sold them, ought make the Court hesitant to restrain what otherwise on its face, looks like genuine business activities on the part of the third party arising from a set of agreements.
It was submitted that the agreements speak for themselves but there are two salient features about which the husband remains silent. First, what was the basis of him receiving a large sum of money if he was not contracting with the third party over some of his legal rights. Secondly, even if he was not giving up his legal rights, what was the logic or explanation behind, the restraint of trade clause? Such a clause as senior counsel for the third party put it, is most unusual but here, it was submitted it was done for money compensation.
The third party’s position was that the husband had no serious issue to be tried. At best, counsel for the wife could only say that the Court had not been favoured with comprehensive evidence by the wife and the joinder of the parties earlier mentioned had just not been done. Whilst one might speculate how that was possible in the timeframe since the orders of July 2016, the reality is that the joinder and even an affidavit by the children might be one thing but as I remarked in discussion, even though there is no indication that the wife was ever involved in the execution of any of the agreements, there is no evidence by the husband or wife as to what they, or more particularly the wife, was told when the issue of the involvement of the children came out in the open. In the meantime, the third party had executed the agreements upon which she was entitled to operate.
Counsel for the husband submitted that the husband was not entitled to respond to the affidavit material of the third party because of the orders of July 2016 and that he had reserved his rights. Whilst that is so, it is hard not to see a gaping hole in the husband’s case when on the face of the documents, both he and his children were participants in the agreements. No explanation other than a denial of giving up rights to the property is made.
Counsel for the husband submitted that the husband’s statement that at no stage was there ever any joint intent to do what the third party alleges, was consistent with the documents. That is hard to understand when one again considers the amount of money to be paid by the third party but also the restraint of trade issue.
Actions post July orders
On the evidence, there arises another curious factual situation. Subsequent to the July 2016 orders, the major client of the business obviously became aware of trouble through the disputed litigation and emailed both the husband and the third party asking what was going on. Both husband and the third party in one document, although it would appear to be the third party’s typing, responded by saying that all was well and that the dispute had nothing to do with the business but rather real property development.
Counsel for the husband accused the third party of making a statement about that dispute which was demonstrably false. Without that evidence being tested, I can only draw the inference that I consider is open to me which is that the husband was reassuring the contractor that the business was under the third party’s control. One might speculate that his reason for doing that was his entitlement to be paid by the third party could be prejudiced if the contract with the company was terminated.
Absent testing that evidence, I propose to draw the same inference that I have about the three agreements namely that they mean what they say.
Should orders be made?
Counsel for both the husband and the wife urged the Court to make the injunctive orders notwithstanding the confusing position in relation to the evidence. In the case of the husband, it was said there as a real risk of dissipation of assets. Nothing in the evidence enables me to draw that conclusion. As I observed at the time, what logic is there in the third party disposing of the assets?
Thus, I conclude that the assets about which the husband and the wife seek protection may be the subject of claims but I am not able to say at this stage that there is any prospect of those potential claims being successful. To make injunctive orders of the type made on 27 July would not be a limited exercise of power. Quite the contrary, they were and would be, extensive and invasive in circumstances where all of the documentary evidence supports a conclusion that the third party is the owner of the property of the business.
When I consider the balance of convenience, it is hard to know what the prejudice is to the husband and wife when they have chosen to limit the evidence upon which the Court can make a proper assessment of what did happen. The husband’s approach of telling the Court what he says is the comprehensive story in the future, is very unsatisfactory. The wife’s approach of not having any explanation for her children’s role not only in respect of the agreements but also the allegations of the third party that they were demanding money, is equally perplexing.
Ultimately, the inference to which I have earlier referred must favour the third party on the evidence before the Court.
Additionally, I remain unconvinced about the objective risk to the husband and the wife. Objective means what it says. The evidence as I have indicated, determines that course. The risk here must be modest because the third party claims she has fulfilled her part of the contractual obligations. There is then the three children who were apparently to be the beneficiaries and have remained silent. If indeed the husband has been paid the significant entitlements under the contracts, why is there no injunctive relief sought against him by the wife?
In the circumstances, it would not be proper to make the injunctive orders and to the extent that it is necessary to say so, all existing injunctive orders are discharged. The husband and the wife’s applications for those injunctions are therefore dismissed.
I shall ask the case management judge to urgently attend to obtaining a hearing on the issue of jurisdiction and have the parties advised of the date. I certify it was appropriate for counsel to attend including senior counsel and two counsel in respect of the third party.
I certify that the preceding Sixty Nine (69) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Cronin delivered on 8 September 2016.
Associate:
Date: 8 September 2016
4
3
1