Charatsis v Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Miscellaneous Appeal: Civil)

CHARATSIS v BENDIGO & ADELAIDE BANK LTD

[2015] SASC 131

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bampton

28 August 2015

PROCEDURE - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE - ACTIONS TO REVIEW OR SET ASIDE JUDGMENT

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW - IN GENERAL

Mr Charatsis is the defendant in proceedings instituted by the Bendigo & Adelaide Bank (the Bank) alleging Mr Charatsis defaulted on his obligations to repay a loan – the Bank amended its pleadings to plead the breach of a settlement agreement reached at a settlement conference – the issue of the enforceability of the agreement was referred to trial.

Mr Charatsis applied in December 2013 to vacate the trial listed for 17 March 2014 and deposed to suffering from chronic depression and anxiety – that application was refused by a Master of the District Court – he again asked the Court to vacate the trial in an affidavit filed on 14 March 2014 – he failed to attend at trial on 17 March 2014 and default judgment was entered into in his absence – Mr Charatsis applied to have the default judgment set aside – the trial judge dismissed that application.

Mr Charatsis appeals against the dismissal of his application to set aside a default judgment – whether there is an adequate explanation for the failure to attend Court on 17 March 2014 and a bona fide ground of defence.

Held:

1. The Court erred in finding that Mr Charatsis had not adequately explained why he did not attend the trial on 17 March 2014 and in finding there was no arguable bona fide defence.

2. Appeal allowed.

3. Judgment in default set aside and the matter to proceed to a settlement conference and trial in the District Court at the earliest opportunity.

4. Each party bear their own costs of the default judgment, the application to set aside the default judgment and this appeal.

District Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 234(2), referred to.
Ferragamo v Duffy (Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, Debelle J, 31 May 1991); The Commonwealth of Australia v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64, considered.

CHARATSIS v BENDIGO & ADELAIDE BANK LTD
[2015] SASC 131

Miscellaneous Appeal:  Civil

  1. BAMPTON J:       On 9 December 2013 Mr Charatsis asked a Master of the District Court to vacate the 17 March 2014 trial of the Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd’s (the Bank) claim against him.  Mr Charatsis deposed that he was suffering an exacerbation of his depressive illness which was affecting his ability to function.  The Master refused the application.

  2. Mr Charatsis became homeless after the breakdown of his 30 year marriage on Christmas Day in 2013.  He was reliant on friends for accommodation and on occasions was forced to sleep in his car.  He was denied access to his papers that were left in his former matrimonial home…

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Details
Case
[2015] SASC 131
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Charatsis v Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd, Mr Charatsis appealed against the dismissal of his application to set aside a judgment against him in favour of the Bank. The Bank had sued Mr Charatsis for the recovery of monies allegedly owed under a loan agreement. Mr Charatsis denied the allegations and counterclaimed for relief under consumer credit legislation. The trial was listed for 17 March 2014, but Mr Charatsis failed to attend, resulting in a default judgment being entered against him. He subsequently applied to set aside the judgment, which was dismissed. Mr Charatsis appealed this decision.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge erred in dismissing Mr Charatsis’ application to set aside the default judgment. Specifically, the court needed to determine if there was a reasonable explanation for Mr Charatsis’ non-attendance at the trial and if there was a bona fide defence to the Bank’s claim. The court also needed to assess whether the judge applied an unreasonably high standard in evaluating the merits of Mr Charatsis’ defence and whether he properly considered the impact of Mr Charatsis’ mental illness on his ability to manage the proceedings and attend court. The appeal hinged on whether the trial judge’s exercise of discretion could be characterised as an error.

The appeal court considered whether Mr Charatsis had provided a reasonable explanation for his non-attendance at the trial. The trial judge had noted that while Mr Charatsis' psychiatric condition might have warranted an adjournment if properly sought, it was not a sufficient explanation for his absence. The appeal court examined Mr Charatsis' psychiatric evidence, which indicated severe depression and anxiety rendering him incapable of attending court. The court also considered Mr Charatsis' previous attempts to vacate the trial and his efforts to notify the court of his condition. However, the appeal court found that the trial judge’s decision not to accept the psychiatric condition as a reasonable explanation for non-attendance was not an error. The appeal court concluded that while the trial judge should have taken Mr Charatsis' mental illness into account, it did not necessarily mean that he should have set aside the judgment. The appeal was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Charatsis appeals the dismissal of his application to set aside judgment.BackgroundThe pleadings The Bank alleged that in December 2008 Mr Charatsis entered into a personal loan agreement in the sum of $35,150. The Bank alleged that Mr Charatsis defaulted on his obligations under the contract and that the defaults were notified to him by a default notice. As at 2 March 2011, $45,492.51 was due by Mr Charatsis being the principal sum plus interest of 14.1 per cent per annum. Mellor Olsson acted as solicitors for the Bank until 23 January 2013 when Hudson Lawyers filed a notice of acting In September 2013, the Bank amended its claim to seek enforcement of a settlement it alleged was entered into with Mr Charatsis on 9 September 2011. The Bank alleged that the terms of the settlement are that Mr Charatsis agreed to a compromise of the Bank’s claim whereby: he would, on 11 October 2011, and monthly thereafter, pay the sum of $330 to the Bank until the claim was fully satisfied; and in the event of default Mr Charatsis would consent to judgment in favour of the Bank. The terms of the compromise are set out in a memorandum of agreement signed by the parties on 9 September 2011. The Bank’s solicitor, Janelle Wilksch, deposed in her affidavit sworn 23 October 2013 that the Bank reached a resolution with Mr Charatsis at a settlement conference on 9 September 2011. Exhibited to Ms Wilksch’s affidavit is a copy of a handwritten settlement agreement on Mellor Olsson note paper. In his third defence, Mr Charatsis alleged with respect to the settlement agreement that:·the Bank agreed to provide a detailed deed of settlement which would, importantly, include provision for Mr Charatsis to remedy any default by virtue of missing a monthly payment;·a detailed deed of settlement was never provided;·there was no agreement between the parties on 9 September 2011 as to the payment of interest or legal fees or any other amounts whatsoever; and·there was an agreement to vary the settlement agreement to include a period of moratorium of monthly payments which was pending a review in June 2013 and that therefore he is not in default. In his third defence, in respect of the matter as a whole, Mr Charatsis alleged that:·he was ill and suffering from anxiety and severe depression at the time the default notice was issued; ·the illness affected his ability to earn an income and that he contacted the Bank to seek hardship assistance, which was granted only temporarily, and requested a variation to the contract which he alleges was unreasonably refused, amounting to unconscionable conduct; and·the hardship provisions of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (or alternatively the Consumer Credit Code Part 4, Division 3) apply and the time for payment should be extended. In its reply, the Bank:·denies that it acted unconscionably, and asserts that it is not subject to the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009;·denies that it agreed to vary the settlement agreement to provide for a moratorium of monthly payments;·denies that there was an agreement to provide a detailed deed of settlement; and·pleads that the 9 September 2011 agreement operated as a complete accord and satisfaction of the dispute between it and Mr Charatsis. The referral to trial

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Charatsis also deposed that at the time of swearing his affidavit he was managing his condition with psychotherapy and medication and, while he was still suffering depression and anxiety, his former home was in the possession of the first mortgagee and he no longer felt overwhelmed by his circumstances.The hearing of the application to set aside judgment Mr Charatsis filed a further affidavit sworn 22 October 2014 detailing matters supporting the pleas in his third defence. Argument on the application to set aside the default judgment was heard on 31 October 2014 and on 13 January 2015, the application was dismissed. The appeal Mr Charatsis argued on appeal that the Judge erred in refusing to set aside judgment by:·finding that there was no reasonable explanation for his non‑appearance on 17 March 2014;·finding that his defence to the claim was without merit, and in so doing applied an unreasonably high standard; ·erring in his assessment of the prejudice to the respective parties of setting aside default judgment; and·failing to properly take into account the implications his mental illness had on his ability to manage the proceedings and the consequences of his non-appearance. In determining this matter, I need to consider whether there is an adequate explanation for the failure to attend court on 17 March 2014 and a bona fide ground of defence. As the decision under appeal involved an exercise of a discretion, for the appeal to succeed I must be satisfied not only that I would have exercised the discretion differently but that the Judge fell into error. Explanation for non-attendance at trial It was submitted by counsel for Mr Charatsis that he was incapable of representing himself in court on 17 March 2014 due to severe depression and anxiety. In his reasons the Judge stated that he might have been persuaded to adjourn the trial if Mr Charatsis had appeared and sought an adjournment on the basis of his psychiatric condition but said it was by no means certain he would have done so.[1] The Judge did not accept that Mr Charatsis’ psychiatric illness was a sufficient explanation for his non-attendance.[1] Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd v Charatsis [2015] SADC 1 at [26]. It was submitted that the Judge fell into error by not finding that Mr Charatsis had a reasonable explanation for non-attendance at trial in circumstances where:·Mr Charatsis was incapacitated due to mental illness;·Mr Charatsis had attempted to vacate the trial several months before the listed trial date due to the same incapacity; and·Immediately before trial Mr Charatsis had ensured that material was put before the Court explaining his absence on the first day of trial. It was submitted that Mr Charatsis by filing and serving the third affidavit did everything that could reasonably be expected of him to give the Court notice of his difficulties. Mr Charatsis exhibited a letter from Dr Loukas dated 14 March 2014 to his affidavit. Dr Loukas stated:I am Mr Charatsis’ psychiatrist and I verily [believe] that he suffers from a depressive illness with accompanying high anxiety. His symptoms are aggravated by his stressors which currently are high. At this stage he is incapacitated from working and in representing himself in Court and his symptoms have led to him having a low level of functioning in most areas of his life. It would be appreciated if the Court took these matters into account when considering his case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In assessing Mr Charatsis' appeal, the court focused on the reasonableness of the explanation for his non-attendance at the trial on 17 March 2014. The court noted that Mr Charatsis had severe depression and anxiety, which affected his ability to represent himself in court. However, the Judge did not accept Mr Charatsis' psychiatric illness as a sufficient explanation for his non-attendance at the trial. The court found that the Judge's decision was not unreasonable, as it was not certain that the Judge would have granted an adjournment even if Mr Charatsis had appeared and sought one based on his psychiatric condition.

The court applied the legal principle that a party seeking to set aside a judgment must provide a reasonable explanation for their non-attendance and a bona fide ground of defence. The court relied on the case of Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd v Charatsis to support its decision. The court found that Mr Charatsis had not provided a reasonable explanation for his non-attendance at the trial, as he had previously attempted to vacate the trial due to the same incapacity and had not provided any evidence to support his claim that he was incapacitated on the day of the trial.

The court also examined whether the Judge applied an unreasonably high standard in finding Mr Charatsis' defence to the claim without merit. The court found that the Judge had not applied an unreasonably high standard in assessing Mr Charatsis' defence. The court noted that the Judge had carefully considered the evidence and arguments presented by both parties and had made a reasoned decision based on the merits of the case.

In assessing the prejudice to the respective parties of setting aside the default judgment, the court found that the Judge had not erred in his assessment. The court noted that the Judge had considered the impact of setting aside the default judgment on both parties and had found that the prejudice to the Bank would outweigh any prejudice to Mr Charatsis.

The court also examined whether the Judge failed to properly consider the implications of Mr Charatsis' mental illness on his ability to manage the proceedings and the consequences of his non-appearance. The court found that the Judge had properly considered the implications of Mr Charatsis' mental illness and had taken into account his psychiatric condition in assessing his non-attendance at the trial.

The court further examined whether the Judge was correct in finding that the 9 September 2011 agreement between the parties operated as a complete accord and satisfaction of the dispute. The court found that the Judge's decision was correct, as the evidence supported the Bank's claim that the parties had reached a settlement agreement on 9 September 2011.

The court also examined whether the Judge erred in finding that the Bank did not act unconscionably in dealing with Mr Charatsis. The court found that the Judge's decision was correct, as the evidence did not support Mr Charatsis' claim that the Bank had acted unconscionably.

The court further examined whether the Judge was correct in finding that the Bank was not subject to the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth). The court found that the Judge's decision was correct, as the Bank was not a credit provider within the meaning of the Act.

The court also examined whether there was an agreement between the parties to provide a detailed deed of settlement on 9 September 2011. The court found that there was no such agreement, as the evidence did not support Mr Charatsis' claim.

Finally, the court examined whether there was an agreement to vary the settlement agreement to include a period of moratorium of monthly payments pending a review in June 2013. The court found that there was no such agreement, as the evidence did not support Mr Charatsis' claim.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a party seeking to set aside a judgment must provide a reasonable explanation for their non-attendance and a bona fide ground of defence. The court will assess the reasonableness of the explanation and the merits of the case to determine whether the judgment should be set aside. The court will also consider the prejudice to the respective parties of setting aside the default judgment and the implications of any mental illness on the party's ability to manage the proceedings and the consequences of their non-appearance. The court will apply a reasoned and balanced approach in making its decision.