Chang v Laidley Shire Council

The appeal concerned Shu-Ling Chang and Tai-Hsing Chen (the appellants) and the Laidley Shire Council (the respondent). The appellants sought approval to reconfigure their land into 25 lots, a proposal that was permissible under an earlier planning scheme but not under the new planning scheme adopted in 2003. This change in planning provisions resulted in a diminution in the value of the appellants' land. The appellants contended they were entitled to compensation for this loss in value, arguing they had an "accrued right" or "accrued entitlement" to compensation under section 5.4.2 of the *Integrated Planning Act 1997* (Qld).

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the appellants were entitled to compensation for the diminution in value of their land due to the inability to reconfigure it as previously permitted, and whether they possessed an "accrued right" or "accrued entitlement" to such compensation. A related issue was whether a development application that contravened draft regulatory provisions constituted a "properly made application" under section 3.2.1 of the *Integrated Planning Act 1997* (Qld), and whether this section should be interpreted in a way that preserves vested interests unless a contrary legislative purpose is manifest.

The High Court, in dismissing the appeal, reasoned that while the appellants' situation might be considered unfortunate, the legislative provisions, when viewed in their entirety and against their historical context and purpose, did not support their claim for compensation. The Court noted that the *Integrated Planning Act 1997* (Qld) provided a mechanism for seeking compensation through a "development application (superseded planning scheme)" within two years of a new scheme's adoption. However, the appellants' application was made in 2004, after the relevant timeframes and potentially not in compliance with the requirements for a "properly made application" under section 3.2.1. The Court found that the legislative changes, though perhaps not explicitly communicated, had the effect of extinguishing the appellants' entitlement to compensation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.