Champion v The State of South Australia

[2024] SADC 26

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

CHAMPION v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

[2024] SADC 26

Judgment of his Honour Judge Durrant  

13 March 2024

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS - EXTENSION OF TIME IN PERSONAL INJURIES MATTERS - KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS OF DECISIVE CHARACTER - WHAT ARE MATERIAL FACTS

Prosecution for assault and other offences- dismissal of some charges and not guilty of assault- breach of duty of care, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution by police alleged- revised claim pleads personal injury out of time- application for extension of time determined prior to trial- whether satisfied facts material to case not ascertained until some point of time occurring within twelve months before expiration of time- whether in all the circumstances just to grant extension- facts not to be regarded as material unless they form an essential element of the causes of action or would have a major significance on an assessment of loss- knowledge or ignorance of whether known facts comprise a cause of action irrelevant- facts essential to causes of action known at time of acquittal- not established facts material not ascertained until some point of time occurring within twelve months before expiration of time- nonetheless in all the circumstances not just to grant extension- application refused.

HELD: Application to extend the time to claim for personal injury dismissed.

Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 36, 48; Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) r 144, 151, referred to.
Ireland v Wightman [2013] SASC 139; A v NSW (2007) 230 CLR 500; Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147; Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53; Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; Ireland v Wightman [2013] SASC 139; Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, considered.

CHAMPION v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2024] SADC 26

Introduction

1. The applicant complains about the conduct of police following an incident on 24 February 2017, in respect of which she was charged and prosecuted for assault.[1]

   [1]    Claim filed 3 January 2023 (FDN 1) at [7]- [13]; Claim Revision 1 filed 30 July 2023, (FDN 11) at [8]- [15].

2. Ms Champion further complains about three additional charges laid- in trespass, disorderly behaviour, and property damage- which were dismissed by a Magistrate.

3. On 20 December 2018, she was found not guilty of assault and awarded costs.[2]

   [2]    On 30 June 2017, see Affidavit of Anthony Eduard Stoks made 06 Sep 2023 (FDN 18) at [3] and [4], Exhibit AES1.

4. Ms Champion has brought this action alleging the police breached a duty of care, abused the court process, and maliciously prosecuted her.[3]

   [3]    Claim filed 3 January 2023 (FDN 1); replaced as of 30 July 2023 by Claim Revision 1 (FDN 11).

   What damage is claimed by Ms Champion?

5. Ms Champion revised her Claim on 30 June 2023, to plead personal injury; particularly, psychiatric injury.[4]

   [4]    Revised Claim (FDN11) at [93]- [94].

   Why is Ms Champion out of time to claim personal injury and in need of an order extending time?

6. The causes of action pleaded accrued to Ms Champion on 20 December 2018, the day she was found not guilty by a Magistrate.[5]

   [5]    Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), s36.

7. The law required her claim for personal injury in respect of those causes of action to be made by 21 December 2021.[6]

   [6] Ibid.

8. Ms Champion recognised she was out of time and applied in her revised claim for an order extending the time to claim for personal injury.[7]

   [7] Ibid s 48.

9. The respondent seeks summary judgment of the personal injury claim. Alternatively, it asks for the extension application to be determined before trial.[8]

   [8] Interlocutory Application filed 6 September 2023 (FDN 17), orders 3 and 4; Uniform Civil Rules 144.2(c) and 151.1; Ibid s 48 (5).

10. For reasons that follow, I have dismissed the application for extension of time.

    What is the relevant test for an extension of time?

11. This Court can extend time ‘to such an extent, and upon such terms (if any) as the justice of the case may require’.[9]

    [9]    Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), s 48 (1).

12. I must not exercise that statutory discretion, unless satisfied of certain things.[10]

    [10] Ibid s 48(3) and (3a).

13. I can do so if satisfied facts material to the case were not ascertained by Ms Champion until some point of time occurring within twelve months before 21 December 2021, and in all the circumstances, it is just to grant the extension of time.[11]

    [11] Ibid.

14. I can do so if satisfied facts material to the case occurred after 21 December 2021, and her claim in personal injury was instituted within twelve months after the ascertainment of those facts, and in all the circumstances, it is just to extend time.[12]

    [12] Ibid.

15. I can do so if satisfied the failure to institute the action before 21 December 2021, resulted from representations or conduct of the State, or a person whom Ms Champion reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of the State, and that was reasonable in view of those representations or that conduct and any other relevant circumstances, and in all the circumstances, it is just to extend time.[13]

    [13] Ibid.

    What is the basis of the application to extend time?

16. Ms Champion asserts, as her case involved police conduct, that has blocked her access to legal advice.[14] There is no evidence anything has been done by Police in that regard. Rather, that assertion refers to her perception lawyers are reluctant to act for her.

    [14] Revised Claim 1 (FDN 11), ground 2.

17. Ms Champion does not say her failure to institute an action for personal injury before 21 December 2021, was the result of representations or conduct of the State, or someone she reasonably believed to be acting on its behalf.

18. The only correspondence between Ms Champion and police after the conclusion of the prosecution, and prior to bringing this action, was a response to her freedom of information application,[15] and in respect of orders for pre-action discovery.[16] 

    [15] Affidavit of Anthony Eduard Stoks made 6 September 2023 (FDN 18) at [5], Exhibit AES2.

    [16] Ibid at [7]-[8] and Exhibit AES5.

19. Facts are not to be regarded as material unless they form an essential element of the causes of action pleaded or would have major significance on assessment of loss.[17]

    [17] Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s48 (3a).

20. Ms Champion submitted inadequate legal knowledge prior to the completion of her law degree meant she did not properly appreciate or ascertain material facts going to her claim and limitations of time. For example, she said she became aware of the existence of time limits for the bringing of actions when studying dispute resolution.

21. Ms Champion says pre-action disclosure on 16 February 2021, of an email from SAPOL to a witness, shows the intent of police in laying the three additional charges was to bully her to plead guilty to assault. ^[18]

    [18] Affidavit of Anthony Eduard Stoks made 6 February 2023 (FDN 7) at [6], Exhibit AES3; Action CIV- 20- 003041; Affidavit of Linda Jane Champion made 8 November 2023, Exhibit LJS 50.

22. Further, Ms Champion submitted her need to focus on her law degree and find a job meant she had been unable to think about her claim until the end of 2022.[19]

    [19] Affidavit of Linda Jane Champion made 8 November 2023 (FDN 19). Affidavit Volume 1 [166] page 35.

    Were those facts material to Ms Champion’s case?

23. Those matters are not facts material to Ms Champion’s case, such as to attract exercise of the discretion to extend time.

24. Laudable as the efforts of Ms Champion may be, the obtaining of a law degree is not relevant to this application. Her ‘knowledge or ignorance that the known facts comprise a cause of action is irrelevant under s 48 of the Act’.[20]

    [20] Ireland v Wightman [2013] SASC 139, per Blue J at [37].

25. Further, Ms Champion did know of the facts essential to the breach of duty of care, abuse of process and malicious prosecution as pleaded, when she was acquitted.[21]

    [21] Claim filed 3 January 2023 (FDN 1); replaced as of 30 July 2023 by Claim Revision 1 (FDN 11); Limitations of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 48(3a)(a).

26. Ms Champion was at her home on 26 February 2017, with her husband and another, when she said the wrongdoing and blackmail by police commenced.[22]

    [22] Cf Reply [19.1.2] and [19.1.3]; Affidavit of Linda Jane Champion made 8 November 2023 (FDN 28) at [23].

27. She knew she had been charged, had a trial, and had been found not guilty.

28. Ms Champion considered at the time police prosecutions had acted unreasonably and without cause and had been actuated by malice.[23]

    [23] A v NSW (2007) 230 CLR 500.

29. She thought, by reference to her experience and observations, the charges had been maintained to achieve KPIs, hide wrongdoing, effect revenge, disrespect her and because of strong personal dislike.[24]

    [24] Trobridge v Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147 per Fullagar J at [155]; Claim filed 3 January 2023 (FDN 1) at [59]; Affidavit of Linda Jane Champion made 8 November 2023 (FDN 28) Exhibit LJC 1 and 2.

30. In respect of abuse of process, Ms Champion pleads she was prosecuted for a collateral benefit; the desire of police to blackmail and punish her or seek revenge.[25] 

    [25] Claim filed 3 January 2023 (FDN 1) at [66]. Claim Revision 1 (FDN 11) at [89].

31. As with her action for malicious prosecution, Ms Champion knew all the material facts essential to her abuse of process plea by 20 December 2018.

32. As well, Ms Champion deposed to having concluded by 21 July 2020, the charges ‘could satisfy the elements of malicious prosecution and abuse of process’.[26]

    [26] FDN 28 [152]-[154].

33. In respect of the alleged negligence of the respondent, the State submitted police officers hold an immunity when investigating criminal matters. It has applied separately for summary dismissal of that part of the claim. ^[27]

    [27] Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53; [1987] UKHL 12; Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; [2002] HCA 35 per Hayne J at [298]; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; [2001] HCA 59 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ at [60].

34. For the same reasons, Ms Champion knew the material facts of the investigation were essential elements of that cause of action, by 20 December 2018.[28]

    [28] Revised Claim 1 (FDN 11) at [87].

35. As for any new evidence disclosed by pre- action discovery, that may have added to the strength of her case. However, that disclosure was not ascertainment of a new material fact forming an element of any of the causes of action. Additionally, the email to a witness relied upon was not essential to Ms Champion weighing the strength and importance of that evidence against her other knowledge of the evidence.[29] 

    [29] Ireland v Wightman [2013] SASC 139, per Blue J at [66].

36. Finally, Ms Champion has deposed that it was in November 2017, that she ‘suffered a breakdown’ attributable to the prosecution the subject of her claim.

    Would it nonetheless have been, in all the circumstances, just to grant the extension?

37. I have considered, assuming the facts relied upon by Ms Champion had been relevantly material to her case, whether I would in all the circumstances have exercised the discretion to extend time.

38. Going to the discretion, Ms Champion submitted her difficulty in obtaining legal advice, the time taken to complete her law degree and an imbalance of power between herself and the police, all favour an extension of time.

39. The respondent submitted Ms Champion did not act for nearly two years after her receipt of the pre-action discovery on 16 February 2021.[30]

    [30] Affidavit of Linda Jane Champion made 8 November 2023 (FDN 28) at [165]- [166].

40. In that respect, Ms Champion deposed during that period she did not read the material the subject of pre-trial disclosure.[31] She also said she thought, when she received those materials, ‘the time limit for any personal injury had long expired’.[32]

    [31] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, per McHugh J at [553]-[555] and Dawson J at [544]; Affidavit of Linda Jane Champion made 8 November 2023 (FDN 28) at [165].

    [32] Affidavit of Linda Jane Champion made 8 November 2023 (FDN 28) at [165].

41. The respondent also submitted the delay in bringing the personal injury claim had prejudiced its defence as Ms Champion has a long- standing mental health history.

42. In her Affidavit of Personal Injury Particulars, Ms Champion says she suffered a psychological injury in her workplace in 2010, causing PTSD.[33] She deposed that still caused her intermittent depression, anxiety, suicidal ideations, inability to handle stress and low tolerance of bullying and intimidation, particularly from people in authority.

    [33] Affidavit of Personal Injury Particulars made 11 September 2023 (FDN 20).

43. The personal injury Ms Champion agitates in the case relates to events more than six years ago. She says it aggravated her existing mental illness, PTSD, depression, anxiety, adjustment disorder, suicidal ideations, and inability to handle stress.[34]

    [34] Ibid.

44. Having weighed those matters, and all the circumstances of this case, I consider the delay too great in circumstances where Ms Champion knew time had expired and that has prejudiced the ability to investigate and defend her claim for personal injury.

45. Given that, I would have declined to exercise the discretion to extend time.

    Conclusion

46. For these reasons, I dismiss the application to extend the time within which Ms Champion can bring her proposed claim for personal injury.

47. I will hear the parties as to appropriate orders and costs.