CGJK and Child Support Registrar (Child support second review)

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CGJK and Child Support Registrar (Child support second review) [2024] AATA 2725 (5 August 2024)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2023/5646

2023/5647

Re:CGJK

APPLICANT

AndChild Support Registrar

RESPONDENT

AndLTQV

OTHER PARTY

DECISION

Tribunal:Ms A E Burke AO, Member

Date:5 August 2024

Place:Melbourne

Pursuant to subsection 43(1)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), the Tribunal sets aside the decisions under review and makes decisions in substitution that:

·7 February 2022 until 6 May 2022 that CGJK had 14% care of child A whilst LTQV had 86%.

·12 December 2021 until 19 March 2022 that CGJK had 100% care for child S and LTQV had 0%.

·19 March 2022 until 5 May 2022 that CGJK had 60% care for child S and LTQV had 40%.

...................................[sgd].....................................

Ms A E Burke AO, Member

Names used in all child support published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by sections 16(2AB)–16(2AC) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

Catchwords

CHILD SUPPORT – review of care percentage determinations – whether there has been a change in the pattern of care – whether existing determination of care should be revoked – actual care – extent of care – inconsistent evidence – conflicting evidence – when actual care changed – whether special circumstances existed that prevented Father lodging objection – decisions under review set aside and new decisions substituted for child S and child A

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth)
Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth)

Cases

HMXZ and Child Support Registrar (Child Support Second Review) [2021] AATA 520
Parent 1 and Child Support Registrar and Parent 2 [2013] AATA 562

Polec & Staker & Anor (2011) 253 FLR 339

Secondary Materials

Department of Social Services, Child Support Guide (Guides to Social Policy Laws, version 4.69, 6 February 2023)

REASONS FOR DECISION

Ms A E Burke AO, Member

5 August 2024

  1. The Applicant, CGJK, is seeking a second-tier review by the General Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT2) of two decisions by the Social Security and Child Support Division of this Tribunal (AAT1) of 11 July 2023. The AAT1 affirmed both decisions under review.

  2. The application was heard on 8-9 July 2024 by telephone. CGJK and LTQV (the Other Party) were both self-represented. Ms Kathryn Lieschke, Seconded Lawyer at Services Australia, appeared for the Respondent, the Child Support Registrar (CSR). The Tribunal held the one hearing to determine the two separate matters under review.

    BACKGROUD

  3. The Applicant, CGJK, and the Other Party, LTQV are the separated parents of four children born in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2009 respectively. The matter before the Tribunal is in respect of the two youngest children, who the Tribunal will refer to as child A and child S. Matter 2023/5646 relates to…

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Details
Case
[2024] AATA 2725
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned a second review of child support care percentage determinations before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The parties, CGJK and LTQV, disputed the actual care arrangements for their two children, S and A, and whether existing care percentage determinations should be revoked or substituted to reflect a change in the pattern of care.

The primary legal issues before the Tribunal were whether there had been a change in the pattern of care for each child, and if so, whether the existing care percentage determinations should be revoked. The Tribunal also considered whether special circumstances existed that prevented the father, LTQV, from lodging an objection to the initial determinations within the prescribed timeframes. The Tribunal was required to determine the actual extent of care provided by each parent for both children.

The Tribunal considered the evidence presented, including the Federal Circuit Court Parenting Orders of 8 April 2015, which established a specific care arrangement. However, the Tribunal noted that the parties' positions diverged significantly regarding the application of these orders to each child. CGJK argued that the orders should be adhered to for child A due to no change in care, while contending that a significant change had occurred for child S, justifying a revocation of the existing arrangements. LTQV, conversely, emphasised the importance of respecting court orders and argued against unilateral changes to care arrangements, suggesting that a focus solely on actual care could create perverse incentives. The Tribunal acknowledged that a parent's percentage of care is generally determined by the actual care provided, often reflected in nights spent with each parent.

Ultimately, the Tribunal set aside the decisions under review. For child A, the Tribunal determined that from 7 February 2022 until 6 May 2022, CGJK had 14% care and LTQV had 86%. For child S, the Tribunal found that from 12 December 2021 until 19 March 2022, CGJK had 100% care and LTQV had 0%, and from 19 March 2022 until 5 May 2022, CGJK had 60% care and LTQV had 40%. The Tribunal made no findings on subsequent periods for which no appeal was before it.

Background

Background to the litigation

The facts of this case revolve around a dispute concerning the determination of care percentages for two children, A and S, between CGJK and LTQV. CGJK and LTQV were married but have since separated, and they share parental responsibilities for their two children. The court had previously issued parenting orders by consent on 8 April 2015, which outlined specific care arrangements for the children, including the allocation of time spent with each parent and other details such as visitation schedules and holiday periods.

In December 2021, child S decided to move schools and live with CGJK full-time, resulting in a significant change in her living arrangements. CGJK contends that S made this decision without LTQV's knowledge or consent, and despite CGJK's attempts to facilitate visitation, LTQV refused to accept care of S. CGJK argues that the change in living arrangements for S justifies a change in her care percentage, whereas the care percentage for A should remain unchanged as there was no such change in her living situation. LTQV, on the other hand, insists that both parents should abide by the binding care agreements and not unilaterally determine where a child will live. LTQV believes that respecting the existing care orders is crucial to avoid creating perverse incentives for parents to undermine orders and manipulate children.

The case comes before the tribunal to review the care percentage determinations made by the Child Support Registrar. CGJK and LTQV both present conflicting evidence and arguments regarding the changes in the pattern of care and the extent of care provided by each parent. The tribunal must consider the actual care provided by each parent, as well as any special circumstances that may have prevented either party from lodging an objection in a timely manner. The tribunal's decision will determine the appropriate care percentages for both children, A and S, going forward.

The matter came before the Tribunal in the context of a review of care percentage determinations made by the Child Support Registrar (CSR). This review was initiated by CGJK, who sought to challenge the CSR's decisions regarding the percentage of care for two children, S and A. The Tribunal noted that there was no appeal against the CSR's determinations for specific periods, and thus did not make findings on these periods. The Tribunal was tasked with considering whether there had been a change in the pattern of care that warranted a revocation of the existing care determinations. This involved examining the actual care provided to the children, the extent of care, and whether there were special circumstances that prevented the Father from lodging an objection. The Tribunal examined evidence from both parties, including care arrangements stipulated in prior Federal Circuit Court Parenting Orders by consent dated 8 April 2015. CGJK argued that there was a significant change in the care arrangement for S, justifying a change in her percentage of care, while LTQV contended that the existing binding care agreements should be respected. The Tribunal ultimately set aside the decisions under review and made new determinations regarding the care percentages for the relevant periods.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Also at 2.2.1, the Guide provides the following on percentage of care:The percentage of care is the mechanism used in the child support formula to take into account the amount of time a parent or non-parent carer is responsible for providing care for the child. A parent or non-parent carer's percentage of care for a day in a child support period is the percentage of care that the person is likely to have, or has had, of the child during the care period.…A person's percentage of care for a child will generally be determined according to the actual care that they have of the child. The actual care may be reflected in care arrangements agreed upon by the parents, including non-parent carers. This agreement might take the form of a written agreement, parenting plan or court order in relation to a child's care.…Care will generally be worked out based on the number of nights that the child is likely to be in the care of the person during the care period (CSA Act section 54A)..EVIDENCE The Final Federal Circuit Court Parenting Orders by consent of 8 April 2015 provide the following care arrangement for the children:That the children live with the husband.That the children spend time and communicate with the wife each year as follows:-(a) For the last two weeks of January - Tuesday to Friday;(b) For the first two weekends of February- Friday to Monday;(c) For the second and third weekend in March - Friday to Monday;(d) For the last 2 weekends in April -Friday to Monday;(e) For the first 2 weekends in May - Friday to Monday;(f) 12 days during June and July over the school holidays;(g) For the last 2 weekends in August-Friday to Monday;(h) 12 days during September and October over the school holidays;(i) For the last 2 weekends in November - Friday to Monday;(j) For the middle 2 weeks of December - Tuesday to Friday;(k) On Christmas Day each alternate year commencing 2015, or at otherwise agreed between the parties, and in default of agreement between the parties, and in default of agreement between 9am and 9pm.(l) On the children's birthdays at times to be agreed, or as otherwise agreed between the parties, and in default of agreement between 3.15pm and 6.30pm if a school day and 10am and 3 pm if a non-school day.(m) Such further or other times agreed between the parties.That in addition to the above time, the wife be at liberty to spend time with the children during the school week of not less than 2 evenings, or 2 days if a non-school day, from after school or 10am if a non school day until 8pm with the agreement of the husband, upon giving the husband notice by 4pm the evening prior, and the husband's agreement not to be unreasonably withheld.That the wife's time on weekends to commence from after school or 3.30pm if a non-school day Friday and conclude Monday morning or Tuesday if Monday is a non-school day (or alternatively Sunday evening if agreed between the parties).That the wife's time during the week or otherwise over holiday periods to commence from after school if a school day, or at an agreed time on a non school day, and conclude prior to the commencement of school or at an agreed time if a non school day

Decision

Reasons for decision

As there was no appeal before this Tribunal as to the CSR determination of the care arrangement for S from 5 May 2022 with CGJK 100% and LTQV 0%, from 17 Nov 2023 with CGJK 0% and LTQV 100% and from 30 Jan 2024 with CGJK 100% and LTQV 0%, the Tribunal made no findings on these periods in question.DECISION Pursuant to subsection 43(1)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), the Tribunal sets aside the decisions under review and makes decisions in substitution that:·7 February 2022 until 6 May 2022 that CGJK had 14% care of child A and LTQV had 86%.·12 December 2021 until 19 March 2022 that CGJK had 100% care for child S and LTQV had 0%.·19 March 2022 until 5 May 2022 that CGJK had 60% care for child S and LTQV had 40%.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

LTQV’s personal friend’s evidence was that he would see S at football games occasionally as she would always say hello.CONSIDERATION Fundamentally this is a case where both parties want their cake and to eat it too. Both parties are in furious agreement that the binding care orders should be adhered to in respect of one child, and both furiously agree the binding care orders should not apply to the other child. What the applicant and other party do not see eye-to-eye on is which child should be subject to the binding care orders and which should not. CGJK’s position is that the binding care arrangements should be adhered to as there was no change in the care arrangement for A, so there should be no alteration in her percentage of care. CGJK’s written submission provides:[S] made a decision to move schools at the end of Year 6, to live with me fulltime on the 12th December 2021. At this time, she made it clear that she did not intend to reside with her father again which resulted in a significant change in circumstances where she was enrolled in a new school. Her father was aware that this change was occurring in the lead up to this as [S’s] current school had contacted him about this.I contacted the father and made him aware of this change. I kept him updated as to [S’s] where abouts and offered on several occasions to ‘come and collect her’ to spend time with her, however, he refused. She was consistently made available to him but he consistently refused care of her. However, CGJK contends there was a significant change in the care arrangement for S and the binding agreement should be revoked and changed to reflect the actual care arrangement. CGJK’s written submission writes:There are court orders in place and a binding child support agreement (both supplied) which there has been no legal change to or any written request from [LTQV] to change this or any request to attend mediation. No such change can be made to reduce my time without my consent or changes to court orders. There are no other court orders which change the care of [A] and I have not ever rejected to provide care for her in the times stated in the court orders. I am complying with the court orders in place which also allow me to have care of [A] for 78 nights per year and additional times under item ‘6’ of the court orders which I have been doing every second weekend this year. LTQV’s position is that parents should abide by the binding care agreements and not unilaterally determine where a child will live. LTQV told the Tribunal that:Moral concern – actual care verses care determination which comes down to whether you respect orders or not, I get you can’t just leave orders in place for ever but there is a moral consideration here. If we don’t respect orders at all and go purely with actual care you create a perverse incentive for parents to deliberate undermine orders and you also create a perverse incentive that financial rewards parents that can manipulate children and alienate them from the other parent and that has huge consequences for children, for child safety it is the reason why we don’t accept evidence from children anymore. Not telling [Tribunal] what to do as that is your job but practical there needs to be a balance between actual care sure that’s got to be acknowledge if you don’t set an expectation that people respect orders you create a perverse incentive for people to manipulate children.LTVQ reiterated that the changes in living arrangements for S were done without his consent. LTQV argued his percentage of care for S should reflect the consent orders of 2015 until such time as when new consent orders were put in place.