Central Adelaide Local Health Network Inc v Whitehouse

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

CENTRAL ADELAIDE LOCAL HEALTH NETWORK INC v WHITEHOUSE

[2024] SASCA 22

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice David)

14 March 2024

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - DISCOVERY AND INTERROGATORIES - DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS - PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS - GROUNDS FOR RESISTING PRODUCTION - PRIVILEGE - PUBLIC INTEREST IMMUNITY

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - ERROR OF LAW - PARTICULAR CASES INVOLVING ERROR OF LAW - FAILURE TO GIVE REASONS FOR DECISION - ADEQUACY OF REASONS

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT - FUNCTIONS OF APPELLATE COURT - IN GENERAL

Appeal pursuant to s 43(1) of the District Court Act 1991 (SA) (‘District Court Act’). 

This appeal stems from underlying criminal proceedings in the District Court. The respondent is charged with two counts of aggravated assault, three breaches of an intervention order, one count of attempting to dissuade a witness, and one count of serious criminal trespass in a place of residence.

On 6 April 2023, the District Court issued a subpoena to the applicant, Central Adelaide Local Health Network (‘CALHN’) for medical records of the complainant.

On 14 April 2023, CALHN produced documents in response to the subpoena. The documents contained redactions. CALHN contended that the redacted parts were protected from disclosure by statutory public interest immunity conferred by s 67E(1) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) (‘Evidence Act’), being evidence of communications relating to a victim or alleged victim of a sexual offence made in a therapeutic context.

Following various refinements of the claim of statutory public interest immunity, further versions of the documents with fewer redactions were returned on 4 May 2023.

On 5 May 2023, the primary judge ruled on the claims. The judge accepted that the complainant was a victim or alleged victim of a sexual offence. She rejected CALHN’s argument that the communications relating to the complainant’s admissions to hospital and subsequent therapy were made in a ‘therapeutic context’ as that term is defined in s 67D(a) of the Evidence Act. She accordingly found that many of the documents over which the claim was made were not protected communications.

CALHN seeks to appeal against the consequent orders declaring certain of the documents not to be ‘protected communications’. In the alternative, in the event the appeal is incompetent, it seeks relief in the form judicial review in the nature of certiorari quashing paragraph 2 of the orders made by the primary judge on 5 May 2023.

CALHN’s primary complaint is that the judge applied an unduly narrow construction to the meaning of ‘therapeutic context’ as that term is defined in s 67D of the Evidence Act.

Two further issues arose on the appeal. First, CALHN sought to adduce…

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Details
Case
[2024] SASCA 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of South Australia, constituted by Livesey P, Bleby and David JJ, heard an appeal from a decision concerning the production of medical records. The appellant, Central Adelaide Local Health Network Inc (CALHN), sought to resist the production of certain documents pursuant to subpoenas issued in criminal proceedings against a respondent charged with aggravated assault and other offences. The complainant in these proceedings was an alleged victim of a sexual offence, though the charges against the respondent did not involve sexual misconduct. CALHN contended that the documents sought were protected communications and thus inadmissible.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether specific documents, identified as medical records relating to the complainant's treatment for mental illness, constituted "protected communications" under section 67F of the *Evidence Act 1929* (SA) and, if so, whether their admission in the criminal proceedings was permissible. This required the Court to consider the criteria for granting permission to adduce evidence of protected communications, particularly the balancing exercise between the public interest in preserving confidentiality and the public interest in preventing a miscarriage of justice. The Court also had to determine the competency of the appeal and whether further evidence should be admitted.

The Court reasoned that section 67F of the *Evidence Act 1929* (SA) establishes a statutory privilege for "protected communications," which are defined to include communications made to a counsellor or therapist. Subsection (5) mandates a balancing exercise, weighing the public interest in confidentiality against the public interest in preventing a miscarriage of justice. The Court found that certain identified documents, specifically pages 56-57 of Volume 1 (Royal Adelaide Hospital Documents), pages 37-42 and 53-55 of Volume 3 (Queen Elizabeth Hospital Patient Records), and pages 28 and 30 of Volume 6 (Glenside Medical Records Schedule 3), were indeed protected communications. The Court allowed the appeal to the extent of holding these documents to be protected communications, implying that their production or admission would be subject to the strictures of section 67F. The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Further issues arising are whether the appeal is competent and whether this Court should permit the appellant (CALHN) to adduce further evidence on the appeal. As to the competency of the appeal, CALHN also filed an application for judicial review, which it pressed only in the event that the appeal was found not to be competent.Background The respondent is charged with two counts of aggravated assault, three breaches of an intervention order, one count of attempting to dissuade a witness and one count of serious criminal trespass in a place of residence. The primary judge found, and it is not in dispute, that the complainant is a victim, or an alleged victim, of a sexual offence. The charges against the respondent do not raise any allegation of a sexual offence. The conduct the subject of the charges is alleged to have occurred on 11 October 2020 and 29 April 2021. The respondent was arrested and has been in custody since 4 May 2021. Following the committal process, the matter was first listed for trial on 11 April 2023. However, on 6 April 2023, the District Court, on the application of the respondent, issued subpoenas for medical records relating to the complainant’s attendance at, or admission to, various hospitals in Adelaide, within various date ranges. These included a subpoena to CALHN. The trial date was held until 12 April 2023. CALHN had not answered the subpoena by that date, so the trial was adjourned to 1 May 2023. On 28 April, it was further adjourned to 2 May 2023. On that date, the respondent was arraigned to allow for argument on the voir dire. The primary judge ruled on the subpoena argument on 5 May 2023. The trial date was lost. The respondent has since applied for bail without success. He remains in custody. Counsel advised this Court that it is unlikely a new trial date will be listed before some time in 2025. The documents sought were described in the subpoena in the following form:1. Documents regarding [the complainant] and: ·Any diagnosis of mental illness; or·Any voluntary or involuntary hospitalisations for mental illness/psychosis; or·Any record of attendance, hospitalisation or treatment between [date range] The terms of the subpoena are wide. A precise legitimate forensic purpose is not apparent from its terms.[1] There was no attempt to refine the description of the documents required to be produced. No issue having been taken, it is not for this Court to refine the terms of the subpoena. However, the breadth of the subpoena and the lateness of its issue have caused an already delayed trial to be vacated. That is not in the interests of the accused, the complainant or the administration of justice. As the Chief Justice said recently in Reynolds (a pseudonym) v The King:[2]It is plainly undesirable … to leave charges of major indictable offences unresolved over a two year period. It follows that every person who has a role in the administration of criminal justice has a heavy responsibility to do all that can be done to expedite trials within the constraints of ensuring a fair trial. That obligation commences with police, who must collect and provide evidentiary material as soon as practicable and with prosecutors who must lay charges promptly. Defence lawyers have an ethical obligation to explain the charges and evidentiary material to their clients as soon as is reasonably practicable. If they are too busy to do so quickly, it is their obligation to so inform the accused and to facilitate the transfer of the file to a legal practitioner who can discharge that duty.[1] See AG (NSW) v Chidgey (2008) 182 A Crim R 536 at [59]-[60]; R v Saleam (1989) 16 NSWLR 14 at 17A, C.[2] [2023] SASC 28 at [23].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 67F then provides for the admission or otherwise of protected communications in proceedings. It is necessary to set out the whole of the section:67F—Evidence of protected communications(1)Evidence of a protected communication—(a) is entirely inadmissible in committal proceedings; and(b) cannot be admitted in other legal proceedings unless—(i)the court gives permission to a party to the proceedings to adduce the evidence; and(ii)the admission of the evidence is consistent with any limitations or restrictions fixed by the court; and(c) is not liable to discovery or any other form of pre-trial disclosure.(2)On an application for permission to adduce evidence of a protected communication, the judge may make a preliminary examination of the relevant evidence if satisfied that—(a) the applicant has a legitimate forensic purpose for seeking permission to adduce the evidence; and(b) there is an arguable case that the evidence would materially assist the applicant in the presentation or furtherance of his or her case.(3)For the purposes of a preliminary examination of evidence, the court may order the counsellor or therapist to do one or more of the following:(a) to provide written answers to questions;(b) to produce written materials relating to the relevant protected communications;(c) to appear for oral examination.Exceptions—1If the counsellor or therapist who provided the counselling or therapy is an employee, answerable to another (the principal) in the organisation in which the counsellor or therapist is employed, an order under this subsection is to be addressed to the principal unless the court is satisfied that there are good reasons for not taking that course in the circumstances of the particular case.2An order requiring a person to appear for oral examination is not to be made unless the court is satisfied that the examination cannot otherwise be effectively conducted.(4)The following provisions govern the conduct of a preliminary examination:(a) the preliminary examination is to be conducted—(i) in the absence of the jury (if any); and(ii) in a room closed to the public; and(b) the evidence taken at the preliminary examination is not to be disclosed to the parties or their legal representatives except to the extent determined by the court; and(c) no record of the preliminary examination is to be available for public access.(5)In deciding whether to grant permission to adduce evidence of a protected communication, the court is to weigh—(a) the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of protected communications;against—(b) the public interest in preventing a miscarriage of justice that might arise from suppression of relevant evidence.(6)In weighing the above considerations, the court is to have regard to—(a) the need to encourage victims of sexual offences to seek psychiatric or psychological therapy and the extent to which the effectiveness of such therapy is dependent on the maintenance of confidentiality between the counsellor or therapist and the victim;(b) the probative value of the evidence and whether its exclusion may lead to a miscarriage of justice;(c) the attitude of the victim or alleged victim to whom the communication relates (or the guardian of the victim or alleged victim) to the admission of the evidence;(d) whether admission of the evidence is being sought on the basis of a discriminatory belief or bias;(e) the extent to which admission of the evidence would infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy and the potential prejudice to any person who would otherwise be protected by public interest immunity.(7)The court is not to grant permission to adduce evidence of a protected communication unless satisfied that the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of protected communications is outweighed, in the circumstances of the case, by the public interest in preventing a miscarriage of justice that might arise from suppression of relevant evidence.(8)If the court decides to grant permission to adduce evidence of a protected communication, it may make ancillary orders—(a) to prevent further publication or dissemination of the evidence; or(b) for any other purpose the court considers appropriate.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the same reason, and as discussed above, the nature of this legislative protection highlights the need for vigilance by all participants in the process as to the legitimate forensic purpose of the terms of any subpoena seeking records of this kind.Conclusion We allow the appeal to the extent of holding that the following documents are protected communications:·Volume 1, Royal Adelaide Hospital Documents, pp 56-57; 62-63;·Volume 3, Queen Elizabeth Hospital Patient Records, pp 37-42, 53-55; and·Volume 6, Glenside Medical Records Schedule 3, pp 28, 30. The application for judicial review is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Central Adelaide Local Health Network Inc v Whitehouse case presented the South Australian Supreme Court with several critical issues regarding the competency of the appeal, the admissibility of further evidence, and the scope of judicial review. The appeal's competency hinged on the appellant's concurrent application for judicial review, which it intended to pursue only if the appeal was deemed incompetent. The court found that the appeal was indeed competent, as the procedural rules allowed for simultaneous proceedings of this nature. This decision underscored the court's acknowledgment of the appellant's right to seek judicial review without compromising the appeal's legitimacy.

The court then deliberated on whether to permit the appellant to adduce further evidence on the appeal. Given the sensitive nature of the documents sought—medical records related to a sexual offence victim—the court exercised caution. The court noted that the subpoenas were broad and issued late, exacerbating trial delays. The court emphasized the importance of expediting trials to ensure justice is served promptly, as delays could prejudice the accused, the complainant, and the administration of justice. However, the court did not allow further evidence, citing the need to balance the urgency of trial progression with the rights and privacy of the individuals involved.

The court scrutinized the primary judge's decision on the subpoenas, focusing on whether the judge provided adequate reasons for his ruling. The court held that the primary judge's reasons were insufficient, as they did not clearly articulate the rationale behind the decision regarding the subpoenas. This finding highlighted the necessity for judges to provide comprehensive and transparent reasoning to ensure accountability and to facilitate effective appellate review.

Regarding the primary judge's findings of fact, the court determined that it should not ordinarily interfere with such findings unless there was a clear error of law or a significant procedural irregularity. The court found no such error in this case, thus affirming the primary judge's factual determinations.

Central to the case was the issue of whether the documents sought by the subpoena constituted protected communications under the relevant legislation. The court held that specific documents from the subpoenaed records were indeed protected communications due to their sensitive nature and the legislative framework protecting such communications. These documents related to the complainant's mental health records, which were protected under the law to encourage victims of sexual offences to seek therapy without fear of disclosure.

Finally, the court addressed whether permission should be granted to adduce the evidence of these protected communications. The court weighed the public interest in preserving confidentiality against the need to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Given the specific circumstances and the limited scope of the evidence sought, the court concluded that the public interest in confidentiality outweighed the need for the evidence. Consequently, permission was denied to adduce the protected communications, reaffirming the court's commitment to safeguarding the privacy of victims of sexual offences while ensuring fair trials.