CCT16 v Minister for Immigration

[2017] FCCA 2560

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CCT16 & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2017] FCCA 2560

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application to extend time for applying for judicial review of decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal affirming decision not to grant Protection visa and decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal it did not have jurisdiction to determine application for review by three of the four applicants on the ground they did not make separate application for review of delegate’s decision – whether adequate and reasonable explanation for delay in making applications – whether merit in grounds of substantive applications – applications for extension of time dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(a), 48B, 116, 347, 348, 417, 474, 476, 477(1), 477(2)

Cases cited:

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391

SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284

First Applicant: CCT16

Second Applicant: CCZ16

Third Applicant: CDA16

Fourth Applicant: CDB16

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND  BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 2059 of 2016

Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis

Hearing date: 13 October 2017

Date of Last Submission: 13 October 2017

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 27 October 2017

REPRESENTATION

First and second applicants in person and on behalf of the applicants

Solicitors for the First Respondent: Mr D Eberl of Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

1. The application made pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) to extend the 35-day period prescribed by s.477(1) in relation to the decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal on 16 April 2015 and in relation to the decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 8 June 2016 is dismissed.

2. The application is otherwise dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2059 of 2016

CCT16

First Applicant

CCZ16

Second Applicant

CDA16

Third Applicant

CDB16

Fourth Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. Before the Court is an application for an order under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) to extend the 35-day period prescribed by s.477(1) of the Act for making an application to this Court for a remedy under s.476 of the Act.

2. The application is made by four members of a family who are citizens of Fiji. The first applicant is the mother, the second applicant is the father, and the third and fourth applicants are their children.

3. The application relates to four decisions.

   a)The first is a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) on 16 April 2015 affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicants Protection visas (RRT decision).[1]

   b)The second is a decision that is notified in a letter dated 16 November 2015 from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department) that the Minister decided it would not be in the public interest to intervene in the applicants’ case and therefore, decided not to exercise the power conferred on the Minister by s.417 of Act.[2]

   c)The third is a decision made by the second respondent (Tribunal) on 8 June 2016 setting aside a decision made by a delegate of the Minister on 2 December 2015 to cancel the second applicant’s Subclass 050 (Bridging (General)) visa (Bridging visa) and instead substitute a decision not to cancel the second applicant’s  Bridging visa (Tribunal decision).[3]

   d)The fourth decision is described in the application as “Ministerial Intervention”. That appears to be a reference to the decision notified in a letter dated 25 July 2016 from the Department that the second applicant’s request on behalf of the applicants that the Minister exercise his power under s.48B of the Act to permit the applicants to make a further application for a Protection visa was not referred to the Minister for his consideration because the applicants’ circumstances did not meet the guidelines set out in the “Minister’s Guidelines – s48A cases and requests for s48B Ministerial intervention”.[4]

   [1] CB198-220

   [2] CB269-270

   [3] CB321-325

   [4] CB438

Jurisdiction

1. At the outset I should refer to that part of the application that purports to challenge the Minister’s decision not to exercise the power conferred on him by s.417 of the Act, and the Department’s decision not to refer to the Minister the second applicant’s request that the Minister exercise his power under s.48B of the Act. This Court does not have jurisdiction in relation to a decision to exercise or not exercise the powers under s.417 or s.48B of the Act. That follows from s.476(2)(d) of the Act which provides this Court does not have jurisdiction in relation to “a privative clause decision or purported privative clause decision mentioned in subsection 474(7)”. Subsection 474(7) of the Act provides that s.48B and s.417, among other provisions, are “privative clause decisions” within the meaning s.474(2) of the Act.

2. This Court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction in relation to the Minister’s decision not to exercise the power conferred by s.417 of the Act or the Department’s decision not to refer to the Minister the second applicant’s request that the Minister exercise his power under s.48B of the Act. That, in turn, means this Court does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the time for the making of an application to review such decisions should be extended. In the remainder of these reasons, therefore, I will consider the applicants’ application for an extension of time in relation to the RRT decision and the Tribunal decision.

Principles governing exercise of power under s.477(2)

1. Under s.477(2) of the Act the Court may order the extension of the 35-day period prescribed by s.477(1) of the Act if two things are satisfied. First, an application for such an order has been made in writing to the Court specifying why the applicant considers it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order. Second, the Court must be satisfied it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make such an order.

2. In SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia Foster J said:[5]

   The courts have developed guidelines as to the factors which might ordinarily be taken into account in considering the interests of the administration of justice in this context. Commonly, those factors include:

   (a) Whether there has been a reasonable and adequate explanation for the applicant’s delay;

   [5] [2013] FCA 1284 at [47]

   (b)     Whether there is any prejudice to the Minister;

   (c) Whether the applicant’s substantive case for judicial review is sufficiently arguable to justify the extension of time.

3. The Federal Court has held that, on an application under s.477(2) of the Act, the Court can consider no more than whether the applicant’s case has some merit. Mortimer J in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection held that a hearing of an application for an extension of time “should not be transformed into a de facto full hearing”.[6] Further:[7]

   If a judge travels beyond an examination of the grounds at what should be a reasonably impressionistic level into a fuller consideration of the arguments for and against each ground of review, then in my respectful opinion that is not a function appropriate to a discretion such as that contained in s 477(2).

   [6] [2015] FCA 1391 at [63] (cases cited omitted)

   [7] [2015] FCA 1391 at [62] (cases cited omitted)

4. As her Honour noted in the same judgment, the words that have been used to describe the merits a claim for judicial review should have to justify the granting of an extension of time include “is “arguable”, “reasonably arguable”, “sufficiently arguable” or has “reasonable prospects of success””;[8] and, as her Honour also stated, that assessment is to be made on “a reasonably impressionistic level”.[9]

   [8] MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391 at [63]

   [9] [2015] FCA 1391 at [62]

Explanation for delay

1. The application for review of the RRT decision was filed some sixteen months after the RRT made its decision, and some nine months after the applicants were informed of the Minister’s decision not to exercise his power under s.417 of the Act. The delay in applying for judicial review, therefore, is significant.

2. The explanation for the delay given by the applicants in their application is that the applicants had applied for “Ministerial Intervention” (which I assume is intended to be a reference to the requests made under both s.417 and s.48B of the Act); the applicants had been given time to make further submissions to the Minister in relation to s.48B of the Act; and the applicants did not have the benefit of legal advice due to their financial hardship. The first and second applicants, who are not legally represented, repeated the substance of these submissions to me. The first applicant also said she and the second applicant did not know about the 35-day limit.

3. The explanations given for this delay are not reasonable. That the applicants made a request under s.48B of the Act and for Ministerial intervention under s.417 of the Act by itself is not a reasonable explanation for a delay in applying for review in this Court; and in any event, even if it were reasonable, the application was filed some nine months after the applicants were notified of the Minister’s decision not to exercise his power under s.417 of the Act. Further, the lack of financial means by itself also is not a reasonable explanation for not applying within the prescribed time. In relation to the Tribunal decision, which was made on 8 June 2016, the delay is only three weeks or so. The applicants however have given no explanation that is specifically directed to this delay.

Merits of proposed application in relation to RRT decision

1. The first and second applicants each made claims for protection. The third and fourth applicants made claims as members of the family unit of which the first and second applicants are members.

2. I first consider the merits of each of the first and second applicants’ claims in relation to the RRT decision. That will require me to set out their claims for protection and the RRT’s reasons for affirming the delegate’s decision in relation to their claims.

First applicant’s claims for protection

1. In her application for a Protection visa, the first applicant claimed she fears being subjected to inhumane treatment by the Bainimarama government because she was her husband’s silent business partner. She was “verbally warned” in December 2012 that her husband needed to pay a taxation debt of over $16,000 in a lump sum and “upfront and that they will take no arrangements”, and that her husband will be placed on a travel ban. The first applicant’s family suffered psychologically because of the number of calls they received from the Taxation Office. The first applicant subsequently resigned from her job to help the second applicant resolve “his tax problems”. The first applicant claimed she fears losing her husband, and that she might be taken to a military camp and tortured because she sold her and the second applicant’s business to her brother and the government “cannot now touch any business assets”. The first applicant also claimed she fears harm if she returns to Fiji because she is a member of the Fiji Democracy and Freedom Movement (FDFM).

2. In a submission she provided in support of her application to the RRT,[10] the first applicant made a number of claims.

   a)First, in the section headed “MY HUSBAND’S ISSUES WITH THE INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT OF THE FIJI GOVERNMENT”[11] the first applicant claimed “the illegal government of Fiji has taken over from all aspects of law and order in Fiji”, by which the first applicant says she means that the government “is now controlled from the prime minister’s officer and his advisors”. The first applicant further claims that the military officers in charge are forcing the second applicant to pay “something he does not owe to the Inland Revenue” and that the first and second applicants received threats from these military officers. These actions led the first and second applicants to have sleepless nights and also “badly affected” their children.

   b)Second, in the section headed “FEAR OF BEING PERSECUTED IF WE RETURNS [sic] TO FIJI BECAUSE OF OUR MEMBERSHIP OF THE FDFM”[12] the first applicant claimed she and the second applicant voted for the SDL party (which I infer is a reference to the “Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua Party” in Fiji) and that they are still strong supporters of that party. It is claimed the FDFM is “the only political body that openly speaks out and is very vocal about the illegal government in Fiji” and that the FDFM “has voiced publicly in support of us” with respect to the actions taken by the Inland Revenue Department against the second applicant, “[w]hat they did to my husband’s grand-uncle whilst he was a member of parliament and a political advisor to the workers at the Emperor Goldmine in Vatukoula, Fiji” and the humiliation the first applicant’s brother suffered at the hands of the military in relation to his purchase of the first and second applicant’s business.

   c)Third, in the section headed “I WORKED WITH VODAFONE FIJI 2002-2012 AND WAS SECONDED TO HELP THE DEMOCRATIC [sic] ELECTED GOVERNMENT CHANGE ALL THEIR PHONE NUMBERS THE DAY THE MILITARY COUP HAPPENED”[13], the first applicant claimed she “had discrimination elements that went on at our work” that led the first applicant to leave her job. She claimed she had helped “the elected democratic government” change their mobile phone numbers “the day the military took over”. One of the military officers in the government obtained information that Vodafone “did the change of mobile numbers” and “they rang us to find more information”. Someone from the Vodafone office leaked information to the military government that “Vodafone helped in the changing of the democratic government mobiles”. Before the first applicant resigned from Vodafone military officers made frequent visits to Vodafone’s headquarters, “requesting for all the top civil servant numbers and their bills to help them with their illegal investigation”. Soldiers were coming “in and out” of the Vodafone headquarters with guns, “intimidating us and forcing us to provide them with all information they requested”. When the military government found out the first applicant was behind the change of mobile phone numbers of the previous government, they “traced where I was and found out I’m here in Australia”.

   d)In a section headed “FREQUENTING AUSTRALIA AND NOT APPLYING FOR A PROTECTION VISA”[14] the first applicant referred to her and the second applicant’s having visited Australia more than once and explained why they did not then apply for Protection visas during those visits.

   [10] CB137-143

   [11] CB139

   [12] CB140

   [13] CB142-143

   [14] CB141

Second applicant’s claims for protection

1. In the application for his Protection visa the second applicant claimed as follows:

   a)The second applicant left Fiji because he feared inhumane treatment and cruel punishment by the Bainimarama government.

   b)The second applicant was warned that if he did not pay a purported taxation debt of over $16,000 in full by August 2012 the military government would shut down the second applicant’s business and the second applicant would have to “face the consequences of not lodging my income tax and VAT returns on time”. The second applicant was forced to pay something he did not owe the military government.

   c)All government ministries in Fiji are run by the military and the second applicant does not believe the Fijian authorities will protect him or his family.

   d)The second applicant and the first applicant joined FDFM and are well known to the security forces in Fiji and will be at great risk if they return to Fiji.

RRT’s reasons

1. The RRT considered the first applicant’s claims that she fears harm because of her political opinions. The RRT accepted there was independent evidence that in 2006 political activists or prominent opponents of the Fijian regime suffered harm for their political opinions. The independent evidence did not suggest, however, that SDL supporters were harmed. Given the first applicant did not claim she contributed to SDL activity, the RRT was not satisfied the first applicant was, or was imputed to be, a political activist or a dissident when in Fiji. Thus, the RRT was not satisfied there is a real chance the first applicant will suffer serious harm in the reasonably foreseeable future because of her political opinion or imputed political opinion or that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk the first applicant will suffer significant harm because of her political opinion or imputed political opinion.

2. Next, after accepting the first applicant is a Christian and that no adverse religious profile was suggested by the first applicant and no adverse religious profile was imputed to the first applicant when she resided in Fiji, the RRT considered the first applicant’s claims based on her helping the former government change all the mobile phone numbers of the top civil servants on the day the military took over in 2006. Although the RRT accepted the first applicant had been employed by Vodafone from 2006 to 2012, it did not accept the first applicant’s claim that she changed the mobile phone numbers of the former government’s top civil servants or that she changed their mobile phone accounts from post-paid to pre-paid accounts, while keeping their mobile phone numbers the same. The Tribunal was of the view that the first applicant invented this claim in order to obtain a Protection visa. In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal relied on the following matters:

   a)First, at the hearing before the RRT the first applicant said she changed the mobile phone accounts of the senior civil servants of the former government from “post-paid to pre-paid”, and they did not have the numbers changed.

   b)Second, the first applicant was unable to explain the significance of switching a mobile phone account from a post-paid account to a pre-paid account, while retaining the same mobile phone number.

   c)Third, the first applicant was unable to explain why the military would be continually concerned for a period of six years about whether the former government’s top civil servants held post-paid or pre-paid mobile phone accounts or why they would continue to seek out and punish the person responsible for this action.

3. The Tribunal further found that, even if it were accepted the first applicant assisted the former government’s top civil servants in changing their mobile phone plans, it is implausible that the military would make frequent visits to Vodafone headquarters with guns from 2006 until 2012 to request the mobile phone bills of all top civil servants.

4. The RRT, therefore, was not satisfied there is a real chance the first applicant will suffer serious harm in the reasonably foreseeable future for any actions taken by her when an employee of Vodafone or that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk the first applicant will suffer significant harm for any actions taken by her when an employee of Vodafone.

5. The RRT then considered the first and second applicants’ claims based on the second applicant’s tax debts. The RRT accepted the second applicant owed money, in the nature of taxation and fines, to the Fiji Revenue and Customs Authority (FRCA). The RRT, however, found no independent evidence that the military had taken over FRCA, or that in 2012 the military enforced tax payments, or that the Fijian authorities enforce tax regulations in a discriminatory manner. The RRT did not accept that weekly calls from FRCA amounted to significant physical harassment. Further, the first applicant returned to Fiji in November 2011 and twice in December 2012 without being harmed. The RRT, therefore, was not satisfied there is a real chance the first or second applicants will suffer serious harm in the reasonably foreseeable future because of the second applicant’s tax debts or that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk the first or second applicants will suffer significant harm for the second applicant’s tax debts.

1. The RRT also considered whether the first applicant faces any risk of harm because the second applicant sold his business to the first applicant’s brother, or because the first applicant’s brother was being pursued by ANZ Bank and FRCA for business debts. The RRT was not satisfied the first applicant will be seriously harmed because she sold her business to her brother or because her brother cannot repay his business debts. The RRT also did not accept that the first applicant would be taken to a military camp and tortured because she sold her business to her brother or that the authorities “cannot now touch any business assets”.

2. As to the first applicant’s claims based on her being a member of the FDFM, the RRT found there is no country information that indicates members of FDFM are subject to harm from the regime on their return to Fiji. In any event, the RRT did not accept the first and second applicants are members of FDFM in Australia, and the RRT did not accept the first applicant’s claims that the FDFM publicly voiced support for the applicants, or that the first and second applicants would be considered vocal opponents of the regime if they returned to Fiji. 

Proposed grounds of application

1. The proposed grounds of application contain the following claims:

   a)The RRT did not “once include questions relating to the main body of laws in the Refugees Convention”.

   b)The RRT kept its questions focused on the matter of the first applicant’s job rather than “the wider and more significant subject concerning” the first applicant’s well-founded fear of being persecuted.

   c)The RRT failed to take into account “huge numbers of readily available material” about breaches of human rights in Fiji.

2. There then follow many paragraphs setting out claims that do not refer to the RRT decision, but to what could only be regarded as relevant to claims for protection. For example:

   a)under the heading “PERSECUTION ON GROUND OF MY RACE” it is claimed that 17 decrees have been promulgated that “expressly target the genocide and annihilation of the native Fijian race” of which the applicants are members;

   b)under the heading “PERSECUTION ON GROUND OF MY RELIGION” it is claimed that as “devoted and committed Christians, we are under siege, because we can no longer continue in the Christian traditions of our forefathers”; and

   c)under the heading “PERSECUTION ON GROUND OF MY POLITICAL OPINION” it is claimed that “DFAT country information for Fiji is false in fact and a fraud on me” and a number of assertions are made about the political situation in Fiji and the prospects of harm to the first applicant if she were to voice her political opinions.

3. The grounds of application conclude as follows:

   Therefore I beg this honourable court to see that the narrow definition of the “significant harm” test in the ‘complimentary [sic] ground’ which I dare say, is very subjective, personal and hard to prove, is a gross trivialisation and almost a type of criminal negligence of the real issue that’s at stake here . . . .

4. In addition to the grounds set out in the application, the applicants rely on an affidavit made by the first applicant, which I read subject to relevance. In the affidavit the applicant deposes to matters that include the following:

   a)the first applicant is a registered member of “Pacific Indigenous Samaritan Association Inc.” which was registered on 16 November 2015;

   b)the first applicant is a registered member and active supporter of the “Fiji Native Government in Exile”;

   c)matters in support of the claim the first applicant is entitled to protection on the ground she is a member of the “Fiji Native Government in Exile”;

   d)matters in support of the claim the first applicant is entitled to protection because of her religious beliefs; and

   e)matters in support of the claim the first applicant is entitled to protection because of her race.

5. At the hearing before me the first and second applicants made submissions in relation to the merits of the application. The first applicant submitted she is still a member of “Pacific Indigenous Samaritan Association Inc.” which is a continuation of the FDFM; she is the secretary of that organisation; she took part in protests last year; and the applicants are active members of “Pacific Indigenous Samaritan Association Inc.”. The second applicant submitted he has been in Australia for five years, he has Australian trade qualifications, he pays taxes in Australia, and he and the first applicant distribute food to the needy.

6. Most of the matters on which the first and second applicants rely in the application for review, the first applicant’s affidavit, and the matters they submitted to me at the hearing, do not refer to the claims the first and second applicants made before the RRT, or grounds on which the RRT relied for not accepting those claims. Most of the matters are advanced in support of claims the applicants are in need of protection and are otherwise people who have been contributing members of the Australian community over the past five years. As I informed the first and second applicants, however, this Court does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the applicants have valid grounds for obtaining a Protection visa. This part of the applicants’ claims, therefore, has no merit.

7. There are some claims the applicants make that do refer to the RRT decision, and I have identified these in paragraph 25 of these reasons.

   a)First, it is said the RRT did not “once include questions relating to the main body of laws in the Refugees Convention”. This claim has no merit. The RRT referred to the Refugees Convention,[15] and in terms considered whether it was satisfied the first and second applicants met the criterion provided for by s.36(2)(a) of the Act namely, whether the first or second applicants are persons to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. To the extent the applicants claim the Tribunal did not consider their claims against the complementary protection criterion, or the Tribunal misunderstood or misapplied that criterion, there would be no substance to such claim.

   b)Second, the first and second applicants claim the RRT kept its questions focused on the matter of the first applicant’s job rather than “the wider and more significant subject concerning” the first applicant’s well-founded fear of being persecuted. This claim also has no merit. The RRT did consider the first applicant’s claims based on what she said had occurred while she was an employee with Vodafone; but, as should be evident from my summary of its reasons, the RRT considered all other claims for protection the first and second applicants made.

   c)Third, the applicants claim the RRT failed to take into account “huge numbers of readily available material” about breaches of human rights in Fiji. This ground also has no merit. The ground does not identify the material the RRT is said not to have taken into account; nor does the ground state whether the material the RRT did not take into account was material the first and second applicants submitted or otherwise identified to the RRT.

   [15] CB213, [74]

Conclusions on application in relation to RRT decision

1. Given the lengthy delay in filing the application in this Court, the absence of any adequate reason for the delay and, above all, the absence of any merit in the proposed grounds of application, I am not satisfied it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice that I should make an order under s.477(2) of the Act extending the time for making an application in relation to the RRT decision.

Merits of proposed application in relation to the Tribunal decision

1. The Tribunal decision relates to four separate decisions a delegate of the Minister made under s.116 of the Act to cancel the Bridging visas the applicants held. The delegate cancelled the applicants’ Bridging visas on the ground that the circumstances on which the Bridging visas were granted no longer existed. The Tribunal set aside the delegate’s decision in relation to the cancellation of the second applicant’s Bridging visa and substituted a decision not to cancel the Bridging visa of the second applicant.

2. The application before me does not identify the grounds on which the applicants seek to challenge the Tribunal decision. From what the first and second applicants said to me at the hearing, however, their complaint is directed to the Tribunal having not set aside the delegate’s decisions to cancel the Bridging visas held by the first, third and fourth applicants.

3. The reason the Tribunal did not substitute a decision in relation to the delegate’s decision to cancel the Bridging visas that had been granted to the first, third, and fourth applicants is that it found it had no jurisdiction to do so. The Tribunal noted the delegate made four separate decisions, one relating to each of the applicants, but the application for review to the Tribunal was made only by the second applicant in relation to the delegate’s decision to cancel the second applicant’s Bridging visa, with the first, third, and fourth applicants being named as secondary applicants to the review. The Tribunal further noted that the only decision of the delegate that was lodged with the application for review was the decision that related to the applicant. In these circumstances the Tribunal found it had no jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decisions in relation to the first, third, and fourth applicants. The Tribunal said:[16]

   As the delegate made separate decisions in respect of each of the applicants, in the circumstances, each applicant, to make a valid application for review, had to make a separate application to the Tribunal and pay the relevant filing fee. This did not occur. In this case, only one filing fee was paid and only the decision in relation to [the second applicant] was provided.

   [16] CB322, [3]

4. The source of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decisions to cancel each of the applicants’ Bridging visas is s.348(1) of the Act which provides that, subject to s.348(2) of the Act (which is not relevant here), the Tribunal must review “a Part 5-reviewable decision” if an application is “properly made under section 347” of the Act. Section 347 of the Act sets out the requirements for the making of an application of “a Part 5 reviewable decision”. That requires that the application be made in the prescribed form, and that the prescribed fee is paid.

5. Given there were four separate decisions to cancel the Bridging visas held by each of the applicants, it follows that each of the decisions was a Part 5-reviewable decision. That, in turn, meant that a valid application for review of each of those decisions could only have been made by the lodging of an application for review for each decision, and the payment of the prescribed fee for each of the applications for review. The Tribunal, therefore, was undoubtedly correct to conclude it did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision to cancel the Bridging visas that were held by the first, third, and fourth applicants.

6. Given I am of the opinion the Tribunal was clearly correct in concluding it did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decisions in relation to the first, third, and fourth applicants, I am not satisfied it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice that I make an order under s.477(2) of the Act in relation to the Tribunal decision.

Conclusions and disposition

1. I am satisfied the Court has no jurisdiction to determine the application to the extent it challenges the Minister’s not exercising his power under s.417 of the Act and the Department’s decision not to refer to the Minister the second applicant’s request that the Minister exercise his power under s.48B . I am not satisfied it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice that an order be made under s.477(2) of the Act in relation to the RRT decision or the Tribunal decision. I propose, therefore, to order that the application for an order under s.477(2) of the Act be dismissed and that the application otherwise be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding thirty-nine (39) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Manousaridis

Date: 27 October 2017