CCGW and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration)
[2017] AATA 1731
•4 October 2017
CCGW and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration) [2017] AATA 1731 (4 October 2017)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2017/4348
Re:CCGW
APPLICANT
AndMinister for Immigration and Border Protection
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Deputy President B W Rayment
Date:4 October 2017
Place:Sydney
The decision under review is set aside and in substitution, the Tribunal decides the cancellation of the applicant’s visa is revoked under section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
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Deputy President B W Rayment
Catchwords
MIGRATION – non-revocation of mandatory cancellation of visa – character test – substantial criminal record – primary and other considerations under Ministerial Direction No. 65 – protection of the Australian community – expectations of the Australian community – best interests of minor children – decision under review set aside and substituted
Legislation
Migration Act 1958, ss 499, 500(1)(ba), 501(3A), (6), 501CA
Cases
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Lesianawai [2014] FCAFC 141
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Venables [1997] UKHL 25; [1998] AC 407
Secondary Materials
Ministerial Direction no. 65 - Visa refusal and cancellation under s501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s501CA
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President B W Rayment
4 October 2017
BACKGROUND
The applicant is the subject of a mandatory visa cancellation, which a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection declined to revoke. The applicant is a citizen of New Zealand, having been born in the Cook Islands. He is nearly 25 years of age. He has resided in Australia with his family since he was six years old.
Since 29 January 2016 he has been imprisoned until his release in July of this year, when he was taken into immigration detention at Villawood Immigration Detention Centre. He was released on parole having served 18 months’ imprisonment.
He had previously served a term of imprisonment from 13 May 2013 until his release on parole after three months.
The two terms of imprisonment to which he was sentenced were for 10 months and 15 days (in 2013) and 30 months (in 2016), and in terms of the Migration Act1958 (the Act), he is regarded as a person with serious criminal offences such as to make him fail the “character test” referred to in s 501(6) of the Act.
While he was in prison on the most recent occasion, the procedure described in s 501CA of the Act was followed. An original decision to cancel his visa having been made, and that decision being one which the Minister was obliged to make under s 501(3A) of the Act, the provisions of s 501CA were engaged. The Minister gave the applicant a written notice giving particulars of relevant information concerning him and inviting the applicant to make representations to the Minister about revocation of the original decision and the applicant took up that invitation. The Minister, by his delegate, declined to revoke the visa cancellation and the applicant brought the matter to this Tribunal, as he was entitled to do under s 500(1)(ba) of the Act.
THE MINISTERIAL DIRECTION
The Tribunal is bound by directions made by the Minister under s 499 of the Act, as a “body” referred to in s 499(2A) of the Act.
Direction no. 65 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s501CA (the Direction) replaced the earlier Direction no. 55 with effect from 23 December 2014. Direction 65 has much in common with Direction 55, which was considered by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Lesianawai [2014] FCAFC 141. The Full Court was there constituted by Buchanan, Perry and Gleeson JJ. Gleeson J dissented in the case. Buchanan J wrote concerning Direction 55 as follows:
[10] In relation to a visa cancellation decision, Direction 55 requires the Tribunal to “take into account” a number of specific considerations, which it characterises as either “primary” or “other” considerations. Primary considerations are matters that must be taken into account, and which should “generally” be given greater weight. Other considerations are matters to which a decision maker should attach less weight.
[11] Direction 55’s emphatic classification of considerations as either “primary” or “other” implies a clarity of distinction that is in some respects obscured by, and not well defined in, the exegetical text of the Direction. Although the two categories are described in somewhat more elaborate detail in Direction 55, the essence of the two categories can be conveyed by the following short descriptions:
(a)Primary considerations
(i) protection of the Australian community
(ii) the quality of the non-citizen’s ties to the Australian community
(iii) the best interests of resident minor children,
(iv) compliance with international “non-refoulement” obligations
(b)Other considerations
(v) the effect of visa cancellation on permanent resident family members
(vi) the effect on Australian business interests
(vii) the impact of non-cancellation on members of the Australian community, including the impact on victims of the non-citizen’s criminality
(viii) difficulties the non-citizen may face in maintaining themselves in their home country.
[12] It is obvious, and Direction 55 recognises, that the four “primary” considerations may point to opposite conclusions about the appropriate exercise of the visa cancellation power. That, in itself, complicates compliance with the direction that “primary” considerations are “generally” to be given greater weight. But the potential complications are increased by the scope for factual overlap between the “primary” and “other” considerations. That scope for overlap exists between the “primary” consideration of protecting the Australian community, and the “other” consideration of the impact of a “non-cancellation” decision on members of the Australian community. Similarly, there is scope for overlap between the “primary” consideration of the quality of a non-citizen’s ties to the Australian community and the “other” consideration of the effect of visa cancellation on a non-citizen’s resident family members.
[13] The evident potential for tension between the various “primary” considerations, and between those considerations and at least some of the “other” considerations, points to the exercise of the visa cancellation power requiring a “balancing” exercise. This is recognised, though in a somewhat less direct context, in Direction 55 at paragraph 7(1)(b). It describes the decision maker as
… required to determine whether the risk of future harm by a non-citizen is unacceptable. This requires a balancing exercise, involving a consideration of the likelihood of any future harm, the extent of the potential harm should it occur, and the extent to which, if at all, any risk of future harm should be tolerated by the Australian community.
[14] That “balancing” exercise is one that requires a comparative, but ultimately impressionistic, evaluation of the totality of the relevant circumstances. This evaluation has to be carried out against the background of the objectives and principles described in Direction 55. It requires a careful and accurate assimilation of all the circumstances relevant to the particular non-citizen who contests their visa cancellation.
(Emphasis in original.) (Footnote omitted.)
Perry J wrote concerning Direction 55 as follows:
[80] Nonetheless, while compliance with Direction No. 55 is required where the delegate or Tribunal is the decision-maker, the purpose of the Direction “is to guide decision-makers… exercising powers under section 501 of the Act…” (cl 6.1(3)) (emphasis added). The tension that this might appear at first blush to create is resolved by recognising that compliance with Direction No. 55 does not involve dictating the way in which the discretion is to be exercised; rather the Direction creates a framework within which the discretion vested in the decision-maker is lawfully to be exercised. I understand it to be in this sense that the concept of “guidance” is employed in the Direction.
[81] In furtherance of this, certain principles are identified in cl 6.3 which “provide a framework within which decision-makers should approach their task of deciding whether to refuse or cancel a non-citizens [sic] visa under section 501.” (cl 6.2(3)). These principles include that:
3In some circumstances, criminal offending or other conduct, and the harm that would be caused if it were to be repeated, may be so serious, that any risk of similar conduct in the future is unacceptable. In these circumstances, even other strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa.
4Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by people who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community only for a short period of time. However, Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct in relation to a non-citizen who has lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age.
...
6The length of time a non-citizen has been making a positive contribution to the Australian community, and the consequences of a visa refusal or cancellation for minor children and other immediate family members in Australia, are considerations in the context of determining whether that non-citizen’s visa should be cancelled, or their visa application refused.
[82] Clause 7(1) of Direction No. 55 provides that, informed by the principles identified in cl 6.3, a decision-maker “must take into account” primary or other considerations where relevant and “is required to determine whether the risk of future harm by a non-citizen is unacceptable”. The latter determination “requires a balancing exercise, involving a consideration of the likelihood of any future harm, the extent of the potential harm should it occur and the extent to which, if at all, any risk of future harm should be tolerated by the Australian community.” (cl 7(1)(b)). The primary considerations in the context of a decision whether to cancel a person’s visa are identified in cl 9(1). Those primary considerations which the Tribunal found to be relevant to the respondent’s case were protection of the Australian community from criminal conduct, the strength, duration and nature of the person’s ties to Australia, and the best interests of minor children in Australia (the three relevant primary considerations). “Other considerations” which must also be taken into account where relevant include, but are not limited to, those identified in cl 10(1) of Direction No. 55.
[83] Clause 8(3) recognises that “[b]oth primary and other considerations may weigh in favour of, or against, refusal or cancellation of the visa”. Clause 8 also deals with the manner in which primary considerations are to be weighed against each other and against other considerations. Thus, by virtue of cl 8(4), primary considerations “should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations”, while cl 8(5) provides that “[o]ne or more primary considerations may outweigh other primary considerations” (emphasis added). In my view, the words “should generally” and “may” in cl 8(4) and (5) respectively make it clear that those provisions are intended to provide guidance to the decision-maker as to how the balancing exercise required by Direction No. 55 should be approached which the decision-maker is bound to consider, while leaving it open to the decision-maker to adopt a different approach in the exercise of discretion in the individual case. The fact that Direction No. 55, aside from prescribing relevant considerations in a jurisdictional sense, provides guidance only in this sense as to the manner in which they are to be balanced is in my view a fundamental aspect of the scheme. It equips decision-makers with a width of discretion that enables them to take into account the myriad of different circumstances and different combinations of circumstances that may arise and thereby to reach a result that is fair and rational in all of the circumstances, while ensuring that account is had to those considerations that the legislator has identified as crucial to a lawful decision.
Buchanan J rejected a challenge by notice of contention to Direction 55 on the basis that it was an invalid fetter on administrative discretions and Perry J agreed.
Gleeson J’s dissent was mainly in agreement with the primary judge about the construction of the reasons of the Tribunal and not because of any disagreement expressed by her Honour with the members of the majority about the purport of Direction 55.
Direction 65 is in closely similar terms to Direction 55, so far as they were discussed by Buchanan and Perry JJ in the passages I have set out above. While Direction 65 is a very prescriptive document, it nevertheless, like its predecessor, preserves for the decision-maker much discretion, consistently with the dictates of the important principle of administrative law described by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Venables [1997] UKHL 25; [1998] AC 407 at 496-497:
When Parliament confers a discretionary power exercisable from time to time over a period, such power must be exercised on each occasion in the light of the circumstances at that time. In consequence, the person on whom the power is conferred cannot fetter the future exercise of his discretion by committing himself now as to the way in which he will exercise his power in the future ... By the same token, the person on whom the power has been conferred cannot fetter the way he will use that power by ruling out of consideration on the future exercise of that power factors which may then be relevant to such exercise.
These considerations do not preclude the person on whom the power is conferred from developing and applying a policy as to the approach which he will adopt in the generality of cases ... But the position is different if the policy adopted is such as to preclude the person on whom the power is conferred from departing from the policy or from taking into account circumstances which are relevant to the particular case in relation to which the discretion is being exercised. If such an inflexible and invariable policy is adopted, both the policy and the decisions taken pursuant to it will be unlawful.
Thus, as in the case of Direction 55, Direction 65 states that the purpose of the Direction is to “guide decision-makers performing functions or exercising powers under section 501 of the Act” and clause 6.2(3) states that “[t]he principles provide a framework within which decision-makers should approach their task of deciding whether to refuse or cancel a non-citizen’s visa under section 501, or whether to revoke a mandatory cancellation under section 501CA”.
Clause 8 of Direction 65 is in similar language to the version of clause 8 in Direction 55 to which her Honour refers.
Direction 65 does not repeat the language referred to by Buchanan J in paragraph [13] of his judgment, but it conveys a similar idea in clauses 6.3(3) and 13.1(2)(b). It distinguishes between primary and other considerations and although indicating that primary considerations should “generally” prevail over the other considerations, nevertheless invites the taking into account of all of the considerations in the particular facts of the case, and invites an overall balancing of all considerations. By clause 14, the “other” considerations are all required to be taken into account where relevant.
Primary considerations
The primary considerations which are relevant are: (i) protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct; (ii) the best interests of minor children in Australia, and; (iii) expectations of the Australian community.
Protection of the Australian community
In relation to the protection of the Australian community, I am directed by clause 13(1) to the matters there referred to. By clause 13(2) I should also have regard to the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen’s conduct to date and to the risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct.
The applicant was convicted of a juvenile offence when he was 15, which he said arose from a neighbour having slapped his younger sister. This led to an altercation as a result of which the neighbour was injured by the applicant. He was made subject to a control order for eight months with a non-parole period of two months.
Also at the age of 15 he was found guilty of an offence involving robbery and violence. The circumstances of that offence are described in the sentencing remarks of Judge Ellis of 21 August 2009 which are in evidence before me. The remarks on sentence contain a number of statements of extenuating circumstances relating to the applicant, including his having attempted to stop the violence against the victim and coming forward voluntarily to make full admissions leading to successful prosecutions against others involved. A suspended sentence of 22 months was imposed upon him.
He was dealt with at Burwood local court in 2012 for various offences for three of which he was fined.
The offences committed when the applicant was 15 years of age have to take account of the fact that he was then a teenager. It is his offences committed when he became an adult, albeit fuelled by alcohol and drugs, to which I now turn.
In 2013 he was dealt with for breaking, entering and stealing, taking into account common assault and larceny, and on appeal his sentence of 10 months was confirmed with a non-parole period reduced on appeal to three months. He was released on parole after those three months in August 2013. The offences arose from a drinking spree with friends in the course of which the applicant entered a bottle shop through an open window and stole at first a carton of Jim Beam whisky, and an hour later, attempted to steal other alcohol, apparently for consumption by himself and his companions. When challenged by a security guard, he threw a rock at the security guard, striking him on the arm, and causing his arm to bleed, and threatened him while holding two bricks. The security guard then ran away in fear.
His most recent offence took place in January 2014, and also involved breaking, entering and stealing. The sentencing judge described the offending as “slightly above low-range and not to the extent of mid-range”. After drinking some 15 beers he broke into an apartment and stole goods which were later recovered. He did not enter the rooms of persons sleeping in the apartment. The remarks on sentence are in evidence before me and describe the facts of the main charge and those of assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest. His sentence was for 30 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months, commencing 29 January 2016. The conviction took into account associated offences of taking and driving a motor vehicle, assault of a police officer and resisting arrest, all of which were described by in the remarks on sentence. The offences were committed whilst he was on parole.
Clause 13.1.1 of the Direction requires the Tribunal to have regard to the factors there set out and I have done so. I note that there was a degree of violence associated with most of the sentences to which I have referred, and that, in the circumstances mentioned by the sentencing judge, there were crimes of assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest. I note the sentences that have been imposed. I note the number and frequency of his offending, and that he was formally warned in writing about the consequences of re-offending on his migration status, on 8 August 2013, before he committed his most recent offence of 2014. Offences have been committed while the applicant was on parole, and while he was on good behaviour bonds.
Again, he was released from prison in July this year, as soon as his non-parole period expired, which was 18 months after his imprisonment began. His other term of imprisonment after three months, when his non-parole period expired.
I have regard to the principle referred to in the first sentence of paragraph 13.1.2 of the direction, and to the mandatory consideration mentioned in paragraph 13.1.2(2)(a) of the Direction.
As to paragraph 13.1.2(2)(b) the risk that the applicant may re-offend is real having regard to his history. I accept that his determination not to do so is genuinely stated by him.
In the periods when he has not been imprisoned, the applicant has been employed and contributed part of his salary to his mother (such as $500 when he was working in construction from a net weekly wage of approximately $1,500), which helped with the support of his family in circumstances described below.
He has also obtained qualifications to position him for several kinds of employment while incarcerated.
Importantly, he has completed during his recent incarceration an Intensive Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program at the John Morony Correctional Complex (known apparently as ‘Windsor 2’). The applicant explained that he was released at the earliest date on account of his having completed all three stages of that program, and having passed successive urine analyses indicating that during the entire period of his incarceration (except for the first day) he was free of drugs. The respondent sought to stress in submissions that he had taken drugs on that first day. However, it is an important fact to note that since that first day (now more than 20 months ago) he has been drug free. He told me that drugs were available to persons incarcerated and to persons in immigration detention at Villawood.
He also told me that, now at the age of almost 25, he is determined to maintain his drug-free status. A substantial part of his motivation to stay drug and crime free is his desire to be reunited with his family, and to continue to play the role which he presently plays with them. The action presently being undertaken by the Minister pursuant to the Act and his immigration detention at Villawood, and the prospect that he might be removed to New Zealand, where he has no ties and where his family would be likely to be out of touch with him except by telephone has given him a wake-up call, probably more so than his past incarceration has done. Even now at Villawood he can regularly mix with his family and does so at least weekly.
His drug use is in remission and has been so for the better part of two years. His mother is apprehensive that he will be at greater risk of regression if he is sent to New Zealand, than if he were allowed back into the Australian community. I do not make that finding, because it is speculative, but I note her concerns.
The possibility of his re-offending is undeniable. His record and present circumstances do not make re-offending more likely than not if he remains here.
Best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision
The next primary consideration to be considered is the best interests of minor children in Australia. There are three young persons who fall into that category. They are his brother Johnny and his sisters Rotana and Karen. They are the children of the applicant’s mother by the late Mr Caine who died three years ago. They live with the applicant’s mother, in a house where the applicant also lived until several years ago, and to which he wishes to return if he is allowed to remain in Australia. He is close to all of the minors. Karen, aged nine, is described by the applicant and other family members as his favourite, and who he regards as having great potential. I was told of her love for the applicant, and that she and all family members, including Rotana and Johnny, would be devastated if he were removed to New Zealand. She is in regular touch with the applicant at Villawood, and goes to visit him with her mother while he is there. She has missed him since he moved out from the home and during his incarceration.
Johnny who is 16 is at TAFE and is an apprenticed glazier. He says that he has depended on the support of the applicant, especially since his own father died. He is his best friend, and a person whom he looks up to. He said his brother, the applicant, has always “been there” for him, disciplining him by yelling at him if he did anything wrong. He says life has been hard for him, especially since his father passed away three years ago. The applicant has supported him in all his decisions, particularly since his father died. He said that even when the applicant left home, he always came around to make sure there was enough food for everybody and to check that everybody was OK. He burst into tears when asked to imagine the applicant being removed to New Zealand. Johnny now contributes half his net wage of $600 per week to the expenses of the house. He has not been led astray, and has been encouraged not to misconduct himself by the applicant. I find that the applicant has a significant and beneficial role to play with Johnny, who will be the loser if the applicant is removed from Australia.
Rotana, aged 15, similarly broke into tears when asked about the likely effect on her if the applicant were removed. She is at school and has regular contact with the applicant at Villawood.
This is a close family with strong mutual ties. The applicant is an older brother to the three minor children but plays a de facto, quasi-paternal role in their lives. I have no doubt that the applicant would, if allowed to remain here, continue to play a positive role in their lives. His influence on them has only been for the good. If he were removed, the three minor children would suffer and probably for a long time continue to suffer real pain.
Expectations of the Australian community
Clause 13.3 of the Direction refers to the expectations of the Australian community. I take the heading of this section of the direction to mean what it says, and to require the decision-maker to gauge, if it is possible, the expectations of the Australian community (as to whether the visa cancellation should be revoked) in the light of the actual circumstances of the case. The language of the clause refers to the fact that certain things “may be appropriate” and stipulates that the decision maker should have due regard to the Government’s views in this respect. It is perhaps hard, in a difficult exercise of discretion, for the Tribunal or any decision-maker to distinguish between gauging (properly informed) community expectations, and a rational and just exercise of discretion. I will return to this factor when discussing my exercise of discretion in this case.
Other considerations
There are two relevant ‘other considerations’ mentioned in clause 14 of the Direction. They are ‘strength, nature and duration of ties’, and ‘extent of impediments if [the applicant is] removed’.
Strength, nature and duration of ties
The question of ties overlaps with the consideration of minor children to an extent. The applicant has close ties with his mother, to whose home he wishes to return, and all his siblings. His adopted sister Miriana (who was taken in by the applicant’s mother when she was six months old and is fully assimilated into the family, and who herself is close to the applicant) and his older sister, Upoko, gave evidence before me. His sister Rachel is presently visiting Ireland. His mother gave evidence before me. All those witnesses indicated the extent of close ties which the applicant has here.
The applicant arrived here when he was five or six, and is now almost 25. He has contributed to the community to the same extent as any employed man does except for the periods of his incarceration totalling some 21 months in all. His mother said that she has made no decision to leave Australia, where she also has lived for 20 years, if the applicant is removed to New Zealand. She said that it would be very hard to do so, in the interests of her three youngest children. Three of her children are minors, born here, of whom two are at school and one is at TAFE and will come out of his apprenticeship in two years. I am not prepared to find that it is likely she will move to New Zealand. On the contrary, I consider that quite unlikely.
The applicant has no current relationship.
He had a relationship with a woman whom his mother strongly disapproved of and who, she thought, may lead him astray. That relationship terminated with the applicant’s most recent offending in 2014.
Extent of impediments if removed
Turning to the ‘extent of impediments if removed’ question described in clause 14.5 of the Direction, the applicant himself is likely to be able to make his way in New Zealand. He is now almost 25, in good health, in need of no economic support as such. He will need a period of time to establish himself. New Zealand is of course a fine place. His mother is apprehensive that without regular contact with his family there is a greater risk that he may reoffend than if he remains here. That is, as I have remarked, largely a matter of speculation.
Primary considerations (continued)
I come to the question of discretion which arises, having taken into account the various considerations mentioned in the Direction. I will also comment on the question which I deferred of the expectations of the Australian community.
Expectations of the Australian community
Community expectations would in my opinion take account of seven main things:
(a)First, the important role which the applicant plays within his family, especially his younger siblings. The tragedy of the death of the father of the three younger children and its continuing effect on them would not fail to engage the sympathy of the Australian community, and the beneficial support role played by the applicant in the family, especially his younger siblings and his mother, who have itself done nothing to deserve the further misfortune of his removal to New Zealand.
(b)Second, the fact that the applicant has lived here for twenty years, since he was five, and has the real possibility of contributing in positive ways to the community, despite his record.
(c)Third, there is his record itself, which is substantial and such that removal to his country of origin (as he was warned might occur), would be regarded as something for which he has himself to blame.
(d)Fourth, there is the quality of his offending, which, as the remarks on sentence made at the time of his most serious sentence indicate, was slightly above low range.
(e)Fifth, there is the fact that he has undergone a course of rehabilitation which has involved him being drug-free for more than 20 months, as he has both the means and the strong motivation not to regress into a life of crime.
(f)Sixth, the fact that he has no connection with New Zealand at all, despite his citizenship.
(g)Finally, it seems to me that the community would appreciate that the applicant has served his time and now finds himself still deprived of his freedom because of immigration detention. Putting those things together suggests to me that especially because of the first factor I have mentioned, the Australian community would regard the revocation of the cancellation of the applicant’s visa as the appropriate result.
The mandatory considerations which I am required to take into account include the various matters to which I have referred, and two of the primary considerations to which I have referred (the interests of minor children and the expectations of the community) favour revocation of the cancellation of the applicant’s visa. The other considerations so far as relevant favour the same result. The past offending of the applicant produces the risk that he will reoffend. That risk is less in the case of this applicant than in others who face the same consequence. That is because the applicant is conscious that it is his family who will be the losers if he reoffends. It seems to me that the best interests of minor children is a factor that in appropriate cases, ought to be a primary factor and that this case is a good example of why that is so.
DECISION
This Tribunal is charged with the duty of reaching the right result, which in cases calling for the exercise of discretion, requires it to reach the preferable decision. I am satisfied that the preferable decision, in all the circumstances is to set the reviewable decision aside.
As such, the decision under review is set aside and in substitution, the Tribunal decides that the cancellation of the applicant’s visa is revoked under section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
I certify that the preceding 48 (fourty-eight) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President B W Rayment
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Associate
Dated: 4 October 2017
Date(s) of hearing: 25 & 29 September 2017 Applicant: In person Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr Z He, Clayton Utz
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Immigration
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Administrative Law
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Natural Justice
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Procedural Fairness
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Statutory Construction
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