Cce16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CCE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 524

File number: VID 965 of 2016
Judge: BROMBERG  J
Date of judgment: 17 May 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – original jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia in relation to judicial review of migration decisions – Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 476A and 474 – where it was asserted that a decision was made to exclude the applicant from a process of assessing the implications for the applicant of a data breach – whether the asserted decision was a “migration decision” by virtue of it being a “privative clause decision” – held that if any such decision was made, such a decision would be preparatory to a decision made under the Migration Act and therefore a “privative clause decision” – the Federal Court of Australia has no original jurisdiction to review – application dismissed
Legislation:

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 48B(1), 195A, 417(1), 474, 476A

Cases cited: SZWAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1173
Date of hearing: 28 April 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 28
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person assisted by an interpreter
Solicitor for the Respondent: Ms E Arduca of Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 965 of 2016
BETWEEN:

CCE16

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGE:

BROMBERG  J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 MAY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Respondent’s Notice of Objection to Competency is allowed.

2.The Applicant’s Originating Application dated 24 June 2016 is dismissed.

3.The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of the application, as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BROMBERG J:

  1. The applicant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China who first arrived in Australia on 8 May 1996 as the holder of a Subclass 676 (Tourist) visa.  It is not necessary to set out the entire history of the applicant’s dealings with the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (“Department”).  It is sufficient to record that on 20 December 2013 the applicant made an application for a protection visa.  In February 2014, the Department inadvertently published on its website personal information about the applicant and thousands of other asylum seekers who were in immigration detention as at 31 January 2014 (“data breach”).  By letter dated 12 March 2014, the Secretary of the Department (“Secretary”) wrote to the applicant advising him of the data breach.  The letter informed the applicant that as a result of the data breach it had been possible to access his name, date of birth, nationality, gender and details about his detention and whether he had any other family members in detention (“letter”).  The Secretary then stated:

    The department will assess any implications for…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 524
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Cce16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant sought judicial review of a decision made in relation to a data breach and its implications for their immigration status. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the decision in question was a "migration decision" as defined by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The central issue was whether the decision to exclude the applicant from the process of assessing the implications of a data breach constituted a "privative clause decision" under the Migration Act, and whether such a decision falls within the scope of the court's original jurisdiction for review.

The court examined the definitions of "privative clause decision" and "migration decision" as provided in sections 474 and 5 of the Migration Act, respectively. The court determined that any decision made by the Minister regarding the data breach would be preparatory to a decision made under the Migration Act, and thus would qualify as a "privative clause decision." Given that the Federal Court's original jurisdiction is limited to specific circumstances outlined in section 476A(1) of the Migration Act, and none of those circumstances applied, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision in question.

The court found that the decision sought for judicial review was indeed a "privative clause decision," and therefore a "migration decision." As such, the court did not have the original jurisdiction to review this decision, leading to the dismissal of the applicant's Originating Application.

The court dismissed the applicant's Originating Application dated 24 June 2016 and allowed the respondent's Notice of Objection to Competency. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application, as agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Respondent’s Notice of Objection to Competency is allowed.

2. The Applicant’s Originating Application dated 24 June 2016 is dismissed.

3. The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of the application, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

“Privative clause decision” is, in turn, defined as having the meaning given by s 474(2). It is necessary, however, that I set out the whole of s 474, which provides:(1) A privative clause decision: (a) is final and conclusive; and (b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and (c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account. (2) In this section: "privative clause decision " means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5). (3) A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following: (a)granting, making, varying, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to make an order or determination; (b)granting, giving, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission (including a visa); (c)granting, issuing, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to issue an authority or other instrument; (d) imposing, or refusing to remove, a condition or restriction; (e)making or revoking, or refusing to make or revoke, a declaration demand or requirement; (f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article; (g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing; (h)conduct preparatory to the making of a decision, including the taking of evidence or the holding of an inquiry or investigation; (i)a decision on review of a decision, irrespective of whether the decision on review is taken under this Act or a regulation or other instrument under this Act, or under another Act; (j) a failure or refusal to make a decision. (4)For the purposes of subsection (2), a decision under a provision, or under a regulation or other instrument made under a provision, set out in the following table is not a privative clause decision: As is apparent from the terms of s 476A(1), the Court has limited jurisdiction in relation to decisions made under the Migration Act. In relation to a migration decision, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to those circumstances specified in paragraphs (a) to (d) of s 476A(1). It is not contended that any of those paragraphs have application. What the applicant contends is that the decision he seeks judicial review of is not a privative clause decision and therefore not a migration decision and therefore not caught by the limitations imposed by s 476A(1) of the Migration Act. It is necessary then to identify what decision the applicant seeks to have judicially reviewed by this Court and determine whether or not the decision sought to be reviewed is or is not a migration decision. The only decision referred to in the Originating Application is that recorded in the details of the claim as set out above, namely “giving considerations as to whether to make a decision to exercise the power under ss 417(1), 48B(1) and/or s 195A of the Migration Act”. The Originating Application suggests that the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision made under one or other of those provisions or, perhaps, a decision made in relation to the exercise of the power conferred upon the Minister under one or more of those provisions.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The phrase “migration decision” utilised by s 476A(1) is defined in s 5 of the Migration Act as follows:"migration decision" means: (a) a privative clause decision; or (b) a purported privative clause decision; or (c) a non-privative clause decision; or (d) an AAT Act migration decision. “Privative clause decision” is, in turn, defined as having the meaning given by s 474(2). It is necessary, however, that I set out the whole of s 474, which provides:(1) A privative clause decision: (a) is final and conclusive; and (b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and (c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account. (2) In this section: "privative clause decision " means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5). (3) A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following: (a)granting, making, varying, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to make an order or determination; (b)granting, giving, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission (including a visa); (c)granting, issuing, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to issue an authority or other instrument; (d) imposing, or refusing to remove, a condition or restriction; (e)making or revoking, or refusing to make or revoke, a declaration demand or requirement; (f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article; (g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing; (h)conduct preparatory to the making of a decision, including the taking of evidence or the holding of an inquiry or investigation; (i)a decision on review of a decision, irrespective of whether the decision on review is taken under this Act or a regulation or other instrument under this Act, or under another Act; (j) a failure or refusal to make a decision. (4)For the purposes of subsection (2), a decision under a provision, or under a regulation or other instrument made under a provision, set out in the following table is not a privative clause decision: As is apparent from the terms of s 476A(1), the Court has limited jurisdiction in relation to decisions made under the Migration Act. In relation to a migration decision, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to those circumstances specified in paragraphs (a) to (d) of s 476A(1). It is not contended that any of those paragraphs have application. What the applicant contends is that the decision he seeks judicial review of is not a privative clause decision and therefore not a migration decision and therefore not caught by the limitations imposed by s 476A(1) of the Migration Act. It is necessary then to identify what decision the applicant seeks to have judicially reviewed by this Court and determine whether or not the decision sought to be reviewed is or is not a migration decision.