Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: CC v New South Wales Crime Commission [2015] NSWSC 1866 Hearing dates: 09 November 2015 Date of orders: 13 November 2015 Decision date: 08 December 2015 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Adams J Decision: Reasons
Catchwords: CIVIL – review – plaintiff ordered by New South Wales Crime Commission to answer questions at hearing – plaintiff refused on basis of privilege against self-incrimination constituting a “reasonable excuse” under s 25 of the Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW) – whether witness may decline to answer questions merely because answers can be provided to investigating police Legislation Cited: Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW), ss 25, 33, 34, 39, 39A, 45, 45(2), 45A, 45A(2)
Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW), ss 39(2), 39(6)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 43Cases Cited: Ganin v NSW Crime Commission (1993) 32 NSWLR 423; 70 A Crim R 417
Lee v R [2014] HCA 20; (2014) 253 CLR 455
McKee v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2008] NSWCA 163; 71 NSWLR 609
R v Seller; R v McCarthy [2015] NSWCCA 76
SD v New South Wales Crime Commission [2012] NSWSC 1642
SD v New South Wales Crime Commission [2013] NSWCA 48
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31; (2008) 235 CLR 286
Siddik v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 116
X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92
Z v N (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 316
Z v New South Wales Crime Commission (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 1388
Z v New South Wales Crime Commission (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 1388Category: Principal judgment Parties: CC (Plaintiff)
New South Wales Crime Commission (Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
M Robinson SC/ A Djemal (Plaintiff)
I Temby QC (Defendant)
Zahr Partners (Plaintiff)
New South Wales Crime Commission (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2015/295724 Publication restriction: The Court prohibits the publication of the name of the plaintiff or any other person referred to in the course of the hearing before the Commission and of any information tending to reveal the identity of the plaintiff or such other person. It is directed, that the plaintiff be referred to as CC.
Judgment
Introduction
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The plaintiff was summoned by the New South Wales Crime Commission to give evidence about a shooting offence. He appeared before the Commission but a number of adjournments ensued and the summons eventually became spent. A second summons was issued but, when he was asked questions at the hearing, he declined to answer them, claiming in substance that he was not obliged to answer them since he was a suspect and his answers would or, at least, might well, be communicated to police who were investigating the offence in which it was suspected he was involved. The Assistant Commissioner ordered him to answer the questions. The plaintiff’s counsel indicated that he wished to seek a review of the Commissioner’s order in this Court pursuant to s 33 of the Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW) (all references in…
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- Case
- [2015] NSWSC 1866
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the plaintiff’s right to silence was not absolute and did not extend to a blanket refusal to answer questions. The court found that the privilege against self-incrimination was not an absolute bar to a witness answering questions at a hearing. The court noted that the privilege was designed to protect witnesses from being compelled to give evidence that might incriminate them, but it did not extend to a blanket refusal to answer questions. The court found that the plaintiff’s refusal to answer questions was not a reasonable excuse under section 25 of the Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW). The court held that the plaintiff was required to answer the questions at the hearing.
The court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for judicial review and ordered her to answer the questions at the hearing. The court found that the plaintiff’s right to silence was not absolute and that the privilege against self-incrimination did not extend to a blanket refusal to answer questions. The court held that the plaintiff was required to answer the questions at the hearing, and that her refusal to do so was not a reasonable excuse under section 25 of the Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW). The court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for judicial review and ordered her to answer the questions at the hearing.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court following an order issued by the New South Wales Crime Commission requiring the plaintiff to answer certain questions at a hearing. The plaintiff refused to answer the questions and sought a review of the order. This case represents a judicial review application, where the plaintiff challenges the decision of the Crime Commission on legal grounds. The court was tasked with determining whether the plaintiff's refusal to answer questions, based on the privilege against self-incrimination, constituted a reasonable excuse under the Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW). The court reviewed the relevant statutory provisions and examined the implications of the privilege against self-incrimination in the context of the Crime Commission's powers.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the plaintiff's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination constitutes a "reasonable excuse" under section 25 of the Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW) to refuse to answer questions at a hearing.
2. Whether a witness may decline to answer questions at a hearing solely because the answers could subsequently be provided to investigating police.
Held
1. The court held that the plaintiff's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination does not constitute a "reasonable excuse" under section 25 of the Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW) to refuse to answer questions at a hearing.
2. The court held that a witness may not decline to answer questions at a hearing solely because the answers could subsequently be provided to investigating police.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined whether the plaintiff's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination was a "reasonable excuse" under section 25 of the Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW). The court considered the statutory language and the overarching purpose of section 25, which is to ensure that witnesses can give evidence without fear of self-incrimination. However, this protection does not extend to a blanket refusal to answer questions based on the fear that answers might subsequently be provided to police. The court noted that the privilege against self-incrimination is intended to prevent a witness from being compelled to give evidence that could incriminate them, not to allow a witness to refuse to answer questions based on speculative concerns about the dissemination of their answers. The court emphasised that the privilege does not provide a carte blanche for witnesses to avoid answering questions at hearings. The court distinguished between legitimate concerns about self-incrimination and speculative fears about the future use of answers by investigating authorities. The plaintiff's argument was found to misinterpret the scope of the privilege. The court concluded that the privilege against self-incrimination does not permit a witness to refuse to answer questions based solely on the potential for their answers to be shared with police. The second issue addressed whether a witness could decline to answer questions on the ground that answers could subsequently be provided to investigating police. The court found that this reasoning is not sufficient to constitute a "reasonable excuse" under the Act. The court underscored that the privilege against self-incrimination is not a shield for witnesses to evade their obligations under the Act. The court held that a witness may not decline to answer questions based on the speculative possibility that their answers could later be used by police. The court's decision reinforces the principle that statutory privileges must be exercised in accordance with their intended purpose, which is to protect witnesses from actual, not merely potential, self-incrimination. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the privilege against self-incrimination does not permit a witness to refuse to answer questions at a hearing solely on the basis that their answers might subsequently be provided to investigating police. The court's decision adhered to the established interpretation of the privilege and clarified the limits of its application in the context of statutory hearings.