CBT16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CBT16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 793

Appeal from: CBT16 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 1031
File number: QUD 288 of 2019
Judge: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 9 June 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – refusal of protection visas – overlooking relevant evidence – whether Tribunal’s credibility findings were illogical or irrational – appeal allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1994 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa)
Cases cited:

AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 266 FCR 83

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429; [2009] HCA 39

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

MZZGE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 72

Date of hearing: 14 November 2019
Date of last submissions: 6 December 2019 (First Respondent)
20 December 2019 (Appellants)
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 74
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr M Black
Solicitor for the Appellants: Stolar Law
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms AL Wheatley
Solicitor for the First Respondent:  Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

QUD 288 of 2019
BETWEEN:

CBT16

First Appellant

CBU16

Second Appellant

CBV16 (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RANGIAH J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 JUNE 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 16 April 2019 are set aside.

3.The decision of the second respondent made on 30 June 2016 is quashed.

4.The second respondent is to decide the appellants’ application for review according to law.

5.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RANGIAH J:

  1. This is an appeal against a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 16 April 2019 dismissing the appellants’ application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal).  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant protection visas to the appellants.

  2. The Tribunal found that the accounts of past harm given by the first and second appellants were not credible and, on that basis, found that there was no real chance they would face persecution if they returned to Bangladesh.  Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the criteria for the grant of protection visas under ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Migration Act 1994 (Cth) had been satisfied.

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 793
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of CBT16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves the appellants, a family from Bangladesh, who sought protection visas in Australia. The husband, wife, and eldest child arrived in Australia in 2012, with the remaining three children being born in Australia. The family applied for protection visas in July 2013, citing threats and harassment from political party members in Bangladesh as the reason for leaving their home country. The delegate refused their applications, a decision that was subsequently upheld by the Tribunal and the Federal Circuit Court. The appellants appealed to the court on the grounds that the Tribunal erred in its credibility assessment and failed to consider relevant evidence.
The central legal issues in this case were whether the Tribunal's credibility findings were irrational or illogical, and if the Tribunal failed to consider relevant evidence in making its decisions. The court examined the principles guiding judicial review of adverse credibility findings, including the importance of the material, its place in the assessment of the appellant's claim, and whether the error was critical to the ultimate conclusion. The court also considered whether the Tribunal's failure to refer to evidence that bore on a finding indicated that the evidence had not been considered, potentially disclosing jurisdictional error in the decision-making process.
The court found that the Tribunal had indeed overlooked relevant evidence in making its credibility findings, leading to an error in the decision-making process. The Tribunal's reference to the husband's written statement accompanying his protection visa application was incorrect, as the statement clearly mentioned that the group threatened to kill the son. The court concluded that the Tribunal's error was critical to its credibility findings and affected the ultimate decision. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the orders of the Federal Circuit Court were set aside, and the decision of the delegate was quashed. The Minister was directed to decide the appellants' application for review according to law, and the appellants were awarded costs for the appeal and the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 16 April 2019 are set aside.

3. The decision of the second respondent made on 30 June 2016 is quashed.

4. The second respondent is to decide the appellants’ application for review according to law.

5. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellants are a family of six, consisting of a husband, wife, and their four children. The husband and wife are citizens of Bangladesh, while the eldest child was born in Bangladesh and the three younger children were born in Australia. The husband, wife, and eldest child arrived in Australia in December 2012. The family made applications for protection visas in July 2013, with the husband providing a statutory declaration detailing threats and harassment he had suffered in Bangladesh. The husband claimed that a group of people associated with a political party in Bangladesh had threatened to kidnap and kill his son if he did not join their party. After being physically assaulted and receiving further threats, the husband decided to leave Bangladesh with his family for their safety. The wife did not apply for protection visas on the basis that she did not fear harm in Bangladesh.

The matter proceeded through several stages before reaching the Federal Circuit Court. Initially, the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused the family's applications for protection visas. The family appealed this decision to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which also refused the applications. The family then sought judicial review of the AAT's decision in the Federal Circuit Court, which dismissed their application. The family appealed the Federal Circuit Court's decision to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The Full Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Federal Circuit Court's decision and quashing the AAT's decision, and remitted the matter back to the Minister for reconsideration.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I will describe the decisions made by the delegate, the Tribunal and the Federal Circuit Court, before considering the grounds of appeal.The applications for protection visas and the delegate’s decision The appellants are members of the same family. The first and second appellants are husband and wife respectively, and it is convenient to refer to them as “the husband” and “the wife”. They are citizens of Bangladesh. The other four appellants are their children. The eldest child was born in Bangladesh and the three younger children were born in Australia. The husband, wife and eldest child arrived in Australia in December 2012. On 20 December 2012, the husband was interviewed by a departmental officer, with the assistance of an interpreter of the Bengali language. The husband claimed that he left his country of nationality for the following reasons:For my son. There are many political parties, BNP, Awami League etc. They forced us to join the parties. I told I won’t join the parties so they threatened me. If we join one party the other party will be our enemy. I have to make a living. They threaten me that they would kidnap my son. I said I would tell the police. Then I thought if I reported to the police they will come and finish the whole family. I didn’t tell my parents or brothers about this. I realised that once they threatened me they will do so for the rest of my life. Then I realised that there won’t be any safety and security for my family, esp my son. I decided to take this step to travel to Malaysia for my family’s sake. And then to Australia. In July 2013, the husband, the wife and the eldest child made applications for protection visas. The husband’s application was accompanied by his own statutory declaration dated 3 July 2013. He said that in mid-2012, a group of 15 to 20 people had entered his house in his village in Bangladesh. One of the men put a pistol to his head and told him to join their political party. The husband believed they were connected to the Awami League. A week later they returned and told him, “if [he] did not join them, they would kidnap and kill [his] son”. Over the next few months, the men would return to his home or call him by telephone to threaten and harass him. About a month after the initial visit, he was physically assaulted, including being cut with a curved blade. About a week after the assault, he received a telephone call demanding money. He realised that even if he paid the money, they would return and ask for more money or kill him anyway. He knew that it was no longer safe for his family to remain in Bangladesh and made plans to leave. The day before he left his village, the men returned to his house and he begged them for more time to pay, knowing that “they” (by which he meant his family) would have left Bangladesh by then. The applications of the wife and child for protection visas were as members of the husband’s family unit. The wife did not apply for protection on the basis that she personally feared harm in Bangladesh.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submits that it was not illogical or irrational for the Tribunal to doubt the claimed rape on the basis of the resumption of a sexual relationship between the husband and wife approximately a month later. The Minister submits that such reasoning was open to the Tribunal given that the wife had alleged that she was violently attacked and raped by four men, where the doctor’s report said there was acute uterine bleeding and where the doctor had recommended hospitalisation for proper treatment. Consideration Ground One The Tribunal, at para [52] of its decision, stated:During the hearing, the first named applicant claimed the group threatened to kidnap the third named applicant. He made the same claims regarding the threatened kidnap of the third named applicant in his entry interview, but made no such claims in his written statement accompanying his protection visa application…The Tribunal considers this to be another instance of the applicants providing inconsistent evidence which weighs in favour of the applicants not being credible witnesses.(Underlining added.) The Tribunal’s reference to the “written statement accompanying his protection visa application” was to the husband’s statutory declaration dated 3 July 2013. In that statutory declaration, the husband said:I begged them not to kill me as I had a son. They told me that if I did not join them, they would kidnap and kill my son. It is apparent that the Tribunal was in error when it found that the husband had not claimed that the group threatened to kidnap his son in his written statement accompanying his protection visa application. It does not appear possible that the Tribunal could have misunderstood the clear statement in the statutory declaration that the group threatened to kill the son, so that the Tribunal must have overlooked that statement. In AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 266 FCR 83, the Full Court considered a case where the Tribunal found there were inconsistencies within the appellants’ evidence, but had overlooked information given in an interview that may have affected the Tribunal’s finding. The Full Court summarised the principles guiding judicial review of adverse credibility findings and whether failure to take into account relevant material in making such findings gives rise to jurisdictional error at [41]:(a)The issue whether or not an administrative decision is affected by jurisdictional error requires a careful examination of the relevant statutory framework, with a particular emphasis on provisions which determine the decision-maker’s powers, procedures, functions and obligations. (b)While findings as to credit are generally matters for the administrative decision-maker, they may be amenable to judicial review on several grounds including legal unreasonableness, reaching a finding without a logical, rational or probative basis, failure to perform the required statutory task of review, and failure to take into account material critical to the formation of the requisite state of satisfaction. (c)Whether or not a credibility finding is affected by jurisdictional error is a case specific inquiry, and should not be assessed by reference to fixed categories or formulae. Merely because a decision-maker has ignored “relevant material” does not always give rise to jurisdictional error in the present context. The importance or cogency of the material, its place in an assessment of the appellant’s claim and in the performance of the statutory task are matters of fundamental importance in a protection visa case. Those matters inform an assessment of the seriousness or gravity of the error. (d)Even if an aspect of reasoning, or a particular finding of fact, is shown to be irrational or illogical, jurisdictional error will generally not be established if that reasoning or finding of fact was immaterial, or not critical to, the ultimate conclusion or end result (such as, for example, where it is but one of several findings that independently may have led to the ultimate decision).(e)Merely because there is no reference in the decision-maker’s reasons for decision to particular material does not necessarily give rise to an inference that the material was not considered. Nonetheless, in the case of the Tribunal, which is required by s 430 of the Act to make a written statement setting out its reason for decision and its findings on material questions of fact, and to refer to the evidence on which such findings were based, a failure to refer to evidence that on its face bears on a finding may indicate that that evidence has not in fact been considered and, in some cases at least, disclose jurisdictional error in the decision-making.(f)Considerable caution must be exercised before concluding that errors in an adverse credibility assessment result in the decision being affected by jurisdictional error, in order to avoid judicial review transgressing into the impermissible area of merits review. (Citation omitted.)