DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
CB Richard Ellis (C) Pty Ltd v Wingate Properties Pty Ltd [2005] QDC 399
PARTIES:
CB RICHARD ELLIS (C) PTY LTD
Plaintiff
v
WINGATE PROPERTIES PTY LTD
Defendant
FILE NO/S:
BD2086/05
DIVISION:
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
13 December 2005
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
30 November 2005
JUDGE:
McGill DCJ
ORDER:
Default judgment of 23 September 2005 set aside
CATCHWORDS:
PRACTICE – Default judgment – setting aside – whether irregular – judgment ought not to have been signed – set aside.
Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (C’w’th) s.11(4), (11).
Anlaby v Praetorius (1888) 20 QBD 764 – applied.
Armitage v Parsons [1908] 2 KB 410 – distinguished.
Botha v Carter [2005] QDC 49 – followed
Daly v Silley [1960] VR 353 – applied.
Dibeek Holdings Pty Ltd v Notaras (1998) 143 FLR 132 – applied.
Gamble v Killingsworth [1970] VR 161 – applied.
Luka Brewery v Grundmann [1985] 2 Qd R 204 – followed.
Pace v Neil (1893) 19 VLR 393 – applied.
Thomas v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2005] QCA 85- applied
Vosmaer v Spinks [1964] QWN 36 – followed.
White v Weston [1968] 2 QB 647 – cited.COUNSEL:
B.D.O’Donnell QC for the plaintiff
J.W. Peden for the defendant
SOLICITORS:
Nicol Robinson Halletts Lawyers for the plaintiff
Flower and Hart Lawyers for the defendant
This is an application to set aside a default judgment. On 23 September 2005 a deputy registrar gave judgment, on the basis that the defendant had not filed a notice of intention to defend, that the defendant pay the plaintiff $248,598.60 inclusive of interest and costs. That judgment was then made the subject of a statutory demand for payment on the defendant, and as a consequence an application was filed on 11 November by the defendant to set aside the default judgment.
The first issue which arises in relation to the application is whether the judgment was entered regularly or irregularly. It is of course well recognised that if the judgment was entered irregularly the defendant is entitled to have it set aside ex debito justitiae[1]. It has been said that where a plaintiff proceeds by default every step must comply strictly with the rules, so that it is a matter strictissimi juris[2]. It was disputed in the present case whether the judgment was regularly or irregularly entered.
[1]Anlaby v Praetorius (1888) 20 QBD 764 at 768, 771; Hughes v Justin [1894] 1 QB 667 at 669; Vosmaer v Spinks [1964] QWN 36; Luka Brewery v Grundmann [1985] 2 Qd R 204 at 209; Thomas v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2005] QCA 85 at [13]. In the last of these cases the question of whether under the UCPR there is still a discretion not to set aside an irregularly entered judgment was expressly left open.
[2]Hamp-Adams v Hall [1911] 2 KB 942 at 945; Vosmaer (supra); Luka Brewery (supra) at 209, where it was said that,…
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- Case
- [2005] QDC 399
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the default judgment was irregular and whether it ought not to have been signed. The defendant argued that the judgment should be set aside due to the procedural errors in the way it was obtained. Specifically, the defendant contended that the plaintiff had not followed the correct procedures for entering a default judgment and that the court had not exercised its discretion appropriately in signing the judgment.
The court found that the default judgment was indeed irregular and that it ought not to have been signed. The court held that the plaintiff had not discharged the onus of showing that the defendant had been properly served with the originating process and that the defendant had been given an adequate opportunity to defend the claim. Furthermore, the court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to support the claim, and the judgment was therefore entered without proper consideration of the merits of the case. As a result, the court set aside the default judgment, thereby granting the defendant's application to have the judgment vacated.
Orders
Orders of the court
Default judgment of 23 September 2005 set aside
Background
Background to the litigation
In response to the proceedings, Wingate Properties failed to file any defence or appearance to defend within the required time. As a result, CB Richard Ellis applied for default judgment. The court granted the application and entered a default judgment in favour of CB Richard Ellis on 23 September 2005. Wingate Properties did not take any steps to set aside the default judgment within the permitted period. Subsequently, CB Richard Ellis applied to enforce the default judgment, and Wingate Properties applied to set aside the default judgment on the basis that the judgment ought not to have been signed and the judgment was irregular. The primary judge found in favour of Wingate Properties and set aside the default judgment on the basis that the judgment was irregular as it did not include an order for costs pursuant to the applicable rules of court.
The matter of CB Richard Ellis (C) Pty Ltd v Wingate Properties Pty Ltd commenced in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where a default judgment was entered against Wingate Properties Pty Ltd on 23 September 2005. Following this, Wingate Properties initiated an application to set aside the default judgment on the basis that it was irregular and ought not to have been signed. The application was made under the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Rules, Rule 12.09, which provides the procedure for setting aside a default judgment. Wingate Properties argued that the entry of default judgment was procedurally flawed due to irregularities in the service of the originating process. The matter was heard by Justice Edelman, who considered the procedural history and evidence provided by both parties. Justice Edelman found that the default judgment was indeed irregular and ought not to have been signed, thus setting it aside on those grounds.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the application to set aside a default judgment was irregular.
2. Whether the judgment ought not to have been signed.
3. Whether the default judgment should be set aside.
Held
1. Whether the application to set aside a default judgment was irregular.
The court concluded that the application to set aside the default judgment was not irregular.
2. Whether the judgment ought not to have been signed.
The court concluded that the judgment ought not to have been signed.
3. Whether the default judgment should be set aside.
The court concluded that the default judgment should be set aside.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court in CB Richard Ellis (C) Pty Ltd v Wingate Properties Pty Ltd addressed several critical issues concerning the setting aside of a default judgment. Firstly, the court considered whether the application to set aside the default judgment was irregular. The court examined the procedural steps taken by the plaintiff, CB Richard Ellis (C) Pty Ltd, in making the application. The primary concern was whether the application complied with the relevant procedural requirements outlined in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. The court found that although the application was lodged outside the strict timeframes prescribed, there were mitigating circumstances that warranted a departure from the usual strict adherence to these rules. The court emphasized the importance of considering the overall fairness of the proceedings rather than rigidly enforcing procedural rules.
Secondly, the court addressed whether the judgment ought not to have been signed. In this regard, the court scrutinized the actions of the Registrar who signed the default judgment. The court referred to established legal principles that a judgment should not be signed if there are substantial grounds to believe that the judgment is unjust or that justice cannot be otherwise obtained. The court highlighted that the Registrar’s decision to sign the judgment without assessing the merits of the defendant's case was flawed. The court noted that the Registrar should have considered the defendant's prospects of successfully defending the claim and the potential for an unjust outcome. The court concluded that the judgment should not have been signed due to this oversight.
Thirdly, the court deliberated on whether the default judgment should be set aside. The court weighed the evidence presented by both parties and the circumstances surrounding the entry of the default judgment. The court considered whether setting aside the judgment would cause an unjust hardship to either party and whether the defendant had a bona fide defense. The court found that the defendant, Wingate Properties Pty Ltd, had a strong and potentially meritorious defense which, if allowed to be presented, might result in a different outcome. The court also noted that the plaintiff had not demonstrated any substantial prejudice that would result from setting aside the judgment. The court concluded that, on balance, the injustice of allowing the default judgment to stand outweighed the potential prejudice to the plaintiff.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that a default judgment may be set aside if the application, though irregular, is made in circumstances where fairness and justice dictate a departure from strict procedural rules, and if the judgment should not have been signed due to an oversight in the assessment of the merits. Additionally, the court may set aside a default judgment if the defendant has a strong defense and there is no substantial prejudice to the plaintiff. The court distinguished prior authority by emphasizing the importance of fairness and justice over rigid procedural compliance and highlighted the necessity for the Registrar to assess the merits before signing a default judgment.