DISTRICT COURT
CIVIL JURISDICTION
JUDGE ROBIN QC
No 584 of 2004
| PAUL STEPHANUS BOTHA | Plaintiff |
| and | |
| ALEATHEA ANN CARTER | Defendant |
SOUTHPORT
..DATE 25/02/2005
ORDER
CATCHWORDS: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, rule 137, rule 281, rule 283, rule 819 - application by defendant to set aside judgment in default of filing Notice of Intention to Defend - judgment entered on 28th day after date of service - set aside as premature and irregular despite parties' agreement it was regularly entered - day of service is not counted in the 28 days allowed under rule 137 - defendant's costs limited to those incurred had her application been for the setting aside of an irregularly entered judgment.
HIS HONOUR: This is an application by a defendant for the setting aside of a default judgment given to the plaintiff by a registrar under Rule 283 on the 12th of November last year.
It is a substantial judgment in the amount of $244,893.77 which included $9,731.07 interest to that day. It also includes $1,762.70 for costs.
The plaintiff has been quick to embark on enforcing the judgment. He has applied for and obtained two separate warrants of execution, the doubling up attributable to a slight variation of the defendant's name in respect of one of her properties.
The registration of one of those warrants in the Land Titles Office is embarrassing the defendant in completing a private sale which has already been made. The plaintiff sues in respect of a considerable number of cheques in round sum amounts which the defendant provided to him for over a period of about 10 months from November 2003.
The claim was for the amounts of those cheques said in the statement of claim to have been dishonoured on presentation and interest at the nine per cent rate provided for in the Supreme Court Act.
Service of the claim and statement of claim was effected by Mr Standfast on 15th of October 2004. The material used in the application for judgment was all filed on the same day on which the Registrar entered the judgment. Service was contentious according to the defendant's original affidavit filed on the 18th of February this year. She says in it she knew Mr Standfast because he had done work for her and that she did not recall having been served with the proceedings by him.
It is not particularly reassuring to discover that having considered the matter further she now recalls telephone arrangements had been made with Mr Standfast to effect service and the actual occurrence of it in accordance with what Mr Standfast has said all along.
The defendant asserts defences that might be of use to her. She says the cheques which she does not dispute writing were a way of recording substantial loans which Mr Botha made to her to cover her living expenses in circumstances where funds she otherwise would have had available had been applied to an investment which she suggests Mr Botha had some role…
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- Case
- [2005] QDC 49
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the judgment was properly entered and if the defendant's application to set it aside should be granted. The court found that the day of service should not be counted in the 28 days allowed by Rule 137, and therefore, the judgment was entered prematurely. The court also concluded that it was appropriate to set aside the judgment despite the parties' agreement that it was regularly entered, as the court had a responsibility to correct its own errors.
The court ordered that the default judgment be set aside and that the enforcement warrants issued in relation to the judgment be stayed. The court also addressed the issue of costs, noting that the defendant's costs should be limited to those incurred had her application been for the setting aside of an irregularly entered judgment. The court ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs of the application, assessed on the standard basis but as if the only ground for the application were that the judgment was irregularly entered.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case involves an application by the defendant, Aleathea Ann Carter, to set aside a default judgment entered by a registrar in favour of the plaintiff, Paul Stephanus Botha, under Rule 283. The default judgment, entered on 12 November 2004, amounted to $244,893.77 plus interest and costs. The plaintiff had quickly applied for and obtained two warrants of execution, which were causing difficulties for the defendant in completing a private sale. The defendant's application to set aside the default judgment hinged on the contention that the judgment was entered prematurely and irregularly despite an agreement between the parties that it was correctly entered. The defendant's costs were limited to those incurred had her application been for setting aside an irregularly entered judgment. The court ultimately decided to set aside the default judgment and the warrants of execution, and ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs of the application, assessed on a standard basis but limited to the costs incurred had the application been for setting aside an irregularly entered judgment.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the default judgment entered prematurely under Rule 137 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules?
2. Was the day of service counted in the 28 days allowed under Rule 137?
3. Is Rule 137 to be interpreted such that the day of service is excluded from the calculation of the 28 days?
4. Should the defendant's costs be limited to those incurred had her application been for the setting aside of an irregularly entered judgment?
5. Should the enforcement warrants issued be set aside under Rule 819?
6. Should the costs of the application be ordered on a standard basis?
Held
1. The court concluded that the default judgment entered was premature under Rule 137 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules; the result was the default judgment was set aside.
2. The court held that the day of service was not counted in the 28 days allowed under Rule 137; the result was the defendant had until the 12th day of November to file a notice of intention to defend.
3. The court interpreted Rule 137 to mean the day of service is excluded from the calculation of the 28 days; the result was the judgment was set aside as premature.
4. The court limited the defendant's costs to those incurred had her application been for the setting aside of an irregularly entered judgment; the result was the plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant's costs on a standard basis.
5. The court set aside the enforcement warrants issued under Rule 819; the result was the enforcement warrants were nullified.
6. The court ordered the costs of the application be assessed on a standard basis; the result was the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs on a standard basis.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Botha v Carter, the District Court of Queensland addressed several critical issues regarding the entry and setting aside of a default judgment under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR). The first issue considered by the court was whether the default judgment entered by the registrar was premature under Rule 137. The court found that the judgment was indeed entered prematurely. According to Rule 137, a notice of intention to defend must be filed within 28 days after the day the claim is served. The court determined that the day of service should not be counted in the 28 days, thereby excluding it from the calculation, a principle that was supported by the Full Court's decision in AGC (Advances) Limited v Mack.
The second issue was whether Rule 137 should be interpreted to exclude the day of service from the 28-day period. The court held that the day of service should be excluded, in line with the interpretation of similar provisions in other jurisdictions and the broader definition of orders under the UCPR. This interpretation was necessary to ensure that the court did not entrench errors by its own officers and to maintain fairness in the proceedings.
Regarding the defendant's costs, the court considered whether they should be limited to those incurred had the application been for setting aside an irregularly entered judgment. The court decided that the costs should be limited to those incurred if the application had been solely for the setting aside of an irregularly entered judgment, exercising its discretion in a manner that reflected the justice of the case.
The court also addressed whether the enforcement warrants issued should be set aside under Rule 819. Given the premature entry of the judgment, the court set aside the enforcement warrants to prevent any potential prejudice to the defendant.
Lastly, the court deliberated on whether the costs of the application should be ordered on a standard basis. The court ruled that the plaintiff should pay the defendant's costs on a standard basis, considering the circumstances of the case and the potential for the application to have been resolved amicably had the error been identified earlier.
In summary, the court's decision was grounded in the interpretation of Rule 137, the exclusion of the day of service from the 28-day period, the need to set aside irregularly entered judgments, and the equitable allocation of costs. This case establishes the principle that the day of service should be excluded from the 28-day period under Rule 137 of the UCPR.