FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 387
File number(s): NSD 1118 of 2022 Judgment of: RARES J Date of judgment: 21 April 2023 Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 (Australian Consumer Law) ss 18, 31
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 153(1), (6), 214
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021
Cases cited: Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225
Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services [2021] FedCFamC2G 316
Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC2G 75
Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services (No 4) [2022] FedCFamC2G 824
Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services (No 5) [2022] FedCFamC2G 1051
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Division: Fair Work Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations Number of paragraphs: 30 Date of hearing: 21 April 2023 Counsel for the Applicant: Applicant was self-represented Counsel for the Respondent: Mr G Gee Solicitor for the Respondent: Hall & Wilcox ORDERS
NSD 1118 of 2022 BETWEEN: CELIA CAVAR
Applicant
AND: AUSTRALIAN UNITY HOME CARE SERVICES PTY LTD
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 APRIL 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
2.The respondent does not seek any order for costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the transcript)RARES J:
INTRODUCTION
This is an application for leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) on 5 December 2022 to order that Cecilia Cavar pay Australian Unity Home Care Services Pty Ltd’s costs fixed in the amount of $13,042.00 (Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services (No 5) [2022] FedCFamC2G 1051). On that occasion, the trial judge also dismissed Ms Cavar’s application to reopen the proceeding that his Honour had summarily dismissed on 1 September 2022 (see Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services (No 4) [2022] FedCFamC2G 824).
In the course of her written and oral submissions, Ms Cavar also appeared to seek to challenge in an appeal a number of decisions made by the trial judge, in addition to the costs order of 5 December 2022, namely:
(1)his Honour’s refusal to recuse himself, the subject of his reasons on 24 November 2021 (Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services [2021] FedCFamC2G 316);
(2)his Honour’s refusal to transfer the proceeding below to this Court under s 153(1) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (Federal…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services Pty Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2023] FCA 387
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case centred around whether there was sufficient doubt about the correctness of the decision made by the court below to warrant an appeal, and whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were not granted. Additionally, Ms Cavar argued that the judge lacked the power to order her to pay costs and had not provided any reasons for doing so.
The court found that Ms Cavar had a reasonable opportunity to present her case to the judge but chose to leave the court of her own volition, without any explanation, prior to the conclusion of the hearing. The court held that it was open to the judge to consider whether Ms Cavar had provided a satisfactory explanation for seeking to have the hearing reopened. Moreover, the court found that nothing Ms Cavar said about the merits of what she might have put to the judge would have led to any different outcome. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no doubt about the correctness of the decision made by the judge, and no injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused.
The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and noted that Australian Unity did not seek any order for costs. The decision in this case confirms that a judge has the inherent power to set aside an order made against a person who did not have a reasonable opportunity to appear and present their case. Additionally, the court emphasised that a wholly successful party is entitled to an order for costs, and the judge had jurisdiction to make such an order in this case.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
2. The respondent does not seek any order for costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ms Cavar complained that his Honour had no power to order costs, quantified in the sum he did or generally, and that he had not given any reasons for doing so.CONSIDERATION Ms Cavar referred me to some cost rules and scales in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021. Those rules were, plainly, irrelevant to the powers which his Honour exercised in dealing with a general federal law matter under s 214 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court Act. Section 214 provided that a judge had jurisdiction to award costs in all proceedings before the Court, including proceedings dismissed for want of jurisdiction, other than proceedings in respect of which any other Act provided the costs must not be awarded, including in family law or child support proceedings and or proceedings in relation to a matter arising under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) or sections of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth). None of those exceptions applied to the proceeding before his Honour. His Honour had jurisdiction under s 214 to make the order that Ms Cavar pay Australian Unity’s costs. He was correct to have done so because Ms Cavar was a wholly unsuccessful litigant on 5 December 2022. The general principle is that a wholly successful party, such as Australian Unity, is entitled to an order for costs: Northern Territory v Sangare (2019) 265 CLR 164 at 177 [36] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ. His Honour calculated the costs in accordance with the then provisions of Sch 2 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021. Ms Cavar identified no basis on which to suggest that his Honour made any error in that calculation. I am not satisfied that his Honour applied any incorrect test in approaching the issue of whether he should grant Ms Cavar leave to reopen. Every court of justice, whether superior or inferior, has an inherent power to set aside an order made against a person who did not have a reasonable opportunity to appear and present his case: Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1 at 8 per Gibbs J. Here, Ms Cavar had a reasonable opportunity to present her case to his Honour on 1 September 2022 but chose to leave the Court of her own volition, without any explanation, prior to the conclusion of that hearing. His Honour was entitled to consider whether, when she sought to have the hearing reopened, she had provided a satisfactory explanation for doing so. It was also open to his Honour to take into account that nothing Ms Cavar said about the merits of what she might have put to him, had she remained in the Court, would have led to any different outcome. CONCLUSION I am wholly unpersuaded that there is any doubt about the correctness of his Honour’s decision, first, to order costs on 5 December 2022, which is the nominal subject matter of Ms Cavar’s application for leave to appeal and her draft notice of appeal, and, secondly, to make any of the other orders to which I have referred of which Ms Cavar complained. Moreover, there is no injustice to Ms Cavar if leave to appeal were refused.