Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 387

File number(s): NSD 1118 of 2022
Judgment of: RARES J
Date of judgment: 21 April 2023
Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 (Australian Consumer Law) ss 18, 31

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 153(1), (6), 214

Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021

Cases cited:

Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225

Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services [2021] FedCFamC2G 316

Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC2G 75

Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services (No 4) [2022] FedCFamC2G 824

Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services (No 5) [2022] FedCFamC2G 1051

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337

Northern Territory v Sangare (2019) 265 CLR 164

Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1

Division: Fair Work Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Number of paragraphs: 30
Date of hearing: 21 April 2023
Counsel for the Applicant: Applicant was self-represented
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr G Gee
Solicitor for the Respondent: Hall & Wilcox

ORDERS

NSD 1118 of 2022
BETWEEN:

CELIA CAVAR

Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN UNITY HOME CARE SERVICES PTY LTD

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 APRIL 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

2.The respondent does not seek any order for costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the transcript)

RARES J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) on 5 December 2022 to order that Cecilia Cavar pay Australian Unity Home Care Services Pty Ltd’s costs fixed in the amount of $13,042.00 (Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services (No 5) [2022] FedCFamC2G 1051). On that occasion, the trial judge also dismissed Ms Cavar’s application to reopen the proceeding that his Honour had summarily dismissed on 1 September 2022 (see Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services (No 4) [2022] FedCFamC2G 824).

  2. In the course of her written and oral submissions, Ms Cavar also appeared to seek to challenge in an appeal a number of decisions made by the trial judge, in addition to the costs order of 5 December 2022, namely:

    (1)his Honour’s refusal to recuse himself, the subject of his reasons on 24 November 2021 (Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services [2021] FedCFamC2G 316);

    (2)his Honour’s refusal to transfer the proceeding below to this Court under s 153(1) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (Federal…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 387
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Cavar v Australian Unity Home Care Services Pty Ltd, Ms Cavar applied for leave to appeal against a decision made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, which had dismissed her claims against Australian Unity Home Care Services Pty Ltd. Ms Cavar alleged that Australian Unity engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct, unfair practices, harassment, coercion, and unconscionable conduct in relation to her employment application. The court below found in favour of Australian Unity, and Ms Cavar sought leave to appeal against this decision.

The legal issues in this case centred around whether there was sufficient doubt about the correctness of the decision made by the court below to warrant an appeal, and whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were not granted. Additionally, Ms Cavar argued that the judge lacked the power to order her to pay costs and had not provided any reasons for doing so.

The court found that Ms Cavar had a reasonable opportunity to present her case to the judge but chose to leave the court of her own volition, without any explanation, prior to the conclusion of the hearing. The court held that it was open to the judge to consider whether Ms Cavar had provided a satisfactory explanation for seeking to have the hearing reopened. Moreover, the court found that nothing Ms Cavar said about the merits of what she might have put to the judge would have led to any different outcome. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no doubt about the correctness of the decision made by the judge, and no injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused.

The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and noted that Australian Unity did not seek any order for costs. The decision in this case confirms that a judge has the inherent power to set aside an order made against a person who did not have a reasonable opportunity to appear and present their case. Additionally, the court emphasised that a wholly successful party is entitled to an order for costs, and the judge had jurisdiction to make such an order in this case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

2. The respondent does not seek any order for costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The genesis of the proceeding below was Ms Cavar’s application to Australian Unity for employment by it as a permanent part-time employee. On about 10 June 2021, Australian Unity sent Ms Cavar a proposed conditional contract of employment. On 25 June 2021, Ms Cavar returned to Australian Unity a signed acceptance of the offer. One part of the offer included a statement under the heading, “Conditional offer”:Please note that this employment offer is conditional upon the completion of Australian Unity’s background checks, which are set out below, to the satisfaction of the Company. In the event your background checks are not completed in time, your start date may be changed or the employment offer will lapse at Australian Unity’s discretion, without any liability to Australian Unity for any payment or compensation to you. (emphasis added) In the event, there appears to have been a dispute between Ms Cavar and Australian Unity as to whether she provided adequate information and adequate referees to enable Australian Unity to be satisfied that its background check process was complete. Rightly or wrongly, Australian Unity determined that the material Ms Cavar provided did not satisfy it.THE ISSUE An applicant for leave to appeal must establish that, first, the decision in question is attended with sufficient doubt and, secondly, substantial injustice would flow if leave to appeal were not granted: Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225 at 231 [29] per McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ. THE PROCEEDING BELOW Ms Cavar commenced the proceeding in the Court below and sought relief there based on her allegations that Australian Unity:·had engaged in conduct that was misleading or deceptive in relation to her employment, in contravention of ss 18 and or 31 of the Australian Consumer Law in Sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth);·engaged in some unfair practices as to the way in which it acted concerning the commencement of her employment; and ·had engaged in harassment, coercion and unconscionable conduct. The proceeding progressed in the Court below, initially with Ms Cavar’s application that his Honour recuse himself. She contended that should occur because, in 2016 in other proceedings that she had brought, his Honour had determined that she pay $6,424.14 costs to her then opponent. That occurred after a remittal to him that followed a partly successful appeal to this Court. His Honour noted in Australian Unity [2021] FedCFamC2G 316 that Ms Cavar had not identified a proper basis for his disqualification in her affidavits or written submissions, to the extent that she may have relied on his Honour’s hearing of the other matter following the remittal. In my opinion, it is plain that any contention that there was any apprehension of bias is unarguable, since Flick J appears to have ordered that the remittal be to the trial judge, and Ms Cavar did not challenge that order. Nor was there anything in the way in which the trial judge decided the earlier proceeding to which Ms Cavar could point, apart from a general allegation that his Honour was, in some way, “corrupt”, about which she offered no evidence whatsoever. That allegation was an abuse of process.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Here, Ms Cavar had a reasonable opportunity to present her case to his Honour on 1 September 2022 but chose to leave the Court of her own volition, without any explanation, prior to the conclusion of that hearing. His Honour was entitled to consider whether, when she sought to have the hearing reopened, she had provided a satisfactory explanation for doing so. It was also open to his Honour to take into account that nothing Ms Cavar said about the merits of what she might have put to him, had she remained in the Court, would have led to any different outcome. CONCLUSION I am wholly unpersuaded that there is any doubt about the correctness of his Honour’s decision, first, to order costs on 5 December 2022, which is the nominal subject matter of Ms Cavar’s application for leave to appeal and her draft notice of appeal, and, secondly, to make any of the other orders to which I have referred of which Ms Cavar complained. Moreover, there is no injustice to Ms Cavar if leave to appeal were refused. In my opinion, this application is without merit and must be dismissed. I note that Australian Unity does not seek any order for costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ms Cavar complained that his Honour had no power to order costs, quantified in the sum he did or generally, and that he had not given any reasons for doing so.CONSIDERATION Ms Cavar referred me to some cost rules and scales in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021. Those rules were, plainly, irrelevant to the powers which his Honour exercised in dealing with a general federal law matter under s 214 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court Act. Section 214 provided that a judge had jurisdiction to award costs in all proceedings before the Court, including proceedings dismissed for want of jurisdiction, other than proceedings in respect of which any other Act provided the costs must not be awarded, including in family law or child support proceedings and or proceedings in relation to a matter arising under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) or sections of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth). None of those exceptions applied to the proceeding before his Honour. His Honour had jurisdiction under s 214 to make the order that Ms Cavar pay Australian Unity’s costs. He was correct to have done so because Ms Cavar was a wholly unsuccessful litigant on 5 December 2022. The general principle is that a wholly successful party, such as Australian Unity, is entitled to an order for costs: Northern Territory v Sangare (2019) 265 CLR 164 at 177 [36] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ. His Honour calculated the costs in accordance with the then provisions of Sch 2 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021. Ms Cavar identified no basis on which to suggest that his Honour made any error in that calculation. I am not satisfied that his Honour applied any incorrect test in approaching the issue of whether he should grant Ms Cavar leave to reopen. Every court of justice, whether superior or inferior, has an inherent power to set aside an order made against a person who did not have a reasonable opportunity to appear and present his case: Taylor v Taylor (1979) 143 CLR 1 at 8 per Gibbs J. Here, Ms Cavar had a reasonable opportunity to present her case to his Honour on 1 September 2022 but chose to leave the Court of her own volition, without any explanation, prior to the conclusion of that hearing. His Honour was entitled to consider whether, when she sought to have the hearing reopened, she had provided a satisfactory explanation for doing so. It was also open to his Honour to take into account that nothing Ms Cavar said about the merits of what she might have put to him, had she remained in the Court, would have led to any different outcome. CONCLUSION I am wholly unpersuaded that there is any doubt about the correctness of his Honour’s decision, first, to order costs on 5 December 2022, which is the nominal subject matter of Ms Cavar’s application for leave to appeal and her draft notice of appeal, and, secondly, to make any of the other orders to which I have referred of which Ms Cavar complained. Moreover, there is no injustice to Ms Cavar if leave to appeal were refused.