Catlin v National Australia Bank Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE FULL COURT (WA)

CITATION:   CATLIN & ANOR -v- NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD [2002] WASCA 224

CORAM:   WALLWORK J

MURRAY J
PARKER J

HEARD:   19 JUNE 2002

DELIVERED          :   16 AUGUST 2002

FILE NO/S:   FUL 80 of 2002

BETWEEN:   ADRIENNE MARIE CATLIN

ADRIAN CHARLES STEPHEN CATLIN
Appellants

AND

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD
Respondent

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Stay of execution pending appeal against order of summary judgment in mortgage action - Grounds for exercise of discretion - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Stay of proceedings refused

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellants:     In person

Respondent:     Ms P E Cahill

Solicitors:

Appellants:     In person

Respondent:     Jackson McDonald

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447

Commonwealth Development Bank of Aust Ltd v Nertec Pty Ltd [1999] WASCA 311

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd (No 1) (1986) 160 CLR 220

Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395

Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (No 2) (1998) 20 WAR 79

Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Aust (1972) 126 CLR 161

State Bank (Vic) v Parry [1989] WAR 240

Case(s) also cited:

Nil

  1. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:  This is an application for a stay of execution of a summary judgment granted to the respondent by Bredmeyer M in an action for possession of the appellants' home in Karratha.  The Master ordered that the appellants give possession of the property to the respondent within 35 days.  That order has not been executed.  On the hearing of the application we granted a stay to preserve the status quo pending our decision.  The stay sought by the appellants is pending the determination of their appeal against the Master's judgment.

  2. The jurisdiction to grant the stay is an inherent jurisdiction implicitly recognised by the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971, O 63 r 15(1)(a) which provides that:

    "Except so far as the Full Court or a Judge may direct, an appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution or of proceedings under the decision of the court below."

    That rule makes it clear that the prima facie position is that the successful party at first instance should be able to enforce the judgment obtained unless the unsuccessful party persuades the Full Court or a Judge that execution should be stayed.

  3. The other rule which is relevant in this context is O 47 r 13(1)(a) which provides that:

    "The Court if satisfied by the judgment debtor or other person liable to execution under a judgment or order that by reason of special circumstances it is inexpedient to enforce the judgment or order … may stay the execution for such period and on such terms as the Court thinks fit."

    Two things should be noted.  The first is that a stay will not be granted unless special circumstances requiring it are demonstrated.  If it is granted, the stay may be…

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Details
Case
[2002] WASCA 224
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Catlin v National Australia Bank Ltd, the appellants, Catlin, sought a stay of execution of a summary judgment granted to the respondent, National Australia Bank Ltd, in an action for possession of the appellants' home in Karratha. The Master had ordered that the appellants give possession of the property to the respondent within 35 days. The stay application was made pending the determination of the appellants' appeal against the Master's judgment. The jurisdiction to grant the stay arose from an inherent jurisdiction recognised by the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971, specifically O 63 r 15(1)(a) and O 47 r 13(1)(a). The former rule indicated that an appeal does not automatically stay execution unless the Full Court or a Judge directs otherwise, while the latter allowed the Court to stay execution if satisfied that special circumstances made it inexpedient.

The legal issues before the court involved the criteria for granting a stay of execution pending appeal and whether the appellants had demonstrated special circumstances warranting such a stay. The court considered the principles established in Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Aust, which held that an injunction to restrain the exercise of a power of sale by a mortgagee would not be granted unless the mortgage debt was paid or the amount claimed was paid into court. The rationale behind this principle was to protect the mortgagee's security unless an equivalent safeguard was provided.

The court, after considering the arguments and the relevant authorities, determined that a stay would not be granted unless special circumstances requiring it were demonstrated. The court found that the appellants had not shown special circumstances warranting a stay of execution. The decision in Inglis was relevant, indicating that the mortgagee should not be deprived of its security unless an equivalent safeguard was provided. Therefore, the court concluded that the stay sought by the appellants would not be granted.

The court's final orders were that the stay of execution previously granted was to be lifted, and the appellants were required to give possession of the property to the respondent within 35 days from the date of the original order. This decision reaffirmed the principle that special circumstances must be demonstrated to secure a stay of execution, particularly in mortgage-related actions where the security of the mortgagee's interest is at stake.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

MURRAY J (dissent)
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: This is an application for a stay of execution of a summary judgment granted to the respondent by Bredmeyer M in an action for possession of the appellants' home in Karratha. The Master ordered that the appellants give possession of the property to the respondent within 35 days. That order has not been executed. On the hearing of the application we granted a stay to preserve the status quo pending our decision. The stay sought by the appellants is pending the determination of their appeal against the Master's judgment. The jurisdiction to grant the stay is an inherent jurisdiction implicitly recognised by the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971, O 63 r 15(1)(a) which provides that:"Except so far as the Full Court or a Judge may direct, an appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution or of proceedings under the decision of the court below."That rule makes it clear that the prima facie position is that the successful party at first instance should be able to enforce the judgment obtained unless the unsuccessful party persuades the Full Court or a Judge that execution should be stayed. The other rule which is relevant in this context is O 47 r 13(1)(a) which provides that:"The Court if satisfied by the judgment debtor or other person liable to execution under a judgment or order that by reason of special circumstances it is inexpedient to enforce the judgment or order … may stay the execution for such period and on such terms as the Court thinks fit."Two things should be noted. The first is that a stay will not be granted unless special circumstances requiring it are demonstrated. If it is granted, the stay may be on terms. As to the latter point, we have mentioned that the action in which judgment was given in favour of the respondent was an action for possession of land. It was grounded on an allegation of default under a mortgage by the appellants as mortgagors. In Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Aust (1972) 126 CLR 161, the High Court determined an appeal by affirming the judgment of Walsh J at first instance, refusing an injunction to restrain a mortgagee from exercising a power of sale under the mortgage in aid of the recovery of the mortgage debt. At 164 Walsh J said:"A general rule has long been established, in relation to applications to restrain the exercise by a mortgagee of powers given by a mortgage and in particular the exercise of a power of sale, that such an injunction will not be granted unless the amount of the mortgage debt if this be not in dispute be paid or unless, if the amount be disputed, the amount claimed by the mortgagee be paid into court." At 164‑5 his Honour remarked that the authorities which he had been able to examine established that as a general rule:"nothing short of actual payment is regarded as sufficient to extinguish a mortgage debt. If the debt has not been actually paid, the court will not, at any rate as a general rule, interfere to deprive the mortgagee of the benefit of his security, except upon terms that an equivalent safeguard is provided to him, by means of the plaintiff bringing in an amount sufficient to meet what is claimed by the mortgagee to be due. The benefit of having a security for a debt would be greatly diminished if the fact that a debtor has raised claims for damages against the mortgagee were allowed to prevent any enforcement of the security until after the litigation of those claims had been completed."The rationale behind the general rule is therefore that at least in a case where the efficacy of the mortgage security itself is not under challenge, even where the mortgagor makes a claim against the mortgagee which it is asserted might be set off against the mortgage debt, the mortgagee should not generally be deprived of its security except upon the provision of an equivalent security by payment or other effective security provided at least to a stakeholder, or to the court. The decision in Inglis has been applied by this Court: eg, Commonwealth Development Bank of Aust Ltd v Nertec Pty Ltd [1999] WASCA 311.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

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