FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Carter v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2019] FCAFC 229
Appeal from: Carter v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2018] FCA 1064 File number: WAD 352 of 2018 Judges: GREENWOOD, KERR AND BURLEY JJ Date of judgment: 16 December 2019 Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – whether primary judge erred in finding that a notice of disqualification from managing corporations was validly served on the appellant by ASIC under s 206F(4) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – whether s 206F required ASIC to serve the appellant directly rather than through an intermediary – application of “effective informal service rule” – appeal dismissed Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 206A, 206F, 459G Cases cited: Capper v Thorpe [1998] HCA 24; 194 CLR 342
Carter v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2018] FCA 1064
Howship Holdings Pty Ltd v Leslie (No 2) [1996] NSWSC 314; 41 NSWLR 542
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362
TCL Airconditioner (Zhongshan)Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 257; 369 ALR 192
Date of hearing: 28 February 2019 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 27 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S. Penglis SC Solicitor for the Appellant: CX Law Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S. Wright SC Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Securities & Investments Commission ORDERS
WAD 352 of 2018 BETWEEN: RODNEY CHARLES CARTER
Appellant
AND: AUSTRALIA SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
Respondent
JUDGE:
GREENWOOD, KERR AND BURLEY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
16 DECEMBER 2019
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1.Service of the decision dated 20 July 2017 to disqualify Rodney Charles Carter from managing corporations under s 206F(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), was effected on 31 July 2017.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
1. BACKGROUND
In the proceedings below, the learned primary judge determined that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) had on 31 July 2017 effected service of a Notice of disqualification from managing corporations upon Rodney Charles Carter in accordance with s 206F of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): Carter v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2018] FCA 1064.
Mr Carter now appeals from that decision. His sole ground of appeal is that:
The learned judge below erred in law in finding that, on the undisputed facts, the Respondent had served the prescribed notice of disqualification on the Appellant within the meaning and for the purposes of section 206F of the Corporations Act.
The undisputed facts are set out in the decision of the primary judge as follows:
[2]On 20 July 2017 a decision was made by ASIC to disqualify…
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 229
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary judge held that section 206F(3) mandated personal service of the notice on the person to be disqualified. The disqualification takes effect from the time when a notice in the prescribed form is served on the person. The court emphasised that the strict liability nature of the offence under section 206A meant that a disqualified person could not use lack of knowledge as a defence. The primary judge concluded that personal service required the document to come to the actual attention of the person to be served, and it was not enough for the person to come to know of the disqualification in an informal or indirect way.
The court examined the statutory language and the purpose of the service requirement, which was to ensure there was no real doubt about the person's knowledge of the disqualification. The primary judge found that ASIC's act of bringing the Notice to the actual attention of Mr Carter met the statutory requirement for the commencement of the disqualification. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the primary judge's interpretation of the statutory requirement for service was correct and that the appeal was without merit.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
ASIC summarises the legal position of Mr Carter as involving the proposition that as a matter of law, s 206F(3) is not satisfied in circumstances where a director actually receives the Notice and ASIC knows that to be the case, unless the director receives the Notice directly from ASIC (or an agent of the director authorised to receive it on his or her behalf). ASIC contends that the primary judge correctly identified three conditions which are sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement in s 206F(3): first, that ASIC must take steps, or do an act, to serve the notice; secondly, that the notice must come to the actual attention of the person to be disqualified; and thirdly, that ASIC must know that the person has received the Notice. It submits that these conditions meet the legislative requirements of s206F(3) in the context in which it appears.4.2 Consideration The primary judge found, and no party challenges, that “service” within s 206F(3) means “personal service”. In Capper v Thorpe [1998] HCA 24; 194 CLR 342, the High Court (Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ) said at [21]:...Where a statutory provision, such as s 6, requires a document to be "served", the statutory command is ordinarily perceived as requiring the contents of the document to be delivered to the person to be served. However, unless the statute says so, a document may be "served" although it is not personally served. Thus, it may be served by posting it to the person required to be served. In many statutory contexts, a document may also be "served" when it is brought to the notice of the person who has to be served. At all events, it will be "served" in such contexts if the efforts of the person who is required to serve the document have resulted in the person to be served becoming aware of the contents of the document. Thus, in Ex parte Portingell, the English Court of Appeal held that a notice of objection had been "served on" the applicant for renewal of a licence when it was handed to a boy of 14 on the licensed premises and the magistrates inferred that "the notice had in fact come to the hands of the applicant". The reference in that passage, which is relied upon by ASIC, that in many statutory contexts a document may be ‘served’ when it is brought to the notice of the person to be served and in such contexts it will be ‘served’ ‘if the efforts of the person who is required to serve the document have resulted in the person to be served becoming aware of the contents of the document’ is only the starting point for analysis. In the present statutory context it is clear the Notice required to be served could not be served merely by it being brought to the notice of Mr Carter. As noted neither party disputes, nor did the primary judge reject, that personal service of the documents by ASIC was required. However that Capper might apply only by analogy, rather than be binding on this Court, in itself is not fatal to ASIC’s case. Proof of personal service ordinarily will be established if a party to be served expressly acknowledges that he or she has both received a document required to be served and has become aware of its terms. So too will a document be personally served if it is served on a solicitor who has authority to receive it on his or her behalf. In Howship Holdings Pty Ltd v Leslie (No 2) [1996] NSWSC 314; 41 NSWLR 542 at 544, Young J addressed the question of service in the context of s 459G of the Act:Section 459G itself does not deal with what is service. The ordinary meaning of ‘service’ is personal service, and personal service merely means that the document in question must come to the notice of the person for whom it is intended. The means by which that person obtains the document are usually immaterial. This is clear in cases that have been considered good law over the centuries, including Hope v Hope (1854) 4 De GM & G 328 at 341-345; 43 ER 534 at 539-540; R v Heron; Ex parte Mulder(1884) 10 VLR 314 at 315; Pino v Prosser [1967] VR 835 at 838. Some of those cases were complicated by the requirement in the former statutes that a person serving initiating process had to endorse the initiating process, but the principle is clear from them. If this were not so, one would get the absurd situation referred to by McInerney J in Pino v Prosser(at 837), that the conclusion would be one which is: “… remarkable to the point of seeming absurdity, in that the defendant who, on his own affidavit admits that he received the writ … should be held not to have been served.”