Carter v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Carter v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2019] FCAFC 229

Appeal from: Carter v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2018] FCA 1064
File number: WAD 352 of 2018
Judges: GREENWOOD, KERR AND BURLEY JJ
Date of judgment: 16 December 2019
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – whether primary judge erred in finding that a notice of disqualification from managing corporations was validly served on the appellant by ASIC under s 206F(4) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – whether s 206F required ASIC to serve the appellant directly rather than through an intermediary – application of “effective informal service rule” – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 206A, 206F, 459G
Cases cited:

Capper v Thorpe [1998] HCA 24; 194 CLR 342

Carter v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2018] FCA 1064

Howship Holdings Pty Ltd v Leslie (No 2) [1996] NSWSC 314; 41 NSWLR 542

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362

TCL Airconditioner (Zhongshan)Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 257; 369 ALR 192

Woodgate v Garard Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 508; 78 ACSR 468

Date of hearing: 28 February 2019
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S. Penglis SC
Solicitor for the Appellant: CX Law
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S. Wright SC
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Securities & Investments Commission

ORDERS

WAD 352 of 2018
BETWEEN:

RODNEY CHARLES CARTER

Appellant

AND:

AUSTRALIA SECURITIES & INVESTMENTS COMMISSION

Respondent

JUDGE:

GREENWOOD, KERR AND BURLEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

16 DECEMBER 2019

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.Service of the decision dated 20 July 2017 to disqualify Rodney Charles Carter from managing corporations under s 206F(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), was effected on 31 July 2017.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

1.                 BACKGROUND

  1. In the proceedings below, the learned primary judge determined that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) had on 31 July 2017 effected service of a Notice of disqualification from managing corporations upon Rodney Charles Carter in accordance with s 206F of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): Carter v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2018] FCA 1064.

  2. Mr Carter now appeals from that decision. His sole ground of appeal is that:

    The learned judge below erred in law in finding that, on the undisputed facts, the Respondent had served the prescribed notice of disqualification on the Appellant within the meaning and for the purposes of section 206F of the Corporations Act.

  3. The undisputed facts are set out in the decision of the primary judge as follows:

    [2]On 20 July 2017 a decision was made by ASIC to disqualify…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 229
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Carter v Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the Federal Court was tasked with determining whether a notice of disqualification from managing corporations was validly served on the appellant by ASIC under section 206F(4) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The court had to decide whether section 206F mandated that ASIC serve the appellant directly rather than through an intermediary. The matter hinged on the application of the "effective informal service rule" and the interpretation of the statutory requirement for service.

The primary judge held that section 206F(3) mandated personal service of the notice on the person to be disqualified. The disqualification takes effect from the time when a notice in the prescribed form is served on the person. The court emphasised that the strict liability nature of the offence under section 206A meant that a disqualified person could not use lack of knowledge as a defence. The primary judge concluded that personal service required the document to come to the actual attention of the person to be served, and it was not enough for the person to come to know of the disqualification in an informal or indirect way.

The court examined the statutory language and the purpose of the service requirement, which was to ensure there was no real doubt about the person's knowledge of the disqualification. The primary judge found that ASIC's act of bringing the Notice to the actual attention of Mr Carter met the statutory requirement for the commencement of the disqualification. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the primary judge's interpretation of the statutory requirement for service was correct and that the appeal was without merit.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 206F relevantly provides:Power to disqualify(1)ASIC may disqualify a person from managing corporations for up to 5 years if:(a)within 7 years immediately before ASIC gives a notice under paragraph (b)(i):(i) the person has been an officer of 2 or more corporations; and(ii)while the person was an officer, or within 12 months after the person ceased to be an officer of those corporations, each of the corporations was wound up and a liquidator lodged a report under subsection 533(1) (including that subsection as applied by section 526‑35 of the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006) about the corporation’s inability to pay its debts; and(b) ASIC has given the person:(i)a notice in the prescribed form requiring them to demonstrate why they should not be disqualified; and(ii) an opportunity to be heard on the question; and(c) ASIC is satisfied that the disqualification is justified. …Notice of disqualification(3)If ASIC disqualifies a person from managing corporations under this section, ASIC must serve a notice on the person advising them of the disqualification. The notice must be in prescribed form. Start of disqualification(4)The disqualification takes effect from the time when a notice referred to in subsection (3) is served on the person.3. DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE The learned primary judge found that service of the kind required by s 206F(3) had been effected, and that ASIC was entitled to proceed on the basis that Mr Carter had been disqualified from managing corporations under s 206F. His reasoning may be summarised as follows:(1)Section 206F(3) requires in mandatory terms that a Notice in the prescribed form be served ‘on the person’. (2)Establishing the date from which the disqualification takes effect is a significant matter because s 206A(1) provides that a person who is disqualified from managing corporations commits an offence if, in effect, they act in substantial disregard of the disqualification. The offence is one of strict liability: s 206A(1A). The strict liability nature of the offence means that it is not open to a disqualified person to prove a lack of knowledge by way of defence.(3)The disqualification must be formally notified by ASIC in a manner that satisfies the legislative language. It is not enough that the person comes to know of the disqualification in an informal or indirect way.(4)Section 206F(3) uses the expression ‘serve...on the person’. It is a requirement for personal service. Personal service requires the document in question to come to the actual attention of the person required to be served. The express requirement in s 206F(3) for a Notice “advising” the relevant person of the disqualification supports the conclusion that it must come to the actual attention of the person to be served. (5)The manifest purpose of the service requirement, in the context of s 206A, is that the disqualification does not commence unless and until there is no real doubt as to knowledge on the part of the person of the disqualification by ASIC. The provision as to service also provides clarity as to the operative date on which the person ceases to be a director. When the disqualification takes effect the person ceases to be a director by operation of s 206A(2). There should be no real doubt as to whether third parties are entitled to deal with a person on the basis that they are a director. (6)There may be reasons why ASIC determines that the disqualification should not occur with immediate effect. The terms of s 206F(3) mean that if a decision to disqualify is made, it will not take effect unless and until ASIC itself takes steps to serve the Notice. (7)Having regard to these matters, the primary judge concluded:[26]These are all considerations that distinguish service under s 206F(3) from other cases where the courts have held that proof of actual notice is sufficient to satisfy a requirement for service even if personal service has not been effected. Accordingly, I accept the submission that s 206F(3) requires that the service of the notice be effected by ASIC. It is not enough that the disqualification becomes known to the relevant person in some indirect way without the involvement of ASIC.[27]Therefore, if it is the case that ASIC by its act brought the Notice to the actual attention of Mr Carter then the statutory requirement for the commencement of the disqualification has been met.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

ASIC summarises the legal position of Mr Carter as involving the proposition that as a matter of law, s 206F(3) is not satisfied in circumstances where a director actually receives the Notice and ASIC knows that to be the case, unless the director receives the Notice directly from ASIC (or an agent of the director authorised to receive it on his or her behalf). ASIC contends that the primary judge correctly identified three conditions which are sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement in s 206F(3): first, that ASIC must take steps, or do an act, to serve the notice; secondly, that the notice must come to the actual attention of the person to be disqualified; and thirdly, that ASIC must know that the person has received the Notice. It submits that these conditions meet the legislative requirements of s206F(3) in the context in which it appears.4.2 Consideration The primary judge found, and no party challenges, that “service” within s 206F(3) means “personal service”. In Capper v Thorpe [1998] HCA 24; 194 CLR 342, the High Court (Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ) said at [21]:...Where a statutory provision, such as s 6, requires a document to be "served", the statutory command is ordinarily perceived as requiring the contents of the document to be delivered to the person to be served. However, unless the statute says so, a document may be "served" although it is not personally served. Thus, it may be served by posting it to the person required to be served. In many statutory contexts, a document may also be "served" when it is brought to the notice of the person who has to be served. At all events, it will be "served" in such contexts if the efforts of the person who is required to serve the document have resulted in the person to be served becoming aware of the contents of the document. Thus, in Ex parte Portingell, the English Court of Appeal held that a notice of objection had been "served on" the applicant for renewal of a licence when it was handed to a boy of 14 on the licensed premises and the magistrates inferred that "the notice had in fact come to the hands of the applicant". The reference in that passage, which is relied upon by ASIC, that in many statutory contexts a document may be ‘served’ when it is brought to the notice of the person to be served and in such contexts it will be ‘served’ ‘if the efforts of the person who is required to serve the document have resulted in the person to be served becoming aware of the contents of the document’ is only the starting point for analysis. In the present statutory context it is clear the Notice required to be served could not be served merely by it being brought to the notice of Mr Carter. As noted neither party disputes, nor did the primary judge reject, that personal service of the documents by ASIC was required. However that Capper might apply only by analogy, rather than be binding on this Court, in itself is not fatal to ASIC’s case. Proof of personal service ordinarily will be established if a party to be served expressly acknowledges that he or she has both received a document required to be served and has become aware of its terms. So too will a document be personally served if it is served on a solicitor who has authority to receive it on his or her behalf. In Howship Holdings Pty Ltd v Leslie (No 2) [1996] NSWSC 314; 41 NSWLR 542 at 544, Young J addressed the question of service in the context of s 459G of the Act:Section 459G itself does not deal with what is service. The ordinary meaning of ‘service’ is personal service, and personal service merely means that the document in question must come to the notice of the person for whom it is intended. The means by which that person obtains the document are usually immaterial. This is clear in cases that have been considered good law over the centuries, including Hope v Hope (1854) 4 De GM & G 328 at 341-345; 43 ER 534 at 539-540; R v Heron; Ex parte Mulder(1884) 10 VLR 314 at 315; Pino v Prosser [1967] VR 835 at 838. Some of those cases were complicated by the requirement in the former statutes that a person serving initiating process had to endorse the initiating process, but the principle is clear from them. If this were not so, one would get the absurd situation referred to by McInerney J in Pino v Prosser(at 837), that the conclusion would be one which is: “… remarkable to the point of seeming absurdity, in that the defendant who, on his own affidavit admits that he received the writ … should be held not to have been served.”