Caron v Jahani (No 2)

[2020] NSWCA 117

Court of Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation:

Caron and Seidlitz v Jahani and McInerney in their capacity as liquidators of Courtenay House Pty Ltd (in liq) & Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2020] NSWCA 117

Hearing dates:

21 April 2020

Date of orders:

18 June 2020

Decision date:

18 June 2020

Before:

Bathurst CJ at [1]; Bell P at [7]; Macfarlan JA at [185]

Decision:

1.   Appeal allowed.

 

2.   Set aside the orders of the primary judge and, in lieu thereof, direct that subject to application of principles of hotchpot, the Liquidators are justified in determining the amounts to be distributed to the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors on the basis that:

 

(a)    the $60,000 withdrawn from Westpac 2 on 21 April 2017 be deducted pro-rata across all investors with claims in respect of deposits made on or before 21 April 2017;

 

(b)    the Category E investors are entitled to the amount of the relevant investment, less

 

(i)   a pro-rata share of the $60,000 deduction; and

 

(ii)   costs in accordance with the general law and the orders of the court below;

 (c)   the Category F investors are entitled to the amount of the relevant investment, less costs in accordance with the general law and the orders of the court below.

Catchwords:

CORPORATIONS – unregistered managed investment scheme – two companies operating a Ponzi scheme – freezing order on companies’ bank accounts – deposits made to companies’ bank accounts on day of and in days after freezing order by unsuspecting investors – liquidators appointed – Court directions sought as to method of distribution of limited funds in bank accounts – mixed and co-mingled accounts – whether rule in Clayton’s Case, simple pari passu approach or lowest intermediate balance rule to be applied – tracing – role of “hotchpot”.

 

EQUITY – blended or co-mingled fund in context of a Ponzi scheme – where multiple deposits and withdrawals made from companies’ bank accounts – companies in liquidation – nature of investors’ interests in moneys held in bank account – bank accounts subject to charge or equitable lien – tracing – relationship between tracing and lowest intermediate balance rule.

  INSOLVENCY – unregistered managed investment scheme – Ponzi scheme – winding up – freezing order on companies’ bank accounts – whether investors who deposited funds into bank account after freezing order was made should be treated differently in terms of distribution of limited funds compared to investors who deposited funds into bank account prior to freezing order – whether deposits made into bank account after freezing order should be treated differently as such deposits could be separately identified and had not been dissipated – consideration of lowest intermediate balance rule and pari passu distribution – relevance of ability to trace – principles of hotchpot.

Legislation Cited:

Corporations (Investigation and Management) Order (No 2) 2003 (NZ)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 77, 1114, 1324, 601ED; Vol 6, Sch 2, s 90-15
Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) s 63

Cases Cited:

Akers v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 223 FCR 8; [2014] FCAFC 57
ASIC v Tasman Investment Management [2006] NSWSC 943; (2006) 59 ACSR 113
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Enterprise Solutions 2000 Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 82
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Idylic Solutions Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1306; (2009) 76 ACSR 129
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Letten (No 20) [2012] FCA 1283; (2012) 92 ACSR 630
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Letten (No 7) (2010) 190 FCR 59; [2010] FCA 1231
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Nelson [2003] NSWSC 129; (2003) 44 ACSR 719
Australian Securities Commission v Buckley (1996) 7 BPR 15,024
Australian Securities Commission v Melbourne Asset Management Nominees Pty Ltd (rec and mgr apptd) (1994) 49 FCR 334; (1994) 121 ALR 626
Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567
Barlow Clowes International Ltd (in liq) v Vaughan [1991] EWCA Civ 11
Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd (in liquidation) v Homan [1995] Ch 211
Black v S Freedman (1910) 12 CLR 105; [1910] HCA 58
Boughner v Greyhawk Equity Partners Limited Partnership (Millenium) (2012) 111 OR (3d) 700; [2012] ONSC 3185
Boughner v Greyhawk Equity Partners Limited Partnership (Millenium) [2013] ONCA 26; [2013] 5 CBR (6th) 113
Brady v Stapleton (1952) 88 CLR 322; [1952] HCA 62
Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253; [2011] HCA 26
Caron v Said Jahani and John McInerney as joint and several liquidators of Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd (In liq) and Courtenay House Pty Ltd (In liq) [2019] NSWCA 293
Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (2019) 368 ALR 390; [2019] HCA 20
Charity Commission for England and Wales v Framjee [2014] EWHC 2507 (Ch)
Devaynes v Noble (1816) 1 Mer 529; [1816] 35 ER 767
Easy Loan Corporation v Wiseman [2017] ABCA 58
El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc (No 2) [1995] 2 All ER 213
El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] 3 All ER 717
Federal Republic of Brazil v Durant International Corporation [2016] AC 297; [2015] UKPC 35
Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102; [2000] UKHL 29
Georges v Seaborn International (Trustee), in the matter of Sonray Capital Markets Pty Ltd (in liq) (2012) 288 ALR 240; [2012] FCA 75
Georges v Seaborn International Pty Ltd (2012) 206 FCR 408; [2012] FCAFC 140
Greymac Trust Co v Ontario [1988] 2 SCR 172
Hagan v Waterhouse (No 2) (1991) 34 NSWLR 308
Hancock v Smith (1889) 41 ChD 456
Heperu Pty Ltd v Belle (2009) 76 NSWLR 230; [2009] NSWCA 252
In re Australian Home Finance Pty Ltd [1956] VLR 1
In re British Red Cross Balkan Fund; British Red Cross Society v Johnson [1914] 2 Ch 419
In re Esteem Settlement [2002] JLR 53
In re Footman Bower & Co Ltd [1961] Ch 443
In re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (In Receivership) [1995] 1 AC 74
In re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (in receivership) [1995] 1 AC 74
In Re Hallett’s Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett (1880) 13 ChD 696
In re Laughton [1962] Tas SR 300
In re Stenning; Wood v Stenning [1895] 2 Ch 433
In re Walter J Schmidt & Co 298 F. 314 (1923)
In the matter of BBY Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed) (in liquidation) (No 2) (2018) 363 ALR 492; [2018] NSWSC 346
James Roscoe (Bolton) Ltd v Winder [1915] 1 Ch 62
Keefe v Law Society of New South Wales (1998) 44 NSWLR 451
Law Society of Upper Canada v Toronto Dominion Bank (1998) 169 DLR (4th) 353; (1998) 42 OR (3d) 257
Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548
McKenzie v Alexander Associates Ltd (No 2) (1991) 5 NZCLC 67,046
Pars Ram Brothers (Pte) Ltd v Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2018] 4 SLR 1404; [2018] SGHC 60
Re Magarey Farlam Lawyers Trust Accounts (No 3) (2007) 96 SASR 337; [2007] SASC 9
Re MF Global Australia Ltd (in liq) (2012) 267 FLR 27; [2012] NSWSC 994
Re Ontario Securities Commission and Greymac Credit Corporation (1986) 55 O.R. (2d) 673; (1986) 30 DLR (4th) 1
Re Registered Securities Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 545
Re Rowena Nominees Pty Ltd; Ex parte Conlan (2006) 199 FLR 415; [2006] WASC 69
Rowena Nominees; Hannan v Zindilis (2016) 51 VR 178; [2016] VSC 723
Russell-Cooke Trust Co v Prentis [2002] EWHC 2227 (Ch)
Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398
Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Worldwide Wagering Pty Ltd (2017) 52 VR 664; [2017] VSC 101
Stephenson Nominees Pty Ltd v Official Receiver; Ex parte Roberts (1987) 76 ALR 485
Sutherland Re; French Caledonia Travel Service Pty Ltd (in liq) (2003) 59 NSWLR 361; [2003] NSWSC 1008
Westpac Banking Corporation v Earthwise International Limited [2005] NSWSC 1037
Whitehand v Jenkins (Supreme Court (Vic), Ormiston J, 6 February 1987, unrep)
Windsor Mortgage Nominees Pty Ltd v Cardwell (1979) ACLC 32,195

Texts Cited:

A Duggan, “The Death and Resurrection of the Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule” (2017) 80 Saskatchewan Law Review 209
A W Scott, “The right to follow money wrongfully mingled with other money” (1913) 27 Harvard Law Review 125
D A McConville, “Tracing and the Rule in Clayton’s Case” (1963) 79 LQR 388
D Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008, Oxford University Press)
J D Heydon and M J Leeming, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (8th ed, 2018, LexisNexis Butterworths)
J D Heydon, M J Leeming and P G Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines & Remedies (5th ed, 2015, LexisNexis Butterworths)
J Edelman, “Understanding Tracing Rules” (2016) 16 QUT Law Review 1
K S Jacobs, The Law of Trusts in New South Wales (1958, Butterworths)
L D Smith, “Tracing in Bank Accounts: The Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule on Trial” (2000) 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 75
L D Smith, The Law of Tracing (1997, Oxford University Press)
L Gullifer (ed), Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (4th ed, 2008, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters)
L W J Aitken, “Tracing into mixed funds” (2003) 77 ALJ 230
P H Pettit, Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed, 1992 reissue, Butterworths)
R P Meagher and W M C Gummow, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (5th ed, 1986, Butterworths)
R P Meagher and W M C Gummow, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (6th ed, 1997, Butterworths)
S B Thomas, “Clayton’s Case and the ‘common pool’ exception” (2004) 15 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 177
S Kinsey and L Papaelia, “Distribution over a mixed fund – pragmatism prevails over esoteric tracing principles” (2012) 20 Insolvency Law Journal 264
S Lowrie and P Todd, “In Defence of the North American Rolling Charge” (1997) 12 Denning Law Journal 43

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Peter Caron (First Appellant)
Anke Seidlitz (Second Appellant)
Said Jahani and John McInerney in their capacity as liquidators of Courtenay House Pty Ltd (in liq) (ACN 130 607 644) & Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd (in liq) (ACN 152 224 149) (First Respondent)
Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd (in liq) (ACN 152 224 149) (Second Respondent)
Courtenay House Pty Ltd (in liq) (ACN 130 607 644) (Third Respondent)
J.P. Melocco Pty Ltd (ACN 008 436 360) (Fourth Respondent)
LifeSmart Trading Pty Ltd (ACN 147 482 853) (Fifth Respondent)
Ralph Del Vecchio (Sixth Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel:
E L Beechey (Appellants)
No appearance (First, Second and Third Respondents)
M A Izzo SC with B Michael (Fourth Respondent)
No appearance (Fifth Respondent)
No appearance (Sixth Respondent)

  Solicitors:
Jones Day (Appellants)
Colin Biggers & Paisley (First, Second and Third Respondents)
Ashurst Australia (Fourth Respondent)
Johnson Winter & Slattery (Fifth Respondent)
Diamond Conway Lawyers (Sixth Respondent)

File Number(s):

2019/301319

Publication restriction:

N/A

 Decision under appeal 

Court or tribunal:

Supreme Court of New South Wales

Jurisdiction:

Equity – Corporations List

Citation:

[2019] NSWSC 1113

Date of Decision:

28 August 2019

Before:

Black J

File Number(s):

2017/269831

HEADNOTE

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]

Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd and Courtenay House Pty Ltd (together, CH) accepted funds from investors for the ostensible purpose of investment in foreign exchange trading from about 2010. CH purported to offer investors various “financial products”, some of which were associated with political events, in the sense that trading profits were to be sought by leveraging off volatility in financial markets associated with matter such as the United States Presidential election and Brexit. Unknown to its investors, CH in fact operated a Ponzi scheme, whereby capital deposits from newer investors were used to pay purported returns on investment and purported returns of capital to earlier investors. Over the life of the Ponzi scheme, between $213 million and $248 million of funds were deposited by investors into the companies’ bank accounts and, contrary to the marketing of the companies as conducting a foreign exchange trading business, little foreign exchange trading was done.

On 21 April 2017, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) obtained ex parte freezing orders over CH’s assets and restrained the companies carrying on a financial services business. A number of investors, presumably unaware of the facts that had led to the making of the freezing orders, made further investments with CH on 21 April 2017 and up to and including 26 April 2017. At least immediately before the freezing orders were made, CH maintained two principal accounts, one with the National Australia Bank and one with Westpac. The Westpac account had approximately $21 million at the time of the Liquidators’ appointment on 16 May 2017.

The present appeal relates to how the limited funds in the Westpac account should be distributed to former clients of CH, with the contest between the Pre-21 April 2017 Investors who deposited funds prior to the date of the freezing order, represented by J P Melocco Pty Ltd (the Respondent) and, on the other hand, some nine Post-21 April 2017 investors who deposited funds into the Westpac account after the freezing order came into force, represented by Mr Peter Caron and Ms Anke Seidlitz (the Appellants). The Post-21 April 2017 Investors were comprised of two classes, being those who deposited funds into the Westpac account after the freezing order came into force but on the same day as a withdrawal of $60,000 from the Westpac account (Category E investors), and those who deposited funds into the Westpac account after the withdrawal of $60,000 and whose funds could be specifically identified by the Liquidators (Category F investors). The $60,000 withdrawal represented a transfer from the Westpac account into another CH account with Westpac but, as no funds remain in the account to which that amount was transferred, the argument proceeded on the basis that the $60,000 amount was irrecoverable.

At first instance, the primary judge concluded that the funds held in the Westpac account were held on separate trusts for both the Pre- and Post-21 April 2017 Investors, and applied the simple pari passu method of distribution of the funds. The primary judge held that the only significance of 21 April 2017 was that the Court made a freezing order on that date, but that this did not provide a principled basis for distinguishing the position of the Post-21 April 2017 Investors with any other investors prior to that date.

The principal issue on appeal was whether the primary judge erred by holding that the simple pari passu method of distribution of the funds in the Westpac account applied, and whether an alternative method of distribution such as the rule in Devaynes v Noble (1816) 1 Mer 529; [1816] 35 ER 767 (Clayton’s Case), or the lowest intermediate balance or North American rolling charge approach should instead have been applied.

The Court held (Bell P, Bathurst CJ and Macfarlan JA agreeing), allowing the appeal:

1. The primary judge erred in applying the simple pari passu method of distribution of the funds in the Westpac account in the circumstances of the present case: [1], [6] (Bathurst CJ); [158]-[176] (Bell P); [185] (Macfarlan JA).

2. Where evidence is available, the lowest intermediate balance rule provides the fairest, most equitable and principled outcome for the allocation of limited funds between investors. Application of the lowest intermediate balance rule permits the tracing of surviving proprietary interests, and where a party can identify through tracing his, her or its equitable proprietary interest in a mixed or co-mingled fund, such tracing should be permitted: [146]-[156] (Bell P); [185] (Macfarlan JA).

Australian Securities Commission v Buckley (1996) 7 BPR 15,024; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Enterprise Solutions 2000 Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 82; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Idylic Solutions Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1306; (2009) 76 ACSR 129; Barlow Clowes International Ltd (in liq) v Vaughan [1991] EWCA Civ 11; In re British Red Cross Balkan Fund; British Red Cross Society v Johnson [1914] 2 Ch 419; In re Walter J Schmidt & Co298 F. 314 (1923); In the matter of BBY Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed) (in liquidation) (No 2) (2018) 363 ALR 492; [2018] NSWSC 346; Law Society of Upper Canada v Toronto Dominion Bank (1998) 169 DLR (4th) 353; (1998) 42 OR (3d) 257; Re Registered Securities Ltd[1991] 1 NZLR 545; Sutherland Re; French Caledonia Travel Service Pty Ltd (in liq) (2003) 59 NSWLR 361; [2003] NSWSC 1008, considered.

3. Discussion by Bell P of the alternative methods of distributing the limited funds of investors in a mixed, blended or co-mingled account, namely, the rule in Clayton’s Case, the simple pari passu method and the lowest intermediate balance rule: [79]-[156].

4. Observations by Bathurst CJ as to the complexities that may affect the distribution of funds in different cases: [2]-[3].

5. It is generally desirable that, where possible, questions of hotchpot be resolved along with other questions relating to the distribution of limited funds in the same hearing: [4] (Bathurst CJ); [176]-[177] (Bell P); [185] (Macfarlan JA).

Judgment

1. BATHURST CJ: I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of the President in draft. I agree for the reasons given by him that in the particular circumstances of the present case the orders he proposes should be made.

2. The present case proceeded on a number of assumptions which were undisputed on the appeal, in particular that the investors’ funds from the time of their investment were held either on an express trust or on a trust arising in accordance with the principles in Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 or Black v S Freedman & Co Ltd (1910) 12 CLR 105; [1910] HCA 58. The juridical basis for the assumption that the funds at all times were held on such trusts is not entirely clear, but it is not necessary to investigate it on the appeal. However, it should be noted that if in fact the trust arose only at the time of the freezing order referred to by Bell P in his judgment, it would be necessary to investigate the terms of the trust prior to determining the appropriate method of distribution. It would also be necessary to consider whether such a trust could arise in an insolvency context and the fact that the imposition of the trust at that time would not only constitute the investors as secured creditors but alter the method of distribution among them by providing a different method of distribution from that required by s 559 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

3. Further, it is by no means clear to me that it would be appropriate to apply the lowest intermediate balance method if the losses were incurred in the course of legitimate trading pursuant to the mandate given to Courtenay House Trading Capital Group Pty Ltd, in circumstances where such trading occurred without negligence or occurred as a result of a negligent breach of trust.

4. Bell P has pointed out that it will be necessary in some circumstances to take the question of hotchpot into account. I agree with Bell P that it is desirable generally that this question be determined along with other questions in the same proceedings relating to the distribution of limited funds in a mixed or co-mingled account or accounts.

5. Finally, the determination of distribution in accordance with the lowest intermediate balance method may be of such complexity that a liquidator would be justified and entitled to distribute on a pari passu basis.

6. However, based on the relatively simple manner in which the present appeal was brought, it is unnecessary to consider these questions further. For the reasons given by Bell P, in the circumstances of the present case the lowest intermediate balance method of distribution is best calculated to do justice to those parties who are represented in the proceedings.

7. BELL P: This appeal, which raises a classic insolvency conundrum, involves a contest between two groups of investors in relation to limited funds originally deposited in a Westpac bank account operated by Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd and Courtenay House Pty Ltd (together, CH), both now in liquidation but erstwhile operators of a Ponzi scheme: see In the matter of Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Limited (in liquidation) and Courtenay House Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2018] NSWSC 404 at [10]; (2018) 125 ACSR 149 (Courtenay House).

1. The contested funds are now held in a bank account controlled by CH’s liquidators (the Liquidators), and the present case was originally given life, as is frequently the case, by an application by the Liquidators for orders and directions about the manner in which they should distribute funds held in certain bank accounts to former clients of CH.

The conundrum – introduction and overview

9. The conundrum concerns how limited funds in a bank account are to be distributed between investors whose funds were deposited into and co-mingled in that account over a number of years, and where there were innumerable deposits into and withdrawals from the account over that time.

10. In Australia and a number of other common law jurisdictions, application of the rule in Devaynes v Noble (1816) 1 Mer 529; (1816) 35 ER 767 (Clayton’s Case) by which the earliest deposit into the bank account is presumed to have been the first withdrawn (that is, “first in, first out”) has been rejected as an appropriate solution to the conundrum which involves dealing with the interests inter se of investors or clients who invariably have been either defrauded or left short of funds by incompetent management. The rule in Clayton’s Case favours later investors over earlier investors.

11. At least two other approaches are available and, as shall be seen, there are variations on these approaches. Indeed, what I describe below as the second alternative may fairly and best be understood as a variation on the first alternative as opposed to a true alternative to it.

12. The first alternative approach is to distribute the fund rateably by reference to the amount of individual investments proportionate to the remaining limited funds in the bank account. This is described as the pari passu ex post facto (pari passu) approach. It is also described as the pro rata or “simple” pari passu approach.

13. Unlike application of the rule in Clayton’s Case, the pari passu approach tends to favour earlier investors over later investors because it turns a blind eye to the fact that withdrawals from the fund over time will have proportionately reduced the quantum of deposits made prior to the withdrawals. Most graphically, where the account has been overdrawn, the pari passu approach ignores the fact that all deposits prior to the withdrawal that sends the account into debit will have been dissipated (assuming the withdrawn funds cannot be traced into a further asset or repository of value). On the other hand, the pari passu approach has the merit of arithmetic simplicity and consequent ease of application: all that is required in order to ascertain a claimant’s share is to divide the fund by the same proportion as one unpaid depositor’s contribution to the fund bears to that of other claimants.

14. The second approach does not ignore the withdrawal of amounts from the fund over time, but treats any given depositor’s share as rateably reduced whenever there is any withdrawal from the fund. It is in that sense a variation of the pari passu approach, but will yield a different outcome depending on the time that individual deposits were made and any subsequent movements in the account. This is called the “lowest intermediate balance”, North American or “rolling charge” approach (lowest intermediate balance rule), (see Barlow Clowes International Ltd (in liq) v Vaughan [1991] EWCA Civ 11 (Barlow Clowes)). The reference to “North American” is because of the approach’s association with the well-known decision of Learned Hand J in In re Walter J Schmidt & Co298 F. 314 (1923)(Re Walter J Schmidt), but in truth it had been employed in a number of earlier decisions of United States’ courts as noted by Professor Scott: see A W Scott, “The right to follow money wrongfully mingled with other money” (1913) 27 Harvard Law Review 125 at 134, fn 25 (Scott).

15. The lowest intermediate balance approach is most consistent with the principles or rules of tracing, and has been considered by some judges and commentators as likely to produce the most equitable result, in the sense of a fair distribution between depositors, as it reflects the accounting reality as disclosed by a running bank account. It will favour more recent depositors or investors over earlier depositors or investors, not by means of a fiction or presumption of the kind animating the rule in Clayton’s Case, but rather by reason of the historical reality that later contributors’ deposits will not have been subject to as much dissipation by the fraudster or defaulting trustee or fiduciary as earlier contributors’ deposits will have been.

16. A practical problem with the lowest intermediate balance approach, however, is that, depending on the number of depositors whose funds have been invested or deposited into a mixed or blended fund and depending on the extent of movements in that fund over time, including withdrawals, enormous complexity may (but will not always) arise in ascertaining the proportionate entitlement of persons with similar equitable claims over the fund. Given that this situation typically arises in an insolvency context, the costs involved in making the relevant calculations may be considered by liquidators to be too great so as to make the exercise worthwhile. In other words, the cost of the accounting exercise may exhaust or significantly erode the remaining fund so that the purpose of so doing may be wholly or partially frustrated.

17. Which of the three different approaches is applied matters, because each approach yields a different financial outcome for depositors in or contributors to the mixed or co-mingled fund. The different financial outcomes resulting from the different approaches are well illustrated in the decision of Williams J in Re International Investment Unit Trust [2005] 1 NZLR 270 at [24] (International Investment Unit Trust), and in the Annex to the decision of Audrey Lim JC in Pars Ram Brothers (Pte) Ltd v Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2018] 4 SLR 1404; [2018] SGHC 60 (Pars Ram); see also the examples given in S Kinsey and L Papaelia, “Distribution over a mixed fund – pragmatism prevails over esoteric tracing principles” (2012) 20 Insolvency Law Journal 264 at 268-269.

18. There is room for debate as to which approach is the fairest and most consistent with principle or, as Williams J perhaps more aptly put it in International Investment Unit Trust at [73], which approach is “the least unfair result for the investors, bearing in mind that, regrettably, no method of distribution will result in perfect justice for all.” See also Russell-Cooke Trust Co v Prentis [2002] EWHC 2227 (Ch) at [58] (Russell-Cooke).

19. With this introduction and overview of the conundrum and the potential solutions to it in mind, it is next necessary to set out the factual background against which it arises in the present case before turning to the reasons of the primary judge and a fuller analysis of the problem and the parties’ competing contentions.

Factual background

20. CH accepted funds from investors for the ostensible purpose of investment in foreign exchange trading from about 2010. It purported to offer investors various “financial products”, some of which were associated with political events, in the sense that trading profits were to be sought by leveraging off volatility in financial markets associated with matters such as the United States Presidential election and Brexit.

21. Adopting the description of Black J (the primary judge), the two CH companies offered several forms of investments to investors, namely “standard products”, which comprised three different types of trading strategies described as “Swing”, “Extreme” and “Elite”, and “special products”, which were offered to existing investors based upon current affairs around the world, including the Brexit Special product. Consistent with its character as a Ponzi scheme but obviously unknown to investors, capital deposits from newer investors were used to pay purported returns on investment and purported returns of capital to earlier investors. Over the life of the Ponzi scheme, between $213 million and $248 million of funds was deposited by investors into the companies’ bank accounts and, contrary to the marketing of the companies as conducting a foreign exchange trading business, little foreign exchange trading was done. Further, that which was done incurred an overall loss. As Brereton J (as his Honour then was) observed in related litigation in Courtenay House at [10]:

“It appears that, despite what was represented to clients, Courtenay House undertook very little foreign exchange trading and generated minimal returns from it; in fact, they operated a Ponzi scheme, using capital deposited by more recent investors to repay earlier investors.”

22. As described by the primary judge in the current proceedings, investors who decided to invest in CH were generally provided with an application form for the relevant investment strategy which they were asked to complete and return, but the companies did not provide consistent information and documents to investors. The Liquidators have not located a signed application form for every investor, and it was unclear which investors received what documentation. Some of the template application forms for standard products identified by the Liquidators from CH’s records stated that the funds deposited by the individual investor were to be held in the Companies’ “trading account held in trust”, although other forms do not expressly make that statement.

23. On 21 April 2017 at 3.11pm, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) obtained ex parte freezing orders over CH’s assets and restrained the companies carrying on a financial services business until 1 May 2017: In the matter of Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 467. The orders were served shortly after 4.00pm on the same day. It should be noted that the Court found that there was a serious question to be tried as to whether Courtney House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd had been carrying on an unregistered managed investment scheme in contravention of s 601ED of the Corporations Act2001 (Cth) and whether both companies in the CH group were carrying on an unlicensed financial services business: [at] [3]-[4].

24. A number of investors, presumably unaware of the facts that had led to the making of the freezing orders, made further investments with CH on 21 April 2017 and up to and including 26 April 2017. (It may be that the investments made on 21 April 2017 were in fact made earlier than 21 April 2017, and that 21 April 2017 is the date on which particular investors’ deposits were received as cleared funds in various bank accounts controlled by CH. The potential significance of this fact will be examined and explored later in these reasons.) A number of these investors had also invested with and through CH, and secured investment returns prior to 21 April 2017. (The significance of this is also considered at [181] - [182] below).

25. At least immediately before the freezing orders were made, CH maintained two principal bank accounts, one with the National Australia Bank (NAB) and one with Westpac. Approximately $185 million had been deposited to the Westpac account since it was opened. It had a balance of approximately $21 million at the time of the Liquidators’ appointment on 16 May 2017. Approximately $29 million was held in the account with NAB at that time.

26. The litigation before Brereton J in Courtenay House principally concerned whether or not the funds in the NAB account were held on trust for all investors and should be “pooled” and treated as funds mixed with the funds in the Westpac account, on the one hand, or whether the funds in the NAB account were only held on trust for those investors who had invested in a “financial product” known as “Brexit Special”, which was said to have been designed to exploit foreign exchange movements associated with the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union, on the other hand.

27. The issue of “pooling” where an insolvent company has conducted a number of “funds” or investment schemes via multiple accounts is typically the first stage in identifying which of a failed company’s assets will be available for particular depositors who have claims against the company in respect of their failed investments. Complex examples of this preliminary pooling exercise include Gordon J’s decisions in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Letten (No 7) (2010) 190 FCR 59; [2010] FCA 1231 (Letten (No 7)) and Georges v Seaborn International (Trustee), in the matter of Sonray Capital Markets Pty Ltd (in liq) (2012) 288 ALR 240; [2012] FCA 75 (Sonray); Black J’s decision in Re MF Global Australia Ltd (in liq) (2012) 267 FLR 27; [2012] NSWSC 994 at [44]ff (MF Global); and Brereton J’s decision in In the matter of BBY Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed) (in liquidation) (No 2) (2018) 363 ALR 492; [2018] NSWSC 346 (Re BBY).

28. In Courtenay House, Brereton J concluded that a basis for pooling CH’s NAB and Westpac bank accounts had not been established, and held that the funds held in the NAB account were the subject of an express trust in favour of those investors who had invested in the “Brexit Special” financial product: at [27]. This conclusion was based on a conventional analysis rooted in the identification of a sufficiently certain intention to create a trust: see, generally, Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253; [2011] HCA 26. His Honour also indicated that an alternative basis for his conclusion that the moneys were held on trust flowed from the application of the principles associated with Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 (Quistclose) and Black v S Freedman (1910) 12 CLR 105; [1910] HCA 58 (Black v Freedman). As it happened, the funds held in the NAB account allowed for an almost complete reimbursement of funds to those who had invested in the “Brexit Special”.

29. Because there were sufficient funds in the NAB account to reimburse all “Brexit Special” Investors, there was no contest between those investors who had invested in the “Brexit Special” financial product before 21 April 2017, and on or after this date, being the date on which the freezing orders were made. Accordingly, there was no need for his Honour to consider whether or not different principles applied to those who had made their investment before or after the freezing orders.

30. Similarly, there was no need for his Honour to grapple with what I have described as the insolvency conundrum introduced at [9]-[19] above. Notwithstanding this, his Honour did observe at [34] that:

“Generally, the Court’s power (under Corporations Act, s 601EE(2)), to make any orders it considers appropriate for the winding up of an unregistered managed investment scheme does not authorise a distribution of surplus assets other than to those entitled to the assets in proportion to their entitlements, although that general principle yields in cases where it is not pragmatic to ascertain the proprietary rights. As Black J observed in MF Global, ‘the case law has recognised that, where there are relatively clear property interests in particular property, this cannot "be altered by reference to some notion of common misfortune", and that “accounts should only be pooled … if mixing or another proper basis for pooling is established”’.” (footnotes omitted).

31. In addition to the funds held in the NAB account which were the subject of Brereton J’s orders, the balance of CH’s funds (approximately $21 million) were, as I have noted at [25] above, held in a Westpac account. The contest in the present case concerns those funds and whilst the contest is, in one sense, quite narrow in its compass, it nevertheless raises important and difficult questions of principle.

32. The contest, as presented to the Court, is between, on the one hand, some 505 investors whose net claims sum $57,358,634 (“net” because the Liquidators subtracted from outstanding capital investments “returns” on investment, which some investors falling within this class had received from the operators of the Ponzi scheme) and, on the other hand, some nine investors who were characterised in the Liquidators’ 2nd Report to the Court as the “Category E” and “Category F” investors.

33. The Category E and Category F investors were, respectively, defined by the Liquidators as investors who deposited their funds in the Westpac account:

(a)   after the freezing order came into force but on the same day as the withdrawal of $60,000 from the Westpac account (namely, 21 April 2017);

(b)   after the withdrawal of $60,000 and whose funds could be specifically identified by the Liquidators.

34. The Category E and Category F investors were also somewhat confusingly described in the Liquidators’ 2nd Report as the Post-21 April 2017 Investors. I use the phrase “somewhat confusingly” by reason of the fact that the Category E Investors had in fact all made their investments on 21 April 2017.

35. The Category E and Category F Investors are now, in effect, the Appellants in these proceedings, and it is convenient to refer to them collectively as “the Appellants” or, where necessary for context, the Post-21 April 2017 Investors, in the balance of these reasons.

36. Certain details in relation to the Post-21 April investments are set out in the following table:

Date	Transaction	Debit	Credit
21-Apr-17	RTGS High Value Payment Ref No 0393056 John Alexandra Ellison	100,000.00
21-Apr-17	Deposit De Ruvo Mwood Brexit P2	25,000.00
21-Apr-17	Deposit Peter Caron Caron Seidlitz	100,000.00
21-Apr-17	Deposit 0210417	250,000.00
21-Apr-17	Withdrawal Online 1436061 Pymt Courtenay C	60,000.00
24-Apr-17	Deposit Anglia Super AngliaFBG Super Top	50,000.00
24-Apr-17	Deposit 1234501	50,000.00
26-Apr-17	RTGS High Value Payment Ref No 0405224 The Romich Supera Credit Beneficiary Accou	50,000.00
26-Apr-17	RTGS High Value Payment Ref No 0410674 Stark Investing Stark Investing Strategy	100,000.00
26-Apr-17	Deposit CBA Pesce SMSF	50,000.00

37. It will be seen from the above table, in terms of account activity, apart from four deposits on 21 April 2017 amounting to $475,000, there was also a withdrawal of $60,000 on that day which represented a transfer from the Westpac account into another CH account with Westpac. No funds remain in the account to which that amount was transferred and the argument proceeded on the basis that that amount was irrecoverable.

38. With the exception of one of the two $100,000 deposits made on 21 April 2017 which, according to their 2nd Report, the Liquidators noted was processed on that day prior to the making of the freezing order, it is not known one way or the other which of the other deposits shown to have been made on that day were received into the Westpac account prior to the making of the freezing orders at 3.11pm on 21 April 2017. It is also not known whether or not the transfer of $60,000 from the Westpac account occurred prior to or after the freezing order and, if after, whether it was within the conventional carve out for freezing orders which permits certain expenses to be incurred.

39. By way of contrast to the account activity on and from 21 April 2017, the Liquidators noted in their 1st Report that, in the month prior to the freezing order, “there were 22 withdrawals and 42 deposits creating a significant mingling issue”. In the Liquidators’ 2nd Report, it was also noted that CH’s books and records were “not reliable”.

40. In the Liquidators’ 2nd Report, four possible approaches were identified as to how the Category E investors should be treated. They can be summarised as follows:

1. first money in/last money out approach, in which the $60,000 withdrawal would be allocated to pre-21 April 2017 investors as the balance of this account at 20 April 2017 was $20,298,677;

2. a last money in/first money out approach with the $60,000 withdrawal allocated across the four deposits totalling $475,000 made on 21 April 2017 thus leaving a net balance of $415,000 to be shared across the four investors at a dividend rate of 87.37 cents in the dollar before costs.

1. alternatively to (b), allocating the $60,000 withdrawal pro rata across all investor deposits in the Westpac account as at 21 April 2017 (balance prior to the $60,000 withdrawal of $20,773,677), translating to a dividend rate of 99.71 cents in the dollar before costs for the four Category E investors;

2. participating in the same way as the pre 21 April 2017 investors, i.e. pro rata.

The Report noted that the second of these approaches “seems equitable”, but recorded an intention to seek the Court’s direction as to which approach was correct as a matter of law.

41. With regard to the deposits made into the Westpac account on 24 and 26 April 2017 by the Category F investors, apart from some de minimis deductions from the Westpac account on account of bank fees, the account was not depleted by any further withdrawals by CH (although it is not to be lost sight of that authorised expenditure by the Liquidators, including the payment of various legal costs, will have further diminished the quantum of funds available for either tracing by claimants or distribution by the Liquidators).

42. In the Liquidators’ 2nd Report, it was stated that since the $300,000 invested on 24 and 26 April 2017 “can be clearly identified, it seems equitable that these funds should be returned to these investors less their pro rata share of the costs and expenses of the liquidation process”. The Report noted that it was intended to seek the Court’s direction as to whether this approach should be taken.

The proceedings at first instance

43. At first instance, the primary judge had before him a number of interlocutory processes relating to the distribution of funds in the Westpac account.

44. The Liquidators sought the following relief pursuant to s 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) Sch 2 to the Corporations Act (IPS) and s 63 of the Trustee Act1925 (NSW):

“1.   (a)   A direction or order that the Liquidators are justified in distributing the funds deposited by the Westpac Investors to the Westpac Investors only, and not to other creditors of the Companies, on the basis that the Westpac Investors are the beneficial owners of the funds deposited by the Westpac Investors into the Westpac Accounts.

(b)   A direction or order that the Liquidators are justified in determining the amounts to be distributed from the Westpac Accounts to the Westpac Investors on the basis that:

(i)   distributions will be made pro-rata on a pari passu basis; and

(ii)   the amounts for which each Westpac Investor will be entitled to participate on a pro-rata pari passu basis are to be determined by deducting from the amount paid in by that Investor any amount or amounts received by that Investor from the Companies.

2. Pursuant to section 90-15 of the IPS and section 63 of the Trustee Act, a direction as to how the amounts referred to in Categories E and F of the Liquidators' Second Report should be distributed or otherwise dealt with.”

45. The Category E and Category F or Post-21 April Investors sought the following relief:

“1.   A declaration that the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors are the beneficial owners of the funds deposited by them into the Westpac Accounts on or after 21 April 2017.

2.   An order that the $60,000 withdrawn from Westpac 2 on 21 April 2017 be deducted pro-rata across all investor deposits in Westpac 2 on 21 April 2017.

3.   Such further or other orders as the Court deems fit.”

46. The Liquidators did not play an active role on the question of the Post-21 April 2017 Investors’ contentions in the hearing before the primary judge, notwithstanding the views that they had expressed in their 2nd Report. Rather, this matter was debated between Mr Peter Caron (Mr Caron) and Ms Anke Seidlitz (Ms Seidlitz), representing the Post-21 April 2017 Investors and J P Melocco Pty Ltd (Melocco) representing the Pre-21 April 2017 non-Brexit Investors. Melocco contended for a pari passu distribution amongst all investors.

47. What divided the two groups of investors was whether the funds held in the Westpac account should be shared on a simple pro rata or pari passu basis, or whether the deposits made on or after 21 April 2017 should be treated differently by reason of the fact that those deposits could be separately identified. If so, subject to accounting for the withdrawal of $60,000 from the Westpac account, provision for “hotchpot” and expenses, the Post-21 April 2017 Investors contended that they were entitled to recover all of their investments because it was plain that, except to the extent of the Liquidators’ expenses and the $60,000 withdrawal, if and in the event that it took place after the deposits had been made, the deposited monies representing those investments had not been dissipated.

48. The primary judge held, in a finding not challenged on appeal, that the funds held in the relevant Westpac account were held on separate trusts for both the Pre- and Post-21 April 2017 Investors: In the matter of Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Limited (in liquidation) and Courtenay House Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2019] NSWSC 1113 at [47].

49. Unlike the position in Courtenay House, because of the variety of “products” that those investors invested in (or thought they were investing in) and differences in documentation in relation to those products and over time (see [22] above), the primary judge did not go through the exercise of ascertaining whether or not an express trust in favour of each investor arose on his, her or its investment being made. No criticism is intended of the primary judge in making that observation. It was unnecessary for his Honour to do so because of his Honour’s conclusion, consistent with the decision of Brereton J in Courtenay House, that both a Quistclose and Black v Freedman trust arose.

50. Self-evidently, the investors’ separate trust funds had been mixed or co-mingled in the Westpac account and it must be remembered that, in this context, “the analogy with a properly constituted and properly managed trust fund is far from exact. Changes in the 'state of investment' of the fund which is being traced may occur in a totally random way”: El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc (No 2) [1995] 2 All ER 213 at 221 per Robert Walker J (as his Lordship then was) (El Ajou (No 2)).

51. The primary judge (at [43]) summarised the argument made on behalf of the Post-21 April 2017 Investors as to why there should not be a pari passu distribution, as follows:

“…[it] would ignore their relatively clear property interests in particular property by reference to a notion of common misfortune, using the language adopted in Re MF Global Australia Ltd (in liq) above at [78]; because equity does not require that available funds be divided between all people who can establish a claim on a mixed bank account, and the Court is able to give a remedy founded on tracing some individual claims where evidence is available which enables that property to be more specifically traced, relying on Re French Caledonia Travel Service Pty Ltd (in liq) [2003] NSWSC 1008; (2003) 59 NSWLR 361 at [176], [189]; that it would be inequitable for Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors to be required to bear losses that were incurred over the seven years before they placed their monies on trust, relying on Re Magarey Farlam Lawyers Trust Accounts (No 3) [2007] SASC 9; (2007) 96 SASR 337 at [119]- [120]; and that the deposits of the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors have not become so intertwined with earlier investments that it is reasonable to regard each investor as having a rateably equal interest in the mixed fund; and a pari passu distribution would extend the effect of the Ponzi scheme to investors who invested after the Ponzi scheme had ceased to operate, by reason of the freezing orders.”

52. The learned primary judge, although accepting that these submissions had “real force”, concluded “with hesitation” that he was ultimately not able to accept them: at [45]. His Honour continued (at [45]):

“… The only significance of 21 April 2017 is that the Court made a freezing order on ASIC’s application on that date, and that does not seem to me to provide a principled basis for distinguishing the position of the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors from that of other Westpac Investors on the immediately preceding days. Other than for that matter, the position of the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors is little different from that of investors on 20 April 2017, or 19 April 2017, or possibly 21 March or 21 February or 21 January 2017. Where that difference is ultimately only a matter of degree, it does not seem to me to be sufficient to support a different treatment of those investors from the other Westpac Investors.”

53. In the result, the primary judge concluded (at [47]) that:

“…the Westpac Investors and the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors fall in the same class, and each has the benefit of a separate trust or trusts in respect of their monies, over the funds in the Westpac Accounts which are, regrettably, insufficient to meet their claims in full. The Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors would be treated the same way as the Westpac Investors in respect of a distribution and, as Ms Beechey fairly accepted, that distribution would need to be deferred in respect of them until it can be determined whether ‘hotchpot’ principles are applicable, where several of those investors were also investors at earlier times.”

54. On the hearing of the appeal, the Court was informed that a “hotchpot” hearing had been heard earlier this year, and that Rees J is currently reserved on that matter.

55. Without in any way pre-empting that decision, it suffices for present purposes to note that the doctrine of hotchpot requires “creditors to bring to account the value of their participation (or expected participation) in the other assets of the company”: Akers v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 223 FCR 8; [2014] FCAFC 57 at [135], referred to with approval in Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (2019) 368 ALR 390; [2019] HCA 20 at [163].

56. As Barrett J (as his Honour then was) noted in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Idylic Solutions Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1306; (2009) 76 ACSR 129 (Idylic Solutions):

“The hotchpot concept is a reflection of the maxim ‘equality is equity’ (with ‘equality’, in an appropriate case, understood as proportionate equality), supplemented by the maxim ‘he who seeks equity must do equity’. The equality (or proportionate equality) that equity in general will promote can only be struck after a person seeking the benefit of it has, as a preliminary, borne whatever burden equity demands be borne in order to ensure that the ultimate equality (or proportionate equality) is not distorted by the effects of unconscientious retention of separately received benefit”.

57. In the context of a mixed fund case, in Re Rowena Nominees Pty Ltd; Ex parte Conlan (2006) 199 FLR 415; [2006] WASC 69 at [71]-[72] (Rowena Nominees), Simmonds J observed that:

“This calculation involves bringing to account the amount for Receivable Money, by treating that amount as if it were a prior distribution from the Fund. This is so that a claimant does not receive an ‘unfair advantage’ by ‘retaining’ what the claimant ‘has already received’ and also ‘sharing equally’ with ‘unadvanced’ Claimants in ‘what remains for division’: Malbray J, Lewin on Trusts 17th ed London, Sweet & Maxwell 2000 at 721 (on the hotchpot principle).

The hotchpot principle also (Lewin on Trusts, at 721):

‘Secures that such a beneficiary shall account, as from the date fixed for distribution, for a sum in respect of interest on the amount which he has already received’.”

58. In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Letten (No 20) [2012] FCA 1283; (2012) 92 ACSR 630 at [73], Gordon J explained:

“The juridical foundation for the hotchpot principle is clear. It comprises the elements summarised at [70] above. Its rationale is simply stated — if Investor A received money from a mixed fund with the consequence that other peoples’ (Investors B–Z) property interests in that money were extinguished or diminished, it would be unconscionable for Investor A with knowledge of that fact to claim to rank equally with Investors B–Z in relation to the balance of the mixed fund while retaining all of the benefit of the payment from property over which Investors B–Z used to have, but no longer had, any proprietary claim.”

59. It may be noted that, as their 2nd Report recorded, the Liquidators had to a certain extent engaged in an equalising of the claims of the Pre-21 April 2017 Investors by (a) excluding those investors who had, through their investments with CH, recovered the entirety of their capital outlay and in fact earned sizeable dividends over the years (funded by subsequent investors); and (b) reducing the claims of other investors who, whilst not having recovered the full extent of their investment through past dividends (also funded by subsequent investors), had nevertheless recovered a substantial part of their investment. These investors’ claims were treated by the Liquidators as “net” claims to reflect these partial returns (see [32] above).

Notice of Appeal

60. By their Notice of Appeal, the Post 21 April 2017 Investors appeal from the decision of the primary judge and, in lieu of the orders made at first instance, seek a direction that the Liquidators:

“…subject to application of principles of hotchpot, …are justified in determining the amounts to be distributed to the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors on the basis that:

(a)   the $60,000 withdrawn from Westpac 2 on 21 April 2017 be deducted pro-rata across all investors with claims in respect of deposits made on or before 21 April 2017;

(b)   the Category E investors are entitled to the amount of the relevant investment, less

(i)   a pro-rata share of the $60,000 deduction; and

(ii)   costs in accordance with the general law and the orders of the court below;

(c)   the Category F investors are entitled to the amount of the relevant investment, less costs in accordance with the general law and the orders of the court below.”

61. Representative orders were made by Basten JA on 2 December 2019 appointing the Appellants, Mr Caron and Ms Seidlitz, as representatives of the Post-21 April 2017 Investors, and Melocco (the Respondent) as representative of the Pre-21 April 2017 Investors: see Caron v Said Jahani and John McInerney as joint and several liquidators of Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd (In liq) and Courtenay House Pty Ltd (In liq) [2019] NSWCA 293.

62. Similar submissions to those that had been made at first instance were ably advanced on behalf of the Appellants by Ms Beechey. Her argument drew on a number of authorities, although she was constrained to accept that no authority on which she relied was precisely on point. Mr Izzo SC, who appeared for the Respondent, sought to defend the decision of the primary judge and contended for application of the simple pari passu method.

The conundrum considered

Some preliminary points

63. Before turning to the authorities and the parties’ arguments, some basic propositions should be stated in relation to the existence, nature and extent of interests held by CH, the Liquidators and the investors in the Westpac account.

64. First and fundamentally, none of CH, the Liquidators, still less the investor depositors, had any legal interest in any funds deposited in the Westpac account. The nature of CH’s and then the Liquidators’ interest in that account was a single chose in action against Westpac: see Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 573-574; Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102 at 110, 126 and 127; [2000] UKHL 29 (Foskett). The bank’s liability to CH and then the Liquidators was as to a single and undivided debt, without regard to the several items which, as a matter of history, contributed to the balance: see D Fox, Property Rights in Money (2008, Oxford University Press) at 1.43, citing Buckley J in In re Footman Bower & Co Ltd [1961] Ch 443 at 450. When various amounts are paid into an account, they form “one blended fund, the parts of which have no longer any distinct existence”: Clayton’s Case at 793, per Sir William Grant.

65. The Liquidators, now having transferred the funds from the Westpac account to an account in their own name with their own bank, have a similar chose in action against their own bank. CH, before the liquidation, also held a chose in action against Westpac in respect of the funds from time to time in the Westpac account, providing it was in credit. It did not hold this chose in action on behalf of any one investor, nor was it divisible.

66. As a result of the finding that CH was a trustee in respect of funds deposited by investors, CH owed equitable obligations as trustee to each investor and, the deposited funds having been mixed with the funds of other investors to whom similar obligations were owed, these obligations, as with those owed to other investors, are treated by equity as being secured by a charge over the blended fund (or more accurately, the chose in action against the bank) to the extent of the trust money. So much was made plain by Sir George Jessel MR in In Re Hallett’s Estate; Knatchbull v Hallett (1880) 13 ChD 696 at 709, 711 and 717 (Re Hallett); see also Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398 at 420-422, 441–442 and 459–460 (Sinclair v Brougham) and Sutherland Re; French Caledonia Travel Service Pty Ltd (in liq) (2003) 59 NSWLR 361; [2003] NSWSC 1008 at [153] (French Caledonia).

67. In Re Hallett, the Master of the Rolls referred to the “… the rule of Equity which gave you a charge – that if you lent £1000 of your own and £1000 trust money on a bond for £2000, or on a mortgage for £2000, or on a promissory note for £2000, Equity could follow it, and create a charge”: at 717. Earlier, the Master of the Rolls said “I do not like to call it a charge … but that is the effect of it”: at 711.

68. Professor Scott used the language of a charge but also spoke of an “equitable lien … on the whole mass for the amount contributed by him”: Scott at 125. Gordon J, in Sonray at [83], citing L Gullifer (ed), Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security (4th ed, 2008, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters) [6-11] to [6-14] (see also at [6.09]), used the description “equitable tenants in common” of the mixed fund as a whole, including its traceable proceeds, to describe the rights of contributors to a deficient mixed fund.

69. All three labels – charge, equitable lien and equitable tenancy in common – recognise a form of equitable proprietary right able to be asserted against the mixed or blended fund, giving disappointed investors precedence over the insolvent company’s general creditors. In Stephenson Nominees Pty Ltd v Official Receiver; Ex parte Roberts (1987) 76 ALR 485 at 504, Gummow J observed that the security given by an equitable lien or charge affords a proprietary remedy. As Millett J (as his Lordship then was) once observed in this context, “[t]he charge itself is entirely notional” (see El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] 3 All ER 717 at 737).

70. The first of the passages cited in [67] above from Re Hallett was quoted by Dixon CJ and Fullagar J in Brady v Stapleton(1952) 88 CLR 322 at 337; [1952] HCA 62. At 337-338, their Honours applied the reasoning in Re Hallett to a mixed fund, saying:

“… it would be a great mistake to suppose that the great case of Re Hallett's Estate (1879) 13 Ch D 696 lays down a doctrine peculiar to money. On the contrary, it extends to money paid into a bank account, and so losing its identity as money, a doctrine which equity would never have had the slightest hesitation in applying to money physically existing or to any other kind of personal property to which it could, as a matter of practical possibility, be applied.”

71. The characterisation of an innocent investor having a charge over an “indistinguishable mass” or mixed or blended fund to the extent of the contribution has taken root in the case law: see, for example, the cases collected by Austin J in ASIC v Tasman Investment Management [2006] NSWSC 943 at [55]; (2006) 59 ACSR 113 (Tasman Investment Management). An investor’s interest in a mixed fund under the lowest intermediate balance approach associated with Re Walter J Schmidt has been characterised as a “rolling charge” (see Barlow Clowes at 35), a description apt to capture the fact that the charge is one over a dynamic phenomenon, the value of which varies with movement on a bank account.

71. In L D Smith, The Law of Tracing (1997, Oxford University Press) (Tracing) at 80, described extra-judicially by Edelman J as a “masterly monograph” (see J Edelman, “Understanding Tracing Rules” (2016) 16 QUT Law Review 1 at 8), Professor Lionel Smith, explaining the rights of innocent contributors to a mixed fund as against a wrongdoer, posited a slightly different characterisation of Equity’s response:

“The effect is something like an equitable charge, which floats over the mixture in favour of innocent contributors.  In fact it is not a charge; it is not a proprietary interest, even though it may allow proprietary rights in a contribution to be asserted in a division of the mixture.  Rather, it is a rule for resolving an evidential impossibility, as to whose contribution is where.  It is a relationship among the contributors, existing both at common law and in equity, under which the wrongdoer’s ability to follow out of the mixture is subordinated to those of the other contributors.” (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).

73. The value of each investor’s charge will be represented by the amount of his, her or its deposit. Applying the language of charge to the facts of the present case, in one sense, it is correct to say that each investor had a charge over CH’s chose in action against Westpac (which now hovers over the funds held by the Liquidators in their bank account). But what if CH’s bank account containing mixed funds was temporarily overdrawn? Was the charge of those investors who had invested prior to this time lost, with all of the blended “trust” funds dissipated? Or does the charge remain, and its value increase as further funds are deposited from other innocent investors (or indeed from the wrongdoer)? Those new investors will also have the benefit of a charge but, on the second hypothesis, the value of their charge would be instantly diminished if the bank account, now in credit, was the only source of funds from which both the earlier and the later investors could recover their investments.

74. As is plain, the charges held by all investors over the single chose in action represented by CH’s bank account were inadequate security, as the blended fund had been depleted by withdrawals, presumably to pay out earlier investors, given the Ponzi scheme that was being conducted by CH. The investors’ interests will have been further depleted by the authorised expenditure of funds by the Liquidators, including in relation to the conduct of this litigation.

75. The critical questions then become how are the limited funds to be distributed between investors, and was there a principled basis in the present case to differentiate the Appellants from the balance of the investors represented by the Respondent. The answer to these questions involves the tackling of the conundrum introduced at [9]-[19] above.

76. Before embarking on that exercise, one can put aside the situation where the evidence allows a court to conclude that a withdrawal or withdrawals from a mixed or blended fund was or were intended to be to the account of one particular beneficiary: see, for example, Re Magarey Farlam Lawyers Trust Accounts (No 3) (2007) 96 SASR 337; [2007] SASC 9 at [108]-[116] (Magarey); Re Global Finance Group Pty Ltd (in liq); Ex Parte Read (2002) 26 WAR 385; [2002] WASC 63 at [194] (Global Finance). As the New Zealand Court of Appeal observed in Re Registered Securities Ltd[1991] 1 NZLR 545 at 553 (Registered Securities), “[i]n such a case there is no apparent equity in that beneficiary entitling him to impose part of the loss on the other”. On the other hand, where purported records exist but bear no relationship to the true position, they will likely be disregarded: see, for example, Australian Securities Commission v Melbourne Asset Management Nominees Pty Ltd (rec and mgr apptd) (1994) 49 FCR 334 at 360; (1994) 121 ALR 626 (Melbourne Asset Management); Georges v Seaborn International Pty Ltd (2012) 206 FCR 408; [2012] FCAFC 140 at [70].

77. With that situation put to one side, attention can be turned to the three alternative approaches to the conundrum as to how to distribute limited funds of investors in a mixed, blended or co-mingled account.

Clayton’s Case

78. The rule in Clayton’s Case applies to the debtor/creditor relationship between a banker and its customer. It was initially supposed that the rule in Clayton’s Case applied to a circumstance where a fiduciary or trustee paid money of two or more trusts into a bank account and where they became mixed: see D A McConville, “Tracing and the Rule in Clayton’s Case” (1963) 79 LQR 388. Examples of this can be seen in In re Stenning; Wood v Stenning [1895] 2 Ch 433 and Hancock v Smith (1889) 41 ChD 456.

79. The rule in Clayton’s Case was famously not applied, however, in Re Hallett, a case where there was one trustee and one beneficiary and the funds held on behalf of the beneficiary were mixed with those of the trustee/solicitor. The principal significance of the decision in Re Hallett lies in the subordination of the interests of a wrongdoer in a case where the wrongdoer has mixed his or her own funds with those of an innocent contributor. It was not concerned with a case where there was a blending in a mixed fund of the funds of multiple innocent contributors.

80. Situations where the blended fund contains the funds of a wrongdoer and innocent contributor aside, in England, the rule in Clayton’s Case remains the starting point, albeit a readily displaced one, for resolving the conundrum as to the distribution of an inadequate mixed fund between innocent contributors: see, for example, Barlow Clowes at 33, 42 and 44; Russell-Cooke at [55].

81. Clayton’s Case has not been applied in Australia, New Zealand, Singapore or Canada to a circumstance where the funds of innocent contributors have been mixed or blended in a bank account and there is a shortfall in funds available for recovery: see, for example, Hagan v Waterhouse(No 2) (1991) 34 NSWLR 308 (Waterhouse); French Caledonia at [160] and the cases there cited and [169]; Registered Securities at 553; Pars Ram; Re Ontario Securities Commission and Greymac Credit Corporation (1986) 55 O.R. (2d) 673; (1986) 30 DLR (4th) 1 (Greymac).

82. In Waterhouse at 358, Kearney J endorsed the “emphatic pronouncement” in R P Meagher and W M C Gummow, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (5th ed, 1986, Butterworths) at 695 that “Clayton’s Caseregulates the state of account between banker and customer, and has nothing to say as to the relationship of trustee and beneficiary”. In Australian Securities Commission v Buckley (1996) 7 BPR 15,024 at 15,037 (Buckley), Santow J (as his Honour then was) said that this observation “begs the question as to the effect of the application of the relevant rules in a competition between two groups of beneficiaries for a single fund, whether in a bank account or otherwise”. In the current edition, J D Heydon and M J Leeming, Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (8th ed, 2018, LexisNexis Butterworths) at [27-11] (Jacobs), the position is clarified by the statement that “the rule in Clayton’s Case is inapplicable as between beneficiaries”.

83. A powerful explanation for the inapplicability of the rule in Clayton’s Case to a circumstance such as confronts the Court in the present case was proffered by Learned Hand J in Re Walter J Schmidt (at 316):

“The rule in Clayton’s Case is to allocate the payments upon an account.  Some rule had to be adopted, and though any presumption of intent was a fiction, priority in time was the most natural basis of allocation.  It has no relevancy whatever to a case like this.  Here two people are jointly interested in a fund held for them by a common trustee.  There is no reason in law or justice why his depredations upon the fund should not be borne equally between them.   To throw all the loss upon one, through the mere chance of his being earlier in time, is irrational and arbitrary, and is equally a fiction as the rule in Clayton's Case, supra.  When the law adopts a fiction, it is, or at least it should be, for some purpose of justice.  To adopt it here is to apportion a common misfortune through a test which has no relation whatever to the justice of the case.”

See also Scott at 130.

84. In making reference in the above passage to the equal bearing by beneficiaries of the depredations of the fund, one sees a manifestation of the pari passu approach to which attention is now turned although, as shall also be seen, Learned Hand J considered that the concept of bearing loss equally needed qualification by reference to the need to accommodate the “lowest intermediate balance” of the fund at any one time: see further at [106]-[129] below. As noted at [11] above and as will be explained further below, application of the lowest intermediate balance rule or method is, properly understood, in fact more of a refinement of, rather than a true alternative to, the pari passu rule or method.

Pari passu distribution

85. A very different approach to Clayton’s Case was taken by Astbury J in In re British Red Cross Balkan Fund; British Red Cross Society v Johnson [1914] 2 Ch 419 (British Red Cross). Justice Astbury’s judgment is a short but important one and bears reproduction in its entirety:

“The rule in Clayton’s Case 1 Mer. 572, 608 as restated by Lord Halsbury L.C. in The Mecca [1897] A.C. 286, 290 is that ‘where an account current is kept between parties as a banking account, “there is no room for any other appropriation than that which arises from the order in which the receipts and payments take place and are carried into the account. Presumably, it is the sum first paid in that is first drawn out. It is the first item on the debit side of the account that is discharged or reduced by the first item on the credit side; the appropriation is made by the very act of setting the two items against each other”.’

It is a mere rule of evidence and not an invariable rule of law, and the circumstances of any particular case may or may not afford ground for inferring that the transactions of the parties were not intended to come under the general rule.

In the present case the rule is obviously inapplicable. At the outbreak of the Balkan war a public appeal was made for subscriptions for a special fund for assisting the sick and wounded. Subscriptions were obtained and duly applied, and at the close of the war there was an unexpended balance of 12,655l. 19s. 6d. That balance belongs to all the subscribers rateably in proportion to their subscriptions, and subscribers who wish their money returned and are unwilling to leave it for the general purposes of the society are entitled to such proportion of their subscriptions as the total amount unexpended bears to the total amount subscribed.”

86. This case, though a decision at first instance, has been cited on many occasions both in Australia and England, although Dillon LJ observed in Barlow Clowes (at 29) that the resulting trust reasoning upon which it appears to be predicated was misconceived because the objects of the trust were charitable, with the consequence that the surplus funds should have been treated cy-près. British Red Cross is also cited with apparent approval in the current edition of Jacobs at [27-11], as it had been in the first edition: K S Jacobs, The Law of Trusts in New South Wales (1958, Butterworths) at 159.

87. On its face, the decision in British Red Cross, which was not cited to the primary judge nor, for that matter, on appeal, supports the primary judge’s conclusion in the present case and stands in the way of the Appellants’ argument. At least at a superficial level, it appears to be an example of the application of the maxim “equality is equity”. The learned authors, J D Heydon, M J Leeming and P G Turner, of Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines & Remedies (5th ed, 2015, LexisNexis Butterworths) at [3-130] identify the best summary of the purpose of this maxim as that given by P H Pettit in Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed, 1992 reissue, Butterworths):

“The maxim that equality is equity expresses in a general way the object both of law and equity, namely to effect a distribution of property and losses proportionate to the several claims or to the several liabilities of the persons concerned.  Equality in this connection does not necessarily mean literal equality, but may mean proportionate equality.   This doctrine of equality, however, operated more effectually in a court of equity than a court of law, and is exemplified in many departments of equity jurisdiction.”

88. The pari passu approach to the distribution of a fund as between investors or contributors makes perfect sense in circumstances where all deposits were received at one time or, if not at one time, then before any material withdrawals from the fund were made, and where no subsequent deposits were made after those material withdrawals. As Debelle J observed in Magarey (at [120]):

“[t]here is a marked difference between this case which involves dealings in a trust account over a long period of time and those cases where a number of investors contribute to a trust fund in a relatively short period of time, where a pro rata distribution may be a suitable means of distribution, especially in the absence of records”.

89. The pari passu approach may also be, and certainly has been, treated as appropriate where the nature of the investment involves investors knowing that their funds will be pooled with those of other investors for investment purposes. An example of this may be seen in the decision of Herring CJ in Inre Australian Home Finance Pty Ltd [1956] VLR 1 at 11, where the Chief Justice noted:

“Insofar as such moneys'' [i.e. the contributions by the progressive purchasers] “are not now forthcoming by reason of the company having expended them for its own purposes, it is the whole body of progressive purchasers who should bear the loss, and not the individual whose particular contribution has been so expended by the company. So far as he is concerned, he has paid his money over to the company in exactly the same way as all the other progressive purchasers have done. It is entirely fortuitous, so far as he is concerned, that it should have been his contribution and not that of someone else that the company has made use of for its own purposes. To throw all the loss upon him would in the circumstances work a grave injustice. A reliable [scil. rateable] division on the other hand will spread the loss evenly amongst all the progressive purchasers.”

90. This decision was applied by Dunn J in Windsor Mortgage Nominees Pty Ltd v Cardwell (1979) ACLC 32,195 at 32,199 (Windsor Mortgage). Windsor Mortgage was in turn applied by Northrop J in Melbourne Asset Management at 353.

91. In Idylic Solutions, Barrett J was dealing with a case involving a contest over the limited funds of two unregistered managed investment schemes, and an application for directions that the liquidator would be justified in taking certain steps in relation to the distribution of funds. At [47], his Honour said:

“Once it is accepted that, by investing in one of the schemes, an investor obtained – and must be taken to have intended to obtain - an interest in a pooled fund made up of the totality of contributions together with accretions arising from deployment of the funds, the prima facie position must be that the proceeds of realisation by the liquidator should be allocated pro rata to the contributions of the several investors, so that losses are likewise borne pro rata.” (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).

92. Apart from the caveat implicit in his Honour’s use of the phrase “prima facie”, Barrett J placed a further important qualification on his endorsement of the pro rata approach, insisting that the investors bring into hotchpot the returns paid to them from the fund: see at [50] and [78] (and see [54]-[58] above).

93. In the course of his analysis in Idylic Solutions, Barrett J put considerable weight on the nature of a common or collective investment pool, observing (at [74]) that:

“[o]nce a contribution is made to the fund, the contribution ceases to have any identity linked to its contributor. The contributor’s rights become proportionate rights in relation to the fund as it exists from time to time, as distinct from rights in respect of specifically traceable assets within it…”. (emphasis added).

This explanation, on one reading, appears to treat the charge over the fund as surviving depletions to it and, controversially, as even surviving a negative balance in the fund. Where a fund has been depleted or even temporarily put into deficit, to allow such earlier depositors to share the final limited fund rateably with later investors is to cause those later investors to subsidise earlier investors. It may also not, with respect, explain how a right to trace in equity is lost, at least where the funds are treated, as those in the present case were, as subject to a trust. On the other hand, Barrett J’s analysis needs to be understood in light of his conclusion (at [75]), in the context of the facts of the case before him, that “one cannot, in effect, view the common pool as a succession of separate “estates”, in the Cleaver sense, each subsisting only until the receipt of some new contribution or the making of some new disbursement causes it to be replaced by another “estate” and with each separate “estate”, at a particular point, subjected to a form of independent pari passu entitlement analysis without paying attention to the history of the fund as a whole”. What his Honour said about “the history of the fund as a whole” aligns with the caution at overgeneralisation which is implicit in the Chief Justice’s separate reasons at [2]-[6] above.

94. Similar reasoning to the pooled investment approach was applied by Williams J in International Investment Unit Trust at [74]-[76] and [81]. Williams J favoured the pari passu approach but with a significant qualification insofar as his Honour also recognised the proprietary claims of three investors who could show their funds had not been disbursed to other investors or otherwise withdrawn: see at [22]. These three investors had deposited their funds on 27 June 2003, some six days prior to the appointment of statutory managers under the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Order (No 2) 2003 (NZ).

95. In Tasman Investment Management at [55], Austin J observed that:

“[w]here the sum of the balance of the bank account and the realisable amount of any charged asset or assets is less than the total amount of the beneficiaries' charges, the charges usually abate proportionately, with the consequence that the beneficiaries share pro rata in the balance of the account and the proceeds of realisation of the assets.”

96. Similar approaches may be seen in Barlow Clowes; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Nelson [2003] NSWSC 129; (2003) 44 ACSR 719; Westpac Banking Corporation v Earthwise International Limited [2005] NSWSC 1037 at [10]; Rowena Nominees; Hannan v Zindilis (2016) 51 VR 178; [2016] VSC 723; Russell-Cooke at [46] and [58]. In Barlow Clowes at 41, Woolf LJ was prepared to attribute to investors an intention to pool their funds by reference to their common misfortune even if, when making their investments, they had not contemplated or intended such a pooling.

97. A similar simple pari passu approach was applied by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Law Society of Upper Canada v Toronto Dominion Bank (1998) 169 DLR (4th) 353; (1998) 42 OR (3d) 257 (Toronto Dominion). The Toronto Dominion Court described the “pari passu ex post facto” approach as one according to which remaining but insufficient funds in a blended account should be shared amongst depositors in proportion to their contributions, without regard to any intervening state of the mixed fund, an approach similar to that adopted in British Red Cross. Delivering the judgment of the Court, Blair J described this approach as the most “convenien[t]” and “workab(le)”: Toronto Dominion at [37].

120. The corollary of the lowest intermediate balance rule is that relatively clear property interests are not to be altered by reference to some notion of common misfortune: see MF Global at [78]; Re BBY at [83(6)]. Although both of these cases were principally concerned with pooling in the sense described at [27] above, the reasoning is analogous to a case such as the present.

121. There is some tension between statements made in Australian authorities such as French Caledonia, MF Global and Re BBY, on the one hand, and at least the judgment of Woolf LJ (as his Lordship then was) in Barlow Clowes. In this context, Woolf LJ dealt with an argument that bears a very close affinity to that made by the Appellants in the present case, stating (at 41-42):

“There remains an argument of Mr Hart with which I should deal. Mr Hart emphasised the theoretical position of an investor who advanced a sum of money just prior to the account of BCI being frozen. In that situation he contended, correctly, that in the normal way an investor must be able to trace the whole of his investment into the balance of the account, unless the investor intends his investment to be treated in the way that funds invested in a unit trust are treated (which he argues is not the position here). Mr Hart submitted that it followed that the investor must be entitled to the whole of the sum in the account which can be identified if, since the investment, there has been no movement in the account. However, as Mr Hart accepts, there is in this case no investor who is precisely in that position. If there was, I accept that the investor's situation would require special consideration. Mr Hart also submits that the position must be, proportionately, the same where the sums drawn out of the account after the last payment in of the moneys of the last of the investors are less than the sum deposited by the investor. Mr Hart contends that at least the difference between the balance of the sum invested after deducting the sum withdrawn must be recoverable in full. I do not agree. The balance of the investment has by then become part of the pool and has to be treated (as it would have been by BCI) in the same way as the other funds within the pool. When this happened, there is no reason why the principle of equality is equity should not be applied. In order to obtain preference over the ordinary creditors, the investor has to rely on equity to trace his moneys into the account. Where the circumstances, convenience and justice so dictate, once the moneys are in the pool equity can require them to be treated as being subject to the other investors' equitable claims on the fund. There is nothing wrong in principle in treating the quantum of the latest investor's claim as either being reduced pro rata by the earlier investors' claims or enhanced by the value of other assets, purchased earlier from the moneys in the pool, into which it is possible to trace.”

126. This analysis would appear to deny the availability of tracing because of a deemed intention to pool. As Campbell J pointed out in French Caledonia (see at [117] above), the equities will not necessarily be equal at all unless one views the matter with hindsight as to the common misfortune of all investors, as Woolf LJ appears to do,

127. The example with which Woolf LJ dealt in the passage from Barlow Clowes extracted at [125] above was not considered by either Dillon or Leggatt LJJ in that case, and both delivered separate judgments in which they did not express any agreement with Woolf LJ.

128. In the conclusion to his judgment in Barlow Clowes, Woolf LJ articulated a flexible approach to what I have described at the outset of these reasons as a classic insolvency conundrum, stating (at 42) that:

“…the approach which should be adopted by the court depends on which of the possible alternative solutions is the most satisfactory in the circumstances. If the North American solution is practical this would probably have advantages over the pari passu solution”.

His Lordship went on, however, to qualify that statement with the observation that:

“…any solution depends on the ability to trace and if the fund had been exhausted (ie the account became overdrawn) the investors whose moneys were in the fund prior to the fund being exhausted will not be able to claim against moneys which were subsequently paid into the fund.”

129. Leggatt LJ preferred the lowest intermediate balance rule over the simple pari passu approach, with the latter to be applied only in circumstances such as obtained in that case, namely where calculation by reference to the lowest intermediate balance rule proved to be “too difficult or expensive”: at 44.

Principle and pragmatism

130. In Registered Securities, the Court of Appeal recognised the logic of the lowest intermediate balance rule when it observed (at 554):

“The tracing of money in equity is affected by a charge on a particular asset or fund to which it can be shown that the plaintiff's property has contributed. We think that the payment of investors' moneys into the overdrawn account of RSL put an end to the possibility of tracing such moneys. That is because as a matter of logic it seems evident that where a claimant's money is paid into an overdrawn account there is no fund or property to which resort can be had. Nor does the position seem different when the account is further overdrawn and the additional sum is expended on some identifiable property. In such a case it is not possible to show that the claimant's money contributed to the new purchase.”

131. On the other hand, the New Zealand Court of Appeal went on to point out (at 555) that:

“The second point is one of a pragmatic nature. There will be cases where an attempt to trace will involve enormous effort and where, on the material known to exist, is not likely to produce a reliable result. … In them the Court must give such directions as will do substantial justice between the parties. That will commonly mean that the fund will be distributed in proportion to the amounts contributed by the claimants on it.”

This was described as a matter of pragmatism, and the reconciliation of principle and pragmatism was reflected in the orders of the Court (at 559), with order 1 providing as follows:

“Subject to:

(a)   transactions already completed or to matters already settled by the consent of the parties;

(b)   any application or proceeding which may be made or brought by any individual investor with a view to tracing his own money into any particular asset;

(c)    the answers to issues three, four, five and six; and

(d)   the payment of all proper costs, charges and expenses,

the said mortgages and the funds recovered by the liquidators representing interest or principal and all other moneys held by the liquidators are distributable to the investors pari passu in accordance with the amounts paid by them to RSL and not repaid as at 27 July 1988.”

132. This order closely mirrored that which had been made by the House of Lords in Sinclair v Brougham at 460. The decision of the Court of Appeal in Barlow Clowes may be similarly viewed as a pragmatic response in a case where a more principled approach, based on the lowest intermediate balance rule, was not practically available.

133. The effect of the decision in Registered Securities was pithily summarised by McGechan J in McKenzie v Alexander Associates Ltd (No 2) (1991) 5 NZCLC 67,046 at 67,065 as follows: “where there can be tracing, there shall be tracing. Where there cannot, the ‘nearest approach practicable to substantial justice’ shall be taken.” This translates, in my view, to adoption of the lowest intermediate balance rule which is, as was pointed out in Greymac at 689, “pro rata sharing on the basis of tracing” (see [109] above), with application of the simple pari passu approach to be undertaken if application of the lowest intermediate balance rule is not feasible or possible. As Brereton J has observed, in this context, the language “not possible” or “impossible” does not mean impossible in any absolute sense, but rather not economically or reasonably practical: Re BBY at [57].

134. The continued ability of particular investors to seek to trace into a mixed or co-mingled fund was also at the heart of Santow J’s reasoning in Buckley. His Honour said (at 15,038) that:

“Otherwise they would be denied justice and equity, based on well settled principles of tracing, under the guise of doing equity and justice to the other investors, when there was no principled and fair basis for doing so as between the two groups.”

135. As Lord Millett said in Foskett (at 127):

“Property rights are determined by fixed rules and settled principles. They are not discretionary. They do not depend upon ideas of what is ‘fair, just and reasonable’. Such concepts, which in reality mask decisions of legal policy, have no place in the law of property.”

Enterprise Solutions

136. A case bearing a very close affinity to the facts of the present case is the decision of Chesterman J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Enterprise Solutions 2000 Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 82 (Enterprise Solutions). In this case, ASIC had sought orders pursuant to ss 1114 and 1324 of the Corporations Act restraining Enterprise Solutions from carrying on an investment advice business within the meaning of s 77 of the Corporations Act, and for consequential orders for repayment of monies obtained in consequence of their having acted as investment advisors.

137. Enterprise Solutions had attracted investments from the public to participate in what Chesterman J described as “elaborate schemes”, which were designed to generate substantial profits from betting on racehorses in Australia and Hong Kong: at [1]. The money, however, was used for different purposes. The schemes had been held, in a prior hearing, to be unlicensed “managed investment schemes”: at [1].

138. Receivers had been appointed to take possession of all of the assets of the schemes, with the exception of some monies that were said to be held by residents of Vanuatu. The actual application before Chesterman J was in relation to orders sought by the receivers to distribute the proceeds of the receivership. The receivers wished to pay the proceeds to those members of the public who had invested in the schemes, but they required an order for this purpose. The order that was sought was that they pay the net proceeds of the receivership rateably to those investors in the schemes who had been identified and whose proofs of debt had been admitted. As is typical in such cases, the proceeds which had been recovered by the receivers were significantly less than the amounts that had been invested by members of the public who had participated in the schemes.

139. The investors had been advised of the proposal to distribute the fund rateably and, with one exception, there was no opposition to the proposal. Chesterman J observed (at [13]) that:

“The moneys deposited by investors were mixed in three bank accounts and the mixed pooled fund was used for various purposes such as paying management fees to the respondents, placing bets, distributing winnings to investors and maintaining credit balances with bookmakers with whom bets were laid. The poor state of the records has made it impossible to trace individual investors’ moneys. Any attempt to do so would involve considerable time and expense. It is unlikely that the result would be reliable.”

140. Chesterman J also said (at [14]) that:

“The purposes for which the investors paid money to the respondents cannot be achieved. The solicitation of their money was unlawful and the operation of the schemes has been brought to an end. Less than 10% of the moneys paid have been recovered. Whatever were the terms on which the respondents held moneys paid by investors in the present circumstances the receivers hold the recovered moneys on resulting trusts for the investors. The trust fund being inadequate for reimbursement in full and there being no means of identifying any particular fund as being the moneys of any particular investor the appropriate order is for a rateable distribution. This proposition is supported by Re British Red Cross Balkan Fund [1914] 2 Ch 419; Keefe v Law Society of New South Wales (1998) 44 NSWLR 451 at 460 - 461 and the discussion in Jacob’s Law of Trust in Australia 6th ed para 2711, 2712.”

141. As noted at [139] above, one investor opposed the rateable distribution, approval of which had been sought by the receivers. That was a Mr Collins, whose particular case Chesterman J described as “hard”: at [15].

142. Mr Collins, who was a relatively late investor, sought, like the Appellants in the present case, to recover in full the amount of his investment, claiming that it could be traced from the bank account into which he paid it into funds obtained by the receivers. The detail of his investment and the subsequent activity on the bank accounts is of importance for understanding both the decision and the question of principle. That detail was set out by Chesterman J (at [17] – [19]) as follows:

“Mr Collins made the deposit on 21 July 1999. Six days later the respondents were prohibited by order of the court from operating the bank accounts or engaging in the activities of the betting schemes. The next day, 28 July 1999, Mr Collins asked for the return of his money. He was asked to put the request in writing and did so by letter dated 29 July 1999.

Despite having paid moneys into the account near the end of the schemes’ operations the bank statements reveal that a number of transactions occurred in the account subsequent to Mr Collins’ deposit. The result of those transactions is to make it impossible to determine what happened to the fund represented by his money. On 21 July 1999 the bank account of Enterprise Solutions 2000 Pty Ltd into which Mr Collins paid his money had a credit balance of $50,165.72. Mr Collins' deposit was only one (though the biggest one) of five made that day. On the same day over $42,000.00 was paid out of the account. The next day, 22 July, $25,420.00 were paid away but $20,000.00 were paid in leaving a credit balance of $44,745.72. Then next day $20,294.00 were deposited and $34,358.58 withdrawn. The credit balance was then $30,681.14. On 26 July $60,950.00 were withdrawn and $30,290.00 deposited. The balance on the account was then only $1.14. Further deposits on 27 July of $13,150.00 and some debits to the account resulted in a credit balance of $13,134.16. A large series of deposits and withdrawals on 29 July and 9 August left a credit balance on 20 August of $17,451.93. Relevant pages of the bank statements evidencing these transactions are exhibited to the affidavit of Mr Hennessy and Mr Collins.

The result is that an amount greater than Mr Collins’ deposit was withdrawn from the account on the day it was deposited but subsequent to the deposit. On the following days amounts aggregating more than $100,000.00 were taken from the account. Although other deposits were made the last credit balance was less than the amount paid in by Mr Collins.”

143. On these facts, Chesterman J concluded (at [20]) as follows:

“This brief recital of fact shows that it is not possible to know which of the withdrawals made on the account subsequent to the relevant deposit represented Mr Collins’ money. Even if those withdrawals could be traced into some identifiable fund which fell into the receivers’ possession it would not be possible to know which withdrawal and which fund could be regarded as his. Putting aside the difficulties involved in tracing the movement and destination of the funds withdrawn there is no means of knowing which withdrawal should be traced.”

In the result, Chesterman J held that it was impossible to treat Mr Collins any differently from the other investors, and thus made orders for the rateable distribution of the fund: at [23].

144. It may immediately be observed that, at least on its face, there was far more activity on the bank accounts in Enterprise Solutions after Mr Collins’ investment than was the case with respect to the investments made in CH on 21, 24 and 26 April 2017 by these investors who were represented by the Appellants in the current case. But the key point to be taken from Enterprise Solutions for present purposes is that it recognised the ability of an investor to seek to establish a proprietary claim. Principle and the ultimate order justifying a pari passu distribution by the liquidators in that case did not stand in the way of Mr Collins’ attempt to establish his claim. The proprietary claim simply did not succeed on the facts.

Conclusion as to approach

145. Subject perhaps only to the existence of knowledge and intention on the part of investors whose funds have been co-mingled that their funds were always going to be treated as such (see [89]-[97] above), the lowest intermediate balance rule recognises the continuing vitality of “clearly discernible separate property rights” (Russell-Cooke at [35]), and is a means of identifying them.

146. The value of particular investors’ interests in the co-mingled fund falls to be determined “on available evidence”: Sonray (at [86]). Where evidence is available, as it was in Greymac, Boughner, Esteem Settlement and Pars Ram, for example, the lowest intermediate balance rule has been applied and provides what, in my opinion, is the fairest, most equitable and principled outcome for the allocation of limited funds between investors.

147. True it is that more recent investors will do better than earlier investors under this method, but that result follows from the application of established principle and respects the historical operation of the account in which funds have been co-mingled and the investors' underlying proprietary interests. This quintessentially factual approach is superior to the fiction or presumption upon which the so-called rule in Clayton's Case rests, and is also superior to the simple pari passu approach because, whilst incorporating a modified form of rateability, it is more consistent with equitable principle and the rules of tracing. The simple pari passu approach may also result in later investors whose funds were not, or were not significantly, dissipated, cross-subsidising earlier investors whose funds had, at least to some extent, been lost prior to any involvement of later investors.

148. As Gordon J explained in Sonray (at [86]), “if a claimant can establish a remedy founded on tracing, the Court will grant relief founded on that evidence because it permits it to reach a different conclusion in respect of that claimant” compared to the result that would follow upon the application of a simple pari passu approach. To similar effect, in French Caledonia, Campbell J observed (at [189]):

“If ever the court is able to give a remedy founded on tracing some individual claimants, it is because evidence is available which enables the property of those individual claimants to be more specifically traced. It should not be a cause for surprise that evidence of these different types can lead to different types of conclusion.”

149. The importance of evidence to determine the most appropriate approach to distribution of a limited fund and the conduct of a reliable tracing exercise was also emphasised by Hargrave J in Sino Iron Pty Ltd v Worldwide Wagering Pty Ltd (2017) 52 VR 664; [2017] VSC 101 at [423]-[430]. His Honour pointed out a number of issues upon which further evidence and submissions were required. The necessary analysis is a task for the party or parties wishing to invoke the lowest intermediate balance rule cf.Heperu Pty Ltd v Belle (2009) 76 NSWLR 230; [2009] NSWCA 252 at [121].

150. In Re BBY, Brereton J made an important related point at [67], noting that liquidators and courts supervising them have to act on such evidence as is available, together with reasonably available inferences, without insisting on the proofs that would be required in a beneficiary’s claim. Earlier at [40], his Honour had observed that:

“…a liquidator’s application for directions, courts often have to do ‘rough justice’ by reason of the limitations of the available evidence, in the light of what is reasonably practical and economical, and judgments may be made on evidence much inferior to that which would be required to sustain a beneficiary’s claim in adversarial proceedings.”

151. In giving directions that a liquidator would be “justified” in taking a particular course, the Court is not determining equitable proprietary rights. Rather, the effect of such orders is to immunise the liquidator from personal liability, provided that he or she acts in accordance with the Court’s directions. As Black J observed in MF Global (at [8]):

“The Court may give such a direction where it will be ‘of advantage in the liquidation’:  Dean-Willcocks v Soluble Solution Hydroponics Pty Ltd (1997) 42 NSWLR 209 at 212; Handberg (in his capacity as liquidator of S&D International Pty Ltd) v MIG Property Services Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 336; (2010) 79 ACSR 373 at [7]. The effect of a determination under the section is to sanction a course of conduct on the part of the liquidator so that he or she may adopt that course free from the risk of personal liability for breach of duty: S&D International at [7].”

152. If a claimant insists on exercising a right to trace into a mixed fund, authorities such as French Caledonia, Sonray, Buckley and Registered Securities recognise that he, she or it may do so (even though the liquidator otherwise seeks the Court’s blessing for a pari passu distribution). This is an exercise in the vindication of proprietary rights or interests. Unlike the liquidator seeking directions, such a claimant will need to be able to establish, on the balance of probabilities, the proprietary interest claimed (as well as the fact that that interest is not required to be subordinated to that of other contributors by reason of the application of the principle of hotchpot or some other disentitling equitable consideration: see French Caledonia at [177] – [178], extracted at [117] above).

153. The identification of an equitable proprietary interest as a result of tracing will generally be easier for those depositors or investors who have made their investments at a later point in time, because such deposits will either not have been eroded by withdrawals, or only rateably diminished by a smaller number of withdrawals than will be the case for earlier depositors.

154. Whilst a liquidator might conclude that it would be impractical or excessively and counter-productively costly to engage in a full analysis of movements in the co-mingled fund or funds, including applying the lowest intermediate balance rule at the time of each withdrawal and to adjust the value of individual investors’ claims accordingly in order reliably to ascertain the claims of all investors, the exercise may not be nearly so daunting or expensive for those investors who have come late to the party, as it were.

155. It should not be a cause for surprise that such investors would wish to take that course, and the authorities that have been referred to above on the whole permit such a course to be undertaken.

156. This leads me to return to the facts of the present case.

The present case

157. The Appellants submitted that a simple pari passu distribution was not appropriate where there were relatively clear property interests in the fund or where there was a rational basis to distinguish between claimants to a fund. They contended that:

“A finding that the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors should share pro rata with the Westpac Investors would impose losses on the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors that occurred prior to their investment. That would not be an appropriate outcome where the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors’ funds can be specifically identified and returned to them (almost) intact.”

158. The Appellants emphasised that because, apart from the $60,000 withdrawal referred to in [37] above which occurred on 21 April 2017, CH did not dissipate any further funds from the Westpac account after and by virtue of the freezing order made at 3.11pm that day, the funds deposited on 21 April 2017 were clearly identifiable, with the position even clearer in respect of funds that had been deposited on 24 and 26 April 2017.

159. The Appellants also invoked the negative proposition that the fact that two groups of investors has shared a “common misfortune” was not enough to deny one group their right to trace independently into a particular account, citing in support the observations of Santow J in Buckley (see at [134] above).

160. The Respondent, on the other hand, submitted that every investor had suffered a misfortune and so should share in the working out of that misfortune rateably. The Respondent submitted that the moneys deposited by the Post 21 April 2017 Investors were no less mixed than those deposited before that date, as illustrated by the fact of the $60,000 withdrawal on 21 April 2017.

161. The Respondent also, in supporting the primary judge’s reasoning, drew attention to the fact that there were deposits made into the Westpac account on 19 and 20 April 2017, the days immediately before the freezing order, as well as withdrawals on those days as set out in the following table:

Date	Transaction	Debit	Credit
19-Apr-17	Deposit Peter Teklic Peter Teklic	50,000.00
19-Apr-17	Deposit Peter Teklic Peter Teklic	50,000.00
19-Apr-17	Withdrawal Online 1304083 Pymt Courtenay	650,000.00
20-Apr-17	Deposit Online 2958222 Pymt Deirdre Haugh Brexit Evan Haugh (500,000.00)	50,000.00
20-Apr-17	Deposit De Ruvo Mwood Brexit 1	25,000.00
20-Apr-17	Deposit 0001968	350,000.00
20-Apr-17	Withdrawal Online 1470618 Pymt Courtenay C	231,000.00

162. The purpose of these evidentiary references was to highlight forensically the relative similarity of position of those who had invested in the days prior to the freezing order on 21 April 2017 with the position of those who had invested on or after that day, and to make the point that different methods of distribution would be applied to them, with very different financial consequences. Thus, the Respondent submitted by reference to the table that:

“It can be seen from the above that on 20 April 2017 there were three investor deposits totalling $425,000 and one withdrawal of $231,000 from the Westpac 2 account on that day. The $231,000 withdrawn could similarly be spread across all deposits in the account at the time of the withdrawal. The same is true on 19 April 2017, when there were two investor deposits from the same investor (totalling $100,000) and one withdrawal ($650,000) from the Westpac 2 account. And so on, ad infinitum.”

163. This resulted in the submission that, whilst the complexity of the exercise may increase exponentially the further back in time one goes, “that is not a reason to place the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors in a special category”. The Respondent’s argument as to the similarity of position of the Pre- and Post-21 April 2017 Investors was thus deployed in favour of the simple pari passu approach being applied across the board, rather than one which permitted only the Appellants and the other investors they represented to follow their investments into the Westpac account.

164. As Campbell J pointed out with great clarity in French Caledonia (at [177]-[178]), the simple pari passu approach is not necessarily to treat all investors equally, other than in a superficial sense, and the claims of investors who have been defrauded are not always equal (see [117] above). Application of the lowest intermediate balance rule permits the tracing of surviving proprietary interests, and that is in effect what the Appellants seek to do. Decisions such as Sinclair v Brougham, Registered Securities, Buckley and French Caledonia all accept that, where a party can identify through tracing his, her or its equitable proprietary interest in a mixed or co-mingled fund, such tracing should be permitted. In this context, application of the lowest intermediate balance rule best accords with both authority and long established rules of tracing designed to identify (not create) equitable proprietary interests.

165. Application of what I have described as the simple pari passu or pro rata method or approach would result in the present case, for example, in the unsatisfactory consequence that fresh investments on and after 21 April 2017, the day CH’s accounts were frozen and the “business” was effectively shut down, being used to subsidise earlier investors who in fact had been defrauded. To adapt the language of Professor Smith to which reference has been made at [98] above, application of the simple pari passu approach is to force one victim to subsidise another in the face of evidence before the Court (namely that some or all of an earlier investor’s deposit had been dissipated) and openly to redistribute property.

166. Notwithstanding the Appellants’ colourful submission that a pari passu order which applied to the Post-21 April 2017 Investors would have the “undesirable effect of extending the effect of the Ponzi scheme” and of undermining the beneficial effect of the freezing order obtained by ASIC, it follows from my analysis that there was no particular magic in 21 April 2017, that being the date of the freezing order. In a very real sense, that was an arbitrary or, as the Respondent submitted, “artificial” date in terms of the tracing of equitable proprietary interests in the Westpac account, and the ability to do so.

167. It will be recalled in this context that the primary judge concluded at [45] of his judgment that:

“… The only significance of 21 April 2017 is that the Court made a freezing order on ASIC’s application on that date, and that does not seem to me to provide a principled basis for distinguishing the position of the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors from that of other Westpac Investors on the immediately preceding days. Other than for that matter, the position of the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors is little different from that of investors on 20 April 2017, or 19 April 2017, or possibly 21 March or 21 February or 21 January 2017.”

168. I agree with the primary judge that the date of the freezing order did not provide a principled basis for differentiating between investors on either side of that line. Indeed, as noted at [38] above, at least one of the investors whose interests were represented by the Appellants made the relevant investment prior to the freezing order, albeit on the same day, and as such bore a closer affinity with those investors who had invested on 19 and 20 April 2017.

169. Where I disagree with the primary judge, however, is that the fact that there were other investors on the other side of the freezing order line should not, as a matter of principle, have prevented those investors whose interests were represented by the Appellants from tracing or following their investments into the Westpac account in order to identify their equitable proprietary interests. In this respect, I accept the Appellants’ submission that “[t]he fact that others do not press for their rights is not a proper basis to deny the Post 21 April 2017 Westpac Investors the relief they seek in reliance upon their rights”.

170. It may well be that those who had invested on 20 April 2017, or 19 April 2017, or possibly 21 March or 21 February or 21 January 2017 or indeed, I would add, even earlier, could also have undertaken calculations by reference to the lowest intermediate balance rule or rolling charge approach in order to identify their equitable proprietary interests. Indeed, it may be that such investors could still do so, senior counsel for the Respondent submitting in this respect that such investors only had not done so because “they have not had representatives appointed who have been funded out of the trust assets to advocate their positions in this respect”.

171. It would appear from the two Liquidators’ Reports that the Liquidators have not undertaken any tracing exercise other than, inferentially, in respect of the Post-21 April 2017 Investors. Whether or not earlier investors would wish to do so or have eschewed any interest in so doing is unknown, and whether or not they should be funded out of trust assets to do so was not a question explored on the appeal. The table set out at [161] above and the Respondent’s submissions referred to at [162] above suggest, however, that the exercise would not necessarily be overly complex at least for those investors who made their deposits on 19 or 20 April 2017.

172. As has been observed both generally and specifically in the context of the present case, noting that there were 22 withdrawals and 42 deposits in the month prior to the freezing order (see [39] above), the further back into the history of a mixed account one travels, the more complex and costly is the tracing exercise.

173. That is not to say that such an exercise cannot be done.

174. It is equally not to say that a liquidator must undertake such a task if he or she makes a bona fide assessment that the costs and complexity of undertaking it are not justified and/or that the records of the company or companies in liquidation are such that the exercise may not be able to be reliably undertaken.

175. In summary, therefore, whilst the learned primary judge’s disquiet at the different consequences for investors on either side of the freezing order line was understandable, that disquiet should not, in my opinion, have resulted in a denial of the relief the Post-21 April 2017 Investors sought.

176. It should also be noted that the Respondent submitted that simple pari passu distribution was justified on the basis that a number of the investors who had invested on or after 21 April 2017 had also made earlier deposits and had secured returns so that they were, in this sense, “return” investors who had unwittingly benefitted from the operation of the Ponzi scheme. A table making good this submission was supplied to the Court.

177. In my opinion, this argument would have relevance, if anywhere, in the hotchpot hearing (see [181] below).

178. Before concluding these reasons, something needs to be said about the uncertainty that subsists with regard to the withdrawal of $60,000 on 21 April 2017, and whether or not that withdrawal occurred before or after the deposits on that day. In my opinion, this issue should be resolved by reference to the burden of proof. Where a party seeks to trace into a mixed fund in order to achieve a superior outcome to that which may be achieved by earlier investors by identifying a proprietary interest, it will be for that party to establish its interest. Where a bank account records both a withdrawal and a deposit on the same day but there is no evidence that the withdrawal predated the deposit of the funds into the account, the depositor will not have established that the withdrawal occurred prior to the deposit.

179. In these circumstances, in my opinion, the effect of the withdrawal should be treated as having depleted the interest of those who made deposits on that day in the same proportion as those deposits bear to those made by other claimants on the account as at 21 April 2017. This is the third of the approaches referred to by the Liquidators in their 2nd Report (see [40] above) and was accepted as a proper approach by the Appellants in their written submissions in order to achieve “the most equitable outcome possible” in the circumstances of the case.

Conclusion and orders

180. It follows from the above that I would make the orders sought by the Appellants in the Notice of Appeal (see [60] above).

181. One matter should be noted for completeness. As is reflected in the orders sought in this appeal, the Appellants recognise that their claim is subject to an application of the principles of hotchpot. That may be because at least in the case of some of the Appellants, their “fresh” investments made on and after 21 April 2017 in substance, if not in form, represented a rolling over of an earlier “repaid” investment or re-investment of “dividends” received from earlier investments. It has also been noted at [54] above that a separate hotchpot hearing took place earlier this year.

182. Whilst recognising that it may not always be possible, it is nonetheless desirable, in my opinion, from the perspective of minimising costs, that questions of hotchpot are resolved in the same hearing as more general questions relating to the distribution of limited funds in a mixed or co-mingled account or accounts.

183. Finally, I note that in his Honour’s judgment appointing the Appellants and the Respondent as representative parties for the purposes of this appeal (see [61] above), Basten JA gave a direction and order or advice, pursuant to s 90-15 of the IPS and s 63 of the Trustee Act, that the Liquidators were justified in paying the legal costs and disbursements of the Appellants and Respondent incurred in relation to and incidental to the appeal and the Liquidators’ own costs of a submitting appearance in the appeal, calculated at the usual rates of the solicitors and counsel engaged by them, in an amount as approved by resolutions of the Committees of Inspection.

184. I do not consider there to be any basis to depart from these orders. It may be noted, however, that to the extent that these costs deplete the size of the fund available for distribution, the claims on the fund by the Appellants and those investors they represent should be rateably reduced by these costs, so that the other investors do not end up subsidising the recovery by the Appellants and those investors they represent in a disproportionate way.

185. MACFARLAN JA: I agree with Bell P.

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Decision last updated: 18 June 2020