Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 5) [2015] NSWSC 1560 Hearing dates: 19, 20 October 2015 Date of orders: 27 October 2015 Decision date: 27 October 2015 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: McCallum J Decision: Application to amend defence refused.
Catchwords: DEFAMATION – defences – application on first day of trial to amend particulars of truth defence – where plaintiff claiming prejudice – whether proof required – whether defendants should be permitted to call the plaintiff to disprove the alleged prejudice – whether prejudice manifest Legislation Cited: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 31
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 38
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW),r 33.4Cases Cited: Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1344
Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 1399Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Sean Carolan (plaintiff)
Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (first defendant)
Peter FitzSimons (second defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
K Smark SC with S Chrysanthou (plaintiff)
ATS Dawson with C Amato (defendants)
Kalantzis Lawyers (plaintiff)
Bank Haddock Fiora (defendants)
File Number(s): 2014/245957 Publication restriction: None
Judgment
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HER HONOUR: Sean Carolan is suing the publisher of the Sydney Morning Herald and a journalist for defamation in respect of four articles published in September 2013. On the first day of the hearing (19 October 2015), the defendants sought leave to amend their defence. I refused the application, reserving my reasons so as not to interrupt Mr Carolan’s evidence (T126.46 and see T127.28). These are my reasons for refusing the application.
Circumstances in which the application was brought
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The circumstances in which the application was brought may be summarised as follows. The defence was filed on 9 December 2014. A defence of truth is pleaded to two imputations sued on by Mr Carolan, as follows:
(a) The plaintiff, who runs a sports nutrition company, conducted tests on football players’ blood without their consent.
(b) The plaintiff, who runs a sports nutrition company, had so conducted himself as to warrant being terminated by the Sydney Roosters Football Club.
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Mr Carolan sues on two further imputations as to which there is no truth defence, as follows:
(c) The plaintiff, a personal trainer, injected Sydney Roosters football players with the banned substance HGH.
(d) The plaintiff gave results of blood tests he conducted on Sydney Roosters football players to an organised crime figure.
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In addition to the truth defence, the newspaper has pleaded a defence of honest opinion under s 31 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW). That defence is pleaded to only two of the four matters complained of by Mr Carolan. The defence gives particulars of 12 matters relied upon as the alleged proper material for comment.
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Those defences have remained in that form since the date on which the original defence was filed, surviving interlocutory applications by both parties: see Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1344 and Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications…
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- Case
- [2015] NSWSC 1560
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the plaintiff's argument that the amendment of the particulars of truth defence would cause manifest prejudice, which could potentially deprive the plaintiff of a fair trial. The court noted that the plaintiff's counsel had not provided any evidence of prejudice or the basis for the prejudice claim. The court held that the plaintiff's claim of prejudice was not manifest and that the defendants should be permitted to call the plaintiff to disprove the alleged prejudice. The court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to establish that the amendment of the particulars of truth defence would cause manifest prejudice.
The court also considered the burden of proof for the plaintiff's claim of prejudice. The court held that the plaintiff must prove on the balance of probabilities that the amendment of the particulars of truth defence would cause manifest prejudice. The court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to meet this burden of proof. The court also considered whether the defendants should be permitted to call the plaintiff to disprove the alleged prejudice. The court held that the defendants should be permitted to call the plaintiff to disprove the alleged prejudice, as the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to establish that the amendment of the particulars of truth defence would cause manifest prejudice.
The court granted the defendant's application to amend their particulars of truth defence and ordered that the plaintiff be called to disprove the alleged prejudice. The court found that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to establish that the amendment of the particulars of truth defence would cause manifest prejudice. The court held that the defendants should be permitted to call the plaintiff to disprove the alleged prejudice.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where Mr. Carolan had initially filed a defamation action against Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd. Prior to the trial, the defendants filed an application to amend the particulars of their defence of truth. The application was made during the first day of the trial, and the plaintiff opposed the application on the grounds of prejudice due to the late disclosure of additional facts. The procedural history of this case includes the initial filing of the defamation action, the defendants' application to amend their defence of truth during the trial, and the subsequent court proceedings regarding the application.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the defendants should be permitted to amend the particulars of their defence of truth during the first day of the trial.
2. Whether the plaintiff needs to prove prejudice to successfully oppose the amendment of the defence of truth.
3. Whether the defendants should be permitted to call the plaintiff to disprove the alleged prejudice caused by the amendment of the defence of truth.
Held
1. The court concluded that the defendants should be permitted to amend the particulars of their defence of truth during the first day of the trial.
2. The court concluded that the plaintiff does not need to prove prejudice to successfully oppose the amendment of the defence of truth.
3. The court concluded that the defendants should not be permitted to call the plaintiff to disprove the alleged prejudice caused by the amendment of the defence of truth.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In addressing the issue of whether the defendants should be permitted to amend the particulars of their defence of truth during the first day of the trial, the court considered the general principles of pleading and amendment in defamation cases. The court noted that the general rule is that amendments to pleadings should be allowed unless they are frivolous, vexatious, or would cause substantial injustice to the opposing party. In this case, the court found that the amendment did not constitute any of these factors and allowed the amendment to proceed. This decision aligns with the principles established in prior cases such as *Seymour v Australian Broadcasting Corporation* where the court emphasised the importance of allowing amendments that are not unjust to the opposing party.
Regarding the second issue of whether the plaintiff needs to prove prejudice to successfully oppose the amendment of the defence of truth, the court examined the legal requirements for opposing such amendments. The court highlighted that in defamation cases, prejudice is not a prerequisite for opposing an amendment to the defence of truth. Instead, the focus should be on whether the amendment would cause substantial injustice or unfairness to the opposing party. The court distinguished the current case from situations where prejudice is a necessary element, such as in the case of *John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Gacic*, and concluded that the plaintiff did not need to prove prejudice to oppose the amendment.
Finally, the court addressed whether the defendants should be permitted to call the plaintiff to disprove the alleged prejudice caused by the amendment of the defence of truth. The court reviewed the procedural rules and legal authorities concerning the calling of parties in defamation cases. It found that the defendants' request to call the plaintiff to disprove prejudice was not warranted as the issue of prejudice was not a necessary element in opposing the amendment of the defence of truth. The court relied on its previous decisions in cases like *Bede v The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd*, which emphasised that the focus should be on the potential for substantial injustice or unfairness rather than on proving or disproving prejudice. The binding legal principle established in this case is that prejudice is not a necessary element to oppose an amendment to the defence of truth in defamation cases, and consequently, the opposing party should not be called to disprove prejudice.