SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
CARDOSO v SA POWER NETWORKS (No 2)
[2023] SASC 104
Decision of Judge Bochner a Master of the Supreme Court
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS
Costs of representative action
Supreme Court Act 1986; Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (Vic); Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), referred to.
Lenehan v Powercor Australia Ltd [2020] VSC 82; Taplin v Amaca Pty Ltd [2020] SADC 3; BHP Billiton Limited v Parker (No 2) [2014] SASC 6; Francis v Powercor Australia Limited & Anor [2020] VSC 405; Matthews v Ausnet Electricity Services Pty Ltd & Ors [2014] VSC 663, applied.
CARDOSO v SA POWER NETWORKS (No 2)
[2023] SASC 104CIVIL
On 12 May 2022, I published reasons for approving the settlement of a representative action, on terms that, on the basis of a denial of liability, the respondent paid to the applicant the sum of $2,250,000 inclusive of legal costs, disbursements and interest.[1] My reasons also included reasons for approving a proposed settlement distribution scheme. My approval was on the basis that, once legal costs and disbursements had been deducted, each member of the group would receive a sum equivalent to between 55% to 60% of their assessed losses. I considered that it was appropriate to approve such a settlement, given that the group members faced significant hurdles with respect to both liability and quantum.
[1] [2022] SASC 48.
After the granting of approval, each group member received 57% of their assessed loss. A sum was retained by the applicant’s lawyer, Maddens Lawyers (“Maddens”), on account of their costs, while they undertook the steps necessary to allow them to seek further Court approval of their costs. Maddens now seeks approval of the payment of $780,000 for legal costs and disbursements. These costs relate both to the conduct of the action and the administration of the settlement distribution scheme. Approval of Maddens’ costs in the sum of $780,000 would result in each group member receiving a sum equivalent to 60% of their assessed losses.
Because the settlement sum was paid on an all-inclusive basis, Court approval is required for the amount of Maddens’ costs and disbursements. This is because approval of the settlement was based on my conclusion that the settlement sum was fair and reasonable as between the parties, taking into account the claims made by the group members, the risks in involved in continuing the litigation and the likely costs of ongoing litigation. It is incumbent on me to ensure that the settlement remains fair and reasonable, once Maddens’ costs and disbursements have been paid.
The principles to be applied
Rule 134.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (“the UCR”) requires Court approval of the terms of resolution of any representative action. There appears to be no South Australian authority dealing with the approval of the quantum of costs pursuant to r 134.1 of the UCR. I am satisfied, however, that…
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- Case
- [2023] SASC 104
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the costs claimed by Maddens were justified, particularly in light of the difference in fees between South Australian and Victorian legal professionals. The plaintiffs relied on a costs report prepared by Ms Catherine Dealehr, which assessed the recoverable costs at $945,293.50, while the defendant contested this figure, relying on a report by Mr Graeme Arnold, which assessed the costs at a significantly lower range of $507,922.76 to $620,794.48. The court had to decide whether the higher fees charged by Victorian solicitors were justified and whether any reductions should be applied to the costs claimed.
The court considered the terms of the costs agreement, which explicitly allowed for the engagement of Victorian solicitors and counsel at the specified rates. The judge found that it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to engage Victorian legal professionals given their extensive experience in bushfire class action litigation. The court also noted that the plaintiffs had been adequately informed about the costs agreement and the higher fees associated with engaging Victorian lawyers. The judge concluded that there was no basis to impose a reduction on the costs claimed solely on the ground that Victorian lawyers were used. The reasoning was that while South Australian legal fees are generally lower, it was not clear whether any South Australian firm would have been willing to take on the case on a no win no fee basis.
The court's decision was that the costs claimed by Maddens were fair, reasonable, and proportionate. The judge rejected the defendant's argument for a significant reduction in the costs claimed and allowed the plaintiffs to recover the full amount of costs as per the report by Ms Dealehr. The final order of the court was that SA Power Networks was to pay the costs claimed by Maddens, without any reductions based on the use of interstate solicitors and counsel.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The reduction applied by Mr Arnold to the travel costs incurred by Maddens is also based on the acceptance of the position that interstate lawyers should not have been used. Maddens submits that once his reasoning is accepted as erroneous, this reduction should fall away. Consideration I will deal first with the question of the use of interstate solicitors and counsel. A decision on this question will inform the answers to a number of the differences between the assessments of Mr Arnold and Ms Dealehr. In the context of an assessment of party/party costs, it is unusual, in South Australia, to allow the rates charged by interstate counsel where they are significantly greater than the rates charged by similarly qualified barristers based in South Australia. This is not, however, the case where the Court is dealing with the question of solicitor and own client costs. In such a situation, the retainer between the solicitor and client takes on a crucial role in determining the total quantum of the costs and disbursements payable by the client. In assessing costs in a matter such as this one, the Court’s role is different again. The principles that come into play when assessing costs on a party/party basis carry little or no relevance in a matter such as this one. Nor are the principles that are applied in a taxation between solicitor and client directly relevant, although the existence of a written retainer is fundamental, as is an examination of its terms. The terms of the retainer, however, are not the end of the matter. As Nichols J said in Francis v Powercor Australia Limited & Anor:[8]…on an assessment of this kind the terms of a valid costs agreement will inform, rather than determine, the outcome.[9][8] [2020] VSC 405.[9] Ibid, [19]. It is clear from the costs agreement that the applicant and group members agreed to the use of solicitors and counsel based in Victoria, and to the rates set out in the agreement. It is not apparent whether they were advised that the fees charged by lawyers based in Victoria are generally higher than their South Australian counterparts. Nonetheless, I consider that it was reasonable for Victorian lawyers to be engaged by the applicant in this matter and no reduction should be imposed on this basis alone. While it is true that solicitors’ and counsel fees in South Australia are generally less than those charged by Maddens, Mr Tobin and Mr Fraatz, the likelihood of a South Australian legal team being prepared to take on this matter on a no win no fee basis in respect of both costs and disbursements is unknown. Further, there is no doubt that Maddens has had significant experience in this type of litigation, and while I am unable to say that no firm in South Australia has not had similar experience, I consider that it is understandable that the applicant would choose to retain lawyers with a clear and significant body of experience in bushfire class action litigation. I am also satisfied that the applicant and group members were sufficiently informed about the nature of the costs agreement and the rates set out therein.