Cardoso v SA Power Networks (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

CARDOSO v SA POWER NETWORKS (No 2)

[2023] SASC 104

Decision of Judge Bochner a Master of the Supreme Court  

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS

Costs of representative action

Supreme Court Act 1986; Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (Vic); Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), referred to.
Lenehan v Powercor Australia Ltd [2020] VSC 82; Taplin v Amaca Pty Ltd [2020] SADC 3; BHP Billiton Limited v Parker (No 2) [2014] SASC 6; Francis v Powercor Australia Limited & Anor [2020] VSC 405; Matthews v Ausnet Electricity Services Pty Ltd & Ors [2014] VSC 663, applied.

CARDOSO v SA POWER NETWORKS (No 2)
[2023] SASC 104

CIVIL

  1. On 12 May 2022, I published reasons for approving the settlement of a representative action, on terms that, on the basis of a denial of liability, the respondent paid to the applicant the sum of $2,250,000 inclusive of legal costs, disbursements and interest.[1] My reasons also included reasons for approving a proposed settlement distribution scheme. My approval was on the basis that, once legal costs and disbursements had been deducted, each member of the group would receive a sum equivalent to between 55% to 60% of their assessed losses. I considered that it was appropriate to approve such a settlement, given that the group members faced significant hurdles with respect to both liability and quantum.

  2. After the granting of approval, each group member received 57% of their assessed loss. A sum was retained by the applicant’s lawyer, Maddens Lawyers (“Maddens”), on account of their costs, while they undertook the steps necessary to allow them to seek further Court approval of their costs. Maddens now seeks approval of the payment of $780,000 for legal costs and disbursements. These costs relate both to the conduct of the action and the administration of the settlement distribution scheme. Approval of Maddens’ costs in the sum of $780,000 would result in each group member receiving a sum equivalent to 60% of their assessed losses.

  3. Because the settlement sum was paid on an all-inclusive basis, Court approval is required for the amount of Maddens’ costs and disbursements. This is because approval of the settlement was based on my conclusion that the settlement sum was fair and reasonable as between the parties, taking into account the claims made by the group members, the risks in involved in continuing the litigation and the likely costs of ongoing litigation. It is incumbent on me to ensure that the settlement remains fair and reasonable, once Maddens’ costs and disbursements have been paid.

    The principles to be applied

  4. Rule 134.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (“the UCR”) requires Court approval of the terms of resolution of any representative action. There appears to be no South Australian authority dealing with the approval of the quantum of costs pursuant to r 134.1 of the UCR. I am satisfied, however, that…

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Details
Case
[2023] SASC 104
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Cardoso v SA Power Networks (No 2), the parties were engaged in a dispute regarding the costs incurred in civil proceedings. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia, where the primary focus was on the reasonableness and proportionality of the costs claimed by Maddens, the solicitors acting on behalf of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought a significant sum in costs, which was contested by the defendant, SA Power Networks. The court had to determine whether the costs claimed were fair, reasonable, and proportionate in light of the evidence and arguments presented by both parties.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the costs claimed by Maddens were justified, particularly in light of the difference in fees between South Australian and Victorian legal professionals. The plaintiffs relied on a costs report prepared by Ms Catherine Dealehr, which assessed the recoverable costs at $945,293.50, while the defendant contested this figure, relying on a report by Mr Graeme Arnold, which assessed the costs at a significantly lower range of $507,922.76 to $620,794.48. The court had to decide whether the higher fees charged by Victorian solicitors were justified and whether any reductions should be applied to the costs claimed.

The court considered the terms of the costs agreement, which explicitly allowed for the engagement of Victorian solicitors and counsel at the specified rates. The judge found that it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to engage Victorian legal professionals given their extensive experience in bushfire class action litigation. The court also noted that the plaintiffs had been adequately informed about the costs agreement and the higher fees associated with engaging Victorian lawyers. The judge concluded that there was no basis to impose a reduction on the costs claimed solely on the ground that Victorian lawyers were used. The reasoning was that while South Australian legal fees are generally lower, it was not clear whether any South Australian firm would have been willing to take on the case on a no win no fee basis.

The court's decision was that the costs claimed by Maddens were fair, reasonable, and proportionate. The judge rejected the defendant's argument for a significant reduction in the costs claimed and allowed the plaintiffs to recover the full amount of costs as per the report by Ms Dealehr. The final order of the court was that SA Power Networks was to pay the costs claimed by Maddens, without any reductions based on the use of interstate solicitors and counsel.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ms Nicholson did not provide a disclosure statement as to her fees or a costs agreement. The evidence Maddens obtained reports from two costs consultants. The first report, dated 18 November 2021, was obtained from Mr Graeme Arnold of Arnold Costs Solicitors. Mr Arnold assessed Maddens’ reasonable costs and disbursements as being in a range of $507,922.76 and $620,794.48, including uplift. This is substantially less than the amount sought by Maddens. Maddens submits that there is a number of problems with Mr Arnold’s report, and it should not be relied on. Maddens’ second report was prepared by Ms Catherine Dealehr of the Australian Legal Costing Group. In her report, dated 13 April 2022, Ms Dealehr assessed Maddens’ recoverable costs in the sum of $945,293.50, and on this basis, concluded that the costs and disbursements sought by Maddens, in the sum of $780,000 including uplift were fair, reasonable and proportionate. It is on this report that Maddens seeks to rely.Mr Arnold’s report Mr Arnold did not have access to Maddens’ file for the purpose of preparing his report. He was of the view, however, that he had access to sufficient documents to form an opinion. Mr Arnold reviewed the costs agreements and disclosure statements provided by solicitors and counsel to determine if they complied with the relevant legislation and were otherwise fair and reasonable. He considered the rates charged against the background of the issues raised in the litigation. He also cross-checked the fees actually charged against the disclosed rates. Mr Arnold then reviewed the time based professional charges and deleted entries that he considered to be non-chargeable. He then applied a global reduction, based on the size and nature of discovery, the pleadings, expert evidence and the relative time spent by various professionals based on qualifications and experience. He also sought to obtain a sense of the efficiency and productivity of the individuals working on the file. Where possible, he examined the time recorded to review particular documents and compared that with what he considered was a reasonable time for such review. Mr Arnold reached the view that, while the hourly rates charged by Maddens are typical of law firms in the eastern states, they are approximately 15% more than the fees charged by comparable firms in South Australia. He considered that there was nothing about this matter that justified the use of interstate lawyers and concluded that a discount of 15% should be applied to the fees charged by Maddens. He considered that the professional fees charged were inflated by approximately one third as a result of dealing with the insurance issues. He also formed the view that the percentage of work done by senior lawyers was high compared to other, less expensive, staff and that there was heavy, ongoing reliance on junior counsel, in circumstances where Maddens should have been able to carry out the work without counsel’s involvement. Mr Arnold wholly excluded the following items:·Costs agreement and disclosure work, including obtaining this information from counsel;·Reviewing basic procedural rules;·More than 2 lawyers or paralegals at mediation and other key events;·Entries with little meaningful or no description;·Time spent travelling between Victoria and South Australia, except for some limited travel between Adelaide and Yorketown and the surrounding areas; and·File administration and maintenance.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The reduction applied by Mr Arnold to the travel costs incurred by Maddens is also based on the acceptance of the position that interstate lawyers should not have been used. Maddens submits that once his reasoning is accepted as ­­­erroneous, this reduction should fall away. Consideration I will deal first with the question of the use of interstate solicitors and counsel. A decision on this question will inform the answers to a number of the differences between the assessments of Mr Arnold and Ms Dealehr. In the context of an assessment of party/party costs, it is unusual, in South Australia, to allow the rates charged by interstate counsel where they are significantly greater than the rates charged by similarly qualified barristers based in South Australia. This is not, however, the case where the Court is dealing with the question of solicitor and own client costs. In such a situation, the retainer between the solicitor and client takes on a crucial role in determining the total quantum of the costs and disbursements payable by the client. In assessing costs in a matter such as this one, the Court’s role is different again. The principles that come into play when assessing costs on a party/party basis carry little or no relevance in a matter such as this one. Nor are the principles that are applied in a taxation between solicitor and client directly relevant, although the existence of a written retainer is fundamental, as is an examination of its terms. The terms of the retainer, however, are not the end of the matter. As Nichols J said in Francis v Powercor Australia Limited & Anor:[8]…on an assessment of this kind the terms of a valid costs agreement will inform, rather than determine, the outcome.[9][8] [2020] VSC 405.[9] Ibid, [19]. It is clear from the costs agreement that the applicant and group members agreed to the use of solicitors and counsel based in Victoria, and to the rates set out in the agreement. It is not apparent whether they were advised that the fees charged by lawyers based in Victoria are generally higher than their South Australian counterparts. Nonetheless, I consider that it was reasonable for Victorian lawyers to be engaged by the applicant in this matter and no reduction should be imposed on this basis alone. While it is true that solicitors’ and counsel fees in South Australia are generally less than those charged by Maddens, Mr Tobin and Mr Fraatz, the likelihood of a South Australian legal team being prepared to take on this matter on a no win no fee basis in respect of both costs and disbursements is unknown. Further, there is no doubt that Maddens has had significant experience in this type of litigation, and while I am unable to say that no firm in South Australia has not had similar experience, I consider that it is understandable that the applicant would choose to retain lawyers with a clear and significant body of experience in bushfire class action litigation. I am also satisfied that the applicant and group members were sufficiently informed about the nature of the costs agreement and the rates set out therein.