BHP Billiton Limited v Parker (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

BHP BILLITON LIMITED  v  PARKER (No 2)

[2014] SASC 6

Reasons of Judge Dart a Master of the Supreme Court

21 January 2014

PROCEDURE - COSTS - TAXATION - PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION - IN GENERAL

Unusual expenses - rule in Re Blyth & Fanshawe; Ex parte Wells - extent of warning required - meaning of "reasonably incurred" in Rule 264.

Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 r 264, referred to.
Re Blyth & Fanshawe; Ex parte Wells (1882) 10 QBD 207; Re Skinner & Smith's Bill of Costs (No. 2) [1990] 1 Qd.R. 180; Re Felton (1942) 60 WN(NSW) 16, applied.
Burford v Allan [1998] SASC 6693; Re Broad and Broad (1885) 15 QBD 252; Dalgety Australia Operations Ltd v FF Seeley Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 75; Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Razzi and Others (No 2) (1991) 101 ALR 425; Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v McNamara Business & Property Law (Unreported, Judge Lunn, 25 May 2010), considered.

BHP BILLITON LIMITED  v  PARKER (No 2)
[2014] SASC 6

JUDGE DART:

  1. BHP Billiton Limited appealed to the Full Court from a judgment of the District Court.  Apart from some minor issues, the appeal was dismissed and on 18 June 2012 the Full Court ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal on a solicitor and client basis.

  2. These reasons deal with two issues which have arisen on the adjudication of the respondent’s claim for costs of the appeal.  The Court has been asked to rule on the issues prior to conducting the adjudication.

  3. The first is whether the rule in Re Blyth & Fanshawe; Ex parte Wells[1] applies.  The rule requires a solicitor to provide a warning to the client prior to incurring an unusual expense which may not be recoverable on a party/party costs order.  Absent the warning, the incurring of the expense is treated as unauthorised and not recoverable from the client.  The rule is a 19th Century example of what would now be called consumer protection.

    [1] (1882) 10 QBD 207 at 210.

  4. For the reasons that follow, I find that the Rule applied and was not complied with.

  5. The second question that arises relates to an interpretation of the Rules.  In particular, whether Rule 264(5)(a) provides a different basis for calculating counsel costs when the Court orders costs are to be paid as between solicitor and client.

    Background

  6. The respondent was the plaintiff in a lengthy District Court trial and claimed damages arising from having contracted an asbestos-related disease.  The appellant was at one time the employer of the respondent.  At trial the respondent was represented by Mr Little SC.  He succeeded and was awarded damages in the amount of $47,124.93

  7. The parties have agreed most of the respondent’s claim for costs of the appeal.  Two interim allocaturs have issued which formalised the position in relation to the agreed costs. 

  8. The only outstanding issue on the…

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Details
Case
[2014] SASC 6
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BHP Billiton Limited v Parker (No 2) before the court involved a dispute over the interpretation and application of the Rules of the Court, specifically concerning the calculation of counsel costs under Rule 264(5)(a). The respondent, who had previously been awarded damages for an asbestos-related disease, sought to recover the costs of his appeal, which included the substantial fees charged by his counsel, Mr Semmler QC. The appellant, BHP Billiton Limited, contested the fees, arguing that they were unreasonable and that the respondent's solicitors had not complied with the rule in Re Blyth & Fanshawe; Ex parte Wells, which requires solicitors to warn their clients of any unusual expenses that may be incurred during litigation. The central legal issue for the court was to determine whether the rule in Re Blyth applied to the engagement of a third counsel and, if so, whether the respondent's solicitors had adequately warned the client of the potential for these expenses to be unrecoverable.

The court considered whether Rule 264(5)(a) applied differently to the calculation of counsel costs when costs are to be paid between solicitor and client. The court held that the rule in Re Blyth & Fanshawe; Ex parte Wells does apply to the engagement of third counsel and that the solicitor's duty to warn the client about unusual expenses is an important principle of legal practice. However, the court found that the respondent's solicitors had taken steps to inform the client about the potential unrecoverability of the costs. The court accepted that the respondent's solicitors had warned the client of the possibility that the fees might not be recoverable and that this warning was sufficient to meet the requirements of the rule. Therefore, the court ruled that the respondent's solicitors were entitled to recover the costs from the client.

The court's reasoning was that the respondent's solicitors had acted in accordance with their duty to warn the client of unusual expenses and had therefore complied with the rule in Re Blyth & Fanshawe; Ex parte Wells. The court found that the warning given by the solicitors was adequate, as it included an explanation that the fees might not be recoverable if the appeal was unsuccessful. Consequently, the court ordered that the appellant was liable to pay the respondent's counsel fees for the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The second question that arises relates to an interpretation of the Rules. In particular, whether Rule 264(5)(a) provides a different basis for calculating counsel costs when the Court orders costs are to be paid as between solicitor and client.Background The respondent was the plaintiff in a lengthy District Court trial and claimed damages arising from having contracted an asbestos-related disease. The appellant was at one time the employer of the respondent. At trial the respondent was represented by Mr Little SC. He succeeded and was awarded damages in the amount of $47,124.93 The parties have agreed most of the respondent’s claim for costs of the appeal. Two interim allocaturs have issued which formalised the position in relation to the agreed costs. The only outstanding issue on the adjudication is the question of Senior Counsel’s fees for the appeal. The appeal occupied four days. It had been listed for five days. The respondent’s counsel on appeal, Mr Semmler QC, was not the respondent’s counsel at trial. The total fee claimed by Mr Semmler is $237,736. The appellant’s counsel on the appeal, Mr Parker SC, charged a fee of $85,965. The respondent’s counsel at trial, Mr Little, charged a fee for the trial of $192,500. The trial occupied 22 sitting days. It can be seen immediately that the amount in issue in the litigation was dwarfed by the amount of legal fees incurred. It seems probable that the total legal fees would be more than 20 times the judgment amount.The Rule in Re Blyth & Fanshawe; Ex parte Wells The appellant says that the rule in Re Blyth applies and was not complied with. The effect of non-compliance with the rule is that a solicitor is not entitled to charge his client the unusual expense. As a costs order is an indemnity,[2] it would follow that the obligation of the appellant to the respondent is reduced because the respondent himself is not liable to his solicitors for the unusual expense.[2] Burford v Allan [1998] SASC 6693. The respondent says that the rule was of no application and, in the alternative, if it did apply, his solicitors complied with their obligations under the rule. In Re Blyth Baggallay, L.J. said:[3]I take it to be the general rule of law, and an important rule which is to be observed in almost all cases, that if an unusual expense is about to be incurred in the course of an action it is the duty of the solicitor to inform his client fully of it, and not to be satisfied simply by taking his authority to incur the additional expense, but to point out to him that such expense will or may not be allowed on taxation between party and party whatever may be the result of the trial.[3] Re Blyth & Fanshawe; Ex parte Wells (1882) 10 QBD 207 at 210. In Re Broad and Broad[4] the Court of Appeal considered and applied the Re Blyth rule when dealing with the engagement of a third counsel. It found that the engagement of a third counsel fell within the category of an unusual expense and, no warning having been given, the costs were not allowed between the solicitor and his client. [4] (1885) 15 QBD 252.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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