IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S61 of 1998
B e t w e e n -
PAUL CARDILE, LUCY CARDILE and ULTRA MODERN DEVELOPMENTS PTY LIMITED
Appellants
and
L.E.D. BUILDERS PTY LIMITED
Respondent
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
CALLINAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 8 OCTOBER 1998, AT 9.36 AM
(Continued from 7/10/98)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
GAUDRON J: Yes, Mr Hughes.
MR HUGHES: If your Honour pleases. Apropos the discussion that occurred between your Honour Justice Gaudron and myself yesterday afternoon about the discretionary aspect of the case, what we have done overnight, your Honours, is to propound a draft of a modified Mareva order, which I will seek leave to hand up. I have given copies to my friends. The effect of the proposed modified order would be to put a limit of $1.2 million on the disposal of assets by Mr and Mrs Cardile and restrain as well the disposition of the assets of Ultra Modern, including the business name, but the draft is ‑ ‑ ‑
KIRBY J: You are conceding that the appeal must be allowed, because we would have no authority to make another order unless we allowed the appeal and set aside orders already made.
MR HUGHES: If the Court is of the view that the appeal should be allowed to the extent of modifying what may be seen to be the rigours of the existing order, we are proposing, without in any way conceding, I should add, that any ground of appeal has been taken of challenging the extent of the order. I want to emphasise that.
GAUDRON J: Yes.
MR HUGHES: This is an exercise on the footing that discretion is sometimes the better part of forensic valour.
GAUDRON J: And on the footing that appropriateness is a limitation on the Court’s part of granting a Mareva‑type injunction.
MR HUGHES: Yes, on that footing.
KIRBY J: Do you contest that footing? Is your primary submission that that is not the correct approach and that this is, as it were, if contrary to your submissions the court came to that view and took a different view, that these would be the orders that you say in those circumstances should be made and then the question would arise whether the new order was in substance different from the order that had been made.
MR HUGHES: Yes. I can hand it up so that your Honours will see what I am contingently about doing, but I want to emphasise that this is an exercise from our perspective in protecting our flank, without conceding that there is, having regard to the limited nature of the notice of appeal, a need to do so.
GAUDRON J: I understand your position, Mr Hughes.
MR HUGHES: An alternative approach, and this is a matter that was discussed between your Honours and my learned friend yesterday, might be, and I simply put…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Cardile & Ors v LED Builders Pty Limited and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [1998] HCATrans 347
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the commission clause in the building contract was enforceable. Specifically, the court had to determine if the clause constituted an unenforceable penalty or an unconscionable bargain, or if it was a valid liquidated damages provision. This required an examination of the nature of the payment stipulated and its relationship to the potential loss suffered by LED Builders.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the commission clause was an unenforceable penalty. Their Honours reasoned that the stipulated commission was not a genuine pre-estimate of the loss that LED Builders would likely suffer upon the sale of the property. Instead, it was a disproportionate sum designed to deter the Cardiles from selling the property, thereby acting as a penalty rather than liquidated damages. The court applied the principles established in cases concerning penalties, emphasizing that a liquidated damages clause must be a genuine attempt to pre-estimate loss, not a punitive measure.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the lower court and remitting the matter for determination of the actual damages suffered by LED Builders, if any, in accordance with the principles of contract law.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.