Caporale v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Caporale v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 556

Citation: Caporale v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 556
Appeal from: Caporale v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 86
Parties: DOMENICA CAPORALE and GIACOMO CAPORALE v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
File number: NSD 519 of 2012
Judge: JACOBSON J
Date of judgment: 30 May 2012
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – extension of time to file notice of appeal refused
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 42A, 43, 44
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 37M
Federal Court Rules 2011, r 36.03; 36.05
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), s 14ZZK
Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Aust Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
Caporale and Commissioner of Taxation [2011] AATA 570
Dunlop v Fishburn (No 3) [2012] FCA 315
Kenso Marketing (M) SDN BHD v Chief Executive Officer of Customs [2011] FCAFC 26
Date of hearing: 29 May 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 45
Appearance for the Applicants: Ms Rosa Caporale for Mr Giacomo Coporale, no appearance for Mrs Domenica Caporale
Counsel for the Respondent: AJ O'Brien
Solicitor for the Respondent: ATO Legal Services Branch

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 519 of 2012

BETWEEN:

DOMENICA CAPORALE
First applicant

GIACOMO CAPORALE
Second applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

JACOBSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 MAY 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The second applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 519 of 2012

BETWEEN:

DOMENICA CAPORALE
First applicant

GIACOMO CAPORALE
Second applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

JACOBSON J

DATE:

30 MAY 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against orders made by a judge of the Court (Robertson J) on 17 February 2012. His Honour dismissed an appeal brought by Mr and Mrs Caporale on a question of law under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals TribunalAct 1975 (Cth) from a decision of the Tribunal dated 2 August 2011.

  2. On that date, the Tribunal affirmed a decision made by the Commissioner on 24 December 2003 in respect of objections made by Mr and Mrs Caporale to assessments of their taxable income for the years ended 30 June 1996 to 30 June 2000.  The effect of the Tribunal’s decision was to disallow the taxpayers’ objections: see Caporale and Commissioner of Taxation [2011] AATA 570.

  3. The reason why the Tribunal came to that decision was that, after considering the lengthy history of the proceeding, including the many delays and extensions of time granted to the taxpayers, the Tribunal refused a further adjournment and held that the taxpayers had failed to discharge the burden of proof under s…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 556
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the applicants, Mr and Mrs Caporale, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against the Federal Magistrates Court's decision. The applicants had previously been involved in a lengthy administrative process with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, culminating in a decision on 2 August 2011. The primary judge, Robertson J, dismissed the applicants' appeal and they now sought leave to appeal against that decision. The key issues before the Court were whether an acceptable explanation existed for the delay in filing the notice of appeal, whether the time limits should be extended, and whether the merits of the proposed appeal warranted an extension.

The Court considered the applicants' explanation for the delay, which was that their solicitor was unwell and their counsel did not advise them of the time limit for filing the notice of appeal. However, the Court found that the applicants' explanation was not satisfactory, as they had considerable experience in litigation and should have been aware of the time limit. Additionally, the Court found that there was no error in the reasons for decision of Robertson J, who had comprehensively dealt with the application and applied the correct legal principles. The Court also noted that the refusal of the adjournment was part of a long and tortured history, during which the Tribunal had provided numerous opportunities for the applicants to present their case.

The Court held that time limits are not to be ignored and will not be extended unless it is proper to do so. Prejudice to the respondent is a material factor but the mere absence of prejudice will not justify an extension. The merits of the proposed appeal are a significant consideration. In this case, the Court found that there was no acceptable explanation for the delay, no error in the reasons for decision of Robertson J, and that the merits of the proposed appeal did not warrant an extension. Therefore, the application for an extension of time was dismissed.

The Court ordered that the application be dismissed and that the second applicant pay the respondent's costs. The costs were to be paid within 14 days of the date of the judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The second applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Of particular importance are:·An acceptable explanation for the delay.·Time limits are not to be ignored and time will not be extended unless it is proper to do so.·Prejudice to the respondent is a material factor but the mere absence of prejudice will not justify an extension.·The merits of the proposed appeal are a significant consideration.The AAT decision The AAT decision and the procedural history which culminated in the decision of 2 August 2011 are set out in full detail by the primary judge at [8]ff. It is sufficient to say that the procedural history shows that, from the time when the matter was reactivated in the Tribunal in 2010, there were numerous directions made by the Tribunal with which the applicants failed to comply and numerous extensions of time were granted by the Tribunal. Ultimately, the proceeding came on for hearing on 31 May 2011 before Senior Member Frost. The critical issue before the Tribunal was the amount of the assessable income derived by the partnership business conducted by Mr and Mrs Caporale in running a service station at Gymea and an investment property at Helensburg. Very little progress was made at the hearing on 31 May 2011 but the Tribunal granted an adjournment to the following day to Ms Rosa Caporale, the applicants’ daughter, who appeared on their behalf, to do some further work on the matter. On 1 June 2011, Mr Caporale gave evidence and was cross-examined. At the end of that day, the Commissioner submitted that given the state of the evidence, the Tribunal should resolve the dispute in the Commissioner’s favour. The primary judge recorded at [28] that, despite the force of this submission the Tribunal considered that in the interests of justice the taxpayers should be granted one further indulgence, The primary judge set out at [28] the relevant portion of the transcript of 1 June in which the Tribunal said that Ms Caporale needed to be able to satisfy the Tribunal that there was an appropriate methodology to establish a satisfactory taxable income figure for the applicants. Senior Member Frost told Ms Caporale to prepare that methodology for the 1996 income tax year only and that no extensions of time would be given and no exceptions made. Directions to give effect to the Tribunal’s requirements were made on 3 June 2011 and called for the methodology (which covered years 1996 to 2000) to be provided by 17 June 2011. A methodology was supplied on 21 June 2011 but the Commissioner indicated a number of concerns about it. Senior Member Frost then made a further direction on 24 June 2011 which provided for an appropriate methodology for 1996 to be supplied by 15 July 2011. Importantly this methodology was confined to 1996 and did not extend to the other tax years. About a week before the date on which the hearing was to resume before the Tribunal, Ms Caporale emailed the Tribunal seeking a six week adjournment. The Tribunal refused the adjournment. On 2 August, when the hearing resumed, Mr Papadopoulos, Solicitor, appeared for the applicants and sought an adjournment. The basis of the adjournment was that Ms Caporale misunderstood that she was required to provide a methodology only for 1996. He submitted that Ms Caporale had brought material with her and she needed two weeks to collate and present it.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

His Honour also rejected a submission that the Tribunal was in error in dismissing the application on the merits under s 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act rather than for procedural non-compliance under s 42A(5).Consideration When the present application was called on for hearing, Ms Caporale sought to appear on behalf of her parents. A difficulty arose in relation to her application for leave to appear for her mother because Mrs Caporale has been made bankrupt by an order of the Federal Magistrates Court. I therefore refused leave for Ms Caporal to appear on behalf of her mother. Despite the ordinary rules governing a right of appearance in the Court, I granted Ms Caporale leave to appear on her father’s behalf (although not without some reservations). Ms Caporale relied on two affidavits sworn by her and one by her father in support of the application. She also relied on an affidavit of an accountant, Mr Cavanagh. The effect of Ms Caporale’s explanation for her delay in filing the present application is that her solicitor, Mr Papadopoulous, was unwell and that when she was present in Court with her counsel, Mr Rollinson, on 17 February 2012 to take the judgment, Mr Rollinson did not advise her as to the time limit for filing a notice of appeal. Although Ms Caporale was not cross-examined on this explanation (some of which was given from the bar table), I do not consider that she has provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay. This is because Ms Caporale has considerable experience in the practice and procedures of litigation, having represented her parents on numerous occasions. In my opinion, she must be taken to have known that there was a time limit applicable to her appeal from Robertson J. But even assuming that Ms Caporale had provided a satisfactory explanation, there are other reasons why I would refuse to exercise my discretion in favour of an extension of time. The principal reason why I would refuse an extension is that, in my opinion, there is no error in the reasons for decision of Robertson J. His Honour dealt comprehensively with the application, applied the correct legal principles and took the most favourable view of the approach to a review of the Tribunal’s findings of fact. Indeed, as is plain from his Honour’s reasons, he considered that the application for the adjournment was supported by no persuasive explanation, that the claim of misunderstanding was vague and lacking in detail. Importantly, his Honour said that he would have made the same findings of fact and would have refused the adjournment on the matters put to the Tribunal. What should also be borne in mind is that the refusal of the adjournment should not be considered in isolation. It came at the end of a long and tortured history. The factual narrative set out by the primary judge demonstrates that the Tribunal went out of its way to provide every possible opportunity to present the case sought to be run by Mr and Mrs Caporale. They were extended far more than a reasonable opportunity to present their case.