Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Limited (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Limited (No 3) [2017] FCA 1079

File numbers: NSD 1307 of 2015
NSD 1308 of 2015
NSD 1459 of 2015
NSD 1472 of 2015
NSD 1473 of 2015
NSD 1462 of 2016
NSD 322 of 2017
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 13 September 2017
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – discovery and interrogatories – whether the Court should order additional categories for discovery of documents – whether leave to administer further interrogatories should be granted  
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 54A

Federal Court Rules 2011, rr 20.17, 21.02, 28.62

Cases cited: Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Limited (No 2) [2017] FCA 1042
Date of hearing: 18, 19 and 24 July 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 87

NSD 1307 and NSD 1308 of 2015:

Counsel for the Applicants: Mr R White
Solicitor for the Applicants: Bannister Law
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr PJ Brereton SC, Mr IJM Ahmed and Ms E Bathurst
Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

NSD 1459 of 2015, NSD 1472 of 2015 and NSD 1473 of 2015:

Counsel for the Applicants: Mr CA Moore SC, Mr ATS Dawson SC, Mr D Roche and Mr A Hochroth
Solicitor for the Applicants: Maurice Blackburn Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr PJ Brereton SC, Mr IJM Ahmed and Ms E Bathurst
Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

NSD 1462 of 2016 and NSD 322 of 2017:

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms NL Sharp and Ms R Withana
Solicitor for the Applicant:  Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr PJ Brereton SC, Mr IJM Ahmed and Ms E Bathurst
Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 1307 of 2015
BETWEEN:

RICHARD CANTOR

Applicant

AND:

AUDI AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED (ACN 077 092 776)

Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 SEPTEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant have leave to administer the following interrogatories to the respondent:

(a)Was the software installed in the engine control unit (ECU) of vehicles equipped with the EA189 diesel engine which effected two different modes of operation, one of which was optimised for NOx and other pollutant emissions and the other of which was optimised for comfort, different as between the Australian affected vehicles and their European equivalents, on the one hand, and vehicles equipped with the EA189 engine sold in the United States, on the other hand?  If so, specify the differences.

(b)State the reasons why the respondent installed in the engine control unit (ECU) of the affected vehicles and their European equivalents, software which effected two different modes of operation, one of which was optimised for NOx and other pollutant emissions, and the other of which was optimised for comfort

such interrogatories to be administered by 15 September 2017 with verified answers to the said interrogatories to be filed and served by 16 October 2017.

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1079
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Limited (No 3) concerns issues of discovery and interrogatories in a series of proceedings related to alleged emissions fraud by Volkswagen, Audi, and Skoda. The applicants, representing various class actions, sought additional categories for discovery of documents and leave to administer further interrogatories. The legal issues before the court were whether the court should order additional categories for discovery of documents and whether leave to administer further interrogatories should be granted.

The court considered the necessity and proportionality of the applicants' requests in light of the extensive discovery already undertaken and the potential for delay and expense. The court noted that the applicants had largely succeeded in their previous discovery applications, securing orders for discovery within an additional 29 categories and leave to administer two further interrogatories. However, the court found that the applicants had failed to substantiate serious allegations of obfuscation by the respondents, which had occupied significant hearing time. The court concluded that the appropriate order for costs was that the costs of the discovery applications heard on 18, 19, and 24 July 2017 should be the applicants' costs in each proceeding.

The court deferred further consideration of certain categories for discovery and interrogatories to later dates, allowing for more comprehensive analysis and the production of relevant documents. The court also ordered the respondents to provide discovery of specific documents by 29 September 2017 and dismissed all other extant applications in respect of discovery not determined or deferred by the orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant have leave to administer the following interrogatories to the respondents:

(a) Was the software installed in the engine control unit (ECU) of vehicles equipped with the EA189 diesel engine which effected two different modes of operation, one of which was optimised for NOx and other pollutant emissions and the other of which was optimised for comfort, different as between the Australian affected vehicles and their European equivalents, on the one hand, and vehicles equipped with the EA189 engine sold in the United States, on the other hand? If so, specify the differences.

(b) State the reasons why the respondents installed in the engine control unit (ECU) of the affected vehicles and their European equivalents, software which effected two different modes of operation, one of which was optimised for NOx and other pollutant emissions, and the other of which was optimised for comfort

such interrogatories to be administered by 15 September 2017 with verified answers to the said interrogatories to be filed and served by 16 October 2017.

2. Further consideration of categories 14 and 20 of the proposed categories for further discovery propounded by the applicant be deferred to the same time as the Court hears the Interlocutory Application filed on 13 July 2017 by the applicant in this proceeding (NSD 322 of 2017) and in proceeding NSD 1462 of 2016.

3. Further consideration of the question whether the applicant should have leave to administer proposed interrogatory 3 be deferred until after production of documents in category 29 of the categories for discovery ordered by Foster J on 4 September 2017 has been completed.

4. The respondents provide discovery of documents in the category more particularly described in the Schedule to these Orders, such discovery to be completed by 29 September 2017 and to be verified, in accordance with Order 11 of the Orders made by Foster J on 13 April 2017, by 29 September 2017.

5. All other extant applications in respect of discovery not determined or deferred by these Orders or the Orders made by Foster J on 4 September 2017 be dismissed.

6. The costs of and incidental to the discovery applications heard by the Court on 18, 19 and 24 July 2017 be the applicant’s costs in the proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

NSD 1307 of 2015

NSD 1308 of 2015

NSD 1459 of 2015

NSD 1472 of 2015

NSD 1473 of 2015

NSD 1462 of 2016

NSD 322 of 2017

SCHEDULE TO THE ORDERS MADE BY FOSTER J ON 13 SEPTEMBER 2017

1. Documents constituting or recording communications between any of the respondents and Robert Bosch GmbH (Bosch), Continental AG (Continental) or IAV GmbH (IAV):

(a) In which Bosch, Continental or IAV referred to the possibility that software in vehicles with the EA189 engine (and/or the engine diesel control unit EDC17) may be a defeat device; and/or

(b) Which refer to an indemnity from any of the respondents in favour of Bosch, Continental or IAV in respect of software in vehicles with the EA189 engine (or the engine diesel control unit EDC17).

Background

Background to the litigation

By these Reasons for Judgment, I determine all remaining issues in dispute between the applicants and the respondents concerning discovery. I will also make some brief remarks concerning the TAR application, which has not yet been heard.BACKGROUND At [1]–[16] of VW No 2, I said:1On 3 September 2015, Volkswagen AG (VW Germany) disclosed at a meeting with representatives of the California Air Resources Board and the US Environmental Protection Agency that emissions software in certain four cylinder diesel engines manufactured by VW Germany and its affiliates in the years 2009–2015 contained a “defeat device” in the form of hidden software which could recognise whether a vehicle was being operated in a test laboratory or on the road. The deployment of this software resulted in the affected diesel engines emitting higher levels of nitrogen oxides (NOx) when the affected vehicles were driven on the road than when tested in the laboratory. 2On or about 7 October 2015, Volkswagen Group Australia Pty Ltd (VW Australia) announced an online tool so that VW and Skoda customers who had purchased vehicles in Australia could check if their vehicles had the affected diesel engines as part of VW Germany’s action plan to respond to “the global emissions issue”. I infer that the “global emissions issue” referred to in that announcement was the capacity of the software in the affected diesel engines to cause those engines to emit lower levels of NOx when being tested in the laboratory than are emitted when the vehicles are driven on the road. 3On 30 October 2015, Bannister Law, as solicitors on the record, commenced two class actions in this Court—Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Ltd (Audi Australia) (NSD 1307 of 2015) and Tolentino v VW Australia (NSD 1308 of 2015)—in which the applicant in each of those proceedings claimed relief in respect of the emissions issue. I shall refer to these two class actions collectively as “the BL class actions”. 4On 20 November 2015, Maurice Blackburn commenced a class action in this Court—Dalton v VW Germany and VW Australia (NSD 1459 of 2015). On 22 November 2015, Maurice Blackburn commenced two further class actions in this Court—Richardson v Audi AG (Audi Germany), Audi Australia and VW Germany (NSD 1472 of 2015) and Roe v Skoda Auto a.s. (Skoda), VW Australia and VW Germany (NSD 1473 of 2015). I shall refer to these three class actions collectively as “the MB class actions”. 5On 1 September 2016, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) commenced a proceeding against VW Germany and VW Australia (NSD 1462 of 2016) in which it sought declaratory relief, pecuniary penalties, corrective advertising and other relief in respect of allegedly false and misleading conduct and representations concerning VW vehicles sold in Australia in the period from 1 January 2011 to 3 October 2015. 6On 8 March 2017, the ACCC commenced a similar proceeding against VW Germany, Audi Germany and Audi Australia in respect of certain Audi vehicles sold in Australia in the period from 1 January 2011 to 3 October 2015 (NSD 322 of 2017). 7A further proceeding brought by Complete Taxi Management Pty Limited and others against VW Australia involving some of the same issues as have been raised in the other proceedings was transferred to this Court by the Supreme Court of Queensland on 7 March 2017. This proceeding is NSD 510 of 2017. 8All of the above proceedings are being case managed together.9The Court has fixed certain issues for a four week hearing commencing on 30 October 2017 (stage 1 trial).10In all of the class actions, the applicants allege that:(a)The software fitted in the diesel engines installed in the affected vehicles is a “defeat device” within the meaning of that expression under the Australian Design Rules applicable to those vehicles and within the meaning of that expression under the Australian Vehicle Emissions Standards; and(b)The affected vehicles failed to comply with the requirements of the Australian Vehicle Emissions Standards, which prohibit the use of “defeat devices” to cause vehicles to operate an emission control system differently in the test environment from the way in which that system functions when operating in normal use on the road. 11The applicants in all of the class actions allege that the respondents engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct and made false and misleading representations in respect of the affected vehicles by representing that those vehicles complied with the applicable Australian Vehicle Emissions Standards when, in truth, they did not comply with those Standards. They also allege that the vehicles were not of acceptable quality and did not comply with applicable safety standards.12The applicants in the MB class actions (MB applicants) also allege that the European and Australian companies named as respondents in those actions engaged in unconscionable conduct, deceit and general law misrepresentation and also failed to comply with an express warranty provided to their customers.13The applicants seek, among other things, compensation on behalf of the owners and interest holders in the affected vehicles for the alleged diminution in value of those vehicles which they contend has been caused by the respondents’ conduct.14The respondents in the class actions deny all of the above allegations on various grounds.15The issues in dispute and questions for the stage 1 trial are set out in Annexure A to Orders of the Court made in each proceeding on 19 July 2017. Those issues and questions are (omitting notes thereto and related sub-issues):1.Do the tests in Annex 11 and Annex 13 to the Standard apply in the present case as part of the full range of applicable requirements under the Standard?2.Which Volkswagen, Audi and Skoda vehicles supplied in Australia contained a device, comprising software in the engine control unit (ECU), and sensors from which the ECU receives signals, which operated in mode 1 and mode 2? 3.Did the Vehicles contain a “defeat device” within the meaning of paragraph 2.16 of UNECE Reg 83 (applied by the Australian Design Rules), and (for NSD 1462 of 2016 only) paragraph 2.16 of Euro 4 and (for NSD 1462 of 2016 and NSD 322 of 2017 only) article 3(10) of Euro 5?4.What is the extent of the difference between the Vehicles operating in mode 1 as opposed to mode 2 in relation to:a. exhaust gas recirculation (EGR) rate/target fresh air mass;b. Injection characteristic;c. Injection pressure;d. Injection timing;e. the emission of oxides of nitrogen (NOx) from the vehicles; f. particulate emissions;g. CO2/fuel economy;h. power and torque;i. vehicle performance; andj the operation of the SCR system.5.Would the Vehicles have passed the NEDC Type I test, in respect of applicable NOx emissions, without the use of mode 1? 6.Did the Vehicles comply with the following provisions of UNECE Reg 83 (sub-paras (a) to (d) (and for NSD 1462 of 2016 only) the following provisions of Euro 4 and (for NSD 1462 of 2016 and NSD 322 of 2017 only) Euro 5 (sub-paras (e) to (k)): a.5.1.2.1 of UNECE Reg 83 (prohibition on use of a defeat device);b.5.3.1.4 of UNECE Reg 83 (whether the Vehicles did not comply with the applicable NOx emissions limits set by ADR 79, except by reason of the use of a defeat device);c.5.1.1 of UNECE Reg 83 (whether the components liable to affect the emissions of pollutants were so designed, constructed and assembled as to enable the Vehicles, in normal use, to comply with the provisions of UNECE Reg 83);d.5.1.2 of UNECE Reg 83 (whether the technical measures taken by the manufacturer were such as to ensure that in conformity with the provisions of UNECE Reg 83, exhaust gas emissions are effectively limited throughout the normal life of the vehicle and under normal conditions of use);e.5.3.1.4 of Annex 1 of Euro 4 (whether the vehicles did not comply with the applicable NOx emissions limits set by Euro 4, except by reason of the use of a defeat device);f.section 5.1.1 of Annex 1 of Euro 4 (prohibition on use of a defeat device and whether the technical measures taken by the manufacturer were such as to ensure that pursuant to the provisions of Euro 4, the tailpipe and evaporative emissions are effectively limited throughout the normal life of the vehicle and under normal conditions of use);g.article 5(2) of Euro 5 (prohibition on use of a defeat device);h.article 1 and Annex 1, table 1 of Euro 5 (whether the Vehicles did not comply with the applicable NOx emissions limits set by Euro 5, except by reason of the use of a defeat device);i.article 4(1) of Euro 5 (whether the manufacturer has demonstrated that all new vehicles sold, registered or put into service in the European Community are type approved in accordance with Euro 5 including having met the emissions limits set out in table 1 of Annex 1 of Euro 5 and the implementing measures referred to in article 4 of Euro 5);j.article 4(2) of Euro 5 (whether the technical measures taken by the manufacturer were such as to ensure that pursuant to the provisions of Euro 5, tailpipe and evaporative emissions are effectively limited through the normal like of the Vehicles under normal conditions of use); andk.article 5(1) of Euro 5 (whether the manufacturer equipped the Vehicles such that that the components likely to affect emissions are designed, constructed and assembled so as to enable the vehicle in normal use to comply with Euro 5 and its implementing measures)?7.Did the vehicles contain a “defeat device equivalent”?In determining the claims of members of the SCR Sub-Group (established by orders of Justice Foster on 19 July 2017 questions 2–7 set out above will involve consideration of the operation of the selective catalytic reduction (SCR) catalytic converter as referred to in particular (iiC)(iv) to paragraph 28 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim. DefinitionsIn this statement of questions for the Stage 1 Trial:a.“Australian design Rules” means:–Vehicle Standard (Australian Design Rule 79/01 – Emissions Control for Light Vehicles) 2005 (ADR 79/01); –Vehicle Standard (Australian Design Rule 79/02 – Emissions Control for Light Vehicles) 2005 (ADR 79/02); –Vehicle Standard (Australian Design Rule 79/03 – Emissions Control for Light Vehicles) 2011 (ADR 79/03); and–(for NSD 1462 of 2016 only) Vehicle Standard (Australian Design Rule 79/04 – Emissions Control for Light Vehicles) 2011 (ADR 79/04) (collectively, ADR 79); b.“UNECE Reg 83” means Regulation No 83 of the UN Economic Commission for Europe;c.“Euro 4” means Annex 1 of the Council Directive 70/200EC as amended by EU Directive 98/69/EC;d.“Euro 5” means EU Regulation 715/2007.e.“the Standard” means: Australian Design Rules or the alternative standard UNECE Reg 83 as it then applied to the approval of the Vehicles.f.“Vehicles” means Audi, Skoda and Volkswagen diesel vehicles fitted with a four cylinder “EA 189” 1.6L or 2.0 engine which are the subject of one or more of Federal Court proceedings Nos. NSD 1307 of 2015, NSD 1308 of 2015, NSD 1459 of 2015, NSD 1472 of 2015, NSD 1473 of 2015, NSD 1462 of 2016 and NSD 322 of 2017;g.“mode 1” means the mode in which the Vehicles operate in the conditions of the NEDC test;h.“mode 2” means the mode in which Vehicles operate when outside certain conditions of the NEDC test. 16.The questions to be determined at the stage 1 trial concern technical engineering matters and the correct interpretation of the various relevant Vehicle Emissions Standards.ALLEGED OBFUSCATION BY THE RESPONDENTS

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

When the matter is next before the Court (on 15 September 2017), I propose to address the ACCC’s TAR application and, if necessary, fix it for hearing. CONCLUSIONS The applicants have had considerable success in relation to the discovery applications that they brought before the Court on 18 July 2017. They secured orders by consent for discovery to be undertaken by the respondents within an additional 29 categories and obtained leave to administer two further interrogatories at this point in time. While it is true that, in large part, the issues remaining after 4 September 2017 which have been the subject of consideration in this judgment were largely decided in favour of the respondents, I think that it would be a wrong approach to determine the question of costs only by taking into account the state of play on and after 1 September 2017. The applicants have failed to make good the serious allegations which they made against the respondents and their lawyers in respect of discovery. Their contentions directed to establishing those allegations occupied some hours of the hearing time. The failure on the part of the applicants to make good these allegations should not be ignored when the question of costs is determined. Taking into account all of the factors to which I have just referred, I have decided that the appropriate order for costs is that the costs of the discovery applications heard by the Court on 18, 19 and 24 July 2017 should be the applicants’ costs in each proceeding. There will otherwise be orders giving effect to these Reasons for Judgment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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