Camidge and Migration Agents Registration Authority (Practice and procedure) - [2025] ARTA 1143

Camidge and Migration Agents Registration Authority (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 1143 (28 July 2025)
Applicant:Charles Camidge
Respondent: Migration Agents Registration Authority
Tribunal Number: 2025/0163

Tribunal:General Member Darian-Smith
Place:Sydney
Date: 28 July 2025

Decision:The Tribunal orders:
(a) under subsection 19(2) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), that the period during which the Applicant may apply to the Tribunal for review of the Reviewable Decision is extended until 15 August 2025.

(b) the Applicant must lodge with the Tribunal and give to the Respondent the Application for Review (in the prescribed form) by close of business on 15 August 2025.

.......................[SGD].................................................
General Member Darian-Smith
Catchwords
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – extension of time – explanation of delay – strength of applicant’s case – whether genuine issues which ought to be litigated - no prejudice to respondent – extension of time granted
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 29
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 11
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) ss 18, 19
Administrative Review Tribunal Rules 2024 r 5(4)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 290, 291, 306, 309
Migration (Migration Agents Code of Conduct) Regulations 2021 ss 13, 14, 15
Cases
Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) FCA 498; 45 FCR 441; 119 ALR 85
Crick and Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd [2016] AATA 313
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344; [1984] FCA 176
Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v Byrnes [1974] 1 NSWLR 27
Re Queensland and Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service (1986) 13 ALD 158; 5 AAR 328
Statement of Reasons

On 1 January 2025, the Applicant (Mr Camidge) filed an application for an extension of time (EOT Application) to seek review of the decision of a delegate of the Respondent (MARA) dated 13 December 2024 (Reviewable Decision).
On 9 January 2025, Mr Camidge informed the Tribunal that under the EOT Application he sought an extension of time until 13 April 2025, as his legal representative was then on holidays.
On 13 February 2025, MARA filed a Notice of Opposing Application for Extension of Time.
The background leading up to the Reviewable Decision is:
(a) Mr Camidge was initially registered as a migration agent on 27 February 2002, thereafter renewing his registration annually up to the registration period expiring on 25 February 2024.
(b) On 31 January 2024, Mr Camidge applied to MARA for renewal of his registration as a migration agent.
(c) On 4 October 2024, Mr Camidge was served with a notice under subsection 309(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) (Subsection 309(1) Notice) informing him that MARA was considering the refusal of his renewal application because it might be satisfied that he was a person who was prohibited from being registered under subsection 290(1) of the Act, as he was not a fit and proper person to provide immigration assistance and/or not a person of integrity.
(d) The Subsection 309(1) Notice outlined alleged conduct of Mr Camidge said to be inconsistent with the honesty and integrity required of a registered migration agent. The conduct involved the alleged provision by Mr Camidge of misleading information to MARA about the status of an Infringement Notice issued by the Tasmanian Property Agents Board (PAB) (in breach of section 15 of the Code of Conduct for Registered Migration Agents (Code)), his alleged failure to act professionally in dealing with Department of Home Affairs staff (in breach of sections 13 and 14 of the Code), and alleged professional misconduct (evidenced by the findings of the Property Agents Tribunal of Tasmania in 2016 as to Mr Camidge’s conduct with the PAB).
(e) On 19 and 20 October 2024, Mr Camidge responded to the Subsection 309(1) Notice, disputing aspects of the factual allegations made against him concerning the PAB.
(f) On 23 December 2024, MARA’s delegate decided to refuse Mr Camidge’s application for registration as a migration agent based on the finding that Mr Camidge was not a person of integrity and was therefore prohibited from registration under the Act.
Mr Camidge’s application for review of the Reviewable Decision is made under section 306 of the Act, and, in accordance with section 18 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act2024 (Cth) and subrule 5(4) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Rules, ought to have been lodged with the Tribunal within 28 days of his receiving notice, on 23 December 2024, of the Reviewable Decision.
The general approach to be adopted by a court or tribunal in considering an application for an extension of time was stated by the NSW Court of Appeal in Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v Byrnes[1], where the Court said: “… where genuine issues ought to be litigated, if such can be done with fairness to all concerned, it is appropriate to take a benign view of applications to extend time.”[2]
[1] [1974] 1 NSWLR 27.
[2] [1974] 1 NSWLR 27, 30.
That benign view towards extension of time applications was cited by the Tribunal in ReQueensland and Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service[3], and represents the general approach to be taken by the Tribunal. Notwithstanding that benign view, the prima facie position is that proceedings will not be entertained if they are instituted out of time, so an applicant must positively satisfy the Tribunal that it is proper for the Tribunal to exercise its discretion to extend time.
[3] (1986) 5 AAR 328, 329.
Decisions of the Federal Court in the context of applications for an extension of time under section 11 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) have been influential in shaping the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s attitude to applications under section 29 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The decision of Wilcox J. in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister of Home Affairs and Environment[4] (Hunter ValleyDevelopments) is the starting point of most Tribunal decisions which have considered applications for an extension of time.
[4] [1984] FCA 176; 3 FCR 344.
The Federal Court’s non-exhaustive statement of the relevant principles in Hunter ValleyDevelopments was usefully summarised by the Tribunal in Crick and Prosegur[5] (Crick) as follows:
“(a) it is the prima facie rule that proceedings commenced outside the prescribed period will not be entertained, and an applicant must show an “acceptable explanation of the delay” and that it is “fair and equitable in the circumstances” to extend time;
(b) a distinction is to be made between an applicant who has “rested on his rights”, allowing the decision maker to believe that the matter was finally concluded, and one who has continued to make the decision-maker aware that he or she contests the finality of the decision;
(c) any prejudice to the respondent caused by the delay is a material factor militating against granting an extension;
(d) the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify an extension; the “unsettling of other people” or of established practices is “likely to prove fatal to the application”;
(e) the merits of the substantial application are properly to be taken into account;
(f) “considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other persons” in a similar position are relevant.”[6]
[5] [2016] AATA 313.
[6] [2016] AATA 313, [11].
The Tribunal in Crick went on to say that these principles were not to be applied “mechanically’.[7] The Tribunal noted that an “acceptable explanation for the delay”, although normally expected to be given, is not an essential precondition to the exercise of the discretion to grant an extension of time.[8] The Tribunal concluded: “All of the circumstances of the case must be considered, the overriding consideration being whether it is reasonable in all of the circumstances to grant the extension.”[9]
[7] [2016] AATA 313, [12].
[8] Citing the Full Federal Court decision in Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) FCA 498; 45 FCR 441.
[9] [2016] AATA 313, [14].
MARA has filed an Outline of Submissions dated 7 May 2025 (Respondent’s Submissions). MARA opposes the EOT Application on the following bases:
“… the applicant’s explanation for the delay is unsatisfactory; there is no proposed substantive application for review in respect of which the merits may be assessed; and there is an alternative avenue of relief available to the applicant in that it is open to the applicant to lodge a fresh application for an extension of time if and when he obtains legal advice.”[10]
[10] Respondent’s Submissions, [5].
The Respondent’s Submissions set out the following points:
(a) the explanation for the delay given by Mr Camidge is unsatisfactory and should weigh heavily against granting an extension of time.[11]
(b) whilst accepting that it suffers no prejudice if time is extended, the absence of prejudice is not itself sufficient justification for the Tribunal to grant an extension of time.[12]
(c) in circumstances where Mr Camidge has not filed his substantive Application for Review, it is difficult to assess the merits of the application for review.[13] and
(d) Mr Camidge is not precluded from lodging a fresh application for an extension of time when he obtains legal assistance, so the Tribunal should not grant an extension under the EOT Application.[14]
[11] Respondent’s Submissions, [19] – [23].
[12] Respondent’s Submissions, [24].
[13] Respondent’s Submissions, [25] – [26].
[14] Respondent’s Submissions, [27].
Mr Camidge has filed a document entitled “Responses to MARA Allegations” dated 30 June 2025 (Applicant’s Response), together with a range of supporting material which includes correspondence between Mr Camidge’s solicitor (Mr Lerino) and the PAB, correspondence between Mr Lerino and MARA, correspondence between Mr Camidge and the Privacy Commissioner, and various character references for Mr Camidge.
The Applicant’s Response disputes that:
(a) there was a proper evidentiary basis for the findings by MARA as to the alleged misconduct on his part involving the matter with the PAB. and
(b) he provided misleading information to MARA in respect of the PAB Infringement Notice.
Whilst the Tribunal is not presently able to form a concluded view on the likely strength of the merits of Mr Camidge’s possible grounds for review, there appears to be at least an arguable case on the merits. It cannot be said that Mr Camidge has no prospects of success on the merits. It is clearly not appropriate for the Tribunal to conduct a merits view in determining the EOT Application. However, the Tribunal is of the view that there is an issue which should be litigated in relation to the dealings between Mr Camidge and the PAB and the extent to which those dealings have been material to the making of the Reviewable Decision.
The Tribunal also considers that the following circumstances of this case are material to its exercise of the discretion as to whether an extension of time to institute the application for review should be granted:
(a) while it remains the case that Mr Camidge has yet to lodge his substantive Application for Review in the prescribed form, he cannot be said to have “rested on his rights”. Mr Camidge gave prompt notice after having been notified of the Reviewable Decision that he disputed the Reviewable Decision, and of his intention to seek additional time to lodge his Application for Review. This is not a case where an applicant allowed the decision-maker to believe the matter was finally concluded [see [9] (b) above].
(b) MARA accepts there is no prejudice to it which has been occasioned by Mr Camidge’s delay in bring his Application for Review. There is no evidence of the “unsettling of other people” or of established practices [see [9](c), (d) above]. and
(c) aspects of the merits of the substantive application for review ought properly to be litigated between the parties.
For the reasons stated, the Tribunal is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances of this case to extend the time for Mr Camidge to make an application for review of the Reviewable Decision until 15 August 2025 (Extended Date).
As there has been an ongoing issue about Mr Camidge not having previously filed and served the required Application for Review documentation, the Tribunal makes an order that the Application for Review must be lodged with the Tribunal and given to the Respondent on or before the Extended Date.
Date of the hearing:             17 July 2025
Representative for the Applicant:            Mr C. Camidge, self-represented Applicant
Solicitor for the Respondent:                   Mr A. Gardner, Mills Oakley