Cameron v Renouf [No 2] - [2009] WASC 84

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS

CITATION: CAMERON -v- RENOUF [No 2] [2009] WASC 84

CORAM: NEWNES J

HEARD: 24 SEPTEMBER 2008

DELIVERED : 6 APRIL 2009

FILE NO/S: CIV 1180 of 1996

BETWEEN: GORDON MAURICE CAMERON
LESLEY RITA CAMERON
Plaintiffs
AND
DIANN VICKI RENOUF
CHRISTOPHER CHARLES RENOUF
Defendants

Catchwords:

Trust - Breach of trust by trustee in failing to transfer land to beneficiary - Beneficiary had use and occupation of land - Beneficiary unable to obtain discounted rate for municipal and water service charges because not registered proprietor - Municipal and water service charges not paid - Entitlement of trustee to be indemnified by beneficiary for outstanding charges and consequential interest and penalties - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Trustee entitled to be indemnified for portion of charges

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiffs: Ms E C Hensler
Defendants: Mr L E James

Solicitors:

Plaintiffs: Mark Cox
Defendants: Kott Gunning

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Cameron v Renouf [2008] WASC 60
Hardoon v Belilios [1901] AC 118
Lord Provost of Edinburgh v Lord Advocate (1879) 4 App Cas 823
United States Surgical Corp v Hospital Products International [1983] 2 NSWLR 157

NEWNES J: The application before me is to determine whether the first‑named defendant (Ms Renouf) is entitled to be indemnified by the plaintiffs (the Camerons) in respect of outstanding municipal rates and water, sewerage and drainage service charges (the rates and charges), and associated interest and penalties, owing in respect of a property in Mullaloo.
I heard the application on 24 September 2008 and the parties were then given leave to file further written submissions in relation to the law on a particular issue that had arisen in argument, namely the availability of concessional charges for municipal and water rates where the occupier is not the registered proprietor of the rated land. Those submissions were subsequently filed.

The background

Before turning to the contentions of the parties in relation to the rates and charges, it is necessary to describe briefly the history of the matter.
In 1996, the Camerons commenced the current action against the defendants (the Renoufs) claiming a declaration that the Camerons were the owners in equity of a property located at 22 Meridian Drive, Mullaloo (the Mullaloo property) and seeking an order that Ms Renouf, who is the Camerons' daughter and who was (and is) the registered proprietor of the Mullaloo property, transfer it to them. The Camerons contended that, on 21 July 1986, in the course of a telephone conversation, the Renoufs represented to them that the Mullaloo property had been purchased by the Renoufs as a gift, that it was the Camerons' property, and that they should move to Perth to live there. At the time, the Camerons were living in Auckland and the Renoufs were living in Sydney.
The Camerons said that the Renoufs repeated, in substance, those statements to them on 4 December 1986 in Sydney.
The Camerons said that they acted on the faith of those representations. With the encouragement and acquiescence of the Renoufs, the Camerons wound up their personal affairs and Mr Cameron wound up his business affairs in Auckland and they migrated to Australia to take up residence in the Mullaloo property. The Camerons said that they took up occupancy of the Mullaloo property in about December 1986 and subsequently made various improvements to it.
The Renoufs denied that they made any representation of the nature alleged and said that the Camerons were otherwise committed to travel to and reside in Perth.
The Camerons' claim went to trial in September 1997. At the trial, counsel for the Renoufs conceded that should the Camerons succeed in establishing the representations and relevant detriment, they would be entitled to the orders they sought.
Ipp J delivered judgment on 3 October 1997. His Honour found that the representations had been made by the Renoufs and that the Camerons were entitled to the Mullaloo property. Having heard from counsel as to the form of orders that should be made, on 22 December 1997 his Honour ordered (so far as relevant) as follows:
1.The property known as 22 Meridian Drive Mullaloo in the State of Western Australia … is vested in fee simple in equity in the Plaintiffs.
2.The Firstnamed Defendant forthwith do all acts and things requisite to cause the property to be registered in the name of the Plaintiffs including but not limited to:
a)signing a transfer in registrable form transferring all of her right title and interest in the Property to the Plaintiffs;
b)causing the duplicate Certificate of Title in respect of the Property to be delivered to the Plaintiffs' solicitors.
3.The parties shall have liberty to apply in relation to the implementation of these orders.
4.There be no order as to costs and that the parties bear their own costs.
It is apparent from the reasons for judgment of Ipp J, and the transcript of the trial, that the issue of which of the parties was liable to pay the rates and charges levied on the property in the event that the Camerons' claim was successful, was not specifically canvassed at the trial. The question of the rates and charges was, however, referred to.
The following exchange occurred in the course of Mr Cameron's cross‑examination:
JAMES MR: Did [Mr Renouf] say to you 'You will have to pay the outgoings, including the insurance and the rates'?---Well, I expected that. If the house was a gift, I would have to do that, wouldn't I?
But did he say to you, 'You'll have to pay the outgoings'?---He asked me for a cheque because he had paid the rates and he asked me for reimbursement, which I did.
Yes?---And as a matter of fact I paid them twice. He was refunded the money and he kept it.
…
Did he say that you would have to pay the outgoings on the house?---There was a natural assumption. If I owned the house it was going to be ‑ ‑ ‑
IPP J: Did he say it? Did he say it or didn't he say it?---He said it, as I said before.
It appears the matter was not pursued further.
The transfer has not occurred because after the trial there was a dispute as to who was liable to pay the amounts owing for the rates and charges (including interest and penalties on the outstanding amounts), in respect of which memorials had been lodged on the title by the relevant authorities.
A stalemate developed and that remained the position for some years. More recently, the Renoufs sought to resolve the impasse and brought an application to have the issue determined under the liberty to apply granted by the trial judge. Mr Cameron argued, unsuccessfully, that the resolution of the matter did not fall within the liberty to apply. It was held that it did: Cameron v Renouf [2008] WASC 60.
The parties have formulated the question which they agree now falls to be determined. That question is as follows:
As between the parties, who is liable to pay outstanding rates, taxes, charges, interest and penalties owed in relation to the property at 22 Meridian Drive Mullaloo and in what amount?
I should say that it was accepted on both sides that, as the registered proprietor, Ms Renouf is liable to the authorities concerned for the outstanding amounts, and that the real matter in contention is the extent (if any) that Ms Renouf is entitled to be indemnified by the Camerons.
It was also not in issue that the Camerons occupied the property from about December 1986 to about October 1987, when Mrs Cameron returned to New Zealand, and that (apart from short intermittent periods) Mr Cameron has continued to occupy it to the present day.
Mr Cameron became entitled to, and was in receipt of, what he describes as 'New Zealand superannuation' upon turning 60 years of age on 17 July 1987. He says it is 'similar to the Australian aged pension'. As from 26 November 1996, Mr Cameron has received an Australian age pension.
Mr Cameron made two payments to the City of Wanneroo (now the City of Joondalup) in respect of municipal rates until, in February 1987, he found the property was still registered in Ms Renouf's name. He made a subsequent payment to avoid the City of Wanneroo taking steps to sell the property. Mr Cameron has not, however, paid any amount in respect of municipal rates since at least 1995, at which time an amount of some $2,290 was already in arrears.
It appears that Mr Cameron has never paid anything (or at least no significant amount) in respect of the water, sewerage and drainage service charges levied by the Water Corporation, although he says he has paid the water usage charges. Mr Cameron says that as the accounts for those service and usage charges were sent by the Water Corporation to Ms Renouf he has to make periodic enquiries of the Water Corporation to ascertain the amount owing in respect of the water usage charges in order to pay them. It is clear, however, that at all times Mr Cameron has been aware that the service charges remained unpaid.
The Renoufs say that in July 2004 they received a demand from the Water Corporation for $25,572.70 and became aware for the first time that the rates and charges had not been paid by Mr Cameron for the period from April 1998 to July 2004.
The present position is that the City of Joondalup and the Water Corporation have each lodged a memorial against the certificate of title in respect of the money owing to them. Until those memorials are removed following payment of the outstanding rates and charges (and the penalties and interest), the transfer of the Mullaloo property to the Camerons pursuant to the judgment cannot take place. I understood from counsel that the total amount of the arrears as at May 2008 was in the order of $60,000. An amount in the order of $42,000 was owed to the Water Corporation and an amount in the order of $18,000 was owed to the City of Joondalup.

Submissions on behalf of the Camerons

Counsel argued that as from the date when the property should have been transferred to the Camerons, Ms Renouf held the property for the Camerons as trustee. If, as trustee, Ms Renouf had paid the rates and charges and associated amounts, and sought to be reimbursed by the Camerons, it would have been necessary for Ms Renouf to establish that the reimbursement sought was just. The same principle is to be applied in the present circumstances; the onus is on Ms Renouf to show that reimbursement is just.
It was also submitted that had Ms Renouf transferred the property to the Camerons in late 1986 or early 1987, as the trial judge found ought to have been done, the present problem would never have arisen. The Camerons, as registered proprietors, would have been entitled to a concessional pensioner rate (the pensioner rate) in respect of the rates and charges from July 1987. Mr Cameron has said on affidavit that he would have paid the rates and charges on time, so none of the interest or penalties would have been incurred.
It was submitted that, alternatively, if Ms Renouf had complied with her obligation as registered proprietor to pay the rates and charges when they fell due, the penalties and interests would not have been incurred.
It was further submitted that Ms Renouf had delayed making this application until 2005 and had therefore not acted diligently.
Counsel for Mr Cameron submitted that in the circumstances it is not just that, as between the parties, the Camerons should be liable to pay all outstanding rates, taxes, charges, interest and penalties. Even if Ms Renouf is not the sole cause of the amount outstanding, she is at least a cause. Therefore, as between the parties:
(a)the Camerons should be liable for water usage charges from 1987, and for the rates and charges from 22 December 1997 [the date final orders were made in the action] at the pensioner rate, less payments already made by Mr Cameron; and
(b)Ms Renouf should be liable for the balance, namely:
(i)the whole of the rates and charges up to 22 December 1997;
(ii)since 22 December 1997, the difference between the amount actually charged and the amount that would be payable had the rates and charges been at the pensioner rate for that period; and
(iii)all interest, penalties and legal charges;
less any amounts paid by the Renoufs.
In other words, Mr Cameron accepts that he is liable to reimburse Ms Renouf for the rates and charges since judgment in the action in 1997, but only at the pensioner rate. He does not accept that he is liable for any greater amount and he does not accept that he is liable for any amount incurred by way of rates and charges prior to judgment. He also does not accept that he is liable for the interest and penalties. He accepts that he is liable for water usage charges.

Submissions on behalf of the Renoufs

It was submitted on behalf of the Renoufs that the title remained in the name of Ms Renouf after judgment in the action only because Mr Cameron had ignored his obligation to pay the rates and charges as they fell due, although he had occupied the premises since December 1986.
Counsel argued that Ms Renouf was not remiss in not paying the rates and charges. Mr Cameron had told Ms Renouf before he went into occupation that he accepted responsibility for the rates and charges. Ms Renouf had no reason to believe that he was not paying them. At the trial, Mr Cameron appeared to accept that he was liable to pay them. There was no indication that the rates and charges would not be paid by the Camerons and that while the property remained registered in Ms Renouf's name, the Camerons would refuse to pay them.
It was submitted that the question of payment of the rates and charges at the pensioner rate was not raised by Mr Cameron until 2008. In any event, under the relevant legislation, an eligible pensioner could claim the pensioner rate if they would have been entitled to the rent from the land had the land been let. Mr Cameron made no such application at any time and, despite his initial expression of willingness to pay the rates and charges, he appears to have refused to pay anything, at the pensioner rate or otherwise, during the whole period between the end of 1986 and 2007, simply on the basis that the title was registered in Ms Renouf's name. It was always open to Mr Cameron to pay to the relevant authorities an amount equal to the pensioner rate and call upon Ms Renouf to pay the balance. Instead, he paid little or nothing.
Although in 1999 there were a number of hearings at which the question of the rates and charges was raised, Mr Cameron did not suggest he was willing to pay at the pensioner rate but maintained that the Renoufs should meet the whole amount. On 27 May 1999, Owen J (as his Honour then was) gave directions that the matter should be pursued by Mr Cameron if he wished to take further the question of who should pay the rates and charges. It was therefore Mr Cameron who failed to take any steps in the matter after 1999 and it was Ms Renouf who finally brought the matter to a head in 2005. It was not until 2004 that Ms Renouf became aware that Mr Cameron had not been attending to payment.
Mr Cameron has had the benefit of the use and occupation of the premises since December 1986. Pursuant to the finding of the trial judge, Ms Renouf has throughout that period held the property as a bare trustee. As trustee, Ms Renouf is entitled to be indemnified by Mr Cameron in respect of liabilities incurred by her by reason of her legal title to the property, being the rates and charges and the associated interest and penalties.

Disposition of the application

The general principle is that a sole beneficiary who is sui juris is personally bound to indemnify a trustee for liabilities properly incurred by the trustee, on the basis that the beneficiary who gets the benefit of the property should bear its burden: Hardoon v Belilios [1901] AC 118, 123 ‑ 125. The scope of the indemnity is sometimes expressed as referring to expenses which were 'reasonably' incurred.
In this case, the liability of Ms Renouf, as trustee, has arisen because Ms Renouf did not transfer the property to the Camerons at about the end of 1986, as the court found she ought to have done. Mr Cameron approached the matter on the basis that, in those circumstances, it was for Ms Renouf to establish that it was just that she be indemnified for the amounts claimed. In argument, counsel for Mr Cameron referred to the 'just allowances' mentioned in Lord Provost of Edinburgh v Lord Advocate (1879) 4 App Cas 823, 839. There Lord Hatherley said that the just allowance permitted to a trustee in default ‘includes everything which the Court might think just and proper’. (See also United States Surgical Corp v Hospital Products International [1983] 2 NSWLR 157, 241 ‑ 243.)
The Renoufs approached the matter on the basis that, as trustee, Ms Renouf was entitled to be indemnified in respect of any liabilities she had properly incurred.
I do not think that for present purposes anything turns on those different formulations. As the matter developed in argument, the substantive issue was whether, or to what extent, the liabilities concerned were simply part of the burden of the property, as opposed to liabilities that had been brought about by the conduct of Ms Renouf or Mr Cameron respectively, for which they must bear the responsibility.
I do not accept Mr Cameron's contention that he is not liable to indemnify Ms Renouf for any of the rates and charges which relate to the period before judgment in the action. Mr Cameron has been in occupation of the property and has had the use of it from about December 1986. He has not paid anything to the Renoufs for his use and occupation. He claimed from the outset to be the beneficial owner of the property and entitled to a transfer of it, a claim which was vindicated by the judgment in 1997. The rates and charges were an incident of the entitlement to the property which he claimed and which he subsequently secured. Indeed, had that transfer of the property been effected in late 1986 or early 1987, as he sought, he would have been directly liable to the relevant authorities for the rates and charges from that time. As Mr Cameron has had the benefit of the property, so he must bear the burden.
That does not, however, answer the question whether Ms Renouf is entitled to be indemnified for the whole amount of the rates and charges, or only for an amount equal to the pensioner rate to which Mr Cameron says he would have been entitled had the property been transferred into the Camerons' name at the outset.
Mr Cameron argues that Ms Renouf is liable for the difference between the ordinary rate and the pensioner rate because her failure to transfer the property into the Camerons' name meant they were unable to claim the pensioner rate.
The Renoufs, on the other hand, do not accept that Mr Cameron was entitled to claim the pensioner rate prior to 1996 (when he came into receipt of an Australian age pension), but say that, if he was, he was entitled to claim it even though he was not registered on the title. It was his failure to claim the pensioner rate that caused Ms Renouf to incur a liability for the rates at the full amount.
It is necessary, then, to consider briefly the entitlement of a person in receipt of a pension to a reduction in the amount payable by way of rates and charges, or as it has been termed, the 'pensioner rate'.
At all relevant times until 1992, the applicable legislation was the Pensioners (Rates Rebates and Deferments) Act 1966 (WA) (the 1966 Act), pursuant to which a 'pensioner' was entitled to obtain a rebate on or deferment of municipal rates and water, drainage and sewerage service charges. Under that Act (as amended by the Acts Amendment (Pensioners Rates Rebates and Deferments) Act 1977 (WA)) a 'pensioner' was defined to mean 'a pensioner as defined under the National Health Act 1953 [(Cth)]'. At the relevant time, a pensioner under the National Health Act was (relevantly) a person who was 'being paid an age pension [or] an invalid pension … under the Social Security Act 1947 (Cth)'.

Relevantly for present purposes, sch 3 to the Social Security Act contained an agreement for reciprocity between Australia and New Zealand in matters relating to social security. The reciprocal agreement applied to certain benefits paid under the relevant legislation in each country.
In his affidavit of 3 September 2008, Mr Cameron said that in March 1987 he was receiving 'a New Zealand benefit' as a result of a workplace injury in 1985 which left him 'permanently disabled for work'. In his affidavit of 24 July 2008 he says that in July 1987, upon turning 60, he became entitled to receive, and did receive, New Zealand superannuation. It was argued on behalf of Mr Cameron that under the reciprocal agreement he was entitled to be paid an invalid pension and then an age pension under the Social Security Act.
On the evidence, however, it is not at all clear that prior to 1996 Mr Cameron was 'being paid' a relevant benefit under the Social Security Act. Mr Cameron implies in his affidavit that the 'New Zealand benefit' he was receiving in 1987 was of the nature of a disability pension but he does not specifically identify the nature of the benefit, or indeed its duration after March 1987. Nor does he identify the New Zealand legislation under which the benefit was paid. On the basis of the affidavit material, it is by no means clear that Mr Cameron was being paid any relevant benefit under the Social Security Act in respect of his disability.
Mr Cameron says that the New Zealand superannuation he commenced receiving when he turned 60 years of age was equivalent to the Australian age pension and therefore by virtue of the reciprocal agreement was a benefit paid under the Social Security Act. I note, however, that article 5 of the reciprocal agreement provides that a person shall not be entitled by virtue of the agreement to the benefits payable by a contracting party unless that person meets the requirements of the social security laws of that contracting party in relation to those benefits. Under Australian law a male was not (and is not) entitled to an Australian age pension until they are 65 years of age.
On the evidence, it seems to me that all that is clearly established is that from 1996 Mr Cameron was paid a benefit (namely the age pension) under the Social Security Act. Beyond that I do not think the evidence is sufficiently clear for any finding to be made at this stage.
I turn then to the question of whether, if Mr Cameron was a pensioner within the meaning of the 1966 Act, he was entitled to the pensioner rate although he was not the registered proprietor of the land.
At the relevant time, s 3(3)(c) of the 1966 Act provided that a person was deemed to be the owner of land (relevantly) if the person was entitled to receive the rent of the land or to receive the rent of the land if the land were let at a rent. Counsel for the Renoufs submitted that those provisions clearly applied to the Camerons, in the light of the decision of Ipp J that the Camerons were at all material times from the end of 1986 beneficially entitled to the land.
In 1992, the 1966 Act was repealed and replaced by the Rates and Charges (Rebates and Deferments) Act 1992 (WA) (the 1992 Act). The 1992 Act did not contain an equivalent provision to s 3(3)(c) of the 1966 Act and counsel for the Renoufs acknowledged that the Camerons were in a much less favourable position under the 1992 Act. It was submitted, however, that under the transitional provisions in the 1992 Act any benefit which existed under the 1966 Act continued, so that had the Camerons obtained the pensioner rate under the 1966 Act they would have continued to be entitled to it under the 1992 Act.
I accept that that is the effect of the transitional provisions in the 1992 Act but I do not accept it is to the point that in 1997 the Camerons were found to have been beneficially entitled to the property since late 1986. While the Camerons' entitlement to the property remained in dispute they were unable to establish that they fell within s 3(3)(c) of the 1966 Act. That was only established by the decision of this court in late 1997, after the 1966 Act had been replaced by the 1992 Act.
It was also Mr Cameron's evidence that he had been informed by the relevant authorities that he was not entitled to the pensioner rate unless he was the registered proprietor of the property. Mr Cameron says that in 1987 he was told by an inspector of the City of Wanneroo that he was entitled to the pensioner rate even if his pension was a New Zealand pension, but he was not entitled to the pensioner rate unless he was the registered proprietor of the land. Mr Cameron also relied upon an affidavit of a former senior rates officer of the City of Wanneroo, Ms Schwidden, who says she advised Mr Cameron that he was not entitled to the pensioner rate unless he was the registered proprietor of the property, although Ms Schwidden does not say when that occurred. It would appear from Ms Schwidden's affidavit that it is likely to have been in or about 1992. Mr Cameron says he was also told by an officer of the Water Corporation that he was not entitled to the pensioner rate unless he was the registered proprietor of the property.
There appears to be no basis upon which Mr Cameron could claim the pensioner rate under the 1992 Act while the property was registered in Ms Renouf's name. In the course of argument reference was made by counsel for the Renoufs to s 29(1)(c) of the 1992 Act. That does not seem to me to be relevant. The section permits the rebate to be claimed by a person who by reason of ill‑health, frailty or other cause is dependant for care on others and who occupies land under the terms of a trust entered into to safeguard the interests of that person. There is nothing to suggest that the section has any application in this case.
In short, on the evidence before me it is not clear whether or not Mr Cameron was entitled to the pensioner rate at any time before 1996, when he commenced to receive an Australian age pension, but it is clear that Mr Cameron was unable to obtain that rate while the property remained in Ms Renouf's name.
I consider that, in the circumstances, Ms Renouf is entitled to be indemnified in respect of the rates and charges incurred from the beginning of 1987, at such rate as Mr Cameron would have been charged had the property been transferred to him by that date. If the relevant authorities would have charged Mr Cameron at the pensioner rate for all or any of that period had he been the registered proprietor, Ms Renouf is liable for the difference between such pensioner rate and the full amount charged for those years. In that connection, I should make it clear that I accept that had he been the registered proprietor Mr Cameron would have applied for the pensioner rate immediately he became entitled to it.
The remaining question is Ms Renouf's entitlement to be indemnified in respect of the interest and penalties on the overdue rates and charges.
Ms Renouf says that there was nothing to prevent Mr Cameron from the outset paying an amount equal to the applicable pensioner rate in reduction of the rates and charges, rather than taking the course he in fact took, which was to pay nothing or next to nothing. Mr Cameron says that he did not do so because if the property was not transferred into his name he would have lost the amount he had paid; he would effectively have made a gift to the Renoufs in reducing the amount of the arrears they owed. He says the uncertainty as to his title to the property was due solely to the (wrongful) denial by the Renoufs that they had made a gift of the property to the Camerons.
In circumstances where the Renoufs had denied the Camerons' title to the property, I do not think it is open to the Renoufs to complain that Mr Cameron did not pay the outgoings on the property while title to it remained in issue.
Since October 1997, however, Mr Cameron has had the benefit of a final judgment of this court that he was entitled to a transfer of the property. Moreover, he accepted in evidence at the trial that he would have to pay the outgoings if, as Ipp J found was the case, the property was his. Nevertheless, following judgment Mr Cameron did not pay any amount in respect of the arrears and has apparently continued to pay nothing in respect of the subsequent rates and charges.
On the other hand, no steps were taken by Ms Renouf to pay the rates and charges and to demand the sum paid from Mr Cameron, nor did Ms Renouf make demand on Mr Cameron to put her in funds to pay them. On the evidence, given the endeavours of the authorities concerned to obtain payment it must have come to Ms Renouf's attention at various times after judgment that the rates and charges were not being paid. It seems that both parties simply refused to deal with the matter, something which does neither much credit. The interest and penalties which have been incurred have, at least to a substantial extent, resulted from that intransigence on both sides. I think each side must bear some responsibility for them.
In the circumstances, upon obtaining judgment in the action in 1997 it was, in my view, incumbent upon Mr Cameron to pay to the Water Corporation and the City of Joondalup, or to tender to Ms Renouf, the amount of the rates and charges levied for each of the preceding years from the beginning of 1987, calculated at such rate as he would have been charged had he been the registered proprietor over that period. It was also incumbent upon him thereafter to pay in respect of the annual rates and charges as they fell due, an amount equal to such pensioner rate as he would have been charged if he was the registered proprietor. He had accepted that he was liable to meet those expenses if the property was found to be his. However, he made no real effort to do so. To the extent that the amount of interest and penalties was increased by his failure to make those payments, he must bear the liability for it.
Otherwise the liability for the interest and penalties must fall to Ms Renouf.
In my view, the just and proper outcome is that Ms Renouf should be indemnified by Mr Cameron:
(a)for any outstanding water usage charges (and any interest and penalties payable on any arrears) from 1 January 1987;
(b)in respect of rates and charges from 1 January 1987 at such pensioner or other rate as Mr Cameron would have been charged had the property been transferred to him at that time; and
(c)for so much of the interest and penalties as would not have been incurred had Mr Cameron paid:
(i)upon the making of orders in the action on 22 December 1997, the amount of the outstanding rates and charges (not including interest and penalties) calculated at the applicable rate for each of the years from 1 January 1987 to judgment; and
(ii)in respect of each subsequent year, the amount payable by way of rates and charges at the applicable rate as they fell due.
I do not know, however, whether the amount of the interest and penalties referred to in par 3 is capable of ready, or any reliable, calculation and I would grant the parties liberty to apply should they encounter any serious difficulties in that regard. The liberty to apply would also extend to any dispute as to whether or not Mr Cameron was entitled to the pensioner rate before he began to receive the Australian age pension in 1996. I would, however, add the observation that this matter has already assumed proportions which appear greatly to outweigh the monetary amount in issue and it would be in the interests of both parties to endeavour to resolve it without incurring further significant legal costs.
I will hear the parties on the terms of the orders necessary to give effect to these reasons and on costs.