Cameron v Queensland Police Service - Weapons Licensing - [2025] QCAT 76

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Cameron v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2025] QCAT 76

PARTIES:

ARCHIE STOCKWELL CAMERON

(applicant)

v

QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE – WEAPONS LICENSING

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

GAR433-23

MATTER TYPE:

General administrative review matters

DELIVERED ON:

3 March 2025

HEARING DATE:

11 February 2025

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Howe

ORDERS:

The decision of Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing made 8 June 2023 revoking Mr Cameron’s weapons licence 26643085 is set aside.

CATCHWORDS:

FIRE, EXPLOSIVES AND FIREARMS – FIREARMS – LICENSING AND REGISTRATION – APPLICATION FOR LICENCE OR PERMIT – where weapons licensing determined the applicant was not a fit and proper person to hold a weapons licence – where the applicant’s weapon licence was revoked – where police relied on a conviction in the Magistrates Court that the Magistrate ordered not be recorded – where s 12(3)(a) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) provided that the conviction could not be relied on for any purpose – where weapons licensing relied on s 12(3A) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) as justification for doing that however – where it was held s 12(3A) did not authorise weapons licensing to do that – where the applicant had recorded convictions for 2 other incidents involving drunkenness – where there had been no further alcoholic misbehaviour for 2 years prior to hearing – where the applicant had possessed a weapons licence since 12 years of age without incident – where in all the circumstances the applicant’s conduct could not be described as anti-social – where the correct and preferable decision was that the revocation of weapons licence be set aside and the applicant had his licence returned

Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (Qld) s 95

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 12(3), s 12(3A)

Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd [2004] FCAFC 183

Grobler v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2023] QCAT 103
Harvey v Minister for Primary Industry and Resources [2024] HCA 1
Nilant v Macchia [2000] FCA 1528
Rose v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1990) 21 FCR 241

XPR v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2025] QCAT 1

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

Self-represented

Respondent:

T Fergusson in-house legal

REASONS FOR DECISION

The applicant, Mr Cameron, held a weapons licence until 2 June 2023 when Queensland Police Service (‘QPS’) revoked the licence on the basis he was no longer a fit and proper person to hold it.
That conclusion was reached subsequent to his plea of guilty to a charge of possession of a dangerous drug at Roma Magistrates Court on 8 February 2023.
The Magistrate held, taking his circumstances and the circumstances of the offence into account, that no conviction should be recorded.
Both the applicant and his brother were before the Court at the time and both were facing the same charge. The learned Magistrate commented when handing down his decision not to record a conviction:
I’ll take into account your plea of guilty, and I’ve reduced the penalty I would’ve otherwise imposed. I take into account total lack of history, and I note there was only a small amount of the drug, and I’ve reduced the penalty I would have otherwise imposed. I’ve also taken into account both of you are young men with no criminal history, and I’ve taken into account the references, which speak highly of you both. You both are contributing members of the community, and that’s a credit to you both, and you are not to be defined by one – as one of your references quoted – idiotic mistake.
The applicant was 19 years of age at the time of that offence.
In Grobler v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2023] QCAT 103 I determined that s 12(3) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (‘PSA’), which provides that unrecorded convictions are not convictions for any purpose, operates to exclude the conviction and circumstances of the conviction from consideration in determining whether a person is a fit and proper person to hold a weapons licence.
That conclusion was also the finding in the later decision of XPR v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2025] QCAT 1.
Mr Fergusson for QPS disagrees. He maintains that the circumstances of the offence leading to such non-recorded conviction may be used by weapons licensing for the purpose of deciding whether a person is fit and proper to hold a weapons licence. He submits that given s 12(3A) PSA entitles QPS to enter such a conviction into police records, and as “Weapons Licensing is part of the QPS”, the information is at an authorised officer’s disposal for the purpose of assessing the person’s fitness for a licence.
Both Grobler and XPR decided that the non-recorded conviction, together with the circumstances of the conviction, are excluded from consideration in determining whether a person is a fit and proper person to hold a weapons licence. The submission that s 12(3A) permits such access and use was not explored in Grobler, nor in XPR.

Section 12(3A)

I turn to consider the matter now. Section 12 PSA provides as relevant:
12 Court to consider whether or not to record conviction
(1) A court may exercise a discretion to record or not record a conviction as provided by this Act.
…
(3)Except as otherwise expressly provided by this or another Act—
(a)a conviction without recording the conviction is taken not to be a conviction for any purpose; and
(b) the conviction must not be entered in any records except—
(i)in the records of the court before which the offender was convicted; and
(ii) in the offender’s criminal history but only for the purposes of subsection (4)(b).
(3A)Despite subsection (3)(b), the conviction may be entered in a record kept by a department, a prosecuting authority or the offender’s legal representative if it is necessary for the legitimate performance of the functions of the department, prosecuting authority or legal representative.
(4)A conviction without the recording of a conviction—
(a) does not stop a court from making any other order that it may make under this or another Act because of the conviction; and
(b) has the same result as if a conviction had been recorded for the purposes of—
(i) appeals against sentence; and
(ii) proceedings for variation or contravention of sentence; and
(iii) proceedings against the offender for a subsequent offence; and
(iv) subsequent proceedings against the offender for the same offence.
Section 12(3A) was introduced by the Justice and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (Qld), s 95. According to the explanatory notes to the introduction of the Bill, the primary objective of the Bill was to make minor or technical amendments to Acts then administered by the Attorney-General and Minister for Justice and Minister Assisting the Premier in Western Queensland. The PSA was only one of many such Acts dealt with by that Act.
In Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd [2004] FCAFC 183 (‘CEO v Adelaide Brighton’) Black CJ said:
Where, as here, a few narrowly focused amendments have been made to parts of a broader legislative scheme, the question that immediately suggests itself is (to use a traditional expression): Was there some ‘mischief’ that the Parliament perceived and that it intended the amendments to remedy?
The explanatory notes explained the purpose of s 12(3A) as follows:
Section 12(3) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 limits where a ‘conviction not recorded’ can be recorded. Clause 95 inserts a new subsection (3A) into section 12 (Court to consider whether or not to record conviction). Section 12(3)(b) of the Act provides that a ‘conviction without recording the conviction’ must not be entered in any records, subject to certain exceptions. Section (3A) provides that despite section 12(3)(b), the conviction may be entered into a record kept by a Department, prosecuting authority or the offender’s legal representative if recording the conviction is necessary for the legitimate performance of their functions. This would include, for example, a notation on a prosecutor’s file about the outcome of prosecution.
Prior to the introduction of s 12(3A), s 12(3)(b) prohibited any record being made of a conviction not recorded other than as noted. That exclusion potentially extended to such things as the person’s legal representative making a note about the outcome following sentencing, or similar note made by the prosecutor at conclusion of proceeding or a note made about the outcome of the proceeding in police records.
This is the mischief the amendment provision sought to address. Section 12(3A) introduced permitted but apparently limited minor record keeping.
Section 12(3A) therefore deals with only a very narrow issue, that is post-conviction archival record keeping. The example given by the explanatory note says as much. The amendment will permit a notation to be made in a prosecutor’s file about the outcome of the prosecution. Without the amendment, that would technically fall foul of the s 12(3)(b) prohibition against any record keeping.
The context whereby s 12(3A) was added to the PSA is not to be ignored. It was but one of a broad tranche of minor and technical amendments of many Acts.
Edelman J described the relevance of context in the modern approach to common law statutory construction in Harvey v Minister for Primary Industry and Resources [2024] HCA 1 as follows:
111. … The modern approach has now been approved and applied many times,^[117] even if its spirit has not always been entirely respected. That modern approach was set out by Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ in CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd.^[118] Referring to information in the reports of law reform bodies and speaking of context "in its widest sense", which includes the identification of external matters such as "the existing state of the law and the mischief which ... the statute was intended to remedy", their Honours said that context is "considered in the first instance, not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise". Their Honours clarified that context is not limited to information contained in extrinsic documents but also includes the application of reasonable expectations concerning any "inconvenience or improbability of result" that could arise on one interpretation of the statutory text which would then be inconsistent with "the legislative intent".[1]
[1][111].
Section 12 in its entirety should be considered to understand the intention of the legislature with respect to the amendment. An interpretation focusing only on the words in s 12(3A) “necessary for the legitimate performance of the functions of the department” absent consideration of context and the wording of the remainder of the provision will not assist in comprehending the true intention of parliament.
The interpretation suggested by weapons licensing sets at nought the protective effect of s 12(3). That seems an entirely unlikely and improbable outcome in the absence of clear and unambiguous language to that effect.
Which leads to the interpretive approach necessary given the admixture of a beneficial provision, s 12(3), and an excepting provision, s 12(3A).
A beneficial or remedial provision gives a benefit to a person thereby remedying some injustice.[2] Section 12(3) is a beneficial provision. It provides beneficial or remedial relief to a person convicted, usually on minor charges, of an offence where a recorded conviction may cause long lasting and inadvertent harm disproportionate to the seriousness of the offence.
[2]Re McComb [1999] 3 VR 485.
In Nilant v Macchia [2000] FCA 1528, a bankruptcy appeal, Weinberg J noted:
40. The orthodox view of the approach to be adopted in relation to the interpretation of remedial legislation is that reflected in the dissenting judgment of Issacs J in Bull v The Attorney-General for New South Wales (1913) 17 CLR 370. His Honour said at 384:
“In the first place, this is a remedial Act, and therefore, if any ambiguity existed, like all such Acts should be construed beneficially … This means, of course, not that the true signification of the provisions should be strained or exceeded, but that it should be construed so as to give the fullest relief which the fair meaning of its language will allow.” (emphasis added)
…
42. A provision such as s 306(1) of the Act should be construed beneficially, and as generously as the language of the section allows. It should certainly not be construed in a narrow or pedantic manner.
A beneficial provision deserves an interpretation which favours the person who is to benefit from the legislation regardless of ambiguity. Whilst s 12(3) is a beneficial provision, the amendment s 12(3A) is not. It is an excepting provision as referred to in Rose v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1990) 21 FCR 241 (‘Rose’) where the Full Court of the Federal Court stated:
13. We were referred in argument to various principles of construction of statutes including the principle that remedial legislation should be construed beneficially. The Act is a remedial provision in that it gives benefits to persons and thereby remedies Parliament's perceptions of injustice. It calls for no narrow or pedantic construction; but, as mentioned earlier, it contains both enabling and excepting provisions which do not therefore necessarily require beneficial interpretation. It depends on the particular statutory provision and an analysis of its language and purpose.
Hence an excepting provision is not given similar liberal treatment and its interpretation should not without clear and express intention to do so destroy the favourable benefit intended to be accorded by the beneficial provision.
In Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd [2004] FCAFC 183 Black CJ after considering the statement in Rose added:
17. Although the Minister’s speech was made after the amendment to the definition of ‘minerals’, his observations may be given some weight in the context of a related series of amendments to the Act with an apparently common goal. They also invite attention to the principle of statutory interpretation that although beneficial legislation (which customs rebate provisions are accepted to be: see Re Santos Resources Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs (Qld) (1988) 18 ALD 11 at 24 and the authorities cited) is generally to be construed broadly in favour of its beneficiaries, excepting provisions within beneficial legislation need not for that reason be given a liberal interpretation (see Rose v Department of Social Security (1990) 21 FCR 241 at 244). As Pearce and Geddes observe in Statutory Interpretation in Australia (5th ed. 2001) at [9.5]:
‘Exceptions may be included in the legislation to provide the practical balance between competing public interests. As such they should be interpreted carefully in order not to destroy that balance.’
In Richardson v ACT Health & Community Care Service [2000] FCA 654 the Federal Court explained why the balancing interpretation is important in determining an appeal concerning a discrimination matter:
23. Before turning to consider whether the views of the Tribunal and of the trial judge were correct, it is as well to direct some comments to the approach that a court should adopt when dealing with legislation such as the Discrimination Act. This type of enactment is concerned with human rights and should be given a construction that furthers its fundamental purpose of eliminating discrimination and advancing equality. No strict construction is required. If the grammatical meaning of the words used does not further the objects of the enactment, then a strict approach to construction must be shunned.
24. As regards the exceptions, however, a different approach is desirable. An expansive interpretation is often likely to circumvent or threaten the underlying object of the legislation. It follows that a strict, and not a liberal, approach is usually required. This will ensure that the overall dominant purpose of the Act is put into effect.
The said learned authors of Statutory Interpretation in Australia in the current 10^th edition of their work[3] referred readers to the annexure to the text where there appear other cases “where exceptions to what was regarded as beneficial legislation were read so as to limit the exception in order to preserve the scope of the beneficial effect of the legislation.”[4]
[3]2024, online edition at 9.7.
[4]Ibid.
Accordingly, in the matter at hand, I reject the interpretation of the s 12(3A) put forward by weapons licensing. A strict approach to its interpretation as an excepting provision to the beneficial provision of s 12(3) is appropriate. That strict approach to interpretation offers nothing more than it entitles a department of the State or a prosecuting authority or the offender’s legal representative to make a note about a conviction post sentencing. It does not entitle weapons licensing to use the conviction or circumstances of conviction for the purpose of determining whether the offender is a fit and proper person to possess a weapons licence. Use like that would stymy the general beneficial purpose of s 12(3) PSA, and the words of the provision would require clear, precise and unambiguous language, and the provision does not have that.
I am informed that XPR v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing is on appeal to the Court of Appeal. There is no indication when that appeal is likely to be heard.
Until the appeal is heard and further guidance is provided by the Court of Appeal, the construction to be given to s 12(3) PSA is that determined in Grobler and XPR.
I therefore exclude as a factor in determining whether Mr Cameron is a person who is fit and proper to hold a weapons licence, the circumstances of and plea of guilty and un-recorded conviction in the matter of Mr Cameron’s drug offence.

Other convictions

QPS do not rely solely on the no recorded conviction offence to maintain Mr Cameron is not a fit and proper person to possess a weapons licence.
There are two incidents. The first concerns a traffic incident on 17 September 2022, some months before the drug charge incident. Mr Cameron held only a provisional licence at the time but was recorded driving with an alcohol level of .036. That was below the general alcohol limit of .05, but if one does not possess an open licence one is not permitted to drive with any amount of alcohol in the blood stream.
As mentioned by the Magistrate, Mr Cameron is a young man. He was 19 years of age at the time of this first offence. He said at hearing that he had travelled to Goondiwindi for the B & S Ball the next day. He went with friends to a hotel the night before. He drank with the friends. He went to sleep. Next day he drove to the showgrounds where the event was to be staged. He was stopped by police at the entrance. He was breathalysed and recorded a blood alcohol limit of .036.
He said he drove the next morning at approximately 11am. He had thought he was entirely clear of alcohol. He owned his own portable breathalyser unit. He had tested himself before driving and recorded a reading of zero percent. That was clearly an incorrect reading, however. On 1 November 2022 he was convicted and fined $300 and disqualified from driving for 3 months. The conviction was recorded.
The other incident relied on by QPS occurred on 8 February 2023. He had been drinking with friends. He left the hotel venue where he had been drinking when it closed at midnight, but then experienced a strong urge to urinate. He tried another hotel but found that was closed too and decided to urinate in a garden bed of the hotel. A police mobile patrol happened to drive by. They flashed their car lights and sounded the siren and Mr Cameron panicked. He ran away, jumping some fences to do so. The police officers followed. He did not run far before he says he realised he was just going to make things worse. He said he stopped and the officers arrested him and took him to the watch house. He was charged with trespass, urinating in public and obstructing police. The police then drove him home to his brother’s house.

On 28 October 2023 he was fined $1,546 and convicted on all three offences.
Mr Cameron tenders a report from a psychologist dated 29 August 2023. The psychologist assessed Mr Cameron on 15 July 2023. The psychologist placed Mr Cameron in a low-risk category for alcohol consumption. The psychologist opines:
My clinical assessment indicates that there are virtually no risks to himself or the community in Mr Cameron possessing a firearm or weapons licence.
…
His psychometric assessment indicates an emotionally stable, compliant and disciplined young man with sound ethical and moral standards.
At hearing, Mr Ferguson said the convictions of 1 November 2022 and 28 October 2023 suggest Mr Cameron may have a problem with alcohol and also anti-social behaviour. That combination makes him not a fit and proper person to hold a weapons licence.
Mr Cameron said at hearing he does not have an alcohol problem. He said he thinks he has matured a great deal since his last episode with drinking and the police charges consequent on his behaviour on the night of 8 February 2023.
Neither of the incidents relied on by police involved a weapon or misuse of a weapon.
Prior to revocation of his licence, Mr Cameron had held a minor’s weapons licence since he was 12 years of age. He is currently 21 years old. A minor’s weapons licence may be held by people aged 11 to 17 inclusive and can be issued for category A, B, C or H weapons.
He said at hearing he had been a competitive clay target shooter, shooting usually once or twice each week. He also travelled with his family to participate in clay target shoots in districts near Roma. He said in those trips away there was no great alcohol consumption by participants. He said that given he was under 18 years of age he didn’t consume any alcohol either at local shoots or on trips away.
Mr Cameron said he had made silly mistakes over the preceding 3 years, however, his conduct around firearms has always been “great” and when he had dealings with police, he has always been respectful and courteous towards them. He is not a violent person.
QPS submits that Mr Cameron is not a fit and proper person to hold a weapons licence. He has an unhealthy attitude to alcohol which is highlighted by the alcohol offences. He is able to stop drinking but after “periods of time he reverts to his old ways”. He exhibits irresponsible and anti-social behaviour.
I am not persuaded that the two separate instances of alcoholic misbehaviour suggest any habit or pattern of alcoholic misbehaviour. Drunkenness in public may well be described as anti-social behaviour, but other than the two occurrences dealt with by the Courts above, there is no evidence to suggest Mr Cameron’s behaviour is appropriately described as anti-social.
Certainly two incidents of drunkenness within a period of just over 3 months is troubling, but the last incident with drunkenness brought to the attention of police occurred 2 years ago and there has been no similar behaviour since. Further, there is no suggestion of misuse of weapons at any time, and he has had quite a long history of weapons possession and use for such a young man. Indeed he might be described as a person well experienced in the handling of firearms.
His referees speak highly of him as did the Magistrate at Roma Magistrates Court.
Taking all matters able to be taken into account, including the public interest, I determine the correct and preferable decision is that the decision to revoke Mr Cameron’s weapons licence be set aside which will mean his licence will be reinstated.