Callil v Commissioner of Police - [2020] QCA 63

[2020] QCA 63

COURT OF APPEAL

MORRISON JA
McMURDO JA
BODDICE J

CA No 224 of 2019
DC No 2677 of 2018

CALLIL, Peter Ronald Applicant

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE Respondent

BRISBANE

MONDAY, 6 APRIL 2020

JUDGMENT

McMURDO JA: On 7 November 2018, the applicant was driving home from work when he was stopped by a police motorcyclist. The policeman said to him that his radar device had recorded the applicant at a speed of 73 kilometres per hour. The speed limit at this place was 60 kilometres per hour. The applicant said to the police officer that he thought he was travelling “a bit over 60, maybe …”, but not at that speed. The police officer said that he would exercise his discretion to reduce the fine, so that it would be for an offence of driving no more than 12 kilometres per hour above the limit. But the applicant disputed that he should be fined at all, and, some months later, he was tried in the Magistrates Court where he was convicted and fined $500.
He appealed his conviction to the District Court, under s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). The case was heard by Judge Ryrie, who delivered a detailed ex tempore judgment dismissing his appeal. Perhaps because the applicant was without legal representation, he did not obtain the printed version of her Honour’s reasons for some months later, which explains his delay in applying for this Court for leave to appeal against that judgment. He filed an application for an extension of time and for leave to appeal under s 118 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld).

His proposed appeal raises only questions of fact. That does not mean that he cannot be granted leave to appeal under s 118, for such an appeal need not involve a question of law, as this Court held in McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612 at 626 [39]. But as was also confirmed in that case, a factual finding may only be reviewed on an appeal to this Court under s 118 if there is no evidence to support it, or it is shown to be unreasonable, in the sense described in Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430 in relation to findings of fact by a jury.

At the applicant’s trial in the Magistrates Court, the prosecution called evidence from the policeman and tendered a disk showing footage taken by the policeman’s body-camera, two still images produced from that footage, two Google Street View images of the relevant place and three documents in the form of certificates as to the accuracy of the radar device. The evidence of the policeman, if accepted, proved the offence.

The applicant gave evidence, disputing that he was travelling at any speed approximating 73 kilometres per hour. He also testified that after he was stopped by the policeman, he suggested, and the policeman agreed, that there be some test of the speedometer of the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Callil v Commissioner of Police

Details

AGLC: Callil v Commissioner of Police [2020] QCA 63
Case: [2020] QCA 63
Decision Date: 6 APRIL 2020

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Callil v Commissioner of Police, the applicant contested a speeding offence conviction in the Magistrates Court and subsequently appealed to the District Court. The District Court dismissed the appeal, and the applicant then sought leave to appeal to the Queensland Court of Appeal. The Court was required to determine whether the District Court's findings were supported by evidence or were unreasonable, and whether the applicant's proposed appeal involved a question of fact or law. The applicant's appeal was limited to questions of fact, but the Court could still consider the appeal if the District Court's findings had no evidentiary basis or were unreasonable. The Court needed to assess whether the evidence presented by the prosecution and the applicant was sufficient to support the District Court's decision and whether the applicant's claim of fabricated evidence had merit.

The Court found that the District Court's decision was supported by the evidence presented at the trial. The police officer's testimony and the body-camera footage were sufficient to establish that the applicant was speeding. The applicant's evidence disputing the speed and his claim of a speedometer test were not convincing enough to overturn the District Court's findings. The Court concluded that there was no arguable basis for the Court to review the District Court's decision on the grounds that it was unreasonable or unsupported by evidence. Consequently, the Court refused the applicant's application for leave to appeal.

The Court granted an extension of time for the applicant to file the application for leave to appeal, setting the deadline as 30 August 2019, the day the application was originally filed. The Court ultimately refused the applicant's application for leave to appeal. This decision upheld the conviction and fine imposed on the applicant by the Magistrates Court.

Orders