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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S57 of 1989 B e t w e e n -
GEORGHITA CALIN (by her Tutor
Constantin Calin)
Applicant
and
THE GREATER UNION ORGANISATION
PTY LIMITED
Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
MASON CJ
TOOHEY J
McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON MONDAY, 6 AUGUST 1990, AT 3.38 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| Calin(3) | 1 | 6/8/90 |
| MR D.F. JACKSON, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear with |
my learned friends, MR B.R. GARLING and
MR R. GAMBI, for the applicant. (instructed by the
Legal Aid Office)
MR D.F. ROFE, QC: If Your Honours please, I appear with my
learned friend, MR B.C. LYNCH, for the respondent.
(instructed by Malcolm Johns & Co)
MASON CJ: Mr Jackson.
| MR JACKSON: | Your Honours, this is a case where essentially |
two bases are advanced for the grant of special
leave. The first is one where, it is submitted, the interests of justice in the particular case
merit the grant of special leave, and I say in thatregard that they merit the grant of special leave,
in a sense, in the end because although the case in
some respects gives rise to important points of law
the issues were not the subject of an applicationfor re-directions or a ground of appeal in the
Court of Appeal.
Your Honours, may I indicate as briefly as may
be the way in which we would put the applicant's
case? Your Honours, the applicant's case was that
she had slipped and fallen in the Rapallo Theatre,in a darkened cinema, after she and her family had bought tickets to enter. That appears summarized,
Your Honours, at page 134 in the application book, and if I could take Your Honours particularly from
about line 14 through on to about line 22 on the
next page.
Now, Your Honours, what appears from that is
that the applicant was thus a contractual entrant
and the duty of care owed to her or standard of
care, perhaps, I should say, was that there was, in
our submission, an implied warranty; that the
premises were as safe for the mutually contemplated
purpose of going to see the film in the auditorium
might make them. Your Honours, that test, if I can as reasonable care and skill on the part of anyone give Your Honours a reference to a recent statement of it is in Morawski v State Rail Authority, (1988) 14 NSWLR 374. Your Honours, it might be convenient if I were to give Your Honours copies of that and some other cases to which I will refer -
there are four sets of them.Your Honours, one sees the statement of the
test at page 381 in the judgment of
Mr Justice Clarke with which Your Honour
Mr Justice McHugh agreed. At page 381 aboutletter F, the quotation from the judgment of
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- Case
- [1990] HCATrans 160
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the lower courts had applied the correct standard of care to the applicant, who was a contractual entrant. Specifically, the applicant argued that the trial judge and the Court of Appeal had applied the general standard of care for negligence, as established in *Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna*, rather than the more stringent implied warranty of safety owed to a contractual entrant. This warranty, derived from cases such as *Maclenan v Segar*, posits that premises must be as safe for the contemplated purpose as reasonable care and skill can make them.
The applicant's submission was that the lower courts erred by not recognising and applying this higher standard of care appropriate for a contractual entrant. While the applicant was acknowledged as a lawful entrant who had paid for her ticket, the way the duty of care was described and applied in the judgments below was, in the applicant's submission, inconsistent with the implied warranty of safety. The applicant sought special leave to appeal on the basis that these points of law, though not formally raised as grounds of appeal in the lower courts, were of sufficient importance to warrant consideration by the High Court.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Ratio Decidendi