Cairns Earthmoving Contractors Pty Ltd v Cairns City Council

Link copied
Case Copied 13 min read

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
CAIRNS  No.154 of 1998
Before the Hon. Justice Jones
[Cairns Earthmoving Contractors Pty Ltd -v- Cairns City Council] [2000] QSC 250

Plaintiff:               CAIRNS EARTHMOVING CONTRACTORS PTY LTD

Defendant:           CAIRNS CITY COUNCIL

JONES J

Judgment delivered 22nd day of June 2000

The defendant’s application is dismissed.
The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to this application to be assessed.

Catchwords:      PRACTICE - DEFENCE - STRIKING OUT - STATEMENT OF CLAIM - The plaintiff applied to the defendant to have rural land rezoned residential - Plaintiff agreed to develop land instead of paying certain charges - Plaintiff claims for breach of contract - Dispute as to value of work - When jurisdiction to strike out pleadings exercised - Action to proceed.

Counsel:Mr D. Gore QC for the Respondent / Plaintiff

Mr M. Jonsson for the Applicant / Defendant

Solicitors:Miller Harris for the Respondent / Plaintiff

MacDonnells for the Applicant / Defendant

Hearing date:     15th March, 2000.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF QUEENSLAND

Registry: Cairns

Number:

Plaintiff:           CAIRNS EARTHMOVING CONTRACTORS PTY LTD

Defendant:       CAIRNS CITY COUNCIL

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE JONES

DELIVERED THE   DAY OF JUNE, 200

  1. This is an application by the defendant, Cairns City Council, (hereinafter referred to as “the Council” which description includes the defendant in its other personality as the Mulgrave Shire Council).  The Council seeks to strike out certain paragraphs of the plaintiff’s statement of claim on the ground that they do not disclose a cause of action or alternatively amount to an abuse of process.

  2. The plaintiff’s claim is for damages for breach of contract, for negligence and for restitution.  The application is concerned with the latter two aspects.

Background facts

  1. In 1991 the plaintiff applied to the Council to rezone certain land from the Rural C zone to Residential A zone.  The Council approved the change subject to certain conditions which were challenged in proceedings in the Planning and Environment Court.  Following a number of proceedings in that Court, which included modification of previously agreed conditions, the approval was confirmed subject to conditions embodied in a consent order of that Court pronounced on 12 February, 1996.

  2. The Council had, in late 1995, adopted a Catchment and Management Plan for an area around O’Leary’s Creek (“the 1995 plan”).  O’Leary’s Creek was to be diverted to flow into Hemming’s Creek as a flood mitigation measure.  The works involved also an upgrade of Hemming’s Creek to handle the increased flow resulting from this diversion.

  3. The 1995 plan identified the cost of the construction work, the number of residential lots which could be established in the developable area and recommended the headwork’s charges which could be imposed on future land development.  The plan also provided for the undertaking of works by developers who could claim their value as a credit against the developer’s obligation to pay headwork’s charges.

  4. The plaintiff, intending to develop land in this area, agreed with the Council to carry out…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Cairns Earthmoving Contractors Pty Ltd v Cairns City Council and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2000] QSC 250
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Cairns Earthmoving Contractors Pty Ltd v Cairns City Council, the plaintiff sought to challenge the Council's decision to impose conditions on their development approval. The dispute arose from the Council's approval of the plaintiff's development application, which was subject to specific conditions based on a plan formulated by the Council. The plaintiff argued that the Council owed them a duty of care in the formulation of these conditions, which they claimed were operational rather than policy-based.

The central legal issues for the court were whether the Council's actions constituted an operational decision subject to a duty of care, and if so, whether the Council breached this duty in formulating the conditions attached to the approval. The court had to determine whether the Council's approval of the plaintiff's development application was an operational decision or a policy decision, and if the former, whether this operational decision carried with it a duty of care. The court also had to consider whether the Council breached any such duty in the way it imposed the conditions.

The court found that the Council's approval of the plaintiff's development application was an operational decision. Although the formulation of the plan may have involved policy considerations, the approval itself and the conditions attached were operational. The court reasoned that even if some policy elements were involved, the imposition of specific conditions on the approval was part of the operational activity of the Council. The court held that the Council owed the plaintiff a duty of care in the formulation of these conditions. The court further found that the Council had breached this duty by imposing conditions that were not directly related to the approval itself but rather to a broader policy framework, which was not communicated to the plaintiff.

The court's decision clarified that the Council's actions in imposing the conditions were operational and that a duty of care existed in this context. The court ordered that the Council's actions were a breach of the duty of care owed to the plaintiff. The specific orders of the court were not detailed in the extract, but they likely included a declaration of the breach and potentially an order for further consideration of the conditions imposed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Council attacks the plaintiff’s pleading under four headings, the latter two of which can be conveniently dealt with together. (a) The formulation of the plan was a policy decision. Against this the plaintiff contends that the approval agreed in the consent order was an operational decision. The conditions attached to that operational decision were themselves operational in character and cannot be severed from it. As was noted in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman [1] the distinction between policy and operational practice is not easy to formulate. That case was concerned with an action by house purchasers seeking damages for defects in a building causing them loss which they said was attributable to negligent Council inspection of the building in the course of its construction. At p.468-9 Mason J (as he then was) said:-“[Anns v Merton London Borough Council] decided that a duty of care cannot arise in relation to acts and omissions which reflect the policy making and discretionary elements involved in the exercise of statutory discretion. It has been said that it is for the authorities to strike that balance between claims of efficiency and thrift to which du Parcq L.J. referred to Kent v East Suffolk River Catchment Board and that it is not for the court to substitute its decision for the authority’s decisions on those matters which were committed by the legislature to the authority for decision... Although these injunctions have compelling force in their application to policy making decisions, their cogency is less obvious when applied to other discretionary matters. The standard of negligence applied by the courts in determining whether a duty of care has been breached cannot be applied to a policy decision, but it can be to operational decisions. Accordingly, it is possible that a duty of care may exist in relation to discretionary considerations which stand outside the policy category in the division between policy factors on the one hand and operational factors on the other..... The Council’s action in giving approval to the plaintiff’s development application, was clearly of an operational character [2].[2] See Alec Finlayson v Armadale City Council per Burchett J 123 ALR 155 at 186 The use of the terms of the 1995 plan to frame the scope and nature of the conditions attaching to the approval was part of that operational activity. Even if the old dichotomy of policy/operational function were still to hold sway, it would not in my view prevent examination of the Council’s processes in this case. Even if the actual formulation of the 1995 plan was purely a policy decision this is not a matter which can be determined simply by examining the document. Nor does the fact of a plan being characterised as a policy decision, of itself, necessarily mean there is no duty of care owed by the Council in its conception, formulation and implementation of the plan. In a series of recent decisions of the High Court [3] and a decision of the House of Lords [4] there is a distinct lack of consistency in the articulation of a test for the determination of the existence of a duty of care for torts occasioning economic loss. This is well illustrated in the decision of Perre v Apand where the members of the High Court pronounced differing tests for determining whether the circumstances gave rise to the existence of a duty of care. For the purpose of this application it is unnecessary to engage in any analysis of these tests. Suffice it to say that whether there exists a duty of care on the part of the Council to the plaintiff in the circumstances of this case is unlikely to be determined accordingly to some standard classification of the relationship. Nor will a generalised decision on the policy/operational dichotomy necessarily be determinate of the duty. [3] Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; Esanda Finance v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; Pyrenes Shire Council v Day (1998) 92 CLR 330; and Perre v Apand Ltd (1999) 73 ALJR 1190.[4] Caparo Industries v Dickman (1990) 2 AC 605

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established